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This thesis aims to provide an analytical framework to which investor-State arbitral 
tribunals can refer in cases where international trade law is invoked. 
The starting point of the present study is the trend in commentary on international trade 
and investment law, which makes the argument that international trade and investment 
law should be reconciled due to the clear "convergence" between (some of) their 
constitutive elements. 
This convergence argument is not misguided: there are similarities between the 
underlying principles of global trade and investment and, as such, a better coordination 
of these principles would be helpful for several reasons. Such reasons include legal 
certainty, reduction of transaction costs, better coherence in the operation of 
international agreements that now combine both trade and investment provisions, to 
name a few. 
However, no matter how reconcilable or converging the two disciplines may be, their 
enforcement mechanisms are structurally different and are likely to remain so even if the 
reforms towards a modernization of the investment dispute settlement (currently 
discussed at the EU policy level) are eventually implemented in the near future. 
In light of this last point, it is possible to claim that integration between trade law and 
investment law will only have limited or even negative effects if the trade and 
investment adjudicators continue to exercise their functions in an isolated manner, 
without taking cognizance of (i) the norms contained in the other discipline and (ii) the 
other adjudicator's scope of authority.  Effective convergence of trade and investment 
entails a two-way process pursuant to which one adjudicator can use (i.e. take into 
account, refer to, apply, interpret and enforce) the law of the other and vice-versa.  The 
thesis envisages one of the two dimensions of this process, namely the use of trade law by 
the investment adjudicator. 
Looking into the details of the convergence argument, the role of investment dispute 
settlement mechanism and the use of trade norms over the past two decades by litigants 
and arbitrators, the present study identifies both the legal techniques and obstacles these 
actors shall apply or go beyond in order to use trade norms in the most appropriate way 
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. CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"In diverse and sometimes contradictory ways, the body of international 
law is rapidly moving in new directions. Whether or not we accept the 
most gloomy prognostications of those who fear material growth, we 
cannot deny that tensions and conflicts are likely to be intensified and 
that international norms and procedures will have to be developed in 
response. We can expect a more uncertain, untidy, more confusing 
international legal system. For the coming generation of international 
lawyers the challenge will be great and the result –we all hope– will be 
more rewarding than ever before." 
O. Schachter 
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
A. THE CLAIM: INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS MUST EMBRACE 
ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
The international investment legal regime is evolving. Like public international law, the 
broader legal system to which it belongs, international investment law is 'moving in new 
directions.' Commentators have observed that one of these directions points towards the 
trade legal regime.1 This bears various consequences, or 'challenges' to use the word of 
O. Schachter, for international investment lawyers.2 This thesis proposes to address the 
most important of these challenges, which is the capacity for investor-State arbitral 
tribunals to engage with international trade norms. 
The present thesis analyses the behavior of investor-State arbitral tribunals in their 
engagement with international trade law and aims to outline the analytical framework, 
which investor-State arbitral tribunals can refer to in cases where international trade law 
is invoked. 
In that sense, the general narrative this research aims to develop can be formulated in 
the following terms. International investment law and international trade law are 
converging. They share the same roots, and interconnections and mutual influence 
between the two disciplines are increasing. Convergence can be considered as positive, as 
it allows one to better address the realities and problems international economic actors 
encounter today. Yet, convergence is also necessarily limited, because of the institutional 
demarcation existing between the trade and investment legal regimes and the diverging 
function of their enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms are structurally different 
                                                 
1 See infra pp.10-25 and references therein. 





and are likely to remain so, even if the reforms towards a modernization of the 
investment dispute settlement are eventually implemented in the near future.3 
In light of this last point, it is possible to claim that integration between trade law and 
investment law will only have limited effects if the trade and investment adjudicators 
continue to exercise their functions in an isolated manner, without taking cognizance of 
(i) the norms contained in the other discipline and (ii) the other adjudicator's scope of 
authority. Effective convergence of trade and investment entails a two-way process, 
pursuant to which one adjudicator can use (i.e. take into account, refer to, apply, interpret 
and enforce) the law of the other and vice-versa. This thesis envisages one of the two 
dimensions of this process, namely the use of trade law by the investment adjudicator. It 
identifies both the legal techniques and obstacles these actors should apply, or overcome, 
in order to use trade norms in the most appropriate way and, more importantly, benefit 
from this use. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Focus on Practice and Dispute-Settlement 
As stated above, this thesis address the ways investor-State tribunals should engage with 
trade law and therefore attempts to provide an analytical framework which these 
tribunals can refer to in cases where international trade law is invoked. This proposition 
necessarily implies a focus on the law of international dispute settlement, and more 
precisely on investor-State arbitration and its actors.  
This choice seemed justified because investment agreements, like trade agreements, can 
be considered as incomplete contracts, and in consequence adjudication is the most 
frequently used form of 'completion'.4 Unless a major reform is undertaken to re-design 
the entire institutional structure of international economic law, the convergence of 
international trade and investment law necessarily implies the participation of 
international trade and investment adjudicative bodies. In other words, if one desires 
convergence between international trade and investment law, one has to demonstrate 
how this convergence might ultimately take place within the courts. Consequently, 
anyone convinced that convergence is happening, or that it should happen, needs to first 
explain the concept to international economic law dispute settlement actors, and, more 
specifically, to international investment arbitration actors. 
The arguments developed in this dissertation are therefore targeted at these actors, i.e. 
arbitrators, parties to procedures and their counsel, as well as observers and 
commentators of the system. In that sense, the thesis aims to introduce (or re-introduce) 
                                                 
3 For a discussion on the attempts to reform the international investment legal regime, see infra p.8 and 
n.22. 
4  For an economic analysis of investment agreements leading to this conclusion, see, A. Van Aaken 
'International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis' (2009) 
12 J. Int'l Eco. L. 507. 




trade law to investment specialists. Anyone interested in an academic discussion and 
examination of the functions of the trade judge as compared to those of investor-State 
arbitral tribunals can benefit from the analytical developments made in Chapter 2. 
Researchers focusing on actual references to international trade law by investor-State 
tribunals should find value in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 are more technical and 
specifically addressed to practitioners with an interest in the way interaction of 
international investment law and other international legal disciplines – and more 
specifically the trade discipline – are regulated, or should be regulated, in arbitral 
proceedings. 
The primary tools used for the research undertaken to build up these arguments have 
been International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and the provisions contained therein 
on dispute settlement, as well as the body of investor-State decisions and awards 
available in the public domain.5 In addition to these treaties and awards, I have also used 
decisions of other international adjudicative bodies, most notably ones issued by WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body, published drafts of future investment agreements and 
academic commentary. These other materials have played an important role in finding 
support for the analysis made while looking at existing international investment rules 
and case law.  
Focusing on these bodies of materials, and especially on case law, presented for me the 
best option to better understand and describe how investor-State tribunals have reacted 
in the past when facing the possibility, or necessity, to refer to international trade law 
and how they should react in the future. In that sense, the thesis both presents an 
objective examination of the work performed by investment tribunals and develops, at 
times, a normative affirmation on how these references to trade law might be undertaken 
without risking any normative conflicts between the disciplines. I have attempted to 
'alert' the reader each time I make such a normative statement. 
I have also used the text of existing investment agreements, as well as model treaties and 
the drafts of future investment agreements, and especially future potential investment 
agreements, such as the ones currently negotiated by the European Union (EU). 6 
                                                 
5 The 'ITA Law' database, created and operated by the University of Victoria, has been the main source for 
finding and accessing awards and other dispute-settlement materials. The 'Investor-State-Law-Guide 
database' ('ISLG'), available upon subscription, has also been extremely useful for locating, within selected 
awards and other dispute-settlement materials, information related to one given topic or subject matter. As 
further explained in Chapter 3, ISLG has allowed me to conduct broad, quantitative research on the 
current use of international trade law by investor-State arbitral tribunals. 
6 The focus on European agreements seemed justified, because the EU can today be seen as one of the most 
active actors in the reformation of the international investment legal regime. Since the Lisbon Treaty, 
investment is part of the EU's common commercial policy and therefore belongs to the competence of the 
EU. The EU approach toward the regulation of investment was first outlined in a communication released 
by the EU Commission 2010. In this communication, and in the various documents published since then, 
the EU Commission has taken the stance that the current international investment legal framework has to 
be reformed. Since then, the EU has negotiated and completed the draft of several international 
agreements (or preferential trade agreements with investment chapters), which are intended to reflect this 





Examining drafts of future investment agreements has been challenging, since many of 
the provisions contained in these drafts, and especially the ones examined in the current 
thesis, have been written and modified, sometimes several times, during the writing 
process of my dissertation. This made the research all the more interesting, as it has 
allowed me to acknowledge potential changes in the field and therefore anticipate, lege 
feranda, how investment tribunals will behave in the future. Nevertheless, a caveat is 
necessary in this respect. These draft agreements are still being discussed and it is 
possible that the final version of the text adopted by the parties to these agreements 
differs from the one discussed in the present work.  
2. Theoretical Stance on the International Investment Legal 
Regime and on International Dispute Settlement 
International Investment Law as a Decentralized Legal System 
Numerous authors have discussed the nature of the international investment legal 
regime, and more specifically of international investment arbitration.7 The goal of the 
present thesis is certainly not to come up with a new way of conceptualizing investment 
arbitration, provided that this is still possible. Arguably, however, any serious forensic 
examination on the behavior of investor-State arbitral tribunals requires a definite 
theoretical stance with regard to the nature of international investment law.  
                                                                                                                                                   
comprehensive European international investment policy' (Jul. 2010), Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, 
Nº COM(2010)343, available at < http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/> (last 
accessed 1 Aug. 2015). For recent studies on the EU investment policy and the way it may influence the 
international investment legal regime in general, see e.g., J. Griebel, 'The New EU Investment Policy 
Approach' in M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 304 ; A. Reinisch 
'The EU on the Investment Path, Quo Vadis Europe-The Future of EU BITs and Other Investment 
Agreements' (2013) 12 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 111 ; J. Chaisse 'Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union 
Policy on Foreign Investment—How will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect The Emerging Global 
Regime?' (2012)  J. Int'l Eco. L. 1. 
7 See e.g., Z. Douglas, who was one of the first authors proposing a theoretical analysis of investment 
arbitration, affirming that investor-State arbitration is a hybrid system. Z. Douglas 'The Hybrid 
Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2003) 74 Brit. YB Int'l L. 151. G. Van Harten and S. Schill 
have pleaded that investment arbitration should be conceptualized as a new form of global administrative 
law. See e.g. G. Van Harten & M. Loughling 'Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law' (2006) 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 121 and S.W. Schill 'Crafting the International Economic 
Order: The Public Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the 
Arbitrator' (2010) 23 Leiden J. Int'l L. 401. E. De Brabandere, for his part, argues that investment 
arbitration is nothing more than an elevated form of public international law. E. De Brabandere, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law: Procedural Aspects and Implications (2014). A. Sykes, in an 
article comparing investment arbitration with trade dispute settlement, offers an economic analysis to the 
mechanism and explains that investment arbitration can be used to lower the cost of capital. A.O. Sykes 
'Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy' (2005) 34 J. 
Legal Stud. 631. In an article that today stands as a masterpiece in the field, A. Roberts attempts to 
summarize all existing conceptions and concludes that investment-arbitration, like the Australian platypus, 
which has a duck's bill, but a beaver body and is warm-blooded like a mammal, but lays eggs like birds, is a 
species of its own and cannot be considered as a sub-category of already existing international legal 
systems. A. Roberts 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System' 
(2013) 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45. 




Amongst the recent publications on the issue, I find the one J. Pauwelyn offered in last 
year's (2014) volume of the ICSID Review particularly compelling, convincing and 
pertinent with regard to the ideas developed in the present dissertation. 8 Pauwelyn 
argues that investment arbitration is a decentralized system, 9  "with self-organizing 
qualities which have emerged through the interaction of its constituent components."10 
He further explains that international investment law has evolved through "small, 
genetic mutations" to address the challenges and criticisms it has faced.11 For Pauwelyn, 
examples of these "minor mutations" include new and more detailed provisions in revised 
version of arbitration rules and recently adopted or renegotiated investment agreements, 
as well as "controversial dissents or reversals of precedents in arbitration awards."12 
According to Pauwelyn, this evolving characteristic fits with the basic features of the 
investment legal regime and, notably, the fact that, unlike other regimes of international 
law, it lacks centralized global control.13 This theoretical stance is interesting, in the 
sense that it insists on the diffused nature of investment law and stresses the possibility, 
and even the necessity, for investment law to be reformed via small tweaks and 
adaptations.14 These two descriptive claims have influenced my understanding of the 
disciplines and inspired several of the arguments developed in the present dissertation. 
Cross-Fertilization and International Judicial ' Interpretative Dialogue'  
In addition to looking at international investment law as a decentralized system, 
developing through various minor changes, I consider cross-fertilization, or judicial 
dialogue between international courts, to be a positive phenomenon. This statement will 
not be examined further in the body of this dissertation and shall be considered as 
axiomatic. The idea is certainly not eccentric. It has been developed at length in the 
                                                 
8 J. Pauwelyn 'At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex Adaptive System, How It 
Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed' (2014) 29 ICSID Rev. 372.  
9  More precisely, Pauwelyn uses the term 'complex adaptive system'. This term is borrowed from 
'complexity theory', a concept used in physics, biology, economics and political science, and employed to 
describe phenomena for which reductionism is inappropriate. Ibid. 382-83. According to Pauwelyn, the 
defining features of international investment law match with the main characteristics usually found in 
complex adaptive systems. Like complex adaptive systems, international investment law "is made up of 
dispersed interactions between many agents, institutions and instruments." Ibid. 384. Further, 
international investment law has emerged through evolution, without major constitutional moments. This 
is feature, labeled as 'organic emergence', is usually found in complex adaptive systems. Third, similarly to 
complex adaptive systems, international investment law lacks a global controller. Finally, a parallel may be 
drawn between the way international investment law continues to evolve while being highly criticized and 
considered as deeply sub-optimal, and the fourth main characteristic of complex adaptive systems: 
"continual adaptation with out-of- equilibrium dynamics". Ibid. 382; 385-86. 
10 Pauwelyn (supra n.8) 375.  
11 Ibid. 380. 
12 Ibid. 381. 
13 Ibid.  





literature and, to some extent, in practice as well.15 The expression 'cross-fertilization' 
refers to the idea that sub-systems of public international law do not stand in isolation 
from each-other and that a given international court or tribunal operating in one of these 
sub-systems may refer to, or rely upon, the law of another. While there are several 
reasons for doing so, it is generally considered that looking at what other international 
courts are doing is an appropriate method of avoiding conflicts in the application of a 
sub-field of international law. Moreover, it enhances the quality of the decisions issued 
by these courts and, in turn, increases their legitimacy.16 This idea has been used as a 
ground for the research performed in the present work. 
II. SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY 
1. The Scope and Delimitation of the Present Study 
The Scope – What Is This Thesis About? 
The present thesis focuses on international investment arbitration, that is, the dispute 
settlement mechanism existing in the great majority of existing international investment 
treaties, which allows a private party (an individual, or a company) to initiate 
proceedings against a sovereign State before an international arbitral tribunal on the 
basis of an alleged breach of international law. Investor-State tribunals (also called 
'investment tribunals' or 'treaty tribunals' in the present dissertation) decide the case by 
applying the international investment treaty used to initiate the proceedings. This thesis 
focuses on the work and behavior of these treaty tribunals. The activity of other arbitral 
tribunals, whose authority is based on other legal instruments (for instance a contract, an 
investment domestic law) has been excluded from the scope of the present research. 
Some investment law-related awards and decisions issued by these other tribunals have 
been used for illustrative purposes. I have attempted to notify the reader whenever such 
references are made. 
The present works does not make a distinction between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. I have looked at awards issued by ICSID tribunals, as well as by arbitral 
tribunals administrated by other arbitral institutions (for instance the PCA or the SCC), 
or constituted upon and applying other arbitral rules (for instance the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules). I do not claim that there are no differences whatsoever between ICSID 
                                                 
15 R. Teitel & R. Howse 'Cross-judging: tribunalization in a fragmented but interconnected global order' 
(2008) 41 NYU J. Int'l L. & Politics 959 ; F. Fontanelli, G. Martinico & P. Carrozza (eds.), Shaping Rule of 
Law Through Dialogue, International and Supranational Experiences (2009) ; E.-U. Petersmann 'Competing 
“Principles of Justice” in Multilevel Commercial, Trade and Investment Adjudication: Need for More 
“Judicial Dialogues” and Legal “Cross-Fertilization”' (2013) 1 Glob. Community YB Int'l L. & Juris. 163 ; 
J.A. Huerta-Goldman, A. Romanetti & F.X. Stirnimann, 'Cross-Fertilization and Reciprocal Opportunities: 
An Overview' in J.A. Huerta-Goldman, A. Romanetti & F.X. Stirnimann (eds.), WTO Litigation, Investment 
Arbitration, and Commercial Arbitration (2013) 1. See also, C. Brown, A Common Law of International 
Adjudication (2007). 
16 See e.g., Teitel & Howse (supra n.15) ; Petersmann (supra n.15). 




and non-ICSID arbitration.17 However, for the purpose of the present thesis, using a 
general demarcation between the two subcategories of investment arbitration and/or 
focusing only on one of them is neither useful nor pertinent. I have always attempted to 
indicate when differences in the law applicable to the tribunals and practice exist, and 
when these differences may have an impact on the ideas developed in this study. In the 
absence of such difference however, I have assumed the work and behavior of ICSID and 
non-ICSID tribunal to be similar. The thesis, therefore, relates to the use of trade law by 
investor-State arbitral tribunals in general. 
The present dissertation has attempted to be current up until August 2015. Considering 
the extremely rapid growth of materials relating to international investment law over 
the last years, it is, however, impossible to guarantee full coverage of all relevant awards 
or decisions, scholarly work, international treaties, or other developments.18 I take full 
responsibility for any omission in that respect. 
Delimitation – What This Thesis Is Not About 
Writing a book about the evolving relationship between international trade law and 
international investment law, in a period when both disciplines are changing rapidly and 
are subject to various heated academic debates, might lead to high expectations. To 
satisfy these expectations in the best possible way, I have decided to trade off 
exhaustiveness for precision in the analysis. As a consequence, many aspects of the 
interrelation between trade and investment and, more generally, several recent questions 
and debates relating to the two disciplines, are not examined in this thesis.  
First of all, this thesis looks at the use of trade law in investment arbitration. It does not 
look at the other side of the relation, namely the use of investment law in trade dispute 
settlement. Authors have attempted to demonstrate that influence between the two 
disciplines should be reciprocal, and that WTO panels and the Appellate Body may find 
guidance by looking at the way investment arbitral tribunals have used international 
law,19 or, more generally, that international trade actors could draw some lessons from 
                                                 
17 Several authors have written about the difference between these two types of investor-State arbitration, 
their pros and cons. See, C.F. Dugan et al., Investor-State Arbitration (2008) 86-91 ; P. Bernardini 'ICSID 
Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration' in D. Arias & M.A. Fernández-Ballesteros (eds.) Liber 
Amicorum Bernardo Cremades (2010) 159-188. 
18 In this respect, I need to acknowledge here that the publication of a monograph on the convergence of 
international trade and investment law is scheduled for November 2015. See J. Kurtz, The WTO and 
International Investment Law (forthcoming, November 2015) 
<http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/international-trade-law/wto-and-international-
investment-law-converging-systems?format=HB> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). Although I have been in 
touch with the author and I am relatively familiar with his work, I have not been able to consult the 
manuscript of this future publication. 
19 M. Footer, 'On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship Between Foreign Investment and 
International Trade' in R. Echandi & P. Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy 





the development of international investment law.20 Nevertheless, reference to investment 
standards by WTO judges seems less likely, as the WTO regime is more elaborate, and 
the case-law more established, than that of investment law. In addition, and more 
technically, WTO judges appear to be less responsive toward non-WTO law, principally 
because of the wording of governing law clauses in the WTO DSU.21 Finally, one might 
reasonably admit that it is simply unrealistic, or overly ambitious to pretend to be able to 
study both aspects of the trade-investment relationship in a single PhD dissertation. 
More generally, the thesis is not to be read as a method for solving the problem of the 
fragmentation of international law (provided that fragmentation is actually a problem 
that needs to be solved), through dialogue between international courts and tribunals.  
As briefly explained above, I consider, in an axiomatic manner, that dialogue between 
international courts is positive. Throughout the present work, I also discuss the need for 
coordination between the international investment and trade adjudicative bodies and 
further argue that cross-fertilization between trade and investment adjudicators may 
foster coherence between the international trade and investment legal regimes. I, 
however, do not attempt to extrapolate from these results that the same applies in 
relations between international investment tribunals and other international courts (for 
instance human rights courts, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court of 
Justice of the European Union), or between international courts in general.  
Finally, this thesis is also not a manifesto in favor of the reform of international 
investment law. I am certainly convinced that international investment law is, like any 
other branch of international law, not picture-perfect. I also accept that investment 
arbitration has shown weaknesses that need to be corrected. Yet, I will not attempt to 
demonstrate that the credibility of investment tribunals will be enhanced if and when 
they refer to other international legal norms. The thesis assumes that this is the case. 
Nonetheless, I am certainly too modest to pretend that I found the key to solving 
investment arbitration's legitimacy crisis. Numerous serious institutions as well as 
respectful authors have worked, and are still working, on this problem.22 The chances of 
finding the solution amongst their suggestions are certainly greater than in the 
following pages. 
                                                 
20 A.M. Johnston & M.J. Trebilcock 'Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights from the Global 
Investment Regime' (2013) 12 World Trade Rev. 621. 
21 See e.g., L. Bartels 'Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings' (2001) 35 J. World Trade 
419.  
22  See i.e., the UNCTAD 2015 'toolbox' propositions, in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015 – 
Reforming International Investment Law Governance (June 2015) pp.164-73 available at: 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). For scholarly 
work on the reform of the current investment legal system, see, J. E. Kalicki & A. Joubin-Bret (eds.), 
Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System - Journeys for the 21st Century (2015) ; J.E. Alvarez et al., 
The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (2011) ; S.R. Franck 'The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions' (2005) 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 ; M. Waibel et al., The Backlash against Investment 
Arbitration : Perceptions and Reality (2010). 




2. Semantic and Terminology 
The way I refer, in the present work, to several key terms and expressions needs to be 
briefly clarified.  
The thesis relates to the 'use' of 'trade' 'norms' in investor-State arbitration. The term 
'use' is understood broadly. I employ it as a generic word that encompasses the various 
'actions' that investor-State tribunals have had to take with trade law, e.g. 'refer to', 'take 
into account', 'apply', 'interpret' or 'enforce'. 
Certainly, these different 'actions' bear different consequences. It is not the same to ask a 
investment tribunal to refer to trade law in order to interpret a given investment law 
standard than to ask the same tribunal to enforce a norm contained in a trade treaty.23 
Several authors have insisted on the distinction between applying a given norm of 
international law and referring to that norm of international law for the purpose of 
interpreting another legal obligation. 24 The ICJ for instance, in the Oil Platform Case, 
accepted to refer to general rules of international law relating to the use of force to 
interpret the treaty the parties to the disputes requested the court to apply.25 The Court 
however refused to apply these general rules; extraneous to the treaty it had to apply, 
because it had no jurisdiction to do so. 26  These different 'actions' and different 
consequences are further explained throughout the course of the thesis. The term 'use' is 
employed however whenever I refer to all of these actions in general. 
The term 'trade law' is also understood broadly and refers to all the existing rules 
contained in international trade agreements and in particular in WTO agreements. In 
that sense, it is often the case that the expressions 'trade law' and 'WTO law' are used as 
equivalent.  
I use also the term 'norm' in a general manner to refer generically to legally binding 
instruments. I do not attach any specific theoretical connotation to the term. The reason 
I decided to employ it is a pragmatic one, as I need an expression that could encompass 
                                                 
23 The discussion between the tribunal and the counsel of one of the parties during the hearings of the 
Canfor & al. v. US dispute is interesting in that respect: elaborating of the opportunity to refer to a trade 
jurisprudence to better capture the sense of an investment rule, one of the arbitrator asks the US' 
representative to confirm that the tribunal is not bound by trade law.  The representative agrees but notes 
that the tribunal can nevertheless take into account the ruling of the trade adjudicator if this is somehow 
relevant in the dispute at hands. See Canfor Corporation v. United States of America; Tembec et al. v. United 
States of America; Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (Transcript of 
Hearing - Day Two, 12 Jan. 2006) pp.188-189. 
24 J.P. Trachtman 'The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution' (1999) 40 Harvard Int'l L. J. 333, 342 ; J.P. 
Trachtman 'Book Review' (2004) 98 Am. Rev. Int'l L. 855 (reviewing J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of international Law (2003)) 858. See also, A. 
Gourgourinis 'The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in International 
Adjudication' (2011) 2 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 31, 
25 See, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), ICJ Report 90 (Judgment, 12 Dec. 1996) ¶¶39-41.  
26 Ibid. In Total v. Argentina, an ICSID Tribunal reached a similar conclusion when request to look at 
WTO law to interpret an investment obligation contained in the France-Argentina BIT. See, Total S.A. v. 





all types of 'rules' –whether it is a treaty, or a specific obligation within the treaty, or a 
principle affirmed by a court of law– which can be referred to by one international 
adjudicator when dealing with a given dispute. 
III. THE STARTING POINT: THE CLAIM FOR CONVERGENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 
The narrative of this work draws upon the claim pursuant to which international trade 
and investment law are converging towards each other.27 This claim is not my own, and 
it has been developed in scholarship over the last decade. 28  In the following 
developments, I briefly schematize the basis of this convergence argument. I do not 
attempt, here, to develop this argument any further. I simply observe that there are 
reasons to believe this argument is far from being misguided (A), and that convergence 
might have some positive aspects (B). I explain, however, why convergence remains 
                                                 
27 This section was originally planned to be a chapter of its own. For time and space constraints, as well as 
for the sake of clarity, I have shortened it and included it in the introduction of this thesis. I do not exclude 
the possibility of extending it again, nor that of updating it in order to take into account the above-
mentioned future publication of the main advocate of the convergence's argument, and consequently 
relocating this section to the main body of this work, should I persevere with an attempt to publish it as 
monograph. 
28 For a discussion on the merits of the convergence argument and on the relation between trade and 
investment more generally see e.g., R. Adlung & M. Molinuevo 'Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There 
Fire behind the (BIT-)Smoke?' (2008) 11 J. Int'l Eco. L. 365 ; A.K. Bjorklund 'Convergence or 
Complementarity' (2013) 12 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 65 ; T. Broude, 'Investment and Trade: The "Lottie and 
Lisa" of International Economic Law?' in R. Echandi & P. Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International Investment 
Law and Policy (2013) 139 ; T. Broude 'Toward an Economic Approach to the Consolidation of 
International Trade Regulation and International Investment Law' (2013) 9 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Studies 24 
; S. Cho & J. Kurtz 'Converging Divergences: A Common Law of International Trade and Investment' 
(2014)  Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper ; N. DiMascio & J. Pauwelyn 'Nondiscrimination in 
Trade and Investment Treaties: World Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin? ' (2008) 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 
48 ; Footer (supra n.19) ; R. Howse & E. Chalamish 'The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State 
Arbitration: A Reply to Jürgen Kurtz' (2009) 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1087 ; Huerta-Goldman et al. (supra n.15) ; 
J. Kurtz 'The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents' 
(2009) 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 749 ; J. Kurtz 'Charting the Future of the Twin Pillars of International Economic 
Law' (2013) 9 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Studies 36 ; J. Kurtz, 'On the evolution and slow convergence of 
international trade and investment law' in G. Sacerdoti et al. (eds.), General Interests of Host States in 
International Investment Law (2014) 104 ; D. McRae 'The World Trade Organization and International 
Investment Law: Converging Systems—Can the Case for Convergence be Made?' (2013) 9 Jerusalem Rev. 
Legal Studies 13 ; G. Sacerdoti 'Trade and Investment Law: Institutional Differences and Substantive 
Similarities' (2013) 9 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Studies 1 ; Sykes (supra n.7) ; F. Weiss, 'Trade and Investment' in 
P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino & C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) 
183 ; M. Wu, 'The Scope and Limits of Trade's Influence in Shaping the Evolving International 
Investment Regime' in Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn & J.E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law (2014) 169 ; A.R. Ziegler, 'Investment Law in Conflict with WTO Law' in M. Bungenberg 
et al. (eds.), International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 1784. See also, the various contributions in the 
TDM 2011 special issue on "Intersections: Dissemblance or Convergence between International Trade 
and Investment Law" available upon subscription at <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/journal-categories-articles.asp?cat=15> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 




limited, and why it seems, today, premature to claim that investment and trade could be 
'consolidated' (C).29 
A. THE MERITS OF THE CONVERGENCE ARGUMENT 
The various works in which the convergence claim is developed follow the same general 
storyline. They look, first, at the history of the two disciplines and note that trade and 
investment law share a common origin (1). Looking then at today's international trade 
and investment legal frameworks, they argue that numerous and increasing inter-
connections continue to exist between the two disciplines, and it is therefore possible to 
claim that trade and investment are converging, despite their institutional differences 
and separation (2).  
1. Once Upon a Time, there were Two Sisters…: A Brief 
Historical Background 
In a recent contribution, T. Broude draws an entertaining parallel between international 
trade law and international investment law on the one side, and 'Lottie' and 'Lisa', the 
two main characters of a children’s novel published in the late forties, on the other.30 
Like Lottie and Lisa, two twin sisters who are separated at birth, because of their 
parents' divorce, but who meet again by chance at a summer camp and eventually 
manage to reunite their family, trade and investment law share the same origin, have 
been bifurcated for circumstantial reasons, and now converge back towards each-other.31  
Broude is not the only one raising an argument on the basis of the 'same origin' of trade 
and investment law. Several authors have indeed explained that rules for the regulation 
of foreign investment and trade were once blended in single instruments.32 The main 
example of these instruments were Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
treaties, concluded during the post-Industrial Revolution era, which allowed Western 
powers to promote and protect investment and trade. These FNC treaties, often 
presented as the ancestors of today's Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 33  were 
comprehensive and broad agreements covering a whole range of disciplines, including 
                                                 
29 The term 'consolidated' is used by Broude, who argues that "from a policy perspective, it seems difficult 
to justify such a continued bifurcation."  See, Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28) 165. 
30 Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28) 130-40, citing E. Kästner, Das Doppelte Lottchen: Ein 
Roman für Kinder (1949). 
31 Broude concludes his piece as follows: "The regulation of trade and investment has been separated for 
historical and political reasons. These causes are no longer relevant, either to economic theory or 
contemporary international economics. It makes little sense to continue the separation of trade and 
investment today, anymore than Lisa and Lottie should have grown up apart." Ibid. 155. 
32 Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28); Footer (supra n.19); Cho & Kurtz (supra n.28). See also, for 
a broad overview of trade and investment law history, M. Herdegen, Principles of International Economic 
Law (2013) 13-15. 
33 See e.g., W. Alschner 'Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law' (2013) 5 Goettingen J. Int'l L. 455; K.J. 
Vandevelde 'A brief history of international investment agreements' (2005) 12 UC Davis J. Int'l L. & Policy 





investment and trade, as well as navigation, intellectual property, and even sometimes 
human rights.34 Without entering into the complexities of these agreements, it is worth 
noting that the common practice at that time was to include in these agreements both 
investment protection rights (including non-discrimination, security and due process), 
which private parties could enforce using diplomatic protection, as well as trade 
provisions, similar to those which would later be found in bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements.35 The following extract from the Permanent Court of International Justice's 
(PCIJ) judgment in the Oscar Chin case sheds light on this practice with respect to 
investment and trade disciplines: 
"Freedom of trade, as established by the Convention, consists in the right –in 
principle unrestricted– to engage in any commercial activity, whether it be 
concerned with trading properly so-called, that is the purchase and sale of goods or 
whether it be concerned with industry, and in particular the transport business; or, 
finally, whether it is carried on inside the country or, by the exchange of imports 
and exports, with other countries."36 
According to the authors who look at the FCN treaties as evidence of a common past 
between the trade and investment discipline, having single instruments made sense, 
because the need for international regulation of investment and trade is based on the 
same justification, that is, the efficient international allocation of resources.37 Broude 
notes, for instance, that:  
"Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' and David Ricardo's comparative advantage are not 
only theories of international trade – the international mobility of goods (and 
services) – but also theories of investment, because they may concomitantly be 
understood as explanations of investor responsiveness to market returns from 
manufacturing activities (i.e., the decision to invest in production of cloth or wine). 
The goals of trade law, and investment law, with all their nuances, are strikingly 
similar, ultimately concerned with the facilitation of economic efficiency through 
international economic activity."38 
                                                 
34 In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ had to interpret the broad notion of "freedom of commerce and 
navigation" and more generally construe the scope of the FCN treaty between the US and Iran. The Court 
affirmed that the FNC treaty "cover[ed] a vast range of matters ancillary to trade or commerce, such as 
shipping, transit of goods and persons, the right to establish and operate business, protection from 
molestation, freedom of communication, acquisition and tenure of property […]". See, Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment (6 Nov. 2003), ICJ Reports 2003, 361, at 
¶¶40-46. See also, on the scope of FNC treaties, J.F. Coyle 'Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation in the Modern Era' (2012) 51 Columbia J. Transn'l L. 302, 311-16. 
35 These treaties would provide, for instance, for custom duties and tariff provisions for goods imported 
from a treaty partner as well as National Treatment (NT) and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment 
provisions. Interestingly, the language of these provisions mirrors the one found in today's free trade 
agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Ibid. 312-13.  
36 The Oscar Chinn Case (Britain v. Belgium) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 63 (Judgment, 12 Dec. 1934) 64, at 84.  
37 Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28) 141-42; Footer (supra n.19) 108; Kurtz–On the evolution 
(supra n.28) 36-38; Cho & Kurtz (supra n.28), 13. 
38 Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28) 141-42. 




Moving to the post Second World War period, Footer explains that the drafters of the 
preparatory works on a founding Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) 
were aware of the common history and necessary inter-connections between trade and 
investment law.39 As a result, Footer explains, the ITO's Havana Charter addressed both 
the regulation of trade and investment law (liberalization and protection).40 For reasons 
that are known to everyone, the ITO, however, did not see the light of day and ever 
since, trade and investment legal regimes have been institutionally separated. While the 
adoption of the GATT in 1947 paved the way for the creation of a centralized 
multilateral forum from which the WTO would emerge, the international investment 
legal regime took the form of a multitude of bilateral and regional agreements.41 
2. " Avec des ' si' , on mettrait Paris en bouteille": Today's 
Dynamics of the Connections Between Trade and Investment 
Disciplines  
The French adage referred to above,42 illustrates the limits of an abusive use of the 
conditional. Broude might be right when he makes the following prediction:  
"Had the need (or opportunity) emerged today to draw an international system of 
international economic law from scratch, it is unlikely that trade and investment 
would have been treated so separately."43 
But he might equally be wrong, and no one can prove this point. Arguably though, this 
demonstration is not necessary to understand the convergence argument and its merits. 
Interconnections do exist between international trade and investment. Proponents of the 
convergence argument have argued that these interconnections are more than simple 
points of similarity and should rather be regarded as mutual influence patterns or 
convergence factors. 
The Same Conceptual Narrative 
In a recent paper, S. Cho and J. Kurtz argue that international trade and investment law 
have a "common jurisprudential ontogenesis."44 With the use of this expression, they 
mean that the way trade and investment law have evolved over time, and more 
specifically in the last decades, can be conceptualized in a similar manner. Cho and Kurtz 
                                                 
39 Footer (supra n.19) 108, citing Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Doc. E/PCT/1986 (Geneva 1947). 
40 Ibid. 
41 For an overview of the failed attempts to conclude an investment multilateral agreement, see e.g. C. 
Brown 'The Evolution of the Regime of International Investment Agreements: History Economics and 
Politics' in M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 153; Vandevelde 
(supra n.33). 
42 This adage would translate literally as "using 'if', one could put the whole city of Paris within a bottle." 
An English equivalent would be "if pigs could fly…". See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying_pig> 
(last consulted 1 Aug. 2015).  
43 Broude 'Investment and Trade…' (supra n.28), 140. 





acknowledge that "different historical paths bestowed the two systems with different 
institutional apparatus in the postwar era."45 Yet, they explain that the two disciplines 
followed the same conceptual narrative since their institutional separation. According to 
them, while the same pro-market, anti-protectionist bias influenced the development of 
the two disciplines during in following decades after World War II, both trade and 
investment legal regimes have since then been, or are still, subject to a 'rebalancing' to 
better safeguard the public interest of States through a process of 'maturation'.46 For Cho 
and Kurtz, the creation of the WTO at the end of the Uruguay round operated as a 
'paradigm shift'. The multilateral trade system appears, today, more "integrated, more 
viable and durable".47 For the two authors, this new conceptualization has implicitly 
influenced the work of WTO judges, who now take the reconciliation between trade and 
non-trade values more seriously. 48  Cho and Kurtz argue that the international 
investment legal system is now being subjected to the same paradigm shift, which is 
manifested in today's investment case law and in the drafting of new IIAs, which are 
both "increasingly accommodative of public interest."49 
Cho and Kurtz's reasoning, which is based on a broad and theoretical observation of the 
two disciplines' recent history, is rather inductive. It cannot be falsified and therefore 
hardly qualifies as 'scientific'. Yet, it presents some interesting points in the way it 
highlights the fact that a parallel can be drawn between the way actors and 
commentators of the two disciplines conceive their fields and deal with their evolution. 
The example they give, on the use of the notions of 'proportionality' and 'margin of 
appreciation' in the case-law and by commentators of both disciplines to show the 
cultural shift happening in these disciplines, is particularly interesting.50  
The Same (or at least, Complementary) Underlying Economic Rationale  
Still, in a rather theoretical way, several authors have attempted to demonstrate that 
investment and trade law share the same underlying economic rationale. According to 
Broude, for instance, both systems share a 'common purpose', which is "the fundamental 
promise to extend and safeguard competitive opportunities to foreign traders and 
investors."51 Kurtz makes a similar claim.52 Both Broude and Kurtz agree that, like all 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 13. 
46 Ibid. 17-20. 
47 Ibid. 19.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 24.  
50 Ibid. 23, citing A. Stone-Sweet & J. Mathews 'Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism' 
(2008) 47 Columbia J. Transn'l L. 72. 
51 Broude 'Towards an Economic Approach…' (supra n.28) 28. See also, R.P. Alford 'The Convergence of 
International Trade and Investment Arbitration' (2013) 12 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 35, 37. Alford argues that 
the international trade and investment legal regimes "promote similar objectives—globalization, economic 
integration, trade promotion, and investment protection." 




branches of international law, the trade and investment disciplines serve various aims 
and purposes.53 They accept that this common goal is not the only one achieved by each 
regime, but consider that it nevertheless remains "significant and important from an 
economic perspective." 54  Sacerdoti, in a similar manner, posits that "international 
regulation in both areas is inspired by the same approach in favor of liberalization and 
nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign actors of cross-border business activity, 
while preserving the competence of importing or host States to regulate the economy 
and safeguard paramount general interest."55  
The rather broad formulation these authors have used when identifying the 'common 
purpose' of trade and investment is certainly intentional. The assertion that trade and 
investment share the same economic DNA is controversial and has been debated. A. 
Sykes, for instance, convincingly demonstrated that important differences could be 
identified between the political economy of some of the main constitutive elements of 
investment and trade dispute settlement mechanisms. 56  Similarly, DiMascio and 
Pauwelyn suggest that the investment and trade legal regimes have focused on different 
objectives.57 They accept that these objectives might be considered as 'complementary', 
but in their view, trade "is about overall welfare, efficiency, liberalization, state-to-state 
exchanges of market access, and trade opportunities–not individual rights",58 whereas 
investment "is about protection, not liberalization, and about individual rights, not state-
to-state exchanges of market opportunities."59  
Commenting on Pauwelyn and DiMascio's arguments, McRae argues that the 
individual–right oriented image that IIAs may convey is evoked due to investor-State 
dispute settlement, which clearly appears as a tool to protect individual rights. He 
explains, nonetheless, that investor-State dispute settlement is only a component of the 
investment law regime, and international investment law cannot be reduced to this 
component. For him, IIAs deal fundamentally with political and economic issues and, in a 
                                                                                                                                                   
52 Kurtz, 'Converging Systems…' (supra n.17) cited in Broude 'Towards an Economic Approach…' (supra 
28) 28. 
53 See e.g., Y. Shany 'Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach' (2012) 
106 Am. J. Int'l L. 225. In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal acknowledged the diversity of goals the 
investment legal regime could promote when it noted that "the protection of foreign investment is not the 
sole aim of the treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign 
investment and intensifying the parties' economic relations." See, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (17 March 2006) ¶300. 
54 Broude 'Towards an Economic Approach…' (supra 28) 28.  
55 Sacerdoti (supra n.28) 11. 
56 Sykes (supra n.7). See also, J. Trachtman, 'FDI and the Right to Regulate: Lessons from Trade Law 
(2003) in UNCTAD, The Development Dimensions of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives, UN Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IA2003/4, available at <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf> (last consulted 
1 Aug. 2015) 189.  
57 DiMascio & Pauwelyn (supra n.28) 53-58. 
58 Ibid. 14. 





way, the substantive provisions they offer may be analyzed as provisions designed to 
preserve competitive opportunities.60 
To this day, the shared economy–DNA debate seems to remain open. To provide a 
definitive answer to this debate would certainly require a verification of whether the 
economic rationales of all the specific rules and components of both systems are 
compatible, and more generally, a broad study of the economic rationales for government 
incentives to foreign investment. This would lead us into economic theory of cross-
boundary contracting and of multinational firms, which R. Howse, M. Trebilcock and A. 
Eliason have excellently summarized in the chapter of their manual on the 'Regulation of 
International Trade' dedicated to 'Trade and Investment'. 61 However interesting this 
exercise would be, it does not fit within the scope of the present thesis. Facing this lack 
of a definite answer, we should accept that trade and investment law may share the same, 
or a very similar, general underlying economic rationale. This is especially true if this 
economic rationale is broadly formulated. It is possible, however, that the political 
economy of some of the components of the regimes differs. It is even possible that the 
two regimes differ significantly. Yet, even if and when they do so, they are hardly 
described as un-complementary.62 
Structural Interlinkage Between Foreign Investment Activities and Trade Flows 
More pragmatically, scholars, as well as specialized institutions, have produced several 
empirical studies on the correlation between foreign investment and trade flows. The 
following affirmation seems to emerge from these studies: Foreign trade and foreign 
investment are interdependent and sometimes complementary economic activities. In one 
of its first reports published on the directions to be given to the new EU investment 
policy, the European Commission explained that "[a]round half of world trade today 
takes place between affiliates of multinational enterprises, which trade intermediate 
goods and services."63 The WTO Working Group on the relationship between trade and 
investment tends to agree with this conclusion as well. 64  For the Working Group, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is often used to minimize the overall production costs of 
                                                 
60 McRae (supra n.28), 15. 
61 M.J. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (4th ed., 2013) 566-604. 
62 For landmark economic studies on these arguments, see J.N. Bhagwati, R.A. Brecher & E. Dinopoulos 
'Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment and Welfare' (1987) 27 Journal of Development Economics 127 and 
B.H. Baltagi, P. Egger & M. Pfaffermayr 'Estimating Regional Trade Agreement Effects on FDI in an 
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Den Broek, 'Protection of Investors in International Trade and Investment Regimes: A Practical 
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Arbitration, and Commercial Arbitration (2013) 14. 
63 European Commission 'Towards a Comprehensive European International Policy' (July 2010) 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions – COM(2010) 343, 3. 
64 WTO (Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment) 'The Relationship Between 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment' (1997), WT/WGTI/W/7, ¶4. 




a given economic actor.65 In that case, FDI is 'trade-creating', because it subdivides the 
production process in different stages between countries, and because this necessarily 
implies trade exchanges between the different production units. Scholars who have 
examined the issue have reached similar results. Footer, for instance, argues that 
investment may have a discernible effect on patterns of trade in terms of exports of final 
goods, as well as parts and components.66 Similarly, Kurtz affirms that "trade and foreign 
investment are increasingly inter-dependent." 67 To illustrate his claim, he notes that 
"non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping duties constitute equally significant obstacles 
to export and thereby naturally favor FDI."68 
Investment activities may trigger trade flows. The opposite may also be true. In a recent 
work criticizing the convergence argument, M. Wu nevertheless admits that trade 
exchange might influence investment treaty formation,69 which in turn may result in 
more investment. Looking at the possible connections between the conclusion of 
international trade agreements and the conclusions of investment agreements, Wu asks 
whether "[p]atterns of trade, driven by increasing supply-chain fragmentation […] 
could shape the formation of investment treaties."70 Wu explains that the role of trade 
exchanges in the selection of investment treaty partners may vary greatly. He concludes, 
however, that there is empirical evidence to claim that several major economic powers 
may be engaged in negotiating potential investment agreements with each other as a 
result of prior trade-related interests and the conclusion of PTAs.71 
In a more general manner, G. Sacerdoti explains that, in todays globalized economy, 
trade and investment regulation are necessarily interconnected.72 To bolster his claim, he 
identifies several sectors of activities (financial markets, cross-border services, trade in 
goods etc.), for which regulation cannot be isolated. Although he concedes that the 
regulation of the international dimension of these activities requires several institutional 
settings, which may be divergent, he argues that models of convergence between trade 
and investment law may be justified, given the fact that investment and trade share a 
                                                 
65 Ibid. The Working Group mentioned refers to the following examples: "[E]xtraction of raw material is 
for natural reasons located wherever the raw material is bountiful and easily extractable; energy-intensive 
processing wherever energy costs are low; labor intensive stages in countries with low labor costs; human 
capital stages in countries with an abundance of skilled labor, and so on."  
66 Footer (supra n.19) 119-22. See also, Trebilcock et al. (supra n.61) 572, where the three authors note and 
explain why "[t]here is a complex interaction between foreign investment and trade protection."  
67 Kurtz 'On the evolution…' (supra n.28) 118. 
68 Ibid. 119. Kurtz relies on empirical evidence that shows that anti-dumping duties and safeguard actions 
taken by the US in the eighties and nineties greatly influenced Japanese FDI into the US market. Ibid., 
citing P. Arzak and K. Wynne, 'Protectionism and Japanese Direct Investment' (1995) 17 J. Politic Modeling 
293. 
69 Wu (supra n.28) 185-95. 
70 Ibid. 185. 
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common object, which is the regulation of international movements of economic factors 
and the exchanges of goods, services, and economic activity such as investment, all 
undertaken by private actors and necessarily interconnected."73 
Parallel and Subsequent Proceedings 
The interconnections between investment and trade activities, as well as between the 
regulation of these activities, may give occasion for one singular government measure to 
spawn parallel trade and investment proceedings. The consequences of such parallel 
proceedings, and the way they can be regulated, are addressed in further detail in a later 
section.74 At this stage, it is only important to note that, as a result of international 
investment operations, international economic actors may engage in the international 
trade of both goods and services. If and when these actors suffer a prejudice from a 
measure taken by the State in which they have invested, they will certainly explore all 
possible legal avenues to address the issue and stop the disturbance or obtain 
compensation. There is a real prospect that the actors try to initiate simultaneous 
proceedings before investment and trade adjudicative bodies, in order to maximize their 
chances of success. This has happened in several instances over the last decade. Authors 
commenting on these cases have affirmed that they were pertinent illustrations for the 
convergence of trade and investment disciplines.75 
A different, yet connected, issue relates to the use of trade proceedings to secure 
compliance with investment arbitration awards. Indeed, as Alford, as well as C. 
Rosenberg, have observed in recent publications, 76  one of the most significant 
illustrations of the intersection of international trade and international law, is the use of 
trade remedies to constrain an investment treaty partner to comply with a decision 
relating to the application of international investment law. Alford explains that "[t]his is 
done primarily when a developed country threatens to remove preferential trade benefits 
to a developing country if that country does not honor its international arbitration 
commitments." 77 To date, there is only one example of such an endeavor. Over the 
spring of 2012, the US decided to suspend preferential trade status granted to Argentina 
under a trade program that provides for a formal system of exemption for certain 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 11. 
74 See Chapter 4. 
75  See e.g., Kurtz 'On the evolution (supra n.28) 122; S. Puig 'International Regime Complexity and 
Economic Law Enforcement' (2014) 17 J. Int'l Eco. L. 491; A. Antoni & M. Ewing-Chow 'Trade and 
Investment Convergence and Divergence: Revisiting the North American Sugar War' (2013) 1 Latin 
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Mechanisms: The Softwood Lumber Controversy' (2011) 2 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 175. 
76 Alford (supra n.51) 50-55; C.B. Rosenberg 'The Intersection of International Trade and International 
Arbitration: The Use of Trade Benefits to Secure Compliance with Arbitral Awards' (2012) 44 Georgetown. 
J. Int'l L. 503. 
77 Alford (supra n.51) 50.  




developing States.78 This decision was driven by Argentina’s refusal to comply with 
investment arbitration awards issued in two cases between US investors and the 
government of Argentina. Both Alford and Rosenberg endorse the position taken by the 
US and seem to affirm that this approach might be reproduced in the future.79 
Trade Influence on the Drafting of New-Generation Investment Agreements 
Another factor of convergence is the common denominator that can be found in the 
formulation of specific norms to be included in both trade and investment international 
agreements,80 and the guidance that the formulation of a provision in one discipline can 
offer to the drafters of the other. Wu notes, for instance, that "[t]he trade regime has the 
potential to exert its influence on a treaty-specific level with respect to the substantive 
provision(s) of particular treaty." 81 The most prominent example of this influence is 
probably the practice of inclusion of a general exceptions clause in new generation IIAs, 
modeled on GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV.82 This practice is still limited, but 
has grown over the last years. General exceptions have indeed been included in several 
recent bilateral, as well as regional IIAs.83 
Further, the trade legal regime, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in particular, is 
often referred to as a model for those discussing the architecture of dispute settlement 
provisions to be included in these new generation preferential trade agreements. An 
interesting example is the recent debate on the possibility to create an appeals 
mechanism, inspired by the WTO Appellate Body (AB) for the dispute settlement 
mechanism, to be included in the investment chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). In that sense, one could claim that the trade legal 
regime also influences the architecture of international investment law dispute 
settlement. 
The Merging of Trade and Investment Agreements 
The last factor of convergence discussed in the literature is the increasing practice of 
merging trade and investment provisions into single international agreements.84 The 
                                                 
78  See, Proclamation No. 8788, 77(61) Fed. Reg. 18899 (29 Mar. 2012), available at 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-29/pdf/FR-2012-03-29.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
79 Rosenberg (supra n.76) 63 ; Alford (supra n.51) 55. 
80 Alford (supra n.51) 40. 
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main example of this trend is provided by the growing number of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), incorporating a robust set of rules relating to investment 
liberalization and investment protection, embedded in a specific chapter.85 These global 
agreements are sometimes referred to as Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements 
(PTIAs). This trend is verified both quantitatively and qualitatively. Empirical research 
indeed shows that since the adoption of the North-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement in 
1994 – which has been qualified as "the archetype for investment commitments tied to a 
trade treaty" – there has been a rise in the conclusion of PTIAs.86 According to the 
United Nation Committee  for Trade and Development ('UNCTAD') contrary to the 
conclusion of BITs, which has declined since the early 2000s, the conclusion of 'other 
IIAs' – i.e. "economic agreements other than BITs that include investment-related 
provisions"87 – has remained stable.88 Further, one should note that the world's most 
advanced economic hubs have embraced this practice, and seek to conclude 
comprehensive agreements with investment chapters integrated to trade disciplines, 
rather than stand-alone BITs. The UNCTAD notes in this respect that,  
"[b]y the end of 2011, the overall IIA universe consisted of 3,164 agreements, 
which included 2,833 BITs and 331 "other IIAs". In quantitative terms, bilateral 
agreements still dominate international investment policymaking; however in 
terms of economic significance, there has been a gradual shift towards 
regionalism."89 
To give but one example of this trend, the main trade agreements the EU is negotiating 
at the moment, i.e. the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with 
Canada and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US, 
will include investment chapters.90 
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B. THE QUESTION OF THE 'GREAT DESIDERATUM' IN CONVERGENCE 
The descriptive claim that trade and investment are converging does not seem 
completely unfounded. Yet, the argument is not flawless and contains several pitfalls, the 
main one being the question of the convergence's 'bien-fondé' – or to use the expression of 
J. Madison in the federalist papers –91 its 'great desideratum'. Is convergence something 
the States would like? What would be the true benefits of merging the two disciplines? 
Are there any? Quite surprisingly, although, as we have seen in the previous sections, 
several authors have spent time commenting on the issue, no one seems to address the 
question as to whether convergence is something actors engaged in international trade 
and/or investment desire, and if so, for what reasons?  
The two following lines of thought could be used to address the issue. As we have seen 
previously, the rise of international agreements including both trade and investment 
rules is described by many as the main factor of convergence. Looking at the motivations 
for the negotiation and conclusion of these comprehensive agreements might be a good 
starting point to understand why international investment and trade law legal regimes 
need to be better integrated. Several authors have worked on these motivations.92 It 
results from their writings that PTIAs represent interesting regulating instruments for 
States as they bring different means of liberalization closer together, allowing for greater 
internal consistency and institutional linkage between trade and investment disciplines.93 
Further, PTIAs allow for a comprehensive approach towards investment regulation, 
covering not only post-investment concerns of foreign investors, but also market access 
liberalization.94 They also warrant better control of activities connected both to trade 
and investment. It makes sense to have rules in the same agreement when, for instance, 
FDI may be used as manner to trade goods or to deliver services into a foreign market.95  
In addition, one could argue that the negotiation of comprehensive agreements allows 
for a broader margin of manoeuver for negotiations and might ultimately reduce 
                                                 
91 This expression is employed in the Federalist Paper Nº10 discussing the forms a government can take 
and the necessity to have safeguards against domestic factions and insurrections. See, I. Shapiro (ed.), A. 
Hamilton, J. Madison & J. Jay: The Federalist Papers (2009) 51.  
92  R. Hicks & K. Johnson, 'When a BIT Just Isn't Enough: Why We See Investment Chapters in 
Preferential Trade Agreements (2012) Unpublished Working Paper, available at 
<http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/FDI2011/papers/hj.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015); E. Denters, 'Preferential Trade and Investment Treaties' in T. Gazzini & E. De Brabandere (eds.), 
International Investment Law. Sources of Rights and Obligations (2012) 49; J.L. Tobin & M.L. Busch 'A BIT is 
Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements' (2010) 62 World 
Politics; L.S. Poulsen 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade: Is a BIT Really Better than a 
Lot?' (2010) 1 Investment Treaty News 16.  
93 F. Baetens, 'Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements and the Trade/Investment Divide: Is the 
Whole More than the Sum of Its Parts?' in R. Hofmann, C.J. Tams & S.W. Schill (eds.), Preferential Trade 
and Investment Agreements: From Recalibration to Reintegration (2013) 91, 96. 
94 R. Hofmann, S.W. Schill & C.J. Tams 'Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements – The New 
Frontier of Investment Law' in R. Hofmann, C.J. Tams & S. Schill (eds.), Preferential Trade and Investment 






transaction costs. Further research is needed to confirm this assumption but, looking 
only at the numbers, one has to accept that the increase in the conclusion of PTIAs must, 
in one way or another, be justified on the basis of State interest. In conclusion, and 
without entering too much into the details of a debate that relates more to political 
economy than international law, from the State's perspective, several reasons might 
justify combining trade and investment provisions into single agreements. 
From the economic actors' perspective, having single comprehensive instruments might 
also be preferable, as these instruments foster clarity and legal certainty. Arguably, any 
economic operator who plans to invest abroad and realizes that it is highly likely that he 
might also be involved in international trade, would rather have to look at only one 
articulated legal framework, rather than two, entirely distinct and not necessarily 
coherent frameworks. 
These propositions show that there are at least some lines of argument to address the 
question of the real advantages of combining trade and investment rules. Although 
further research is certainly needed to address the question in a more rigorous manner, it 
seems that this obstacle is not insurmountable. 
C. THE LIMITS OF THE CONVERGENCE ARGUMENT: SO CLOSE, YET SO FAR 
AWAY  
1. Dissociated Epistemic Communities? 
The convergence argument not only raises some questions, but also faces some definite 
limits. The first one relates to the differences between the practitioners and experts in 
each field and the absence of exchanges between them. Both international investment 
law and international trade law are highly specific disciplines of public international 
law. 96  Becoming an expert in one of these two fields usually implies a form of 
specialization that makes it difficult, in practice, to also fully comprehend the other. 
Consequently, only a few investment lawyers are also proficient in international trade 
law and vice versa. For instance, a brief survey of major global law-firms with expertise in 
trade law and in investment would show that the two disciplines are taken care of by two 
different teams or departments, and that the members of one of these teams or 
departments are seldom invited to 'commute' to, or to get involved in, the work of the 
other. Of course, exceptions exist. 97  But generally speaking, investment arbitration 
practice is usually associated with international commercial arbitration, or in some 
                                                 
96 In a paper relating to the sociology of the investment epistemic community, S. Schill notes that the 
international investment arbitration community is evolving in its composition. He argues, indeed, that 
investment "is no longer an esoteric topic open to only a few specialists, but has reached the mainstream of 
international law." Schill accepts, however, that international investment law remains a full discipline, "at 
par with other specialized areas, such as WTO law, human rights, or environmental law". S.W. Schill 
'W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law' (2011) 22 
Eur. J. Int'l L. 875, 903. 
97 There are indeed lawyers and experts who seem fluent in both trade and investment law. In Chapter 3, 
we give several examples. These 'bi-lingual' lawyers remain, however, few and far between.  




instances, with public international law, whereas international trade law remains the 
concern of individuals with a sharp understanding of basic economic principles, market 
access regulation and other regulatory and policy matters.  
The difference that exists between investment and trade practice is far from being 
insurmountable. While the teams in specialized law firms remain separated, one might 
observe intermingling within the staff of governmental agencies in charge of 
international economic legal issues. To give an example, trade and investment legal 
issues are addressed by the same team within the French Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
and the French negotiation experts and representatives to the EU institutions for 
international trade and investment issues work hand-in-hand. Referring to the EU, the 
organization of the Commission is another pertinent example. There, the units in charge 
of the negotiations and monitoring of investment treaties have integrated within DG 
Trade. Wu notes in this instance that it is often the case that the same government 
agency "takes the active lead in WTO, PTA and BIT negotiations."98 In addition, we 
have seen also that individuals appointed as panelist to address a given trade dispute may 
be appointed as arbitrator in the other field.99 Finally, as we have seen in the present 
section, there is a nascent and growing community of scholars writing about both 
investment and trade law. Yet again, these examples remain too isolated to perceive a 
real trend in the reconciliation of trade and investment lawyers' communities. They 
remain apart, and the general feeling within these communities is that they basically 
have nothing to do with each other.100 
Arguably, the separation between the two communities bears consequences on the 
design and articulation of the international legal regimes to which they belong.101 For 
instance, one could argue that, while economists were greatly involved in the design and 
architecture of trade agreements, the drafting of investment agreements have been, until 
recently, the sole concern of lawyers. These differences in praxis might result in the 
formulation of rules that do not always appear compatible. Kurtz argues for example that 
investment law has remained "a field dominated by a very particular group of lawyers, 
                                                 
98 Wu (supra n.28) 185.  
99 The main example being the appointment of G. Sacerdoti, former AB president, as arbitrators or 
president in several investment arbitration disputes. For a discussion on these disputes, see infra Chapter 3. 
100  Scheueur and Dolzer, in their landmark textbook on international investment law, reach this 
conclusion in their short section on investment and trade law. According to them, "[i]n terms of legal 
methodology, the difference between the two fields calls for caution in assuming commonalities between 
foreign investment law and trade law." R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 
(2012) 19. 
101 McRae, for instance, explains that "[t]he fact that it was lawyers drafting a legal regime may have had 
an impact on what was drafted. They were thinking about core provisions and process, not directing their 
attention to reconciling the application of core provisions with governmental regulation and social values. 
There was not the investment policy community in governments at least at that time comparable to the 
trade policy community that surrounded the negotiation, implementation, and interpretation of GATT 





which has resulted in a highly distinct and troubling thinness to the analysis of legal 
protections aimed fundamentally at economic and political issues."102 
These differences are certainly to be seen as an important obstacle to the convergence of 
the two disciplines.  
2. Institutional Separation and Distinct Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
The second obstacle to the convergence of international trade and investment law is the 
strong difference between the function and role of the existing mechanisms of dispute 
resolution in both fields. The substantive norms of trade and investment law may have 
common roots, but the way these norms are articulated, applied, and enforced is 
different, and there are good reasons for that. 
Certainly, the trade legal regime, and notably the WTO, contains rules relating to 
international investment regulation. This has already been explained at length, and there 
is no need to repeat here what the most prominent experts in the field have already 
demonstrated.103 WTO investment related provisions are limited in scope,104 focused on 
market-access and establishment (through the regulation of trade in services), and do not 
cover investment protection, which is the main objective of IIAs. 
The last obstacle to the convergence argument, the one I consider the most important, is 
the difference between the architecture and functions of the trade and investment dispute 
settlement mechanisms. This difference is examined at length in Chapter 2 of the present 
dissertation. 
Because of these obstacles, it seems idealistic to plead for a formal, institutional 
reconciliation of international trade and investment law. Not because they relate to 
totally different substantive norms, but because several of the institutional features of 
their legal regimes remain different. 
Yet, one must accept that several of the 'converging factors' we discussed are concrete 
and difficult to rebut. In that sense, even if absolute consolidation of the two disciplines 
remains an abstract idea, the line between investment and trade law continues to fade. 
The trade and investment adjudicative bodies, which play a central role in the 
development of these disciplines, need to be aware of this phenomenon and, therefore, 
                                                 
102 Kurtz 'On the evolution…' (supra n.28) 113. 
103 P.C. Mavroidis, 'Regulation of Investment in the Trade Régime: From ITO to WTO' in Z. Drabek & 
P.C. Mavroidis (eds.), Regulations of Foreign Investment - Challenges to International Harmonization (2013) 13. 
See also, Weiss (supra n.28), M. Hahn, 'WTO Rules and Obligations Related to Investment ' in M. 
Bungenberg et al. (eds.), International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 653. 
104 Canada: Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984) where the pre-
WTO panel concluded that GATT provisions (and more particularly the ones on non-discrimination) do 
not apply to foreign persons or firms. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Trebilcock et al. (supra n.61) 
581-83. 




should place themselves in a position to better deal with rules from the other system. In 
this book, I explain how this should be done for investor-State tribunals. 
IV. THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK 
We have seen in the present Chapter 1 that the convergence argument is not misguided: 
There are similarities between the underlying principles of global trade and investment 
and, as such, a better coordination of these principles would be helpful for several 
reasons. Such reasons include enhancement of legal certainty, the reduction of 
transaction costs, and better coherence in the operation of international agreements that 
now combine both trade and investment provisions, to name a few. 
However, no matter how reconcilable or converging the two disciplines may be, their 
enforcement mechanisms are structurally different and are likely to remain so, even if the 
reforms towards a modernization of the investment dispute settlement (currently 
discussed at the EU policy level) are eventually implemented in the near future. Chapter 
2 focuses on these differences and demonstrates that coherence and convergence between 
the trade and investment law disciplines can only be achieved through the development 
of soft integration techniques (rules that allow an adjudicator from one discipline to take 
into account what an adjudicator from the other discipline is saying). 
Chapter 3 presents the results of an exhaustive research into the actual use of trade law 
in investment arbitration. The main finding of this research is that references to trade 
norms, in investment arbitration, are made more often than one might think, and can be 
categorized into different situations. Chapter 3 explains these situations and attempts to 
demonstrate that the use of trade norms by investment tribunals is not problematic, if 
undertaken carefully; 'undertaken carefully' meaning that the specific situation, in which 
the reference is made, is taken into account. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discuss the techniques that can be used to integrate trade 
norms in investment arbitration and to regulate possible interactions and conflicts 
between the trade and investment legal regimes. Chapter 4 focuses on the concept of 
jurisdiction and argues that (i) the use of trade norms in a given investment dispute does 
not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of the investment tribunal dealing with that 
dispute, (ii) investment tribunals may even have jurisdiction over claims that refer 
directly to trade law and (iii) techniques exist to address potential conflicts of jurisdiction 
between trade and investment adjudicators in cases of parallel or subsequent 
proceedings. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of substantive interactions between 
investment and trade law. The goal is to demonstrate how an investment tribunal should 
deal with trade norms once these norms have 'entered', and are being discussed, at the 
merits stage of an investment dispute. The main argument defended there, is that, when 
it is assumed that trade law has a direct bearing on a given investment dispute, the 
arbitral tribunal may, and should, engage in a better integration of the trade norms 





The last Chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the results of this study and offers concluding 
observations on the relationship between international investment law with international 





. CHAPTER 2. 
DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS: THE 
SPECIFICITIES OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 





Several authors writing about international trade and investment law have made the 
argument that international trade and investment law should be reconciled due to the 
clear "convergence" between (some of) their constitutive elements. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, this argument is not misguided: there is a form of coherence 
between the underlying principles of global trade and investment regulation, and a 
better coordination of these principles might be beneficial for several reasons (legal 
certainty, reduction of transaction costs, etc.).1 
The present chapter argues that, no matter how reconcilable, or converging, these two 
disciplines may be, their dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the 
objectives underlying these mechanisms, are fundamentally different in their structure. 
In other words, I take the view that while substantive rules of trade and investment may 
present similarities, the way they are enforced is necessarily different. Taking this into 
account, the focus made on litigation in the present chapter is a conscious decision. I do 
not argue for a change in substantive rules, nor do I try and anticipate what would be the 
result of such a change. I take the law as it is, and observe how the methods available to 
enforce this law differ.  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate why the harmonization of trade and investment 
dispute settlement mechanisms is unwarranted. Coherence and convergence between the 
trade and investment law disciplines can only be achieved through the development of 
soft integration techniques (rules that allow an adjudicator from one discipline to take 
into account what an adjudicator from the other discipline is saying). In addition, this 
Chapter highlights the role of investment tribunals, which are the main actors this 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 1, we have explained that the principal reason for this coordination is a better harmonization 
between interdependent rules and increase in legal certainty and, ultimately, to avoid disproportional 
transaction costs. The structure of modern PTAs is certainly the best example of States' willingness to 





research focuses upon, and compares their role with that of trade dispute settlement 
bodies. 
Furthermore, the chapter will adopt an original approach by combining a positivistic 
presentation of the basic rules of both mechanisms, with an analysis of their (political and 
economic) rationale. Section II studies the general functions of the adjudicator in the two 
disciplines. For this purpose, I focus on the intention of the parties to the agreements, 
upon which the adjudicators are established, and on how these adjudicators have 
interpreted the rules within which these intentions have been crystallized. Section III 
then presents an analysis on the issue of standing, in relation to the two dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and their jurisdiction. There, I explain how the rules designed to 
bring a claim before the WTO DSU or an investment tribunal, and the underlying basis 
of these rules, are fundamentally different. In Section IV, I scrutinize the instruments 
available to enforce the decisions adopted by the dispute settlement bodies, the remedies 
available and the possible avenues of recourse and appeal. Section V concludes upon how 
the composition of the two dispute settlement mechanisms is largely different, and how it 
is premature to suggest that that formal and institutional convergence of trade and 
investment norms, as they operate today, should occur. 
II. FUNCTION AND VOCATION 
A. THE PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Understanding the Prerogatives of International Courts 
The terms 'function' and 'vocation' are used to designate the general mission that the 
litigants expect a given adjudicator to undertake. In other words, the question that is 
addressed here is: what do the treaty makers and litigants (if different) seek to achieve by 
establishing, and going before, a tribunal?2 
Before answering this question, a first preliminary remark is in order. One may recall 
that, traditionally, studies on the functions of international courts focused on the 
different artifacts that international judges could use to achieve the general task 
entrusted to them, of assisting sovereign states in settling their disputes. Hence, these 
studies focused on the 'powers' or 'prerogatives' of the courts rather than on their role.3 
                                                 
2 Arguably, other intakes could be taken into account in order to fully capture the function of international 
adjudicative bodies. For instance, one may argue that the perception the adjudicative body has about their 
role, might differ from that of their stakeholders, and thus needs to be examined. See J.E. Alvarez, 'What 
are International Judges for? The Main Functions of International Adjudication' in C. Romano, K.J. Alter 
& Y. Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (2014) 158, 159. I explain below why 
priority is given here to the conception of the parties to international agreements instituting international 
courts and/or to the litigants before such courts. 
3 For classical studies, that are related to the ICJ, see R.P. Anand, ‘Role of International Adjudication’ in L. 
Gross (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice (1976) vol. I, 1; T. Sugihara, 'The Judicial 
Function of the International Court of Justice with Respect to Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues' 
in A.S. Muller (ed.), The International Court of Justice (1997) 117. Recently, authors revisited this approach. 
See e.g., L. Boisson De Chazournes & S. Heathcote 'The Role of the International Adjudicator' (2001) 05 




In light of this approach, understanding the function of international judges required an 
examination of what type of powers they held, as well as the sources of these powers 
(that is to say, an examination of the statute of each court or tribunal). The results of 
these studies would often be presented in list form, delineating the limited prerogatives 
envisaged in each court's constitutional instrument. Modern studies and surveys, of 
practices of the various international courts and tribunals that exist today, show that 
today's international adjudicators serve broader functions. More importantly, they show 
that the compilation of a simple catalog of the prerogatives granted to a given court is 
insufficient to fully appreciate what said court is supposed to do.4 For instance, scholars 
have affirmed that international courts may "exercise constitutional, enforcement and 
administrative review; stabilize normative expectations and legitimate the exercise of 
public authority; improve state compliance with primary legal norms; engage in judicial 
lawmaking to clarify substantive obligations; and enhance the legitimacy of international 
norms and institutions." 5  Accordingly, an examination of the functions of tribunals, 
nowadays, requires one to (i) identify the categories of missions international tribunals 
may undertake,6 and (ii) to see if one given judge fulfills all of these missions, or, if said 
judge primarily focuses on the fulfillment of one mission over any other, to what extent, 
and for what reasons, the judge choose to do so.7 To accomplish this, scholars have used 
both efficiency and goal oriented approaches, methods that generally borrow analytical 
tools from political science,8 and/or law and economic analysis.9 Their idea is that courts 
                                                                                                                                                   
ASIL Proceedings 129; D. Shelton 'Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts' (2008) 9 
Chicago J. Int'l L. 571. 
4 These modern studies often take as point of departure the methodology M. Shapiro developed in his 
seminal analysis of domestic courts in different political systems. See, M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and 
Political Analysis (1981). 
5 L. Helfner, 'The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators' in C. Romano, K.J. Alter & Y. Shany (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (2014) 464, 465. For a similar observation, see Y. Shany 
'Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach' (2012) 106 Am. J. Int'l L. 
225, 246. Alvarez (supra n.2) gives an interesting example when he claims that "[t]he determination by a 
chamber of the ICC that defendants retain certain rights even when presented by evidence produced by 
intermediaries […] might be categorized (1) as settling an interpretative dispute between the prosecutor 
and the defense; (2) as assisting in furthering the truth of what actually occurred in a particular case; (3) as 
providing an authoritative interpretation of that tribunal’s rules; or (4) as purporting to guide how future 
prosecutors need to behave." Alvarez then explains that this decision can be explained in terms of one of 
the various functions (dispute settlement, fact-finding, lawmaking, governance, etc.) courts may be 
considered to have. See, ibid. 176.  
6 The labeling of categories varies depending on the studies. We usually always find two broad functions 
discussed in the present paper: settling a dispute and develop the rule of law within the regime in which 
they operate, and then, depending on the authors: a fact-finding function, a governance function or 
stabilizing normative expectation function, an interpretative function, etc. See, Alvarez (supra n.2).  
7 See e.g., A. Guzman 'International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis' (2008) 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 171.  
8  L. Johns 'Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International 
Adjudication' (2011) 56 J. Conflict Resolution 257. See also, Shany (supra n.5) 229. To go one step further in 
the theory of international courts, one should refer to the distinction between international courts as 
agents of States and international courts as trustees of these States. On this distinction, see e.g. K.J. Alter 





are efficient if they are able to duly perform the missions their stakeholders assigned to 
them and vice-versa; an efficient court is one that performs well at the tasks it was 
assigned. 
Although both approaches, traditional and modern, may provide interesting results when 
comparing the work of trade and investment courts, it is the modern approach that is the 
more pertinent for our present purpose, as it reveals an interesting difference between 
the vocation of the two mechanisms. I use therefore this goal-oriented approach in the 
following developments.10 
The Two (Non-Necessarily Exclusive) General Functions of International Courts 
As a second preliminary remark, it seems warranted to recall that when using this 
modern approach for a general study of international courts, two opposing views often 
arise.11 Courts can be regarded as 'deciders' or as 'information providers'.12 By assigning 
the notion 'decider' to a court, one means that the court's main focus leans towards the 
enforcement of a given rule, by settling a dispute between two international actors. 
Alternatively, by viewing the court as an 'information provider', one views the court as 
more likely to engage in normative clarification, if not creation, in addition to 
adjudication.13 To distinguish between these two views, the terms 'private function' and 
'public function' have been used.14 Brown for instance explains that:  
"On one view, the function of international courts is a private function; that is, that 
international courts are created in order to settle disputes referred to them. In 
other words, their task is ‘to do justice’ between the litigant states, and to render a 
                                                                                                                                                   
9 See e.g., E.A. Posner & J.C. Yoo 'Judicial Independence in International Tribunals' (2005) 93 California L. 
Rev. 1, A.T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2007) 49-54. See also, to a 
broader extent, Shapiro (supra n.4) 34-39.  
10 For a similar approach, see A. Von Bogdandy & I. Venzke 'On the Functions of International Courts: An 
Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority' (2013) 26 Leiden J. Int'l L. 49, 72. Here the 
authors conclude their study explaining that what they call multi-functional analysis, i.e. the analysis of the 
different functions of international courts, "helps to better understand the differences between 
international judicial institutions."  
11 The distinction between public and private function is often framed within the broader debate of the 
international judge as a lawmaker. Studies related to this debate are countless. Ginsburg addresses it in an 
interesting piece in which the ultimate goal is to test the limits of this debate and concludes that it is 
notable how not all international courts have such authority. T. Ginsburg 'Bounded Discretion in 
International Judicial Lawmaking' (2005) 45 Virginia J. Int'l L. 631. For more general and recent surveys, 
see G. Born 'A New Generation of International Adjudication' (2012) 61 Duke L. J. 775 and Alvarez (supra 
n.2).  
12 Johns (supra n.8) 258. Commenting on virtually the same distinction, others have talked about 'party-
originated institutions' and 'community-originated institutions'. See e.g., D. Caron 'Towards a Political 
Theory of International Courts and Tribunals' (2006) 24 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 401, 403-04. 
13 The constituent instruments of a given international dispute settlement body are the most important 
sources of information in order to determine the extent of a body's power to interpret the law they apply. 
However, treaties are not the only source of powers for international courts to engage in normative 
clarification. On this issue, see C. Brown 'The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals' 
(2005) 76 Brit. YB Int'l L. 195.  
14  S. Schill 'Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator' (2010) 23 Leiden J. Int'l L. 401.  




judgment or award which takes account of all relevant facts, which is limited to the 
petitum of the dispute, and which is made with final and binding force. […] On 
another view, international adjudication also has a public function, which goes 
beyond the settlement of the dispute. According to this view, the goal of the mere 
settlement of the dispute is too focused on the private aspect of disputes, and is not 
conducive to the positive creation of norms which can generate obedience among 
members of the community being regulated by that system of norms."15 
An international court has a private function in the sense that it serves, above all, the 
interests of the two disputing parties that have been referred to their judgment. By 
contrast, when performing tasks belonging to the 'public function', the court engages in 
activities that do not serve the sole interest of the parties to the dispute, but rather the 
legal system in which the adjudicator operates in, as a whole. For that, the court may 
have to look beyond case law, and engage in the application of unwritten procedures and 
common law of international adjudication.16 
This distinction, between the public and private functions, appears useful when one 
engages in a comparison of the functions of dispute settlement organs. 17  If all 
international courts and tribunals have the ability to assume both a private and a public 
function, the repartition, or importance of one towards the other, might differ depending 
on the vocation of said court and on the legal framework in which the court operates. 
Some international dispute settlement bodies will appear to use their public function 
more than others, whether it be, because they enjoy a broader sense of freedom to do so, 
because the legal systems in which they operate require it, and/or because of their 
design. The predominance of one function over the other reflects both, the underlying 
structural framework that provides the guidelines for the adjudicator in question (viz. the 
statute, the mandate given by the parties and the applicable procedural rules), and the 
way this adjudicator interprets this framework. Thus, if one wishes to establish which 
international court orients itself more towards assuming a public function, and which is 
more private-function oriented, one needs to look at the framework from which the 
authority originates, as well as the case law related to said framework.18 That is the 
                                                 
15 Brown (supra n.13) 230-31.  
16 C. Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007) 226-35. 
17 Arguably, other distinctions and approaches may be used to distinguish the activity of investment 
tribunals from that of the WTO dispute settlement body. For instance, some authors have used the 
agent/trustee to claim that investment tribunals act as agents of the State whereas the WTO mechanism 
(or at least the WTO AB) acts more as a trustee. See e.g. J. Kurtz, 'Building Legitimacy Through 
Interpretation in Investor-State Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence and the Identification of 
Applicable Law' in Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn & J.E. Viñuales (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law: Bridging Theory Into Practice (2014) 257, 267-68. 
18 Brown (supra n.13) 234-37. See also, Alvarez (supra n.2) 177. Alvarez concludes his survey admitting that 
"the extent to which judges and arbitrators can pursue the main functions of adjudication varies with the 
ex ante and ex post institutional constraint within each court or arbitral institution. These constraints, as 
well as their own views of their function, determine how judges and arbitrators exercise their often-





approach adopted in the present chapter and, having made these two preliminary 
remarks, it is now possible to clarify the first argument put forward in this chapter.  
In the light of the above, it is contended that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
has a more salient public function than that of international investment law.19 The WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism has a general function regarding the WTO legal regime 
as a whole and, more generally, the regulation of international trade. Contrastingly, 
investment tribunals are focused on a dispute between two parties, where one of the 
parties is a private entity seeking (monetary) reparation because of an alleged breach of 
its own private rights. 
In the following sections, I present the legal rules on which this affirmation is based and 
the way they have been interpreted. Then, I address a recent trend in the literature, that 
argues for  a paradigm shift in the investment arbitration field that would lead to an 
increase in investment tribunals using their public function, and I explain why these 
normative conclusions should be tempered. 
B. 'PRESERVE AND CLARIFY' VS. 'SETTLING A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO 
PARTIES' 
By concentrating on legal instruments appertaining to WTO and international 
investment law, this section identifies specific provisions that can be used to understand 
the general functions of the adjudicator in both disciplines. I examine these provisions, 
by looking at the case law and its economic rationale, and assess which function (private 
or public) can be considered as predominant within each discipline. By doing so, I do not 
intend to draft a list of all the possible tasks performed by these bodies. 
The rules associated with the WTO legal regime appear to be more explicit and 
therefore easier to capture, and therefore, for the sake of clarity, I begin with an 
assessment of the predominant function of the WTO dispute settlement body. I then 
turn to international investment arbitration and explain what elements are missing in 
order to claim that investment arbitrators have a similar vocation to that of a WTO 
adjudicator.  
1. WTO Dispute Settlement: Preserve and Clarify 
The Law 
The text of the DSU provides several useful provisions that capture the role of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. Article 3.2 is the first and most explicit of them. Its first 
sentence reads:  
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.  
                                                 
19 It should be clear that WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanisms refer to the work of (i) the Panels and (ii) 
the AB. The consultation phase of a dispute, which occurs before the constitution of a panel to hear a given 
dispute, is essentially private. 




This provision is particularly instructive. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is 
institutionalized as an organ, embodied with the general assignments of providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system, that goes beyond the interests of the 
sole parties to a given WTO dispute. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 
therefore, not only incurs obligations towards the parties to a given dispute, but also vis-
à-vis the multilateral trading system, as a whole. It ought to perform its duty in a fashion 
that will provide legal security and predictability to the system. Of course, ex officio 
complaints are not possible. Therefore, these obligations are to be seen as secondary: 
WTO dispute settlement provides security and predictability while it settles a dispute 
between two parties. Yet, these obligations exist. On several occasions the panels and the 
AB have affirmed that these assignments were central and part of the general function of 
the WTO adjudicative system. For instance in the US — Section 301 Trade Act case, the 
panel, 20 while considering how to interpret DSU Article 23,21 addressed the question of 
the object and purpose of the DSU. The answer given was twofold. Firstly, the panel 
noted that the most relevant of these objectives were 
"those which relate to the creation of market conditions conducive to individual 
economic activity in national and global markets and to the provision of a secure 
and predictable multilateral trading system."22 
Referring to Article 3.2, the panel then added that:  
"[p]roviding security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is 
another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving 
the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the 
most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its 
different operators."23 
Article 3.2 is thus construed as requiring all WTO adjudicative bodies to act in a fashion 
that is compatible with the general objectives of the WTO legal system as whole. The 
WTO judge has a duty towards the system as a whole. As it will be demonstrated later, 
the obligations that investment arbitrators may have towards the international 
investment legal system, should one exist, are less evident.  
The second sentence of Article 3.2 is even more insightful, as it confirms the additional 
duty towards the WTO legal regime. This sentence reads as follows:  
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of 
                                                 
20 United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974, WT/DS152/R, Panel Report (22 Dec. 1999) 
(hereinafter: Panel Report, 'US–Section 301').  
21 This Article prohibits unilateral redress and more generally that WTO disputes shall only be resolved 
through the WTO DSU mechanism. 
22 Panel Report, US–Section 301, ¶7.71. 





those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.  
In the light of this provision, and its interpretation by the WTO panels and the AB, it 
becomes clear that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is more than a simple forum 
for the settlement of one given dispute. 
Remarks 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism contributes to the operation of the legal 
system put in place by the WTO. In addition to its primary role, which is to help the 
parties coordinate their behavior in the enforcement of the trade obligations included in 
the WTO instruments, the agents of the WTO dispute settlement system shall clarify 
and articulate the rules contained in the instrument, while taking into consideration the 
general objectives of the WTO instruments. This is clearly a public function. 
This function can be apprehended as follows. Most of the rules contained in WTO 
instruments are not self-explanatory, as WTO legal provisions are often drafted in 
general terms so as to be of general applicability and to cover a multitude of individual 
cases. Having rules that are too specific would impede the regulation of narrow cases, 
rather than enhances it. Assessing the violation of a legal requirement contained in a 
particular provision by following a certain set of facts is, therefore, a question that is not 
always easy to answer. Further, WTO Members need to coordinate their understanding 
of whether or not their actions (e.g. the issuance of trade-related measures) are within the 
scope of the WTO legal instruments. In international trade law, like in many other 
domains of international law, the negotiation process results in a text that can be 
understood in more than one way, so as to satisfy the interests of all the parties involved 
in the process, which are inevitably driven by different domestic interests. In these 
circumstances, the WTO judge has to clarify WTO law, 24  as well as act as a 
'downstream coordinator', 25  that is making sure that the way parties to the WTO 
agreement understand their obligations can be synchronized.  
                                                 
24  In other words, the WTO adjudicator is competent to interpret WTO law, and shall do so "in 
accordance with Public International Law". The extent to which this provision implies that the WTO 
judge has to import international legal standards in its analysis when applying WTO law is discussed in 
the literature, and it is usually accepted that this provision means 'in accordance with the principles 
provided for by the VCLT'. See P.C. Mavroidis 'No outsourcing of law? WTO law as practiced by WTO 
courts' (2008) 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 421.  
25  Ginsburg (supra n.11) 652. Ginsburg relies on law and economics principles and explains that 
international trade can be described as an 'iterated prisoners' dilemma'. In this configuration, it is only the 
repetition of the game that allows the players to develop cooperative strategies. Ginsburg argues that, 
nevertheless, this repetition requires coordination, and that the WTO Dispute Settlement Undertaking is 
the institution that primarily undertakes this coordination: the WTO dispute settlement regime can be 
used by the parties when they dispute whether a particular course of action should be counted as a 
defection or cooperation in the ongoing repeated prisoner's dilemma". Hence, the WTO DSB provides "a 
signal to the parties as to the state of the world, and the parties can coordinate accordingly". Ibid., 650-52. 
See also, W.F. Schwartz & A.O. Sykes 'The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in 
the World Trade Organization' (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 179. 




To do so, WTO adjudicative bodies may have to refer to previous disputes and the way 
they have been settled, and the law of WTO dispute settlement authorizes such 
references. In US — Stainless Steel (Mexico), the AB explained that the Panel had to 
follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues, as a failure 
to do so would undermine the development of a coherent and predictable body of 
jurisprudence, clarifying Members’ rights and obligations under the covered agreements 
as contemplated under the DSU.26 
Again, this demonstrates that the WTO DSU encompasses general objectives related to 
the harmonization and coherent development of the norms belonging to the WTO legal 
regime. When implementing such general objectives, the WTO adjudicator accomplishes 
prerogatives that belong to its public function.27 
It is important to note that while performing this task, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism does not enjoy unlimited, normative, creative power. This is made clear in 
the last sentence of Article 3.2. The WTO dispute settlement system's 
"recommendations and rulings […] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements." As Mavroidis puts it, when interpreting WTO law, 
"the agents [WTO adjudicative bodies] cannot undo the balance of rights and 
obligations as struck by the framers [WTO Members]."28 
Notwithstanding this, there shall be no doubt that the above mentioned provisions 
provide the WTO dispute settlement body with a public function for it to exercise along 
with its other duty, which is to settle the dispute between the parties in question.29  
                                                 
26  United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, 
Appellate Body Report (30 Apr. 2008) (hereinafter 'AB Report, US–Stainless Steel'). 
27 In US-Stainless Steel, the AB noted that clarification was a task that could not be properly undertaken if 
limited to the frame of the settlement of a given dispute:  
"Clarification, as envisaged in Article 3.2 of the DSU, elucidates the scope and meaning of the provisions of 
the covered agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
While the application of a provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, the 
relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the application of a 
particular provision in a specific case."  
AB Report, US–Stainless Steel, ¶161. Arguably, this statement can be interpreted as an implicit recognition 
of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism public function the AB shall have. 
28 Mavroidis (supra n.24) 426. This principle was affirmed in several WTO disputes. See e.g. United States — 
Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, Appellate Body 
Report (25 Apr. 1997) p.19 (hereinafter 'AB Report, US–Wool Shirts') and United States — Subsidies on 
Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (3 Mar. 2005) ¶509. 
29 Article 3.7 clarifies that the "aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a 
dispute". The AB in the US–Wool Shirts dispute affirmed very clearly that: "the basic aim of dispute 
settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes". See, AB Report, US–Wool Shirts, p.19. It is therefore obvious 
that the WTO shares a private function, alongside its public function. As mentioned in the introduction of 
the present section, it can be argued that all international courts have both functions. However, it is 
interesting to note that this disposition is located after the other provisions (3.2) that are discussed in the 
present development. One could therefore make the argument that the drafters of the text sought to 





These basic considerations have been developed in the literature. Trachtman has 
published important work on the function of the WTO dispute settlement body, in which 
he insists on the role that WTO dispute resolution has in completing the 'contract' that 
WTO agreements represent.30 In this regard, Trachtman notes that "one must recognize 
that dispute resolution is not simply a mechanism for neutral application of legislated 
rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance."31  
Finally, it can be noted that this conception is also compatible with a formal analysis of 
international trade law, as a regime. Economic studies of trade agreements, such as the 
WTO, show that such agreements are endogenously incomplete contracts, and that 
completeness is better achieved through dispute-settlement. Horn, Maggi and Staiger 
have recently voiced these arguments. 32 They demonstrate that in trade, contracting is 
costly, and that an optimal trade agreement may, in fact, be an incomplete trade 
agreement.33 Furthermore, they each recognize that dispute settlement plays a role in 
helping complete the rules embodied in trade agreements. More precisely, they note that 
the adjudicator will necessarily have to "interpret ambiguous obligations, fill gaps in the 
agreement, and modify rigid obligations."34 In both studies, the GATT/WTO agreement 
is used as the main example of a legal regime. Hence, the WTO judge is compelled to 
assume functions that go beyond the simple settlement of a dispute between two parties. 
However, as we will now explore, investment tribunals are not driven by these same 
concerns.  
2. Investment: Settle a Dispute Between Two Parties 
The (Absence of) Law 
Unlike in trade instruments, it is difficult to isolate, in IIAs, a provision, or a set of 
provisions, that can be considered to provide for a clear identification of what the main 
function of an international investment tribunal may be. It is, therefore, even more 
difficult to identify a provision that could be interpreted as providing international 
investment tribunals with a 'public function'. The dispute resolution provisions of IIAs 
are indeed starkly written procedural tools, that aim to give a private individual the 
possibility to challenge the international liability of a sovereign State before an 
international tribunal, created for that precise purpose. A few (modern) IIAs include 
provisions regarding the 'function' of investment arbitration. Nevertheless, these 
provisions remain relatively basic and do not allow for the affirmation that investment 
                                                 
30 J.P. Trachtman 'The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution' (1999) 40 Harvard Int'l L. J. 333. 
31 Ibid. 336. 
32 See H. Horn, G. Maggi & R.W. Staiger 'Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts' 
(2010) 100 American Eco. Rev. 394 ; G. Maggi & R.W. Staiger 'The Role and Design of Dispute Settlement 
Procedures in International Trade Agreements' (2011) 126 Quarterly J. Economics 475.  
33 Horn et al. (supra n.32) 394.  
34 The study actually aims to identify which of these three tasks is the more desirable for future trade 
agreements. Maggi & Staiger (supra n.32) 476. 




tribunals have a far greater role than that of adjudicating investor-State dispute 
settlement resolution. A good example of this can be found in NAFTA Chapter 11 
Section B (Articles 1115 to 1138). The first provision of this section, Article 1115, which 
relates to the 'purpose' of the NAFTA investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms, 
reads as follows:  
Without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Chapter 
Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures), this 
Section establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that 
assures both equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the 
principle of international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal. 
To be clear, this provision only introduces a general function for investment tribunals, 
which is the duty to respect basic principles of due process when settling a dispute 
between an investor and a party to the NAFTA. This provision, as well as any of the 
other articles of Section B, does not make reference to general duties towards the legal 
regime of international investment law that could be construed as giving the possibility 
to an investor-State tribunal to engage in a public function.  
Conversely, the 2012 US Model BIT, a 'new-generation' model BIT,35 does not refer to 
the purpose of investment arbitration. The arbitration clause (Article 24) and the other 
provisions related to arbitral proceedings (Articles 25 to 36) focus mainly on the 
procedural aspects of investment claims, such as, for example, the consent of the parties 
and the selection of arbitrators. The explicit references, in the model BIT, to the 
protection of the environment, international labor standards (Article 13), and to the 
necessary transparency of arbitral proceedings (Article 29), are elements that seem to 
open the doors for an argument that an investment tribunal based on this type of BIT 
would embody certain functions that go beyond the settlement of a given dispute. Yet, 
these references remain very specific and cannot be construed as providing an 
investment tribunal, constituted pursuant to a similar agreement, with public functions. 
The Canadian 2004 Model BIT includes, in its Article 20, a provision on the 'purpose' of 
investor-State dispute settlement. The text of this provision is, however, very modest:  
"Without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Section D 
(State to State Dispute Settlement Procedures), this Section establishes a 
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes."36 
                                                 
35 As mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, this expression, used by the UNCTAD and other 
commentators of the investment legal regime, refer to IIAs concluded in the last five to ten years; 
agreements that are more sophisticated than those concluded during 80s and 90s, in the way they 
introduce features (e.g. investor obligations regarding human rights or environmental concerns, right for 
the state to regulate) that are supposed to restore the balance in investment arbitration. See i.e. UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (2012), available at 
<http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015), pp. 
99 et seq. 
36 Section D, to which this Article 20 relates to Inter-State Disputes Settlement. The 2004 Canadian Model 
BIT is available online at <http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> (last 





No mention is made of the investment regime, or even to general investment policy 
objectives. Nor is any mention made of the role investment tribunals play in the 
clarification and maturation of international investment law, as a legal regime. Rather, 
this provision is merely an introduction to the section dealing with the settlement of 
disputes, a section that focuses only on the different procedural steps that shall be 
followed by the adjudicators when presented with an investment claim. 
Remarks 
Given the minimalist appearance of these investor-State arbitration clauses, and their 
focus on the dispute – and only the dispute – the following assumption can be made: the 
primary role of an investment tribunal is to settle a dispute between two parties. This, of 
course, sounds glaringly obvious, and is very simplistic compared to the various avowals 
made here and there.37 It seems à la mode to claim that investment arbitral tribunals 
serve a much wider function.38 
However, one may recall that numerous investment tribunals have insisted on this basic 
idea, whereas no tribunals, to this day, have accepted, nor endorsed, the role many 
scholars would like them to have. In Glamis Gold v. US, 39  the tribunal, inter alia, 
proceeded to review the cases in which the scope of the function of investment 
arbitration was questioned. 40  The tribunal investigated whether its mandate, under 
NAFTA Chapter 11, would limit it to a case-specific analysis of problems related to the 
dispute, or if it implied a need to take into account the general legal context in which the 
tribunal operated. 41  The tribunal did not use the terms 'private function' or 'public 
                                                 
37 To give one example, an author has recently attempted to demonstrate that investor-State arbitration 
could be used as a tool to protect international cultural heritage rights. See V.S. Vadi 'Investing in Culture: 
Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law' (2009) 42 Vanderbilt J. Trans'l L. 853 (arguing that 
synergy between public and private actors can be found in providing an alternative framework for 
protection of undersea heritage). More generally, in a recent article, T. Schultz and C. Dupont investigate 
the instances in which investment arbitration can be considered as a tool to promote the international rule 
of law. See, T. Schultz & C. Dupont 'Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-
empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study' (2014) 25 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1147. 
38 In my view, this trend is due, in part, to the investment arbitration legitimacy crisis, further discussed 
later in the paper, which necessarily triggers discussion on the role of investment tribunals. In these 
discussions, many argue that investment tribunals do more than settle disputes. Ironically, the claim is 
used both ways. Detractors would tend to affirm that arbitral tribunals do too much: in their view, while 
ruling on a given, tribunals hinder justice and democracy by threatening States' regulatory autonomy. See, 
on these claims and their shortcomings, the recent contribution of Filippo Fontanelli in the Italian 
International Law Society blog, available at <http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1360> (last consulted 
1 Aug. 2015). Others argue that it is by doing more, for instance by engaging in global governance, that 
investment tribunals will regain legitimacy. See B. Kingsbury & S. Schill 'Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative 
Law' (2009) NYU School of Law - International Law and Justice Working Papers 2009/6, available at 
<http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015), 
pp.40-50. 
39 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (8 Jun. 2009).  
40 The very first development of the awarded are devoted to "The Tribunal’s Understanding of its Task: 
Undertaking a Case- Specific Arbitration with Awareness of the NAFTA Chapter 11 System". Ibid. ¶¶3-9.  
41 Ibid. 




function'. Nonetheless, it indirectly referred to these concepts, by addressing the debate 
about which function – 'case-specific' vs. an analysis with an 'awareness of other systemic 
implications' – should be given priority.42 The tribunal noted that it could not ignore the 
singularity and the entirety of the NAFTA system. Yet, it insisted on its duty to focus on 
the specific case before it:  
"Therefore, this Tribunal, in undertaking its primary mandate of resolving this 
particular dispute, does so with an awareness of the context within which it 
operates. The Tribunal emphasizes that it in no way views its awareness of the context in 
which it operates as justifying (or indeed requiring) a departure from its duty to focus on 
the specific case before it. Rather it views its awareness of operating in this context as 
a discipline upon its reasoning that does not alter the Tribunal’s decision, but 
rather guides and aids the Tribunal in simultaneously supporting the system of 
which it is only a temporary part."43 
Commenting on the decision, which reflects a position shared by other tribunals, 44 
Reisman argues that the way in which reference was made to the court's awareness of the 
context (or in other words, to the public function), by the arbitrators, was rather 
surprising, even if rather limited.45 Reisman thus insists on the importance of a case-
specific analysis of investment arbitration.46  
In the non-NAFTA context, tribunals have also recalled that their role was limited to 
the settlement of a dispute between the two parties who had brought their case forward 
for  arbitration. In Romak v. Uzbekistan,47 the tribunal was quite explicit in this regard: 
"Ultimately, the Arbitral Tribunal has not been entrusted, by the Parties or 
otherwise, with a mission to ensure the coherence or development of "arbitral 
jurisprudence." The Arbitral Tribunal’s mission is more mundane, but no less important: 
to resolve the present dispute between the Parties in a reasoned and persuasive manner, 
irrespective of the unintended consequences that this Arbitral Tribunal’s analysis 
might have on future disputes in general. It is for the legal doctrine as reflected in 
articles and books, and not for arbitrators in their awards, to set forth, promote or 
                                                 
42 Schill (supra n.14). 
43 Glamis Gold v. US (supra n.39) ¶6 [emphasis added].  
44 See e.g., Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 
Award (13 Sept. 2006) ¶95, where the tribunal highlighted the limits of referring to other BITs concluded 
by the host-State to determine the general investment policy of that state, in order to interpret provision of 
the BIT at stake in the dispute, and thus providing that its task "was to interpret the BIT and […] to 
apply ordinary canons of interpretation, not to displace, by reference to general policy considerations 
concerning investor protection, the dispute resolution mechanism specifically negotiated by the parties." 
45  W.M. Reisman ''Case Specific Mandates' versus 'Systemic Implications': How Should Investment 
Tribunals Decide?' (2013) 29 Arb. Int'l 131.  
46 Reisman concludes that the 'awareness' the tribunal is referring to does not affect the modus operandi a 
case-specific approach that investment tribunal should follow. Ibid. 138.  





criticize general views regarding trends in, and the desired evolution of, 
investment law."48 
The justification given by the tribunal is particularly insightful. The tribunal referred to 
the parties to the arbitration, and how they did not confer upon the tribunal a mandate to 
clarify or develop investment law. Rather, the tribunal was entrusted with a specific 
mission: to settle their dispute. 
The text of the ICSID Convention does not contradict the assumption developed in this 
section, and illustrated with these cases. Although, the preamble of the Convention does 
mention general objectives, such as the pursuit of global economic development, it does 
not relate to the function of investment tribunals. Instead, the functions of arbitral 
tribunals are listed in Chapter 5, Section III of the Convention, which relates to the 
'Powers and Functions of the Tribunal'. But again, the provisions in Section 5 are 
relatively basic (for instance, the first provision of this section, Article 41 announces the 
fundamental principle of compétence de la compétence), or procedurally oriented (other 
provisions relate to applicable laws, the production of documents, the application of 
arbitration rules, default, counter claims and provisional measures) and therefore cannot 
be taken to affirm that investor-State tribunals shall be entrusted with a public 
function.49 
The above-mentioned assumption seems to be confirmed: the primary role of investor-
State tribunals is to settle a dispute between a private party and a sovereign State, and to 
do so according to the norms chosen by the parties to an IIA. It is not contested that, in 
order to accomplish this function, tribunals may conduct their analysis based on 
precedents. However –and this is key – if and when they do so, it is in order to 
accomplish their primary task of settling the dispute between an investor and a State.  
One last remark may be made regarding the stare decisis discussion. Indeed, the use of 
stare desicis arguably strengthens the argument according to which tribunals give 
priority to a case-specific approach and to their private function. It is largely accepted 
that there is no stare decisis principle in investment arbitration. The tribunal may rely on 
prior decision to consolidate their reasoning, but they have no obligation to do so. The 
extent to which this possibility shall be seen as a duty, more than an option, has been 
widely discussed.50 In a recent award, the tribunal explained: 
                                                 
48 Ibid. ¶171 (emphasis added). Referring to AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (26 Apr. 2005)(hereinafter 'AES v. Argentina') ¶¶30-31, where the 
tribunal explained that although it was useful to consider former investment cases, especially where they 
concerns similar issues, the principle of stare decisis did not apply and the tribunal was not bound by 
previous case law. 
49 In its commentary of these provisions, Schreuer does not refer to such 'public function'. C. Schreuer et 
al., The ICSID Convention : A Commentary (2009) 34-43. 
50 See numerous doctrinal references in Chapter 5. In practice, the two sides of the debate have been 
crystalized in already cited AES v. Argentina (supra n.48) in which the tribunal is very skeptical about the 
possible existence of a requirement to follow previous decisions, and in Saipem v. Bengladesh where the 
tribunal expressly referred to a duty "to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment 




"While there is no system of precedent, it is a fundamental principle of the rule of 
law that like cases should be decided alike, unless a strong reason exists to 
distinguish the current case from previous ones."51 
This affirmation is consistent with the famous excerpts of the award in AAPL v. Sri 
Lanka. In that seminal case, the arbitrators explained that their task was primarily to 
settle the dispute brought before the tribunal, and to do that 'in the light of' identified 
precedent and international legal authority applicable in the dispute.52 
It follows from these cases, that tribunals may well refer to precedent, in order to arrive 
at a decision, but are not strictly bound by them. Arguably then, tribunals have little 
incentive to take into consideration the legal system in which they operate. Yes, one may 
argue that tribunals gain credibility when issuing a decision consistent with previous 
decisions, awarded for similar cases, but nevertheless, they have (i) no obligation to 
follow such decisions, and (ii) no guarantee that their decision will be followed in the 
future.53 These factors can be viewed as obstacles to the fulfillment of a public function 
by investment tribunals.  
In addition to the discussion on the role of precedent in investment arbitration, other 
considerations can be used to highlight the limited impact of the public function of 
investment tribunals.  For instance, when looking at the relation between international 
investment law and national law for instance, or when examining claims on the ripeness 
of a claim, tribunals have repeatedly highlighted that their role was bound by the parties 
agreement, and that they consider themselves to be a forum to settle a specific dispute, 
not a supranational body, assuming an appeal function.54 
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that an investment tribunal's main function is 
to settle the disputes brought before it according to the terms of the parties agreement, 
on the basis of which it has jurisdiction. In other words, an investment tribunal's main 
function is a private function. 
Contrary to the WTO legal system, in the investment agreements of today, there exist 
no clear legal provisions, such as the WTO DSU Article 3.2, that would warrant the 
affirmation that investment tribunals should engage in a public function, viz. act in a way 
                                                                                                                                                   
law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards 
certainty of the rule of law" Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, 
Award (30 Jun. 2009) ¶90.  
51 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Award (10 Feb. 2012) 
¶52. 
52 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 
June 1990)¶78. 
53 Several scholars have criticized such limitations, as they can be viewed as the major cause of malfunction 
for the investor-State arbitration system. See F. Ortino 'Legal Reasoning of International Investment 
Tribunals: A Typology of Egregious Failures' (2012) 3 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 31. 
54 See e.g. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Arbitral 
Award (26 Jan. 2006) ¶125, where the tribunal held that it was not its function to act as a court of appeal 





that is coherent with general considerations about the international investment legal 
regime as a whole. In international trade dispute settlement, this public function is 
predominant, and can be viewed as one that is equally as important as that regarding the 
settlement of the dispute. In international investment dispute settlement, this public 
function primarily exists, if at all, as an accessory. Claims to the contrary are purely 
normative. 
Certainly, one may view this as a regrettable conclusion. Several authors have pleaded in 
favour of a reform of the system, in order to compel arbitral tribunals to be more 
deferent towards the investment legal regime as a whole. These claims are interesting, 
especially in the light of numerous critiques formulated against investment arbitration. 
3. Changes Ahead? The (Limited) Practical Resonance of The 
Argument on the Public Function of Investment Tribunals 
International Investment Law as Global Public Law: The Claim… 
For several years, investment arbitration has faced numerous critiques and is going 
through what one might call 'a legitimacy crisis'.55 The reasons for these critiques, and 
their substance, fall outside the scope of the present chapter. It shall only be noted that 
some authors have argued that one way to overcome this 'crisis' would be to recognize 
that investment tribunals do, in fact, enjoy a public function. Schill has recently 
developed this argument, using as a starting point the differences between commercial 
arbitration and investment arbitration. He explains that the activity of investment treaty 
arbitrators is not limited to the settlement of disputes between two parties, unlike the 
activity of commercial arbitrators. Rather, an investment tribunal operates "in a larger 
framework of international investment protection and has effects as a governance 
mechanism on stakeholders that are not parties to the proceedings."56 The basic idea 
underlying this conception is that an investment tribunal's activity has far reaching 
consequences, which have an impact upon other stakeholders in the international 
investment legal regime as a whole, and not just the parties to the dispute. Therefore, the 
function of investment tribunals should be conceptualized differently. This reasoning is 
certainly appealing. It does, indeed, seem difficult to refute the fact that investment 
awards and decisions, when taken all together, constitute a body of rules that affects far 
more than the interests of one single investor and one single respondent State before a 
given investment tribunal. In my view, however, this observation does not suffice in 
order to claim that investment tribunals are endogenously embodied with a public 
function, let alone one as important as that which can be identified within the WTO's 
dispute settlement mechanisms. 
                                                 
55 For a broad overview and an insightful evaluation of these critiques see M. Waibel et al., The Backlash 
against Investment Arbitration : Perceptions and Reality (2010). The expression 'legitimacy crisis' has been 
used by several authors. See e.g., S.R. Franck 'The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions' (2005) 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521.  
56 Schill (supra n.14) 428. 




To clarify, I am not claiming that investment arbitral tribunals should not have such 
public function. Neither do I argue that, from the point of view of an external observer, it 
is invalid to say that an investment arbitrator might proclaim upon issues that usually 
fall within the scope of public law.57 I simply argue that this observation cannot imply 
that investment arbitration tribunals should be empowered with a public function or 
should consider themselves as being granted with this power. Claims as to the contrary 
are purely normative: no matter the perception of academics, practice has not changed. 
Nor can we identify arbitration rules or IIA's that today encapsulate this idea. 58 
Furthermore, it may be argued that there still remain several obstacles in the way of a 
claim that such changes will occur in the future. 
…And its Difficult Application in Practice 
Firstly, it seems difficult to believe that tribunals themselves could expressly claim such 
power. An arbitral tribunal's authority necessarily derives from the consent of the parties 
to an international agreement, that clarifies what body will have the authority to settle a 
legal dispute between the parties, should such arise. In principle, the powers of any 
international arbitral tribunal are those conferred upon it by the parties to the 
arbitration agreement themselves, within the limits allowed by the applicable laws to the 
said arbitration agreement.59 Additionally, it is admitted that, limited powers may be 
conferred to the tribunals by operation of rules originating from the legal system within 
which the tribunal is operating.60 
In investment arbitration, it is the consent of both parties, that conclude the IIA upon 
which the dispute is initiated, as well as the parties to the dispute itself that shall be 
considered. State-parties to IIAs frame a tribunal's marge de manoeuvre. They do so 
                                                 
57 For instance, it is not questionable that an investment tribunal can be competent to examine the validity 
of a public regulatory measure, or a public contract, in light of international law. Cases in which this type 
of question has been raised are numerous. See on this issue, the recent survey of the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development ("IISD"): L. Johnson and O. Volkov, State Liability for Regulatory Change: How 
International Investment Rules are Overriding Domestic Law (Jan. 2014) IISD – Investment Treaty News, 
available at <http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/01/06/state-liability-for-regulatory-change-how-
international-investment-rules-are-overriding-domestic-law/> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
58 Interestingly, the current German Ministry of Economics Affairs affirmed, during a meeting with 
current European Trade Commissioner C. Malmström in February 2015, that his teams were working "on 
a way to replace the conventional arbitration court system with one based on public law". The EU 
commissioner found that "it was a very good idea, but noted that "[a]t the same time, it cannot be 
implemented from one day to the next" and affirmed that, meanwhile, the new EU investment policy will 
include 'less ambitious reforms' of the arbitration system. See EurActiv, 'Malmström: Germany's TTIP 
debate 'more heated'', 24 Feb. 2015, available at <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-
society/malmstrom-germanys-ttip-debate-more-heated-312354> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
59 Gaillard E. Gaillard & J. Savage (eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (1999) ; A. Redfern & M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
(2004) 947.  
60  For studies on general international litigation, see C. Brown, 'Inherent Powers in International 
Adjudication' in C. Romano, K.J. Alter & Y. Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 
(2014) 828. For a more detailed enquiry on international investment arbitration, see e.g. M. Paparinskis, 
'Inherent Powers of ICSID Tribunals: Broad and Rightly So', in I. Laird and T.J. Weiler, Investment Treaty 





directly when they tailor ad hoc arbitration clauses and procedural rules within their 
agreement, or indirectly when they simply refer to existing arbitration rules or centers 
(i.e. ICSID, UNCITRAL, etc.). When a claimant initiates the arbitration proceedings to 
the dispute, and possibly adapts them, provided the Respondent State agrees, the 
claimant validates the scope of these powers. As we have seen earlier, existing 
investment rules do not seem to expressly provide arbitral tribunals with a public 
function. Rather, they emphasize the private function of investment tribunals, as these 
rules refer to specific procedural tools shaped exclusively to settle disputes. 
A particularly interesting example is the final draft of the investment chapter that will be 
included in the EU-Canada FTA, or Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
("CETA"). The CETA investment chapter seeks to reflect a modern approach towards 
investment arbitration.61 Indeed, one of the most important goals of the EU Commission 
in concluding this agreement has been to establish the 'most progressive' system of 
investor-State dispute settlement. 62  One may thus argue that it was the perfect 
opportunity for stakeholders of the investor-State arbitration system to expressly grant 
tribunals with a public function. The CETA drafters could have included, in the 
investment chapter, a provision like that which can  be found in WTO-DSU Article 3, 
giving arbitral tribunals broader authority to go beyond the settlement of disputes and 
engage in normative clarification. Yet, this did not happen. The available draft of the 
investment chapter in no way refers to such authority. The first provision of the dispute 
settlement section, entitled 'purpose' in previous versions of the draft, but now called 
'Scope of a Claim to Arbitration' read as follows:  
"Without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Chapter 
[XY] [Dispute Settlement], an investor of a Party may submit to arbitration 
under this Section a claim that the respondent has breached an obligation under: 
Section 3 (Non-Discriminatory Treatment) […] 
Section 4 (Investment Protection) of this Chapter; and 
where the investor claims to have suffered loss or damage as a result of the alleged 
breach. […]."63  
Similarly to the various agreements mentioned before, the provision of this last-
generation investment agreement focuses only on the dispute-settlement aspect of 
investment arbitration.  
Furthermore, while it is admitted that tribunals also have prerogatives conferred to them 
by the operation of law,64 or even powers that are inherent to their missions,65 these 
                                                 
61 European Commission, 'Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement', DG Trade 
Factsheet, 26 Sept. 2014, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015). 
62 Ibid. 
63 The current draft of the CETA is available on the EU Commission website, at the following address < 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 




powers and prerogatives are not without limits. In an ICSID arbitration case, a 'manifest 
excess of power' from the tribunal is a basis for the annulment of the award. A tribunal 
that would start regulating in light of the system's interest, rather than in light of that of 
the parties to the dispute, would undoubtedly take the risk of seeing the award 
annulled.66 It is not surprising then to notice that tribunals have been very careful when 
examining the scope of their prerogatives. In Frontier Petrolum v. Czech Republic,67 the 
tribunal introduced its discourse on the merits affirming that "[i]n assessing the Parties' 
arguments on the interpretation of the relevant BIT provisions as well as Claimant's 
treaty violation claims, this Tribunal's task is limited to applying the relevant provisions 
of the BIT as far as necessary in order to decide on the relief sought by the Parties."68 In 
Lemire v. Ukraine, while examining whether measures taken by the Ukrainian parliament 
amounted to a violation of the FET standard of the US-Ukraine BIT, the tribunal 
insisted on its 'limited' powers:  
"The Arbitral Tribunal naturally respects the legislative function or the Ukrainian 
Parliament. It certainly is not the task of this Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under 
the ICSID Convention, to review or second-guess the rules which the 
representatives of the Ukrainian people have promulgated. The powers of this 
Tribunal are much more limited: they only encompass the authority to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether Ukraine has violated certain guarantees, offered to 
American investors under the BIT, and to establish the appropriate remedies."69 
Moving on to consider the scope of its authority, regarding the possibility of enforcing 
FET protection, the tribunal repeated that it could not consider itself as a regulator.  
"The arbitrators are not superior regulators; they do not substitute their judgment 
for that of national bodies applying national laws. The international tribunal’s sole 
duty is to consider whether there has been a treaty violation."70 
In my view, these affirmations are compelling examples of how tribunals perceive their 
own function. This function is limited and focused on dispute-settlement.  
A second obstacle to a possible change in the conception of the function of investment 
tribunals, is the concurrence that exists amongst the international arbitration centers 
used for investment disputes, and the diverse costs this change would imply. The best 
                                                                                                                                                   
64 Redfern & Hunter (supra n.59) 280-82; G. Cordero Moss, 'Tribunal's Powers versus Party Autonomy' in 
P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino & C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2009) 
1207. 
65 See generally, Brown (supra n.13). 
66 This has not happen so far. Nevertheless, the ICSID Appellate Committee has already decided that a 
failure in the application of the law chosen by the parties could lead to an excess of powers. Industria 
Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Perú, S.A. (also know as "Lucchetti") v. Peru, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4 (Decision on Annulment, 5 Sept. 2007) ¶¶111-14. 
67 Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czeck Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (12 Nov. 2010).  
68 Ibid. ¶25.  
69 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (14 
Jan. 2010) ¶240.  





way to grant a public function to investment tribunals, is to introduce changes to either 
IIAs or arbitration rules, or both. For instance, one option could be the introduction, to 
the ICSID convention for example, of provisions with a similar language to that of  
Article 3.2 WTO-DSU. However, this type of change comes at a cost. 
Firstly, such a change has a cost for the arbitration centers and institutions themselves. 
Amending the text of the ICSID Convention for instance, can be complex, since 
amendments can only occur when a consensus is reached amongst all the parties to the 
convention. Similarly, a given State eager to give more authority to investment tribunals 
would have to change its model-BIT, and either amend its existing agreements or reach 
interpretative agreements with all its counter-parts in such agreements, operations that 
would bear a certain cost for both parties. It is therefore reasonable to assume that not 
all the procedural rules, or IIAs would be changed at the same time.  
Secondly, the widening of the function of investment tribunals would also bear a cost for 
the parties to the dispute. Arguably, the burden that would be carried by investment 
tribunals, having been requested to clarify the law in a coherent manner for international 
investment law as a whole, in addition to settling the dispute at hand, would weigh 
heavy, with the added possibility of the former outweighing the latter. Such costs would, 
necessarily, be borne by the disputing parties. However, given the voluminous pleading, 
massive legal costs already common in investment arbitration proceedings, and the 
burdens placed upon parties, even a modest increase in expenses could be seen as a 
possible obstacle, that any player would like to eschew.71 Therefore, it would not be 
surprising to observe parties, and primarily claimants, trying to avoid the fora in which 
the proceedings are burdened because of the costly authority granted to the tribunals. A 
claimant who is not interested in a forum where the adjudicator embodies the power of 
normative creation or clarification prerogatives, might seek arbitration before another 
institution. To do so, the claimant would simply have to initiate the claim through a 
corporate subsidiary of the appropriate nationality, and thus use another BIT that offers 
another option for dispute settlement. The jurisprudence regarding access to 'mailbox 
companies' to BIT protections in certain circumstances being relatively liberal, the risk 
of strategic initiation can be seen as particularly acute. Thus, without even discussing the 
negative consequences of this possible behavior, known as 'treaty shopping', it seems 
clear that any attempt to give investment tribunals more powers, in order to enhance 
their public function could be undermined, as such improvement could be seen as costly 
for the parties to an investment dispute, arguably leading parties to seek possibilities 
which would allow them to avoid such costs elsewhere.  
To be clear, and as already mentioned, it is undisputed that developing the public 
function of investment tribunals would have some advantages. In my view, this is 
therefore desirable. But the sole desire of (young) academics is not enough to modify the 
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behavior of investment tribunals. Provided that no major structural reforms are taken in 
context of the new EU investment policy, the function of investment arbitrators is not 
likely to change in the foreseeable future.  
III. STANDING AND JURISDICTION 
In this section, I will extend the analysis to include the structural differences between 
trade and investment dispute settlement mechanisms, whereby I will seek to prove that 
these differences are too grave for us to entertain the notion of convergence between the 
two disciplines. The dynamics of investment arbitration (how the mission that has been 
identified in section one is put into practice), will be put to scrutiny and compared with 
trade dispute settlement. In order to accomplish this, I will be comparing the issue of 
standing before the adjudicative bodies and the basic aspects of their jurisdiction.72 Here 
again, I focus on the rationale of the existing general rules and principles which delineate 
the conditions for an allegedly aggrieved player to bring a dispute before an investment 
tribunal or WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and those delaminating the scope of 
authority for the adjudicators in both disciplines. 
A. STANDING: STATE-TO-STATE VS. INVESTOR-STATE  
In this section, I will be following the same methodology assumed in the previous 
section, by first providing a brief description of the WTO regime, followed by a more 
detailed examination of the international investment regime. The reasons for this 
repartition are the same as those presented above: standing in WTO dispute settlement 
is more straightforward than investment arbitration, the latter being subject to 
ideological considerations. 
1. WTO Dispute Settlement: State Exclusive Right to Initiate 
Proceedings 
The Law 
Pursuant to the text of the WTO agreements, only countries that are signatories to the 
WTO Agreements –i.e. 'WTO Members'– are subject to the obligations enshrined in 
them, and may benefit from the rights recognized therein.73 In Japan – Film, the Panel 
explicitly insisted on this affirmation:  
                                                 
72 As noted by Schneider, the first of these two elements (standing) is one of the principal factors that allow 
for the differentiation between international economic dispute resolution regimes. See, A.K. Schneider 
'Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations' 
(1999) 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 697, 705-06. The second (jurisdiction) is analyzed here as a corollary of standing. 
Once the parties, that can appear before the tribunal, have been identified, it is indeed necessary to 
understand how the tribunal will exercise its authority upon the case brought before it. This cannot be 
done without a careful presentation of the jurisdictional principles before the two mechanisms.  
73  According to Article XII.1 of the Marrakech Agreement "[a]ny State or separate customs union 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations" to become a Member of the 
WTO. As only WTO members to the WTO can initiate dispute pursuant to the DSU, it follows that only 





"[t]he WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in respect of which only 
national governments and separate customs territories are directly subject to 
obligations."74 
Consequently, the rights and obligations on dispute settlement procedures as covered by 
the DSU are reserved to WTO Members. The text of the DSU refers exclusively to the 
'Members', allowing them to take part in the dispute settlement proceedings either as a 
claimant, a respondent, or a third‐party. Private entities (natural or juridical persons), 
and countries that are not WTO Members, are not granted any standing rights in the 
dispute settlement mechanism. As affirmed by the AB in the US – Shrimp case: 
"only Members may become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, 
and only Members 'having a substantial interest in the matter before the Panel' 
may become third parties in the proceedings before the Panel."75 
The WTO dispute settlement procedures are thus foreseen purely for the resolution of 
State‐to‐State conflicts. The obligations enshrined in the WTO agreements apply 
exclusively to WTO Members, and so do the rights enshrined in said agreements, along 
with the ability to seek their enforcement. Legal standing in WTO disputes is, therefore, 
relatively straightforward.76 It remains an exclusive right of States. 
Remarks 
To be clear, the law of the WTO only allows Members, i.e. States, to bring claims before 
the WTO adjudicators. However, this should not be understood as implying that only 
States have interests, and are consequently the only ones engrossed, in WTO litigation. 
Against this backdrop, it is clear that WTO dispute settlement is an intergovernmental 
forum and that private parties have no right of standing in WTO disputes.77 Yet, this 
does not mean that private parties do not get involved in WTO disputes. In fact, it is 
generally accepted that even though the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is reserved 
for States, private interests are usually found at the very origins of many (not to say 
every) disputes,78 this is so because the beneficiaries of multi-lateral trade regulation are 
to be found, ultimately, amongst private entities.79 To confirm this assertion, one can for 
                                                 
74 Japan — Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, Panel Report (31 Mar. 
1998) ¶10.52. 
75 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (AB 
Report, 12 Oct. 1998) ¶101 (hereinafter 'AB Report, US–Shrimp).  
76 WTO judges have had to address several legal and technical questions about legal standing, for instance 
about the legal interest of the claimant in the dispute. For a clear overview of these questions that touch 
upon considerations that are not directly related to the present development, see e.g. M.J. Trebilcock, R. 
Howse & A. Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (2013) 183-87.  
77 Scholars have demonstrated that the State-to-State structure of WTO litigation was actually consistent 
with the objective of the WTO legal regime. See e.g. A.O. Sykes 'Public versus Private Enforcement of 
International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy' (2005) 34 J. Legal Stud. 631, 646-54.  
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instance refer to the procedures involved in registering trade complaints before the 
Office of the US Trade Representative 80  or before the DG Trade of the European 
Commission. 81  These procedures are open to private parties and clearly aim at 
introducing an investigation, which will be led by the competent public authority (the 
USTR, or DG Trade) and which might result in the lodging of a claim before the WTO 
DSB. The DG Trade factsheet on how to file a Trade Barrier Regulation complaint is 
instructive in this regard, as it explains, in its very first development, that the purpose of 
such a complaint is the launch of an investigation and the attempt from the European 
Commission "to use bilateral contacts, WTO dispute settlement, or other dispute 
settlement procedures to remove the trade barrier."82 
Additionally, authors have noted that private parties may assist governments in the 
conduct and treatment of a trade dispute,83 as well as at the end of the dispute when 
counter-measures are imposed. 84  Finally, private parties can also be more directly 
involved in WTO dispute-settlement, as amicus curiae briefs have been accepted in WTO 
disputes.85  
                                                                                                                                                   
and predictability affects mostly these individual operators. Trade is conducted most often and 
increasingly by private operators. It is through improved conditions for these operators that Members 
benefit from WTO disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows from a breach is often 
indirect and results from the impact of the breach on the market place and the activities of individuals 
within it". Panel Report, US–Section 301, ¶¶7.76-77. 
80 The USTR Webpage includes a section on enforcement, which explains the various steps that need to be 
taken in order to report a trade barrier and request the government to initiate proceedings before the 
WTO. See, <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). See also, the 
webpage of the US Department of Commerce which includes a specific 'on-line' form dedicated to private 
agents who wish to report a trade barrier: <http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp> (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
81  The EU Commission DG Trade offers a webpage dedicated to trade barrier investigations. See, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-settlement/trade-barrier-
investigations/index_en.htm> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
82  EC Commission – DG Trade 'Trade Barriers Regulation – Filing a Complaint' (2013) available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150984.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
83 G.C. Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation (2003) 143. Schaffer indeed 
explains that "WTO legal rights affect company and industry-specific interests. Details of market shares 
and legal arguments are the province of business executives and legal advocates, not State–or more remote 
European Community– diplomats. The more legalized international trading system creates stringer 
incentives for well-placed private actors to engage public legal processes. To litigate effectively, in the 
WTO system, government officials need the specific information that business and their legal 
representatives can provide. Officials therefore strive to establish better working relations with industry 
on trade matters. The engagement of private firms, in turn, helps nations public officials render 
international public law more effective– hence the reciprocal relationship between WTO public law and 
private interest".  
84 B. Hoekman & P. Mavroidis 'Bite the Bullet: Trade Retaliation, EU Jurisprudence and the Law and 
Economics of 'Taking One for the Team'' (2013) EUI Working Paper No.RSCAS2013/32, available at 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27034/RSCAS_2013_32.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015). 
85 The impact of amicus curiae participation on the structure of the WTO settlement mechanism has been 
discussed, see Sykes (supra n.77) 641 and references therein. For a critical appraisal of the tradeoffs of 
amicus participation see P.C. Mavroidis, 'Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing' 
in A. Von Bogdandy, P.C. Mavroidis & Y. Mény (eds.), European integration and international co-ordination: 





However, the fact that private parties can participate directly (through amicus briefs) or 
indirectly (when shadowing governments involved in trade disputes), does not confer 
onto them the right to bring a dispute before a WTO adjudicator. Contrary to 'legal 
standing', the operation of amicus curiae submissions does not concern the execution of a 
right of individuals to be heard defending their particular interests, but rather it is 
understood as providing a form of assistance to the tribunals that allows for the 
expression of interests –private or public – not otherwise formally represented in the 
jurisdictional process. Similarly, when private actors are indirectly involved in disputes, 
because they advocate for the case to be brought before the WTO adjudicators, they do 
not legally act as litigants to the dispute, and thus the WTO agreements do not confer 
them any rights with regards to the possibility of bringing a case forward. 86  To 
conclude, private parties can, in a way, be involved in WTO disputes, but nevertheless, 
have no right of standing before a WTO dispute settlement body.  
2. Investment Arbitration: Hybrid Mechanisms and a Private 
Right of Action  
The Law 
Dispute resolution clauses in investment treaties usually share the same purpose and 
structure: they give a private entity the possibility to initiate a legal action before an 
international court, usually through the format of an arbitral tribunal, against a State in 
the territory in which an investment has been made.  
Thus, from a technical point of view, standing, in investment arbitration, is associated 
with the notions of investments and investors. It is accepted that the definition of these 
two connected notions delineates who has standing in investment arbitration.87 In IIA 
language, and to simplify,88 an investor is a private person (whether an individual or a 
legal person), national of the party to an investment agreement that has been made to 
cover an investment in the territory of the other party to the agreement, according to the 
terms of said agreement. Hence, a full presentation of the concept of standing in 
investment arbitration requires (i) a detailed definition of ‘investment’, and (ii) an 
examination of the conditions under which a private persons can be qualified as a 
‘national’, and is thus allowed to benefit from the protection of the investment 
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Bungenberg et al. (eds.), International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 1212. 




agreement. This double-analysis goes beyond the scope of the present study.89 That 
being said, what should be kept in mind is that international investment agreements 
allow investors, usually private parties, to bring, before an arbitral tribunal, a dispute 
against a sovereign State when such dispute regards an investment made within the 
territory of said State. This mechanism reflects the very essence of an investment 
protection agreement, which is to provide private entities with the possibility of claiming 
damages for an international wrongdoing, before an international court.  
The ICSID Convention provides additional information regarding the concept of 
standing in investment arbitration. Article 25(1) of the Convention, which relates to the 
jurisdiction of the Center, reads as follows: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 
Accordingly, under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Convention 
applies to investment disputes between, on the one hand, contracting States, and on the 
other, 'nationals' of other contracting States. The two elements of 'investment' and 
'foreign national', identified earlier, are present in this text as well. Commenting on this 
provision, A. Broches, who was the General Counsel of the World Bank at the time when 
the Convention was being prepared, highlighted that the basic feature of ICSID 
arbitration was to create a forum to settle disputes between States and private parties. 
Broches indeed noted that the requirement upon which ICISD arbitration shall be used 
to settle disputes between 'contracting States' and 'nationals of other contracting States' 
is in keeping with the purpose of the Convention, to create an international forum for the 
settlement of disputes between states and foreign investors." 90 He then added that "the 
facilities of the Centre are neither available for disputes between private parties who can 
either have recourse to national courts or to commercial arbitration, nor for disputes 
between states who can bring their disputes before the International Court of Justice or 
can agree to submit them to conciliation or arbitration through conventional 
arrangements."91 It should be clear that IIAs, as well as the ICSID, create the possibility 
for investors – viz. private parties – to bring actions against sovereign States.  
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90 A. Broches, Selected Essays, World Bank, ICSID, and other Subjects of Public and Private International Law 
(1995) 167. 






Investment agreements vest the right for foreign nationals and legal entities to bring a 
claim directly against a sovereign State before an investment tribunal. This affirmation is 
fundamental and needs to be further examined.  
Soon after the first investment treaty cases arose, several authors have attempted to 
theorize the mechanism instituted by these clauses. 92  According to these authors, 
investor-State arbitration was an innovative mechanism of international adjudication 
that needed to be conceptualized accordingly.93 Z. Douglas' 2003 article is usually seen 
as one of the first important attempts of forming such a conceptualization.94 Two general 
observations can be identified in Douglas's work. The first, is that investment arbitration 
cannot be "rationalised either as a form of public international or private transnational 
dispute resolution."95 The second, is that investment arbitration is a mechanism that 
allows for the enforcement of obligations directly owed by a private entity.  
The first observation is straight-forward: investment arbitration embodies elements of 
both public and private international law, and so can be qualified as a hybrid mechanism 
of dispute settlement. In Douglas' own words:96 
"Investment treaties are international instruments between states governed by the 
public international law of treaties. The principal beneficiary of the investment 
treaty regime is most often a corporate entity established under a municipal law, 
while the legal interests protected by the regime are a bundle of rights in an 
investment arising under a different municipal law. The standards of protection are 
fixed by an international treaty, but liability for their breach is said to give rise to a 
'civil or commercial' award for enforcement purposes."97 
Hence, the presence of the state, along with the fact that the basis of arbitration relies on 
an international agreement, do not allow for the apprehension of investor-State 
arbitration as identical to international commercial arbitration.98 On the other hand, 
                                                 
92 See e.g., G. Sacerdoti 'Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection' (1997) 
269 Hague Recueil 251 ; J. Paulsson 'Arbitration Without Privity' (1995) 10 ICSID Rev.–FILJ 232 ; E. 
Gaillard 'L’arbitrage sur le fondement des traités de protection des investissements' (2003) Rev. Arb. 853.  
93 B. Legum 'The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA' (2002) 43 Harvard Int'l L. J. 
531; see also T.W. Wälde, 'The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration' in T.W. Wälde & P. Khan (eds.), 
New Aspects of International Investment Law (2007) 43. Authors also generally refer to ‘the specific’ or ‘sui 
generis’ nature of international investment litigation, see e.g. Ibid. See also the thesis, in French, of W. Ben 
Hamida, L'arbitrage transnational unilatéral (2003) thèse de doctorat, Paris 2. Finally, for a recent study on 
the paradigm shift in the literature about the conceptualisation of the mechanism, see A. Roberts 'Clash of 
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System' (2013) 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45. 
94 Z. Douglas 'The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2003) 74 Brit. YB Int'l L. 151.  
95 Ibid. 161.  
96 Ibid. 161 [emphasis added], citing Paulsson (supra n.92).  
97 Ibid. 163.  
98 In order to emphasize the specific nature of such investor/state arbitral tribunals, some have refered to 
the Iran-US tribunals or even to mixed arbitral tribunals created by the Treaty of Versailles after the second 
world-war to settle claims arising out of damage or injury inflicted upon property, rights or interests of 
Allied nationals in German territory. See e.g. G. Cuniberti 'Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment 
Dispute Settlement' (2006) 21 ICSID Rev. 381, 391. 




investor-State arbitration cannot be considered as a specific kind of diplomatic protection 
claim because, ultimately, private persons control the arbitration, and because the regime 
and conditions of the functioning of these two mechanisms are different.99 From this 
primary observation we arrive at the second idea in Douglas' work: Investor-State 
arbitration does not derive from diplomatic protection, where private interests are 
espoused by the State, which can initiate an action before an international adjudicator. 
Rather, IIAs create rights that are directly owned by private persons, individuals or, 
more likely, legal persons. And it is up to persons such as these to initiate the dispute. By 
way of consequence, the 'functional control of the claim' belongs to the individual, and to 
the individual only, 100 and the national state of the investor does not have standing 
before the investor-State tribunal.101  
As Douglas notes, 102  contrary to diplomatic protection, the national State is not 
supposed to have discretion as to whether to introduce a claim before an arbitral tribunal 
on behalf of its allegedly injured investor. Nor can it interfere in the arbitral proceedings: 
"[i]n pursuing its own claim, the investor is under no obligation to inform its national 
state of the existence of the arbitral proceedings, nor to consult with its national-State on 
the substantive and procedural issues that arise in the proceedings." 103  One could 
certainly argue that the term 'obligation' here is straightforward and that investors are 
simply not used to informing their national states. Yet, it still remains that, today, home 
governments have no formal influences on the process, once the investment proceedings 
begin.104 
Of course, the national-State can intervene as a non-disputing party,105 or issue, together 
with the other party to the international treaty, interpretative statements.106 But these 
                                                 
99 Douglas explains that “[t]he functional assumption underlying the investment treaty regime is clearly 
that the investor is bringing a cause of action based upon the vindication of its own rights rather than 
those of its national state. In these circumstances it is untenable to super-impose the Mavrommatis 
formula of diplomatic protection over a triangular relationship between investor, its national state and the 
host state of the investment in order to rationalize 'arbitration without privity' under investment treaties.” 
Douglas (supra n.94) 182, referring to The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), Judgment on 
Objection to Jurisdiction of the Court (30 Aug. 1924), PCIJ Series A No 2, at 12. 
100 Ibid.183. 
101 Ibid. 183. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Interestingly, new generation IIAs might change this practice as obligations to inform home-State are 
being included as conditions to initiate the investment proceedings. See for instance the CETA Current 
Draft Article X.18. 
105 In theory, the home-State could participate to the proceedings as an amicus curiae. In at least one case, 
between a Dutch investor and the Slovak Republic, in which the validity of the BIT was challenged by the 
host-State, the Netherlands submitted observations to the arbitral tribunal about their view on the 
question. Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic (also know as 'Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic [I]'), UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (26 Oct. 2010)¶¶145-175. 
106 A. Roberts has published a comprehensive study on the role of States (home-State and host-States) in 





actions do not affect the right of the investor to bring the case before the tribunal.107 
Hence, the possible participation of the national-State does not change the configuration 
of the mechanism. To the contrary, the above-mentioned cases show that the investor, 
and its national-State, may have diverging opinions regarding an opportunity to bring 
an investment claim. 
Sykes, in an already mentioned article, has demonstrated that the nature of investment 
arbitration, as described above, is coherent with the political economy of investment 
agreements. According to him, the investor is guided, in bringing forward its claim, 
solely by the dictates of self-interest, without necessarily having regard for any 
consequences that such may have for the diplomatic relationship between its nation-State 
and the host-State. 108 The investor bears, exclusively, the 'functional control' of the 
claim, and by consequence the financial burden of presenting such a claim falls 
exclusively on said investor. Damages recovered in the award are transferred to the 
account of the investor and the nation-State has no legal interest in the compensation 
fixed by the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, the home-State (who concluded the 
agreement in the first place) does not have to engage in the diplomatic protection of its 
investor and saves the costs of doing so (selecting which investors 'deserve protection', 
engaging in the disputes, and finding a way to compensate its investor in case of success 
of the claim, etc.). 
B. JURISDICTION: RESTRICTIVE VS. EXTENSIVE  
Another interesting way to compare the dynamics of investment arbitration with that of 
WTO dispute settlement, is to look at the scope of their jurisdictional powers. Article 23 
prohibits WTO members from referring a case to another international adjudicative 
body when the case concerns a dispute arising from the application or interpretation of 
WTO agreements. It thus gives 'exclusive competence' to WTO judge for the 
examination of a possible breach of WTO rules. Conversely, the scope held by the WTO 
                                                                                                                                                   
investment agreements and, by doing so, frame the tribunal's margin of action. See A. Roberts 'Power and 
Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States' (2010) 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 179. 
107 Douglas actually explains that in several instances, national-State have voiced their disagreement with 
the arbitral proceedings. Douglas (supra n.94), 170. The author notes for instance that in two NAFTA 
cases Gami v Mexico, and Mondev International Ltd v. United States, the National states of the investor, the 
US in Gami and Canada in Mondev, intervened pursuant to Article 1128 to contend that tribunals had no 
jurisdiction to the investors' claims. See Gami Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican 
States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 Nov. 2004), ¶22 ; Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 Oct. 2002) and Second Submission of Canada Pursuant to 
NAFTA Art. 1128 (6 July 2001). 
108 Sykes (supra n.77) 642-45. For Sykes, the establishment of a private right of action is 'obvious' since the 
central objective of investment agreements is "to induce foreign investors to make new investments in 
developing countries at a lower interest rate […] A promise of monetary compensation to investors is 
[…] a cheap commitment device for states with benign intentions toward investors and a cheap way for 
states with more benign intentions than others to signal their type. As long as the capital-importing nation 
is confident that it does not wish to engage in prohibited behavior, then the private right of action on 
behalf of foreign investors is not a burden on it but a clear benefit". Ibid.  




judge can be seen as restricted, since they are strictly limited to the sole enforcement of 
WTO norms. 
By contrast, investment tribunals do not have any kind of exclusive jurisdiction over an 
investment breach. International investment law, as a regime, is decentralized and there 
is no one single adjudicator that can claim exclusive competence to implement and 
enforce investment protection rules. Additionally, the scope of the power of investment 
arbitration review is relatively broad, and can even be enlarged by mechanisms crafted in 
practice: investment tribunals are regularly asked to review claims that are based on 
legal rules which are not to be found in investment agreements, but that are 'imported' 
into the dispute.  
1. Jurisdiction of the WTO Adjudicator: Compulsory, Exclusive 
and Specialized 
The jurisdiction of the WTO Panels, and the AB, has been qualified as "compulsory, 
exclusive and not general."109 Compulsory because when WTO members access the WTO 
organization, they consent to the jurisdiction of the WTO adjudicative bodies and, 
according to the basic principle of international litigation, cannot then refuse to appear 
before it.110 Compulsory does not mean absolute, and in the WTO, like for any other 
international adjudicators, the jurisdiction of dispute settlement body is not without 
limits. Firstly,  WTO panels and AB's jurisdiction is materially limited to WTO 
disputes. This simple affirmation has been recalled by the AB itself in Mexico – Taxes on 
Soft Drinks, in response to Mexico's argument about the necessity to take into account 
prior NAFTA proceedings related to the dispute. 111 Secondly, as noted by Van Damme, 
general principles such as non ultra petita, and the principle according to which it is for 
the State to decide how to implement a given ruling issued by an international court, can 
also be used to delineate the jurisdiction of the WTO panels and AB.112 In any event, and 
according to another general principle of international litigation, it is the WTO panels 
                                                 
109 I. Van Damme, 'Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation' in D. Bethlehem et al. (eds.), Oxford 
Hanbook of International Trade Law (2009) 298, 299.  
110 This basic principle was affirmed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case. In this landmark case, the world 
court affirmed that consent provides the cornerstone for the exercise of jurisdiction by any international 
court or tribunal Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment 
on Preliminary Objection (25 Mar. 1948), ICJ Reports 1948, 15. The principle was re-affirmed by the 
Court in the Peace Treaty Interpretation Advisory Opinion. The Court declared it was "well established" that 
"no judicial proceedings relating to a legal question pending between States can take place without their 
consent", Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion – 1st Phase 
(30 Mar. 1950), ICJ Reports 1950, 65, at 71.  
111 Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
(6 Mar. 2006) (hereinafter 'AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks').  





and AB that have the power to determine their own jurisdiction, 113  and thus to 
determine if these principles ought to be applied. 
More importantly, the WTO adjudicative body can be considered as having exclusive 
jurisdiction over a WTO Dispute.114 Indeed, the Article 23 of the DSU provides that: 
1) When members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other 
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they 
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules of procedures of this Understanding. 
2) In such cases, Members shall: 
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that 
benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of 
the covered agreement has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute 
settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding.  
[…] 
Van Damme's comment on this provision is instructive. She explains that "[t]he 
language used in Article 23 (the term 'shall' and the prohibition against utilization of 
alternative procedures) thus appears to indicate an inflexible exclusive jurisdiction 
regime, barring referral of cases arising under the GATT/WTO legal system to any 
outside judicial forum."115  
The WTO DSB has confirmed the exclusive nature of Article 23(1). In US – Section 301 
Trade Act, the Panel explicitly affirmed that Article 23.1 required WTO Members  
"to "have recourse to" the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek 
the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to 
have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other 
system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and 
obligations. This, what one could call "exclusive dispute resolution clause", is an 
important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU."116 
Although it can be argued that this exclusive character is not strictly absolute,117 the role 
of Article 23 is particularly important. By virtue of WTO law, WTO members are 
                                                 
113 This principle has repeatedly been affirmed by WTO panels and the AB. See e.g. US – Anti-Dumping Act 
of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R (AB Report, 28 Aug. 2000), ¶54 and references therein; Mexico – Soft Drinks, 
¶45.  
114 Van Damme (supra n.109) 300. See also, G. Marceau 'Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 
The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties' (2001) 35 J. World Trade 
1081, 1101; Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2003) 183-86. 
115 Van Damme (supra n.109) 300.  
116 Panel Report, US–Section 301, ¶7.43.  
117 One might question the exclusive character in light of the growing use of amicable settlement of WTO 
disputes, tolerated under DSU Article 3.7. See W. Alschner 'Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: 
Bilateral Solutions in a Multilateral System' (2013) 13 World Trade Rev. 65. Shany also makes a four-fold 
argument about the non-absolute character of WTO jurisdiction arrangement. He notes that "[f]irst, it 
should be realized that the DSU permits parties to agree to settle their dispute by way of arbitration, i.e. 
outside the ordinary structure of WTO dispute-settlement institutions (but still subject to control by the 
DSB). Hence, the DSU itself allows for some measure of flexibility in forum selection. Secondly, the 




limited to WTO dispute settlement mechanisms when they seek the enforcement of a 
WTO rule.118 
Finally, the jurisdiction of the WTO DSB can be labeled as restrictive, or not-general, it 
the sense that it is specialized and limited to WTO claims only. In Mexico–Soft Drinks, 
the AB clearly expressed this principle when stating that there is "no basis in the DSU 
for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes."119 In that case, 
Mexico argued that since the US had acted inconsistently with NAFTA law, and the 
measures targeted before the WTO were taken as a consequence of the US's action, 
WTO law could not apply to them. The AB decided that accepting this argument would 
imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to make a determination 
under NAFTA law. In the words of the AB, this is not possible pursuant to Article 3.2 of 
the DSU, which makes clear that said system "serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements." 120  This basic and simple idea is fundamental for the 
present paper. The Panels and the AB have jurisdiction only over WTO claims, i.e. 
claims related to an alleged breach of an obligation issued from WTO instruments. They 
can certainly review the facts of cases, and make the necessary determination to rule the 
case (Articles 7.1 and 11 DSU), but they cannot rule upon another norm, be it 
international or not. As we will see in the next development, this is slightly different for 
investment arbitration.  
                                                                                                                                                   
language used in Article 23(2) is somewhat ambiguous since it only bars ‘determinations ’ by external 
dispute-settlement procedures concerning breach of GATT law, loss of benefits thereunder, or defeat of its 
object. The Article does not explicitly oust the possibility of referring disputes over the interpretation of 
the GATT/WTO agreements to external courts and tribunals (the same observation is valid under Article 
23(1), since it only seems to address violation type disputes). Thirdly, it is not clear whether dispute 
settlement under regional trade arrangements, involving the application of provisions, which provide for 
identical trade benefits to these granted under the GATT and its related agreement, is precluded. On the 
contrary, it is at least arguable that the language of Article 23(2) would not bar recourse to alternative 
procedures if the determinations were formally adopted in the context of a different legal regime, as long 
as it is accepted that they could not produce a res judicata effect under GATT/WTO law. Finally, 
according to Article 1(2) of the DSU, specific dispute-settlement rules found in the covered agreements 
override the provisions of the DSU. As a result, it would seem that specific jurisdiction-regulating clauses, 
such as Article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPSM 
Agreement) providing for non-exclusive jurisdiction of the GATT/WTO dispute-settlement machinery 
should prevail." Shany (supra n.114) 183-85 [references omitted]. Finally, according to Pauwelyn, a WTO 
member, as a defendant in a dispute, could satisfactorily challenge the jurisdiction of a panel or of the AB 
when (i) a non-WTO agreement concluded between the said member and another WTO member, claimant 
in the case, would either forbid the reference to the WTO dispute settlement or confer (exclusive or 
compulsory) jurisdiction to another international body, provided that the said agreement covers matter 
that connected to the case, or (ii) because of the res judicata effect of other rulings. See J. Pauwelyn 'How to 
Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World Trade Organization Law?' (2003) 37 J. 
World Trade 997, 1005-19. 
118 Here, it is important to recall that Article 23 is binding upon WTO Members, and only upon WTO 
Members. WTO does not prevent non-WTO Members (private parties for instance) to claim for a breach 
of WTO before a DSB that would declare itself competent to rule the case.  
119 AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, ¶56 





2. Jurisdiction of Investment Tribunals: Non-exclusive, 
Expandable and Highly-contestable 
Non-Exclusive  
Contrary to WTO dispute settlement, investor-State tribunals do not have any kind of 
exclusive jurisdiction to settle FDI disputes. On the contrary, today it is largely accepted 
that, whilst being the most common and arguably most effective way of resolving such a 
dispute, investor-State arbitration is not the only option for investors. Unlike in the 
WTO regime, the international investment law regime does not select one specific 
method of dispute settlement. Investment arbitration was created in order to provide an 
alternative avenue for redress than that of the courts of the host state. But IIAs hardly 
ever exclude all recourse to state courts. Additionally, nothing prevents investors from 
bringing an investment claim before another international adjudicatory body. Indeed, it 
is because the provisions of IIAs are generally broad, that they can be enforced through 
different types of domestic and/or international courts. International arbitration, 
therefore, remains but one choice among many different available fora. Bishop, Crawford 
and Reisman identify no less than sixteen fora in which investment disputes can, or could 
be, brought, in addition to national courts.121 Such a number can be seen as a positive: it 
reflects the different possibilities given to private persons to act against States that do 
not respect the international obligations to which they have consented. This 'open 
option' is likely to be used by the investors, since it increases the chances of obtaining 
compensation. However, the downside is that it favors forum shopping and heightens the 
potential for parallel proceedings. 
Expandable 
The jurisdiction of investment tribunals can also be qualified as expandable. IIAs contain 
several features that can be used by investors to request a tribunal to rule upon legal 
obligations that are not contained, per se, in the investment treaty. In other words, where 
it is crystal clear that WTO DSBs can only adjudicate upon WTO claims, investment 
tribunals have even been relied upon to address claims that are only indirectly linked to 
BIT provisions, such as claims regarding umbrella clauses, MFN clauses and 
preservation of right clauses, to name but a few examples.  
This idea of 'expandable jurisdiction' is fundamental and will be further developed later 
in the thesis.122 At this stage, it is important to note that the scope of the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
121 R.D. Bishop, J. Crawford & W.M. Reisman, Foreign investment disputes: cases, materials, and commentary 
(2005) 317-490. This range of fora includes: the ICSID, arbitration under the ICSID additional facility 
rules, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the ICC, the LCIA, the SCC, the 
American Arbitration Association, arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, arbitrational under 
ad-hoc arbitration rules, the Permanent Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, the European 
Court of Justice, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and finally, domestic courts. If all these 
fora are not available for all the investors (regional courts, Iran-US Claims Tribunal) or if some of them are 
not operating anymore (PCIJ), the number of available bodies for investors remains relatively high. 
122 See infra Chapter 4, pp.174 et. seq.  




investment tribunals is largely malleable. The rules and criteria (personae, materiae, and 
temporis) that have been used to establish the jurisdiction of one given tribunal are well 
established. A broad interpretation of IIA provisions have, nevertheless, allowed 
tribunals to expand their jurisdiction over matters that are not directly referred to in 
IIAs. 
Highly-Contested 
The third and last characteristic that needs to be mentioned regarding the jurisdiction of 
investor-State tribunals, is that in practice, jurisdiction is highly contested. Contrary to 
WTO disputes in which the jurisdiction of panels, or of the AB, is rarely challenged, the 
ratio of investment claims that are challenged at the jurisdictional stage is relatively 
high, as is the ratio of claims failing at this stage. For instance, in ICSID proceedings, 
tribunals have declined jurisdiction in about 25% of cases.123 In its 2014 annual report, 
the UNCTAD notes that of the 23 public decisions issued by investment tribunals in 
2013, 14 principally addressed jurisdictional issues, with 7 decisions upholding the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction (at least in part), and 7 decisions rejecting jurisdiction.124  
There are several reasons for these numerous challenges. In general, the highly 
contested jurisdiction of investment tribunals can be seen as the counterpart to the 
potentially broad jurisdiction these same tribunals might enjoy. As mentioned in 
previous developments, IIA provisions related to the scope of investment claims can be 
drafted in broad terms. As a consequence, the scope of a State's consent to arbitration can 
be seen as enlarged and of an imprecise nature.125 When the actual dispute presents 
itself, a State might very readily assert that such a dispute was not the kind of dispute it 
contemplated when it signed the applicable treaty. Further, and still generally, 
investment arbitration is usually considered as a costly and time consuming method of 
settling a dispute. At the same time, arbitration rules allow for the 'bifurcation' of 
proceedings, which entail tribunals to examine preliminary objections (such as 
jurisdictional objection) first, and to proceed with the merits of the dispute only if these 
objections are rejected. States, therefore, have an incentive to eliminate, or at least 
narrow down, a case at an early stage. More specifically, IIAs provide for relatively 
detailed jurisdictional requirements and conditions, as well as having temporal 
limitations and restrictions based on nationality. Cases governed by the ICSID 
Convention offer even more opportunities for jurisdictional objections. To give only one 
                                                 
123 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2013-2), (June 2013), available at <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/15/000333037_2014011
5155248/Rendered/PDF/839910NWP0ICSI0Box0382124B00PUBLIC0.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015), p. 14. 
124 UNCTAD, 'Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement' (Apr. 2014) UNCTAD IIA 
Issue Note, available at <http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf>, (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015) p. 10. 






example, investors must satisfy the definition of investment under the ICSID 
Convention, as well as under an investment treaty, if one applies. The same is true with 
respect to nationality requirements. In addition, the ICSID Convention, as well as last 
generation IIAs, have special provisions on frivolous claims that permit states to have 
expedited hearings on claims that are apparently without merit, or that fail to state a 
cause of action on which relief can be granted. Defending States thus have numerous 
tools that they can use to challenge the jurisdiction of investment tribunals, and 
therefore attempt to derail investment claims. 
IV. REMEDIES, ENFORCEMENT AND APPEAL  
Using the same approach as the one adopted in the previous sections, the following 
developments do not examine the details of all the procedural steps related to the 
enforcement and appeal mechanisms in trade and investment dispute settlement. Neither 
will I discuss the intricacies of these mechanisms, nor the debate surrounding their 
legitimacy. Rather the following section focuses only the main consequences of a ruling 
on the inconsistency of a given State measure. Thus, I use this basic presentation to 
explain how, and why, mechanisms of compliance with a ruling on inconsistency, along 
with the operation of these mechanisms in practice and the procedure to challenge this 
ruling, differ substantially in international trade and investment disciplines. 
A. REMEDIES: CHANGE IN THE LAW VS MONETARY COMPENSATION 
1. Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement 
The Law 
There are different ways to present the remedial regime set in place by the DSU. 
However, Van den Bossche's and Zdouc's approach seems to be the one that squares the 
most with the objective of the present chapter.126 According to them, the WTO DSU 
provides for three types of remedy: The withdrawal of the measure, which is final, and 
two temporary remedies in the form of compensation and retaliation.127  
Pursuant to WTO DSU Article 3.7 (the first objective of WTO dispute settlement is to 
withdraw the inconsistent measure) and to WTO DSU Article 19.1 (the end result of a 
successful WTO complaint is a ruling to the defaulting State to bring the measures into 
conformity), the first remedy to be adopted, in principle, 128  is the withdrawal (or 
                                                 
126 P. Van Den Bossche & W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases 
and Materials (2013) 156-311. 
127  Ibid. Referring to the case in US–Cotton Subsidies on Upland Cotton, one could argue that this 
classification is not complete as a WTO party can always decide to pay the price of retaliation and never 
comply with the decision. This argument is sound. Nonetheless, it does not need to be further inquired for 
the purpose of the present section, which is to present the main features of the remedies available under the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  
128 This type or remedy is contained in Article 3.7 of the WTO DSU. The fourth sentence of this provision 
provides:  




modification) of the measure that is in breach of the WTO obligation. This remedy is 
final, and is the only remedy that is supposed to bring an end to the dispute. This usually 
implies a change in the legislation of the defending State, even though the WTO DSU 
does not specifically require that change, as the State enjoys latitude in the method to be 
used to satisfy the ruling.129  
Pursuant to the language of Article 3.7 of the DSU, and in principle, the withdrawal of 
the WTO-inconsistent measure should be 'immediate'.130 However, when the defaulting 
State cannot take immediate action, Article 21.3 provides for a 'reasonable period of time 
for implementation'. Pursuant to this Article, this 'reasonable period of time' is either 
agreed between the parties (which has been the case in the vast majority of trade disputes 
to date), or determined through binding arbitration (approximately thirty cases to 
date).131 Although parties to WTO disputes seem to agree on the length of this period in 
the majority of cases, in slightly less than thirty cases to date, the length of this period 
has been decided through binding arbitration pursuant to WTO DSU Article 21.3(c). 
According to WTO settlement experts, the average time granted for implementation 
following this arbitration procedure is less than twelve months.132 
If a defaulting State does not withdraw or modify the WTO-inconsistent measure by the 
end of the reasonable period of time, the DSU provides for two alternative remedies: (i) 
compensation, and (ii) suspension of concessions or other obligations, also called 
'retaliation'. These two alternative remedies have to, as their principal objective, induce 
the defaulting State to eventually comply with the ruling of the WTO judge, and 
henceforth bring an end to the dispute. In that sense, these two remedies are only 
temporary. Rules related to the first of these two alternative remedies are contained in 
WTO DSU Article 22. Pursuant to these rules, compensation is voluntary (the 
complainant does not have to accept the remedy) and applies only for the future, which is 
to say that compensation here shall not be considered as a form of reparation. This 
                                                                                                                                                   
“In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is 
usually to secure the withdrawal of the measure concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of any of the covered agreements.”  
129  This latitude is reduced if the Panel/AB suggest a method to comply in addition to the 
recommendation. Still, it is usually considered that, contrary to the recommendation, these suggestions on 
the procedure to be followed to comply with a ruling are not binding on the defaulting State. See P.C. 
Mavroidis 'Remedies in the WTO legal system: between a rock and a hard place' (2000) 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 
763, 789-90. 
130 This is suggested by the language of WTO DSU Article 3.7, in the fifth sentence, which states that one 
of the two alternative remedies to withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measures, compensation should be 
envisaged "only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable". 
131 Van Den Bossche & Zdouc (supra n.126) 196-97. 
132 World Trade Law has monitored implementation periods in all WTO disputes. The results of their 
study is available upon subscription at the following address 





remedy has been used very sporadically in practice.133 The early case of Japan–Alcoholic 
Beverage II, where the parties agreed compensation through temporary additional market 
access concession, is usually mentioned as the best examples of compensation.134  
WTO members have made more use of retaliation. This remedy, which is labeled as a 
measure of 'last resort' in the DSU, 135  implies the intervention of the DSB. The 
complainant shall request authorization to retaliate against the resilient defaulting-State. 
Authorization is virtually automatically granted, since the decision is taken by reverse 
consensus. Note, however, that pursuant to DSU Article 22.4, the DSB can only 
authorize retaliation measures equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. The 
major difficulty here relates to the determination of the level of the nullification. In that 
respect, Article 22.6 provides that disagreements between disputing parties, on this level, 
are to be arbitrated by the original panel. To date, while requests for authorization to 
retaliate have been filed in 22 cases, authorization from the DSB have been issued in only 
nine of them (in all other cases, the requests have not been pursued any further), with the 
complainant State suspending concessions in only four of these nine cases.136 
If the answer given by the responding party is considered to be unsatisfactory, 
compliance proceedings can be subsequently initiated and can result in authorizing 
retaliatory trade sanctions to the prevailing parties, until measures deemed to comply 
with the original ruling are implemented. These compliance proceedings are exposed 
further below. 
Remarks 
The remedial mechanism of WTO dispute settlement favors continuity. The main 
concern of this mechanism is, in theory, the withdrawal of the inconsistent measure. 
Consequently, on could argue that its main objective is to maintain a balance, a level 
playing field, between all the members of the organization. In theory, the defaulting 
WTO Member has only to re-establish the status quo that trade negotiations allowed to 
institute. In theory, again, compensation and retaliation are only temporary and a 
member cannot simply 'buy' its way out of a violation. 
                                                 
133 To my knowledge, it has been used only once in the United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act 
case. See, United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act - Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the 
DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, Award of the Arbitrators (9 Nov. 2001).  
134 Van Den Bossche & Zdouc (supra n.126) 200. 
135 Article 3.7 last sentence states that:  
"The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member invoking the dispute settlement 
procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the 
covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis- à-vis the other Member, subject to authorization by the 
DSB of such measures." 
136 Van Den Bossche & Zdouc (supra n.126) 201.  




This remedial mechanism is certainly not perfect.137  It has been criticized for several 
reasons.  For instance, in a few cases, strong players did manage to 'buy' their way out, 
using their economic power and capacities to resist enforcement. 138   Mavroidis and 
Hoekman have also demonstrated the limits of the mechanism and its negative effects for 
private economic actors, which can suffer the consequences of retaliation measures, 
without having the possibility to obtain compensation.139 Yet, overall the mechanism 
works and that compliance is generally achieved in majority of disputes.140  
Another remark is in order.  The WTO remedial mechanism focuses on prospective 
remedies. In theory retroactive remedies, which are in line with general principles of 
international regarding state liability and reparation, could be available, as the DSU does 
not expressly prohibit them.  Yet, there is very limited practice in that respect.141 
Because of that, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is usually seen as deviating 
from the consequences that international law attaches to the breach of an international 
obligation. As we will see in the next section, the breach of an international agreement, 
under general international law, entails the obligation of full reparation. This may 
further entail an obligation of compensation, as a rule, through the awarding of monetary 
damages for those adverse consequences that cannot be retroactively redressed. By 
contrast, in the WTO dispute settlement system, the recommendations are limited to 
bringing an objectionable measure into conformity with the covered agreement, the first 
objective of the dispute settlement being to secure the withdrawal of the measure in 
breach with WTO law. The effect of the decision is, therefore, limited to the future. 
2. Compensation in Investment Arbitration 
The Law 
In contrast to the WTO mechanism of dispute settlement, international investment law 
does not create a specific remedial regime of State responsibility.142 Contrary to the 
                                                 
137 For a recent study on the work of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see, P. Mavroidis, 'Dispute 
Settlement in the WTO (Mind Over Matter)' (May 2015) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Research Paper, available upon subscription at 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35980/RSCAS_2015_34.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015).  See also, D. Palmeter & S.A. Alexandrov 'Inducing Compliance in WTO Dispute Settlement' in 
D.L.M. Kennedy & J.D. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor 
of Robert E. Hudec (2002) 647. 
138 For a review of these cases and their consequences, see e.g. D.J. Townsend & S. Charnowitz, 'Preventing 
Opportunistic Uncompliance by WTO Members' (2011) 14 J. Int'l Eco. L. 437. 
139 Hoekman & Mavroidis (supra n.84). 
140 For a critic of this type of affirmation, see Mavroidis (supra n.137) 28-33. 
141 See, the Report of the Panel in Australia–Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive 
Leather Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United State WT/DS126/RW (Panel Report, 11 Feb. 
2000). See also, Mavroidis (supra n.137) 37-40. 
142 For a different position, see Z. Douglas, 'Other Specific Regimes of Responsibility: Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and ICSID' in J. Crawford, A. Pellet & S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International 
Responsibility (2010) 815. But see J. Kurtz 'The Paradoxical Treatment of the ILC Articles on State 





WTO, investment law instruments (IIAs and Arbitration Rules) are generally silent on 
issues regarding remedies and compensation.143  
As a consequence, investment tribunals generally turn to customary international law to 
address these issues.144 The PCIJ Chorzow Factory case145 is cited quasi-systematically 
and serves as a starting point for any discussion on the remedial regime to be applied.146 
Investment tribunals may also refer to the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility to 
illustrate the content of general rules of international law on remedies.147 Relying on 
                                                                                                                                                   
Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility' (2010) 25 ICSID Rev. 127. The latter envisages, 
in a systematic way, all the cases in which the ILC Articles have been referred to. He thus identifies 
numerous disputes in which the tribunals used ILC Article provisions, related to the consequences of an 
international breach, as the basis for their reasoning when addressing remedy issues. See, ibid. 182-95. On 
the nature of State Responsibility in investor-State arbitration more generally, see the very informative 
PhD thesis of French author M. Raux. M. Raux, La Responsabilité de l'Etat sur le Fondement des Traités de 
Promotion et de Protection des Investissement (2010) Thèse pour l’obtention du grade de docteur en droit 
public de l’Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II). As to the applicability of ILC Articles in Investment 
Arbitration, Raux is quick to remind that the ILC Articles provide for the Lex Specialis principle in Article 
55, and that the Commentary of these articles refers expressly to investment arbitration. He explains 
nonetheless that Articles 55 does not mean that investment tribunals should never refer to these rules: "les 
traités de promotion et de protection des investissements peuvent déroger au régime général codifié par la 
C.D.I. sans les exclure nécessairement et intégralement." See, ibid. 11. Through his work, Raux then 
distinguishes situations where ILC Articles can be applied because of no existing lex specialis rules from 
the ones where their application is not appropriate. Ibid. 49; 81-97 ; 328-36. When addressing remedial 
issues, Raux notes that references to ILC are ‘omnipresent’. Ibid. 435. 
143 One should note however that new generation IIAs include provisions on remedies. See for instance the 
CETA Current Draft Article X.36. 
144 As mentioned above, Douglas refutes this affirmation and argues that "the law applicable to an issue 
relating to the consequences of the host state’s breach of an investment treaty obligation is to be found in a 
sui generis regime of state responsibility for investment treaties." Z. Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims (2009) 94; see also Douglas (supra n.94) 121-29. Yet, even a cursory analysis of investment 
arbitration case law considering this issue confirms that customary international law remains the most 
prominent source of inspiration for a tribunal's analysis on remedies in investor-State arbitration. To 
mention only one case, see Impregilo S.p.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award 
(21 June 2011) ¶361. ("As regards compensation, the basic principle to be applied is that derived from the 
judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case. According to this 
principle, reparation should as far as possible eliminate the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed").  
145 The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), Judgment on Jurisdiction, No. 8 (26 Jul. 1927), PCIJ Series 
A No. 9, 47. 
146 It is impossible to list here all the cases that referred either specifically (by quoting for instance parts of 
the decision) or generally to the Chorzow decision. Amongst most recent examples, one can for instance 
mention Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22 
Sept. 2014) ¶678, where the tribunal noted quite explicitly that "it is well accepted in international 
investment law that the principles espoused in the Chorzow Factory case, even if initially established in a 
State-to-State context, are the relevant principles of international law to apply when considering 
compensation for breach of a BIT. It is these well-established principles that represent customary 
international law, including for breaches of international obligations under BITs, that the Tribunal is 
bound to apply"; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, 
Final Award (18 July 2014) ¶1587-89 ; SAUR International S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/4, Award (22 May 2014) ¶86 and references thereunder. 
147 See contra, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (8 
Dec. 2008) ¶113, where the tribunal refused to apply the ILC article because it "contains no rules and 
regulations of State responsibility vis-à-vis non-State actors: Tribunals are left to determine 'the ways in 
which State responsibility may be invoked by non-State entities' from the provisions of the text of the 
particular treaty under consideration." But as already mentioned, the ILC Articles are frequently cited and 




these two legal sources, tribunals have found that restitution and compensation are the 
two forms of reparation to be elected in investment arbitration.148 
Although restitution appears as the primary remedy for a State's breach of international 
law pursuant to the two above-mentioned sources, and although it is, in principle, 
available in investor-State arbitration,149 it can be argued that there are some practical 
and legal impediments for this type of remedy in investment arbitration.150 Generally 
speaking, it is usually considered that if a dispute between an investor and a State was so 
important as to lead to the initiation of arbitral proceedings (which are long, costly and 
which will necessarily reveal, and exacerbate, legal, factual and commercial 
disagreements between the parties), then it is difficult for a tribunal to impose a form of 
reconciliation that is necessarily implied with restitution. For instance, one may argue 
that even if a State is required to give an investor back their property, after a finding of 
unlawful expropriation, it would be difficult to convince the investor to keep its business 
and pursue its activities in the State against which it legally battled, in probably not the 
most amicable of manners, during the proceedings. There are, of course, exceptions.151 
On two occasions, tribunals did uphold claims for restitutions.152 But these cases are in 
the minority.153 Furthermore, even in such cases, tribunals envisage contingent remedies 
either because monetary compensation is impossible, or because of the peculiarity of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
applied by investment tribunals. See e.g. ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and 
ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and the Merits (3 Sept. 2013) ¶339 ("ILC Articles, supported in their commentaries by 
reference to the authorities, have been regularly referred to in subsequent decisions including ICSID 
awards and decisions, as codifying or declaring international law"); M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New 
Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award (31 July 2007) ¶42, where the 
tribunal decided that questions related to the responsibility of the respondent had to decided in accordance 
with "applicable norms of general international law, including the customary rules recognized in the Final 
Draft of the International Law Commission of the UN (hereinafter referred to as “the ILC”) Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of States".  
148 See e.g., LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award (25 July 2007) ¶32. Satisfaction, the third form of reparation 
mentioned in the ILC Articles is sometimes acknowledged as well. See e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim 
Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award (29 
July 2008) ¶790. To my knowledge, this form has never been used in past investment disputes.  
149 For the tribunal, restitution would have been the preferred remedy had it not been for Moldova’s 
uncertainty as to whether restitution would be possible, and the tribunal’s lack of power to effectively 
supervise and enforce restitution. Eventually, the tribunal granted Moldova a period to effect restitution; 
failing which, it would be required to pay compensation to the investor. 
150 B. Sabãhï, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration: Principles and Practice (2011) 
61-62. In CMS v. Argentina, the tribunal acknowledged the difficulties for restitution in practice. See, CMS 
Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005) 
¶406.  
151 See e.g., U. Kriebaum, 'Restitution in International Investment Law' in R. Hofmann & C.J. Tams (eds.), 
International Investment Law and General International Law : From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? 
(2011) 201. 
152 For a recent analysis of the two cases in which restitution has been envisaged, see E. De Brabandere, 






claim,154 or as an alternative to restitution should the latter fail in practice. For instance, 
in Arif v. Moldova,155 while addressing remedy issues for a breach of the FET standard, 
the tribunal noted that both parties agreed, during the proceedings, that restitution was 
possible. The tribunal explained that it would prefer to support this remedial method, 
but that it lacked the power to effectively supervise and enforce orders in that regard.156 
Eventually, the tribunal granted Moldova a period to effect restitution; failing which, 
Moldova would be required to pay compensation to the investor.157 
For these reasons, compensation is usually considered "as the most common type of 
remedy sought and awarded in investment arbitration."158 Once this type of remedy is 
chosen, tribunals then have to decide on the proper standard of compensation applicable 
in the circumstances of the dispute. Here again, the tribunals are left without detailed 
guidance as to how to proceed, and this is usually perceived as problematic, since it 
further complicates the settlement of investment disputes. As Ripinsky and Williams 
wrote, in one of the major studies on compensation in international investment 
arbitration, the "lack of a coherent and systematic approach to compensation issues […] 
contributes to the uncertainty of the legal environment and the unpredictability of 
outcomes of disputes." 159  Accordingly, tribunals exercise some discretion, when 
identifying the standard best suited to the nature of the breach, in the disputes they 
encounter. 
The standards chosen, and the final amount of damages awarded, will usually depend on 
the cause of action (standards applicable for an exportation claim are not necessarily the 
same as the ones for the FET standard), on the type of damages (whether the damages 
relate to investment expenditure, lost profit, incidental expenses, etc.), and on many 
other technical aspects with which parties and arbitrators are often assisted by experts, 
and which certainly go beyond the scope of the present studies. What needs to be 
underlined here is that tribunals have largely agreed that damages can cover both actual 
damage (damnum emergens) as well as profits that were not realized because of the 
occurrence of the illegal act (lucrum cessans). 
Remarks 
Sykes, in the above-mentioned study, explains why monetary compensation is pertinent 
in dispute settlement such as investment arbitration. In his view, "the promise of 
monetary compensation to investors is […] a cheap commitment device for states with 
benign intentions toward investors and a cheap way for states with more benign 
                                                 
154 ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/2, Award (18 May 2010). 
155 Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award (8 Apr. 2013). 
156 Ibid. ¶571. 
157 Ibid. ¶572. 
158 Sabãhï (supra n.150) 91. 
159 S. Ripinsky & K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (2008) xxxv. 




intentions than others to signal their type." 160  In his views, because investor-State 
arbitration is about protection ex-post of investors, it is pertinent, to focus on the rights 
they loose because of State wrongful behavior.   
Another reasons might be used to explain why monetary damages are favored in 
investment arbitration. Investment arbitration, even when institutionalized under the 
ICSID or another arbitral institution, remains of ad hoc nature. There is no central 
institutional  of investment arbitration which can be used to continuously monitor the 
implementation of non-pecuniary remedies. If a (ICSID or non-ICISD, it does not make a 
difference) tribunal issues an award enjoining the defaulting State to do something, for 
instance gives back the property that has been unlawfully expropriated from the 
investor, rather than to pay damages to the investor, and if the State refuses to comply, 
the tribunal has no authority to take any additional decision to force the State to obey 
with its ruling. The investor is left with no other options than re-litigating the case, 
either before another investor-State tribunal, trying do demonstrate that the refuse to 
comply with the award amounts to a breach on an investment obligation, or more likely 
before domestic courts, using the original award to obtain another form of compensation.   
Furthermore, one may argue that it has never been envisaged to formally give the 
opportunity to the tribunals to ask for withdrawal, as it would imply that tribunals have 
form of power over regulatory measures. In today's discussion about a possibility to 
reform investment arbitration, many have insisted that investor-State tribunals do not 
have such power and that shall not have it in the future. 
B. COMPLIANCE: THE AUTOMATICITY OF WTO RULING IMPLEMENTATION 
VS. THE INTRICACY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS ENFORCEMENT 
1. The Effectiveness of the Centralized WTO Mechanism 
The WTO DSU centralizes compliance procedures within the WTO system. The DSU 
provides rules for the application and enforcement of the decisions of either the Panels or 
the AB. Consequences of non-application or misapplication of WTO court rulings by 
defaulting States, are spelt out in the DSU. Similarly, the DSU also provides for 
procedures to monitor compliance with the recommendation. 
As explained above, any responding party that is found to act inconsistently with WTO 
law has a 'reasonable period of time' (or 'RPT') to implement the Panel's or AB's 
recommendation. Article 21.6 provides that during this RPT (which is determined either 
by consent between the parties or by arbitration pursuant to WTO DSU Article 21.3(c)), 
the DSB keeps the implementation of adopted recommendation and rulings under 
surveillance. In practice, this rule provides an opportunity for all WTO members,161 
through the DSB, to exercise a form of multilateral control on the outcomes of a dispute. 
                                                 
160 Sykes (supra n.77) 644. 
161 Article 21.6 provides states indeed that "he issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings 





The defending state is required to provide written reports of its progress in the 
implementation of rulings and recommendations. Arguably, these reports create an 
incentive for the State to comply with the ruling. 
When a defaulting state attempts to comply, and therefore withdraw or modify the 
inconsistent measure, it is possible that the original complainant considers that such an 
attempt does not satisfy the ruling. Thus, new disagreement between the parties can 
arise. Parties can for instance disagree as to whether implementation measures have been 
taken, or on the consistency of these measures with the WTO.162 In that case, Article 
21.5 provides for recourse to a WTO panel. New proceedings, usually called 'compliance 
proceedings', are initiated, and the rules set out in the DSU are applicable, with only few 
deviations related to the delays, in order to make these compliance proceedings more 
expeditious.  
As mentioned previously, if the defending party refuses to comply with the ruling either 
at the end of the RPT or at the end of the one opened subsequent to the compliance 
proceedings, the other party has the possibility of requesting compensation. If no 
agreement is found for compensation, then the winning party may request to create, or 
raise, tariffs against the violating State, equivalent to the injury suffered. The 
authorization for retaliation is given by the DSB. New disagreements on the 
proportionality and effect of the retaliation measures may arise, but the DSU again 
provides for rules to overcome these difficulties. 
2. The Intricacy of the Enforcement of Investment Arbitral 
Awards 
Once an investment tribunal issues an award in which the defending State is ordered to 
pay compensation to the investor, the defending State may either voluntarily comply 
with the award, or refuse to do so. It is usually preached that investment arbitration 
awards are voluntarily complied with at a high rate. 163  Amongst the incentives to 
voluntarily comply with awards, one can mention, for instance, the upholding of a State's 
reputation, the possibility of political embarrassment, the reluctance of States to send the 
wrong message to potential investors and business partners more generally, the possible 
pressure that may be applied by international community, and the high costs involved in 
resisting compliance. These incentives are real, but their effects are not unconstrained. 
Recent examples have shown that States may, nevertheless, refuse to comply with 
                                                 
162 Van Den Bossche & Zdouc (supra n.126) 293. 
163 See e.g., A. Reinisch, 'Enforcement of Investment Awards' in K. Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (2010) 671, 671; S.A. Alexandrov & I. Laird, 
'Compliance and Enforcement' in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino & C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (2008) 1171, 1174. Although precise numbers are missing, only few 
enforcement proceedings regarding investment awards have come to light. Such proceedings necessarily 
imply that the investor is taking action to constrain the State, so to make it comply with the adverse-
award, and their rarity can be used to claim that the belief according to which 'States will comply' is not 
unfounded. 




arbitral rulings.164 In that case, the investor has to take action to enforce the award, and 
the mechanism to do so, depends on the applicable rules governing the arbitral award. 
The Law and the Distinction between ICSID and Non-ICSID Awards 
According to last UNCTAD statistics, approximately 55% of investment disputes are 
brought before ICSID tribunals.165 Chapter IV, Section 6, of the ICSID Convention, 
entitled 'Recognition and Enforcement of the Award', offers what seems to be an efficient 
mechanism for the recognition of awards. This section gives investors the possibility to 
seek the enforcement of awards, against a respondent State's assets, before the domestic 
courts of all ICSID contracting parties (approximately 160 States). 
Article 53 of the ICSID Convention provides that "the award shall be binding on the 
parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those 
provided for in this Convention."  This provision refers to the ICSID annulment 
procedure as the only remedy against the award. 166  Other, external, remedies to 
challenge, set aside, or review an ICSID award before domestic courts or elsewhere, are 
thus excluded.167 This control, over the remedies against the award, is usually presented 
as one the greatest advantage of the ICSID Convention.168 
Pursuant to Article 54, each contracting party to the ICSID Convention "shall recognize 
an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a 
court in that State." In practice, this means that the investor may go 'hunting' for 
commercial assets belonging to the recalcitrant State, not only within the jurisdiction of 
that State, but wherever such assets are held, provided that they are held in a State that 
is party to the ICSID Convention.  
Despite the apparent automaticity created by Articles 53 and 54, the execution and 
enforcement of ICSID awards is not limitless. The most important obstacles are the rules 
relating to State immunities. Indeed, the ICSID does not derogate from these rules as 
                                                 
164 See, T.-Y. Lin 'Systemic Reflections on Argentina's Non-Compliance with ICSID Arbitral Awards: A 
New Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement?' (2012) 5 Contemporary Asia Arb. J. 1. On the issue 
of non-compliance with investment awards more generally, see V.J. Tejera Pérez 'Diplomatic Protection 
Revival for Failure to Comply with Investment Arbitration Awards' (2012) 3 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 1; 
C.B. Rosenberg 'Intersection of International Trade and International Arbitration: The Use of Trade 
Benefits to Secure Compliance with Arbitral Awards' (2012) 44 Georgetown. J. Int'l L. 503. 
165 See UNCTAD, 'Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement' (Apr. 2014) UNCTAD IIA 
Issue Note, p.4, available at <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf> (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
166 As we will see in the last development of the present section, this procedure permits ad hoc committees 
to review award on specific grounds. 
167 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, 
Decision on Annulment (6 Jan. 1988) ¶4.2 ("The post-award procedures (remedies) provided for in the 
Convention […] are to be exercised within the framework of the Convention and in accordance with its 
provisions. It appears from these provisions that the Convention excludes any attack on the award in 
national courts"). 





applicable under the law of the State where execution is sought. The language of Article 
55 is clear in that regard:  
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from 
execution.  
In practice, the investor, facing non-compliance from the defending State, who initiates 
enforcement proceedings before a domestic court, will have to target commercial assets, 
because most jurisdictions distinguish between sovereign and commercial property, and 
allow execution only on the latter.169 
In theory, the possibility of relying on State immunity from execution does not alter the 
fact that non-compliance with an award is a violation of the ICSID Convention. ICSID 
Article 53 is clear in that regard. The obligation to comply with an award is independent 
of any potential defense that could be used at the enforcement stage, including ones on 
immunity. This was clearly stated in one of the first ICSID arbitration cases,  MINE v. 
Guinea,170 and reaffirmed more recently in Mitchell v. Congo, where it was stated that:  
"The immunity of a State from execution (Article 55 of the Convention) does not 
exempt it from enforcing the award, given its formal commitment in this respect 
following signature of the Convention."171 
In practice however, when the defending State succeeds in invoking its immunity from 
execution, the award, whilst still binding, cannot be enforced. Therefore, the investor 
cannot be compensated. 
The ICSID convention indirectly contemplates what can be considered as two 
alternative enforcement methods, for when a defending State refuses to comply. The 
non-observance of the ICSID Convention obligation to comply with ICSID awards, 
clearly constitutes a violation of an obligation pursuant to the ICSID Convention. As the 
MINE v. Guinea tribunal noted, this violation can attract its own sanction.172 Firstly, it 
can be used "to revive the right of diplomatic protection of the home-State of the 
prevailing investor."173 In that case, ICSID Article 27 could be referred to, as the latter 
expressly allows home-States to initiate international actions against a host-State that is 
failing to abide by, and comply with, an ICSID award.174 Secondly, inspired by Article 64 
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of the Convention, the investor could also attempt to persuade its home-State to initiate 
proceedings against the host-State before the ICJ. Article 64 provides for referral to the 
ICJ when regarding the 'interpretation and application' of the Convention. These two 
alternative methods were envisaged in Mitchell v. Congo. The ad hoc Committee in that 
case affirmed that: 
"If [the defending State] does not enforce the award, its behavior is subject to 
various indirect sanctions. Precisely, reference is made to Articles 27 and 64 of the 
Convention. The investor's State has the right, according to Article 27 to exercise 
diplomatic protection against the State which does not respect its obligation to 
enforce an arbitral award of the Centre; but also, according to Article 64, to have 
recourse to the International Court of Justice. Moreover, a State's refusal to 
enforce an ICSID award may have a negative effect on this State's position in the 
international community with respect to the continuation of international 
financing of the inflow of other investments."175 
Until recently, these alternative methods had remained textbook hypotheses. With the 
resilience of certain States, in not enforcing ICSID awards, investors have started to 
consider making use of them. For instance, following Argentina's refusal to comply with 
ICSID awards, several US investors have petitioned their government, requesting that 
their government acts on their behalf, by imposing trade sanctions against Argentina.176  
For cases falling outside the ICSID system, arbitral awards will be subject to rules 
applicable under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards, provided that the State where enforcement is sought is party to the Convention.  
The core provision of the New York Convention is the obligation to recognize and 
enforce foreign arbitral awards "in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon" and under the conditions established by the 
Convention itself.177 This obligation, to enforce awards, is subject to a limited number of 
exceptions, all listed in Article V of the Convention. Generally speaking, these 
exceptions relate either to serious defects of the arbitral process, or to fundamental vales 
of the State where enforcement is sought. More precisely, Article V(I) allows domestic 
courts to refuse enforcement when the party challenging enforcement can prove (a) the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement; (b) lack of notice or violation of due process; (c) 
excess of power by the arbitral tribunal; (d) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal; 
or (e) that the award has not yet become binding, or was set aside or suspended in the 
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176 See R.P. Alford 'The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration' (2013) 12 Santa 
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country of origin. In addition, pursuant to Article V(II), the recognition and enforcement 
of an award may be refused if the subject matter of the dispute is considered 'not capable 
of settlement by arbitration', or if it would be contrary to the public policy of the country 
of enforcement.  
Finally, Article III of the New York Convention does not exclude obstacles to 
enforcement measures based on the rules on State immunity. In a similar way as to what 
has been discussed earlier, defending States may thus rely on these rules to resist the 
execution of awards and seizure of their assets. 
Challenges against non-ICSID awards (investment awards which have been issued by 
tribunals acting upon arbitration rules other than those in the ICSID convention; for 
instance UNCITRAL Arbitration rules) have been attempted on several occasions. In 
general, domestic courts have been reluctant to exercise too strict a review, and have 
focused on the most serious breaches of the grounds provided for by the New York 
Convention to set aside the award.178 It is generally accepted that the standard of review 
to be used, by domestic courts that are called upon to enforce foreign awards, should be a 
deferential one, permitting refusal only in exceptional situations.179 
Remarks 
The first remark that needs to be made is that investment award enforcement 
mechanisms are not dualistic. There is the ICSID mechanism on one side, which aims at 
automaticity, and the rest on the other. This is something that investors need to take 
into account at the very beginning of the dispute, when they introduce the claim.  
Second, it is important to keep in mind that the mechanics for enforcement of investment 
awards are largely decentralized. In the event of a State not complying with an award, 
even if the award has been issued by an ICSID tribunal, the investor will necessarily 
have to go before a domestic court to enforce the award. In such a case, domestic 
procedural rules, which differ from one State to  another, will apply. Of course, the New 
York Convention is supposed to provide some guidance, by standardizing the 
requirements for the enforcement of awards. However, these requirements are applied by 
the domestic courts. Furthermore, it is important to note that case-law on the 
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Convention might differ from one State to another. As we have seen recently in the 
Micula v. Romania arbitration, investment awards are not foreign to that notion, and the 
divergences in its interpretation might be seen as problematic.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude, in that respect, that in comparison with the WTO 
mechanism, in investment arbitration, non-compliance from a State is more difficult to 
handle, and is subject to more uncertainties. 
C. ANNULMENT AND APPEAL: CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED 
1. The WTO Appellate Body and its Principal Function 
The WTO AB was created in 1995 in the framework of the Uruguay Round. At that 
time, it was an innovative feature in international trade dispute settlement, and remains 
so to this day. This innovative character is represented by the rules governing the 
structure of this organ and the way it operates. The rules are set out in WTO DSU 
Article 17. They can be presented in the following synthetic manner: 
• This article provides for a standing, permanent, international tribunal. It is made 
of seven 'members', appointed for four years,180 with the possibility of being re-
appointed once.181  
• Cases are heard by divisions of three members,182 the AB thus never sits in the 
Assemblée Plenière to decide on a case.183  
• Pursuant to Article 17.7, and the internal procedure rules applicable to it, the AB 
has its own secretariat, which is both separate and independent from, the WTO 
secretariat.184 This secretariat is composed of full time lawyers who assist the AB 
members with legal research and related assistance with pending cases.  
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• Proceedings before the AB are organized through rounds of written pleadings 
and a hearing. Although proceedings are defined as confidential, following GATT 
practice, the AB has taken it upon itself – in the absence of an applicable rule – to 
provide transparency. The AB has thus admitted amicus curiae briefs, and when 
the parties agree, allowed for the viewing of hearings, as well as the 
representation of parties by private lawyers.  
• Article 17.6 states that appellate review "shall be limited to issues of law covered 
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". In other 
words the AB may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of 
the Panels. In that regard, it may complete the analysis of the Panels should they 
be uncontroversial.  
• The AB does not bear the power to remand. 
• Finally, the AB has the same prerogatives as the Panels in term of the remedies it 
can grant. If the AB concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it recommends that the member concerned brings the measure into 
conformity with it. 
Beyond this schematic description, the AB may be perceived as one of the pillars of the 
trade regulation system. Historically, the AB was created to give the parties to a dispute 
a 'second shot'. Studying the travaux préparatoires of the WTO DSB, today's structure 
shows that several countries were worried about the instauration of negative consensus 
for decision making, with regard to recommendations to be made following a finding of a 
violation of WTO obligations, and the automaticity it implied.185 They thus insisted 
upon the introduction of this second degree of jurisdiction, which would be used to 
control the work of the panels. Today, several authors argue that the AB has 
transcended this strict 'watchdog' function and plays a major role in guaranteeing the 
proper application and interpretation of the law, in the interest of all the members of the 
organization.186 According to them, appellate review by a standing body composed of, 
permanent judges is meant to ensure consistency, over time, in the application and 
interpretation of the laws within the organization. In that sense, these authors argue that 
it is the AB that ought to carry out the public function described in the first section of 
this chapter, that is "to preserve and clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements."187 Recently, two authors have worded this idea as follows: the "Appellate 
Body has laid down a systematic and consistent interpretation of the WTO agreements 
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that has increased the reliability, predictability and stability of the WTO system as the 
tool of governance of the multilateral trading system."188 
A close look at the jurisprudence emanating from the AB, shows that these affirmations 
cannot be systematically verified. For as regards several WTO obligations, there has 
been fluctuation in the analysis proposed by the judges. Horn and Mavroidis have 
reviewed the literature on this issue and,189 relying on the work of various experts, and 
on studies on the American Law Institute project,190 demonstrate that several flaws can 
easily be identified in establishing a consistent approach to the interpretation of WTO 
rules of given WTO rules.191  
Divergences in AB case law certainly exist and should not be overlooked. After all, the 
AB is not bound by the rule of stare decisis.192 Whilst the AB may attach significance to 
the reasoning provided in previous panel and AB reports, it remains free to adapt its 
jurisprudence to the development of new arguments presented by the parties and their 
counsels, and to correct possible errors made in previous decisions. 
Nonetheless, practice shows that the AB systematically relies on previous case-law. 
Reports issued by the AB now include a list of all the cases mentioned and cited in the 
reasoning of the judges. In addition, one might accept that lines of reasoning that almost 
always justified by a reference to previous reports in contemporary decisions. Of course, 
commentators frequently note that reliance on previous case law is not always sound and 
that the AB itself does not develop a perfectly coherent jurisprudence. Yet, it is difficult 
to deny that the AB does refer, extensively, to its previous decisions. In that sense, it is 
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possible to argue that the existence of a centralized body, such as the AB, does more 
good than harm in respect of consistency. 
2. The Absence of an Appellate Mechanism in Investment 
Arbitration 
The Law 
The ability to appeal, in investment arbitration, is one of the discipline's most talked 
about issues at the moment, especially because it entered the scope of proposed reform 
and suggestions for the emerging EU investment arbitration policy. Today, international 
investment arbitration does not provide for a centralized mechanism of appeal.  
As mentioned earlier, ICSID awards are subject only to limited remedies laid down in 
Articles 50 to 52. Articles 50 and 51 provide for rules regarding the interpretation or 
revision of an award, provided that the latter contains information that needs to be 
clarified,193 or that new facts capable of changing the outcome of the dispute have come 
to the knowledge of one of the parties.194 More importantly, Article 52 gives to parties 
the possibility to seek the annulment of an award before an ad hoc Committee established 
pursuant to the ICSID Convention. This internal 'annulment committee' will consider a 
request for annulment on strictly limited grounds, set out in Article 52(1):  
 a. the tribunal was not properly constituted;  
 b. the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;  
 c. there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
 d. there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or  
 e. the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
Tribunals and investment arbitration experts have been adamant when highlighting the 
distinction between annulment and appeal. Annulment does not mean a review of a 
tribunal's original legal analysis. Rather, ad hoc committees have to exercise great care in 
ensuring that the reasoning of an arbitral tribunal is clearly understood, and must guard 
against the annulment of awards for trivial matters.195 As the tribunal in AES v. Hungary 
noted:  
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"With respect to [Article 52] the drafters have taken great care to use terms 
which clearly express that annulment is an exhaustive, exceptional and narrowly 
circumvented remedy and not an appeal. The interpretation of the terms must take 
this object and purpose into consideration and avoid an approach which would 
result in the qualification of a tribunal's reasoning as deficient, superficial, sub-
standard, wrong, bad or otherwise faulty, in other words, a re-assessment of the 
merits which is typical for an appeal."196 
When a committee upholds an application for annulment, the original award is set aside. 
The annulment decision does not replace the original award. It nullifies the ruling(s) of 
this original award and leaves the parties in the same position as before arbitration was 
initiated. Article 52(6) makes it clear: if one of the parties still wants a decision on the 
dispute, it shall initiate new arbitration proceedings.  
For cases falling outside the ICSID system, as mentioned earlier, arbitral awards may be 
subject to challenge proceedings before domestic courts, on potentially broader grounds 
than ICSID annulment proceedings. Again, in most domestic systems, the scope of 
review will be rather limited and, generally, domestic courts will be reluctant to decide 
again upon a case, when examining whether the award shall be annulled.  
Remarks 
The absence of a centralized appellate mechanism for international investment arbitral 
awards, is seen my many as a problem, most notably in light of several inconsistent 
decisions issued over the last years on the application and interpretation of investment 
norms.197 The introduction of an appellate mechanism in investment arbitration has been 
suggested on numerous occasions,198 and there is an abundant number of studies and 
reports produced by authors and institutions on this issue, as well as on how to proceed 
towards the creation of such mechanism.199 
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The main argument in favor of an appellate institution is that this institution could 
strengthen confidence in the dispute settlement system, and therefore facilitate the 
acceptance of, and compliance with, adverse outcomes in particular cases, as well as 
ensuring consistency in interpretation from one dispute to the next.200  
Contrastingly, the skeptics underline the costs involved in the creation of an appellate 
mechanism, and how it would necessarily imply a reform of the ICSID convention and so 
too, possibly, amendments to all existing IIAs, which do not envisage the possibility of 
an appeal of arbitral awards. Furthermore, in the eyes of the skeptics, this mechanism 
could be systematically used by States (which would have a political incentive to 
challenge an adverse award at whatever cost) and could alter the general balance that 
exists today in investment disputes.201 
Overall, there is a shared understanding that if this appellate mechanism should see the 
light of day, the framers of this mechanism will have to pay the closest attention in 
building its essential aspects and technical features. Issues, such as those related to the 
possibility of remand, costs and length of the proceedings, application of the stare decisis 
principle, and the appointment of appellate judges, will need to be carefully addressed 
before moving forward with the creation of a standing international investment 
arbitration appellate court. Interestingly, many authors argue that the WTO AB could 
be used as a model for crafting such a court.202 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that the institutional designs of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the international trade and investment legal regimes are very different. 
In fact, their dispute settlement mechanisms can be used as a catalyst to understand the 
differences between the two disciplines. 
More importantly, the underlying principles, and economics, of both disciplines seem to 
justify their different institutional designs. The substantive norms of trade and 
investment law may have common roots, but the way these norms are applied and 
enforced is different, and there are good reasons for that.  
Because of that, it seems unrealistic to plead for a formal, institutional reconciliation of 
trade and investment law. Not because they apply totally different substantive norms, 
but because their dispute settlement mechanisms operate differently.  
Against this background, and having in mind the axiom presented in the introduction 
(coordination between trade and investment norms is positive), and the conclusions made 
in the previous chapter (international investment law and international trade law, as 
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disciplines, share the same roots when it comes to substantive rules), we will need to look 
into what I call soft integration techniques, which are the rules allowing the adjudicator 
of one discipline to better apprehend norms applied in the other.  
The next chapter demonstrates that investment tribunals have often found themselves in 
situations where they have to apply, or at least refer to, trade norms, emphasizing the 





. CHAPTER 3.  
MAPPING THE CURRENT USE OF TRADE NORMS 





Investment arbitration actors frequently refer to trade norms. Reflecting upon these 
references, some scholars have argued that the use of trade law in investment arbitration 
should be welcomed, whilst others have argued the opposite.1 Interestingly, no one has, 
so far, attempted to conduct an exhaustive research on all of the investment cases where 
trade norms have actually been referred to. Instead, they focus on a limited sample of 
cases, in which one type of reference (for instance a reference to one specific GATT rule) 
is made.  
This chapter seeks to fill this gap, and present the results of such exhaustive research. 
The main finding, is that references to trade norms, in investment arbitration, are made 
more often than one might think and can be categorized into four different situations. 
Trade norms have been used (i) to illustrate a factual or incidental legal element of the 
investment dispute, (ii) to interpret a substantive investment norm, (iii) to counter a 
claim relating to a breach of an investment obligation and, finally, (iv) as the basis of a 
claim relating to a breach of an investment obligation. Further, the research, which I 
have conducted, allows me to present the reasoning of investment tribunals, when using 
WTO law, and to address the following question: what is the rationale, or more 
accurately, what are the rationales, behind the use of trade law in investment practice? 
By addressing this question, I highlight the reasons why referring to trade norms can be 
pertinent. 
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From these results, this chapter develops the following argument: the use of trade norms 
by investment tribunals is not problematic if undertaken carefully; 'undertaken carefully' 
meaning that the specific situation, in which the reference is made, is taken into account. 
This argument fits into the broader narrative defended in the present thesis by putting 
forward the idea that a better apprehension of trade norms by investment tribunals will 
foster a more efficient convergence between the international trade and investment 
disciplines and enhance the legitimacy of investment arbitration.  
This brief introduction is followed by the presentation of the methodology I used to 
perform this research and the general results I have obtained (Section II). I then analyze, 
in four different sections, the four situations in which investment tribunals have made 
use of trade norms: as a factual or incidental legal element (Section III) as an 
interpretative element (Section IV), as part of a claim (Section V) and as part of a defense 
(Section VI). The last section (Section VII) concludes.  
II. SETTING THE SCENE: RESEARCH, METHODOLOGY AND 
FINDINGS 
A. RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
The following developments introduce the results of an empirical analysis on the use of 
WTO law in investment treaty disputes. The data was collected from all the dispute 
materials available on the Investor-State Law Guide database. The period covered for the 
search runs from 20 July 1987 (date on which the first BIT dispute was introduced) 2 to 1 
August 2015. 
The main objective of this work is to determine when, and why, investment arbitration 
actors use WTO norms. In order to do this, I chose to identify precisely when, and how, 
investment arbitration actors 'refer to' (in the literal sense) WTO norms.  
This research was performed in three stages. First, I identified all the disputes in which 
the term 'World Trade Organization', and/or acronym 'WTO', were used. Once this first 
enquiry was completed, I then ran additional rounds of research, looking for references 
to the main WTO multilateral agreements, i.e. those referred to in Annexes I and II of 
                                                 
2 I refer to the seminal case AAPL v. Sri Lanka, which is known today to be the first case in which an 
international arbitration tribunal has accepted jurisdiction on the basis of an international investment 
agreement. For information on the proceedings about this case, see the case webpage on the ISCID website 
available at 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/87/3> (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015). According to my research the first case in which a trade norm has been referred is 
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, a NAFTA dispute initiated before a UNCITRAL tribunal in 1997. In its notice 
of arbitration, the claimant referred to GATT jurisprudence to elaborate on how National Treatment 
should be interpreted. See Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration 
(14 April 1997) ¶¶16-17.  




the Marrakesh Agreement as well as the Government Procurement Agreement.3 Hence, 
I looked for all the materials in which 'WTO' did not appear and at least one of the 
following fourteen other terms and/or acronyms did:  
(i) General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/GATT;  
(ii) General Agreement on Trade in Services/GATS;  
(iii) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights/TRIPS;  
(iv) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures/TRIMS;  
(v) Technical Barriers to Trade/TBT;  
(vi) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement/SPS;  
(vii) Agreement on Agriculture;  
(viii) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; 
(ix) Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; 
(x) Rules of Origins; 
(xi) Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 
(xii) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures;  
(xiii) Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes; and  
(xiv) Government Procurement Agreement.4 
After identifying all available materials referring to WTO norms, the third step of the 
research consisted in identifying and classifying which of the WTO Appellate Body 
(hereinafter "AB") and Panels decisions have been used in investment arbitral decisions 
and awards. This third step had three objectives: on a practical basis, it was used to 
cross-reference the results of first two steps and, more interestingly, to draw comparison 
with the use of other international courts and tribunals jurisprudence. Finally – and on a 
                                                 
3  The present dissertation is about the relation between investment arbitration and trade dispute 
settlement. Therefore, it made sense to look at investor-State arbitral tribunal references to all the 
agreements that can be applied by the WTO adjudicator, i.e. those referred to as the 'covered agreements' 
in the WTO DSU. These 'covered agreements' are listed in the Appendix 1 of the WTO DSU and include 
the multilateral agreements referred to in Annexes I and II, and the plurilateral agreements for which a 
decision by their parties setting out the terms for the application of the DSU has been adopted. Such a 
decision has been taken for the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). It is the only plurilateral 
agreement which can be subject to WTO DSU proceedings. The Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft for 
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, did not take a decision in that respect and the two other existing 
plurilateral agreements, the International Dairy Agreement, and the International Bovine Meat 
Agreement, are no longer in force. See, the information relating to the substantive scope of the dispute 
settlement system on the WTO website, available at 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s5p1_e.htm> last consulted (1 Aug. 
2015). 
4 For the thirteen additional rounds of research (those for each of the main multilateral agreements), apart 
from the two ones relating to the GATT (49 documents) and GATS (height documents), the results were 
limited (between zero and four of documents for each terms/acronym). Henceforth, I assumed that 
searches for references to any of the other multilateral WTO agreements (without mention being made to 
the WTO itself), i.e. the various understandings and agreements on implementation of specific provisions 





more substantial basis – it allowed for the identification of different categories of 
references to WTO case law. 
The research, in an effort to encapsulate more than what could be achieved by 
concentrating solely on arbitral awards, covers all, publically available, 'dispute 
materials'.5 It was assumed that WTO norms can be discussed during proceedings, and 
thus influence, in a certain way, the conduct of said proceedings, even if they are referred 
to only in a limited manner, if not at all, in the final decisions and awards. This 
assumption has been confirmed by the study as, in several cases, WTO rules were 
extensively referred to in the pleadings but then disregarded, or partially disregarded, in 
the awards. To take only one example, in the NAFTA dispute Grand River v. United 
States,6 the claimant relied on WTO law on two occasions. The first, when stressing the 
opportunity to refer to WTO Panel and AB jurisprudence on National Treatment to 
interpret NAFTA Article 1102, and the second, to buttress arguments on 'procedural 
fairness' in the framework of NAFTA Article 1105. 7  The tribunal addressed both 
questions, but did not elaborate upon either. 8 Further, the Grand River tribunal did 
discuss the trade cases cited by the investor, and chose rather to focus only on NAFTA 
case-law.9 
At this stage, it is important to recall that known disputes do not necessary reflect the 
full universe of existing investment treaty cases because it is not possible to know the 
exact number of confidential cases that exist. Even when the cases are known and the 
final awards available, the dispute documents (pleadings, etc.) very often remain 
unpublished. In virtually all cases outside the NAFTA system, party submissions are not 
published.10 This is rather problematic, especially in the light of the remark made in the 
previous paragraph (trade norms are frequently referred in all the steps that lead to an 
                                                 
5 By 'dispute materials', I refer to arbitral decisions (on procedural matters, on interim measures, on 
admissibility and jurisdiction…) and awards (partial, final, on costs…), submissions from the parties 
(notices of intent/arbitration, briefs, memorials, pleadings, post-hearing submissions…) amicus curiae and 
non-party submissions, expert opinions, procedural orders, hearings' transcripts and separate opinions, and 
finally, ICSID annulment committee decisions.  
6 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (12 June 
2011) (hereinafter 'Grand River v. US'). 
7 Grand River v. US (Claimants Statement of Claim, 30 June 2005), [Part A] ¶¶43-44 and [Part B] 
¶¶108-10.  
8 Grand River v. US (Award, 12 June 2011), ¶¶166-72; 204-236.  
9 Ibid. 
10  One may regret this feature of investment-treaty arbitration. Arguably, Investor-State arbitration 
should be based on a presumption of openness to ensure both independence and transparency and to 
ensure also that the state decision-making with significant implications for public policy and for resource 
allocation, as well as for rights and interests of actors other than the disputing parties, is known and 
accountable to those who are affected. Still in that regard, one may note that the claims for more 
transparency have been, or are –to some extent– considered as last generation's rules (IIAs, Procedural 
Rules, etc.) on investment arbitration favours the publication of dispute documents. The last version of 
UNCITRAL procedural rules or the affirmations of the EU Commission for a greater transparency 
provided in future EU investment agreements are interesting examples. 




award, but not necessarily in the award). However, looking at the results of the study, it 
is safe to assert that when a given award refers to WTO rules, even if only briefly, it 
usually means that a great deal of arguments referring to trade norms were being 
developed at length during the proceedings, either in writing or orally at the hearing 
stage. 
In the light of these remarks, the results presented below shall be tempered: It remains 
impossible to assess with exactitude the number of cases in which WTO norms have 
been used. That being said, the high number of references found in the available cases, 
especially compared to references to other non-investment rules, seems significant and 
deserves to be analyzed. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
1. Figures: Number of WTO Law References Higher than 
References to other Branches of International Law 
As of 1 August 2015, I have been able to identify 310 investment dispute documents in 
which the keywords 'World Trade Organization', or the acronym WTO, has been used 
at least once. Amongst these, more than 50 investment disputes documents include more 
than 15 references. In addition, 49 documents include the term 'GATT' (while not 
referring to 'WTO'), height documents refer to 'GATS', two to 'TRIMS', four documents 
to 'TRIPS', one to TBT, one to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes and zero to any other WTO agreements.  
Theses documents belong to – at least – 60 investment disputes, which amount to 
approximately 10% of all existing investment arbitrations.11 Looking at the occurrence 
of at least on these terms in final awards and decisions only, that number would 38. This 
last figure confirms the necessity to look at all dispute materials and not only final 
decisions. There are more references to WTO law in the pleadings, and in other 
proceeding materials, than there are in the awards.12 
                                                 
11 Tables on file with the author. I emphasize the term 'at least' for four reasons: (i) some of the cases are 
pending and it is difficult to say how they will develop, (ii) some cases have been consolidated (and two 
cases become one), (iii) as previously explained not all dispute materials are in the public domain, and (iv) 
because a margin of error should be left. On this last reason, the amusing example of the reference to 
'TRIPS' may be mentioned. If there are four documents relating to investment disputes that refer to the 
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, there are many more documents 
referring to the "trips" that one protagonist in the case may have taken. Of course, those documents have 
not been counted. Although many checks and controls have been carried out, it nevertheless seems prudent 
to avoid claiming that no mistake has been made whilst processing all of the materials covered in the 
research. 
12 Two explanations can be given. The first one, which is discussed in more detailed in the following 
sections of the present Chapter, regards the willingness of tribunals to enter in discussions relating to 
trade norms. It may be the case that a tribunal disregards trade norms because it does not see how 
referring to them may be help it arrive at a decision for the case in question. This assumption is difficult to 
verify: tribunals will not always express clearly their aversion for trade norms. Yet, looking at the case law 
discussed in this chapter, one may assume that such aversion, to referencing trade norms, may actually 





These numbers allow for a first preliminary remark. Trade instruments seem to play an 
important role in investment disputes. Indeed, they are referred to more often than the 
majority of other non-investment international law instruments. To offer a comparison, 
110 documents include references to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), 59 documents to the American Convention on Human Rights, 11 documents to 
UNCLOS. The ECHR is referred to in 23 investment arbitration decisions and awards, 
whilst the UN Charter in referred to in only 8 cases. The ILC Articles and the VCLT are 
the only international instruments which are referred to at a significantly higher rate 
than WTO agreements.13 
Similarly, WTO AB or Panel decisions have had a significant influence on international 
investment arbitration. WTO case-law has been referred to in 33 investment disputes,14 
which is more than decisions of the ECHR (30), the CJEU (25), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (non-investment treaty awards – 11 cases) the ITLOS (5 cases), 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (four cases). The case-law of the ICJ 
(virtually all cases),15 and of the Iran-US claim tribunal (more than 70 cases) are the only 
non-investment treaty international jurisprudences that have been referred to on more 
occasions than that of the WTO.16 
                                                                                                                                                   
the time, or the resources) to dig into trade arguments made by the parties. As explained at length in the 
previous chapters, whilst it may be the case that trade and investment dispute settlement mechanisms 
share the same roots, they have not been codified in a similar manner and it is impossible to think that all 
arbitrators have mastered both international investment and trade disciplines (see Chapter 1). If verified, 
this second assumption could be very problematic. Indeed, one may argue that tribunals have a duty to 
address all arguments and allegations made by the parties. 
13 An extensive research – which I could not afford to undertake – would be needed to have the exact 
figures for these two instruments. They are, indeed, referred to in the vast majority of existing disputes. 
Crawford has recently discussed the role of the ILC Articles in investment arbitration. See J. Crawford 
'Investment Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility' (2010) 25 ICSID Rev. 127. For a 
discussion on the use of the VCLT as tool to interpret investment agreement, see J.R. Weeramantry, Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (2012) 37-114. 
14 This number highlights the fact that WTO rules are referred to in addition to WTO decisions. Recall 
that references to WTO norms in general (rules and case law) are to be found in 60 disputes. 
15 Virtually all investment arbitration awards refer, directly or indirectly, to ICJ case-law. Investment 
jurisprudence has thus been qualified as 'porous', absorbing ICJ precedents. See A. Pellet 'The Case Law of 
the ICJ in Investment Arbitration' (2013) 28 ICSID Rev. 223, 240. 
16 The high number of references to the Iran-US tribunal can be explained by the close similarity between 
the rules and obligations to be found in the Algiers Accords of 1981 and in classic BITs. Several authors 
have described the Iran-US tribunal as an ancestor of BIT arbitral tribunals. Another explanation could be 
that several of the judges in the Iran-US tribunal have acted as arbitrators in various BIT disputes. For 
studies relating to the relation between disputes before those tribunals and investment arbitration, see C.S. 
Gibson & C.R. Drahozal 'Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration' 
(2006) 23 J. Int'l Arb. 521 ; D. Caron, 'The Iran – U.S. Claims Tribunal and Investment Arbitration: 
Understanding the Claims Settlement Declaration as a Retrospective BIT' in C.S. Gibson & C.R. Drahozal 
(eds.), The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at 25: The Cases Everyone Needs to Know for International and 
Investor-State Arbitration (2007) 375. For a more general study comparing the references to other 
international courts by (a limited number of) ICSID tribunals, see O.K. Fauchald 'The Legal Reasoning of 
ICSID Tribunals - An Empirical Analysis' (2008) 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 301. 




A large number of the cases that refer to the WTO are NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes (28 
disputes, app. 45%). Although one might think that this number is explained by the 
normative connections between NAFTA and WTO law, and the references to WTO in 
the text of the NAFTA itself, 17  it seems that the reasons are more circumstantial, 
relating to the factual proximity of certain disputes with trade concerns (all four of the 
investment disputes initiated by Canadian wood exporters against the US have referred 
to WTO law and WTO proceedings in what is usually called the Softwood Lumber saga) 
and to the persistence of certain NAFTA lawyers with experience in trade, relying on 
trade law in each of their disputes. For instance, numerous reference to WTO law have 
been made in virtually all the known disputes in which T. Weiler, or the firm Appleton & 
Associate, were counsel to one of the parties. B. Appleton and T. Weiler are usually 
considered to be fluent in both international investment and trade law.18 Arguably, this 
dual expertise might influence the way they, and in turn the tribunal, handle the case. 
WTO law is also present in 'classic' BIT disputes (by opposition to NAFTA), and the 
famous Continental v. Argentina case, 19  further discussed in Section 3 below, is a 
prominent example. It is tempting to highlight how a 'circumstantial element' was 
present in that specific case, with the president of the arbitral tribunal, Pr. G. Sacerdoti, 
having previously served as the chairman of the WTO AB.20 Yet, there are numerous 
disputes that refer to WTO law and in which the actors – whether it be the litigants, 
their counsels or arbitrators – have no direct connection to the trade world (or at least, 
less obvious connections than those mentioned in the present section). Hence, if it is 
possible to argue that the participation of an actor with strong trade expertise in a given 
investment dispute might trigger reference to WTO law, the opposite argument, that 
the lack of participation from an actor with strong trade expertise would most likely 
mean the absence of a reference to WTO law is not necessarily valid: the participation of 
such an actor is not a prerequisite for the cross-fertilization of the two disciplines. 
                                                 
17 Various NAFTA provisions refer to WTO law. See for instance the references to the GATT in the 7th 
paragraph of its Preamble, as well as in Article 103 (Chapter 1: Objectives – Relation to other 
Agreements), Article 201 (Chapter 2: Definitions – Definitions of General Application), Article 301 
(Chapter 3: National Treatment and Market Access for Goods – National Treatment), Article 317 
(Chapter 3 – Third Country Dumping), Article 704 (Chapter 7: Agriculture and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures – Domestic Support), and Article 2005 (Chapter 20: Institutional Arrangements 
and Dispute Settlement Procedures – GATT Dispute Settlement). 
18 B. Appleton describes himself as a lawyer specialized both in international trade law and international 
investment law. See the webpage of his law firm at <http://www.appletonlaw.com/bappleton.html> (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015). Similarly, while T. Weiler describes himself as working 'exclusively' in the field of 
international investment law, his past experiences and publications denote strong experience in 
international trade. See the webpage of his law firm at <http://toddweiler.com/page6/index.html> (last 
consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
19 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (5 Sept. 2008) 
(hereinafter 'Continental v. Argentina'). 
20 As mentioned in a later section, detractors of the approach adopted in Continental have actually implied 
that the only reason for reference to WTO law in the case was the ‘accessibility’ of this law to G. Sacerdoti. 





The arbitral forum for the dispute does not seem to impact much on the propensity of 
investment arbitration actors to rely on WTO law: amongst the 60 disputes identified, 
app. 55% have been settled by ICSID Tribunals or under the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules and app. 45% under UNICTRAL or other Arbitration Rules, either in an 
institutional center such as the PCA or the SCC, or ad hoc tribunals. 
More interestingly, WTO law is referred to at all stages of the proceedings, and for 
various reasons. This is particularly important, especially because the works relating to 
the interconnection of WTO law and investment arbitration have usually been limited to 
one phenomenon; that being the use of WTO norms when interpreting given investment 
standards –for instance National Treatment– at the merit stage of the claim.21 However, 
the present study shows that WTO law has penetrated investment arbitration in a much 
more profound and intricate way.  
2. Four Different Scenarios 
WTO law has been used in four different situations. In addition to the one mentioned 
above, wherein WTO law or jurisprudence is used as an interpretative element, trade 
norms have been relied upon as rules to be enforced by investment tribunals. In this 
second situation, the investor affirms that WTO norms have been breached, that this 
breach has a consequence on its rights as protected in the investment agreement, and 
that the Tribunal shall rule on this breach and grant the investor some form of 
compensation. In other words, in this situation the breach of a WTO obligation is 
supposed to result in the breach of an investment obligation. 
WTO law also appears in arguments raised by respondent States. In this third situation, 
the idea is to affirm that the State was somehow compelled to take the measures alleged 
to be violations of investment law in order to comply with WTO law, or more generally 
that the investors claim is without merit because inconsistent with a given WTO 
obligation. In this situation, WTO law is supposed to trump investment law.  
Finally, WTO has been mentioned either by the claimant, the respondent or the tribunal 
itself, when (i) elaborating on a basic principle (procedural, relating to treaty 
interpretation, etc.) that is not connected per se to investment norms, or (ii) more simply, 
when going through the factual matrix of the case (because this matrix includes elements 
that are to be found in the international trade law arena). In this situation, reference to 
WTO law serves only as an accessory or illustrative tool, it does not bear any 
consequence on the direct application of a substantive norm of investment law.  
Arguably, these four situations have different causes and consequences. Referring to an 
isolated WTO AB in ordr to explain how the burden of proof shall be applied in 
international arbitral proceedings is different to arguing that the investor failed to 
provide technical assistance as required by relevant WTO standards as incorporated into 
                                                 
21 See e.g., Kurtz (supra n.1). 




the agreements between the investor and the host-State, and thus cannot benefit from 
the treaty protection. Similarly, asking a tribunal to declare that the State has breached 
the TRIPS agreement and consequently violated the legitimate expectations of an 
investor, which are protected by investment law, has nothing to do with relying on 
GATT Article XX jurisprudence to construe how a BIT reservation clause is supposed 
to apply. Thus, each of these four situations or 'scenarios', as I will call them from now 
on, deserves to be analyzed separately. For the sake of clarification, they will be 
numbered as follows: 
– Scenario No.1: WTO law as a factual or accessory legal element, used to 
construe rules or principles that are not substantive investment standards, e.g. 
general principles of procedures); 
– Scenario No.2: WTO law as an interpretative element, for substantive 
investment norms; 
– Scenario No.3: WTO norms in the claim, viz. breach of WTO triggers a 
breach of investment law; 
– Scenario No.4: WTO norms as a defense, viz. WTO law trumps investment 
law. 
A disclaimer needs to be made regarding this categorization. One may argue that it is 
artificial to make distinctions between these scenarios, because there is no clear-cut 
situation where WTO law may be referred to in different ways in one given case. This 
affirmation would not be ill-founded. In many cases, WTO law might be referred to in 
the factual description on the case, and then later within the arguments on the merits. In 
Methanex v. US for instance,22 a case that deals with elements that, in the present study, 
fall under 'Scenario No.3', there were, nevertheless, numerous references to WTO law in 
order to interpret investment norms (a 'Scenario No. 2' situation).23 Thus, it may well be 
that once an issue of trade law enters into an investment case, it gradually grows in 
importance over the proceedings and references to trade law become more recurrent. In 
Methanex, trade concerns were first introduced in the claimant's submissions. The 
investor argued that NAFTA Article 1105 could be used to incorporate GATT 
obligations. 24 References to trade law then spread rapidly throughout the case. It is 
                                                 
22 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (3 Aug. 2005)(hereinafter 
'Methanex v. US'). 
23 Ibid. Part II, Chapter B, ¶¶3-6. 





mentioned in expert opinions,25 in one of the amicus submission,26 during the hearings,27 
and in the award,28 each time for different purposes. 
Another example is found in Merrill v. Canada.29 In the hearings, WTO law has been 
referred to on numerous occasions. Robert Howse, a well-known expert in international 
economic law, participated as an expert witness. In his oral submissions, when discussing 
issues relating to the extents of NAFTA obligations such as National Treatment 
(hereinafter NT) or Most-Favored-Treatment (hereinafter MFN), Howse referred 
several time to GATT provisions.30 It is difficult to assess whether and, if so, to what 
extent, Howse presentation was actually taken into consideration by the tribunal when 
reaching its decision. The award does refer to WTO law, but not to the texts and 
provisions Howse used in his submissions.31 
In Continental v. Argentina the tribunal justified its reference to WTO law when 
interpreting the necessity clause contained in the BIT (Scenario No.2), most notably 
because the claimant, itself, used WTO in its argumentation.  
Scenarios can overlap, and references to WTO law may occur throughout all of the 
different stages of a dispute, and for various reasons. This is not disputed. Nevertheless, 
it is important to keep these four categories separated. As we will see, the reactions of 
investment tribunals differ slightly, depending on the situation in which trade norms are 
referred to. Therefore, it seems pertinent to approach each scenario individually. 
Bearing this in mind (that scenarios can overlap) the following represents the amount of 
times each scenario has occurred in international investment arbitration. 
- Scenario No1: at least 20 
- Scenario No2: at least 25 
                                                 
25 Methanex v. US , Expert Opinion of Pr. C-D. Ehlermann (4. Nov. 2002) pp. 31-34.  
26 Methanex v. US, International Institute for Sustainable Development Second Amicus Curiae Submission, 
(9 March 2004), ¶¶12-24.  
27  Methanex v. US, Transcript of Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibilit (11 July 2001), various 
references, see e.g. pp. 11; 19-23; 88-90; 182; 259 and 385. 
28 Methanex v. US, Final Award (3 Aug. 2005), Part II, Chapter B, ¶¶3-6.  
29 Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Administered Case, 
Award (31 Mar. 2010) (hereinafter 'Merrill v. Canada').  
30 Merrill v. Canada, Hearing Transcripts nº5. pp.1295-97. 
31 It does so when analysing the meaning of the notion of 'requirement', or when drawing attention to the 
possibility that one of the measures under scrutiny could be considered as an 'actionable subsidy' under the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See, Merrill v. Canada, Award (31 Mar. 2010) 
¶102. The tribunal nuanced the approach taken in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, another NAFTA Chapter 11 
case, in which it was affirmed that the word 'requirement', as used in NAFTA Article 1106(1), had a 
mandatory nature, with the approach taken in a Indonesia–Certain Measures Affective the Automotive Industry, 
a WTO dispute, in which the panel considered that 'requirement' could include various forms of 
governmental action that could influence the conduct of private parties. There, the tribunal simply 
affirmed that if the measure was "a direct transfer of funds from the Canadian government to the industry 
there might be, mutatis mutandis, a case for an actionable subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures." Ibid. ¶222 & note 151 




- Scenario No3: 4 
- Scenario No4: 1 + 3 potential 
We will now proceed to individually address each scenario. 
III. TRADE NORMS AS EITHER FACTUAL OR ACCESSORY 
LEGAL ELEMENTS  
In Scenario No.1, WTO law is mentioned as part of the factual matrix, or context of the 
case. I also include in this first scenario, what I call accessory legal references to WTO 
law, which are isolated references to WTO law, used to underpin a legal argument that 
is not directly linked to investment standards or law. A prominent example of this 
second subcategory is when investment arbitration actors make reference to WTO case 
law to support their understanding of treaty interpretation methods. Beside this main 
example, isolated legal references are relatively disparate, but remain numerous. 
A. CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLAIM 
Reference to WTO law can be included in the description of the factual development of a 
given investment dispute. As mentioned elsewhere in this work, international investment 
law and trade law, as disciplines, can be considered as interdependent, at time even 
overlapping. 32 As a consequence, trade and investment disputes addressing the same 
subject matter may be initiated simultaneously, or sequentially. The 'sugar war', between 
the US and Mexico,33 or the 'soft-wood lumber saga', between the US and Canada, are 
notorious examples. 34  In both cases, a State measure, or set of measures, triggered 
disputes before both trade and investment dispute settlement bodies. 35  It is not 
surprising then to see one body, of one system, referring to the undertakings of the 
other, in order to shed light on the factual background of the dispute at hand. 
                                                 
32 See Chapter 1, pp.10-25 and references therein. The interrelationship between investment and trade has 
been recognized within the WTO itself, with the creation of a Working Group on trade and investment. In 
the first report issued by this Working Group, it is demonstrated that regulations in one discipline may 
affect the economics of the other, and vice-versa. See WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between 
Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat (WTO Doc. WT/WGTI/W/7, 8 Sept. 1997). See also, M. 
Footer, 'On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship Between Foreign Investment and 
International Trade' in R. Echandi & P. Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy 
(2013) 105, 105-06. 
33 For a recent study on this widely commented case, see A. Antoni & M. Ewing-Chow 'Trade and 
Investment Convergence and Divergence: Revisiting the North American Sugar War' (2013) 1 Latin 
American J. of Int'l Trade L. 315.  
34 For a recent and broad overview of this 'saga', see L. Guglya 'The Interplay of International Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms: the Softwood Lumber Controversy' (2011) 2 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 175.  
35 Joost Pauwelyn has provided an excellent overview of the disputes and their repercussions on each 
other. See J. Pauwelyn 'Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA "Spaghetti Bowl" is 





In the three disputes initiated by US Sugar exporters against Mexico, in the soft drink 
dispute, the tribunals elaborated on WTO proceedings in which the same measure was 
also challenged. 
Similarly, in the arbitration between Canadian lumber producers and the US, the parties 
and the arbitrators extensively referred to the trade proceedings in which the US 
imposition of anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties had been previously 
ruled to be in breach of WTO agreements. Determining the nature of the measures 
contested by the investors proved a crucial element in the arbitration. The investors 
alleged that the countervailing duty and antidumping measures on Canadian import of 
softwood lumber to the US were in breach of NAFTA Article 1102 (NT), 1103 (MFN 
Treatment), 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), and 1110 (Expropriation).36 These 
measures were taken by the US trade authorities in order to compensate for the effect of 
Canadian lumber subsidy programs, which was allegedly favoring local industries over 
US producers. They consisted in a series of determinations, made by the Department of 
Commerce (DoC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC),37 which resulted in 
countervailing duties, as well as provisions contained in the 'Byrd Amendment', 
according to which the duties, assessed pursuant to countervailing duty or antidumping 
orders, should be distributed annually to affected US domestic producers. The US 
objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal arguing that, because such countervailing duty 
and antidumping laws were contemplated under another NAFTA Chapter (viz. Chapter 
19, which included its own dispute settlement mechanism), Chapter 11 tribunals were 
not competent to rule on their international legality. The question therefore became, 
whether each contested measures should be considered as a 'countervailing duty and 
antidumping law' in the sense of NAFTA Article 1901.38 Looking closely at the language 
of that provision, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the DoC and ITC 
determinations were indeed to be classified as 'countervailing duty and antidumping law', 
and that consequently, Chapter 19 was the only venue for any challenge to them. The 
                                                 
36 Canfor Corporation v. United States; Tembec et al. v. United States of America; Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. 
United States of America, UNCITRAL, (Decision on Preliminary Question, 6 Jun. 2006)(hereinafter 'Canfor 
& al. v. US') ¶86. 
37 Pursuant to the US Tariff Act of 1930, and to the U.S. ITC Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Handbook, the US procedure to be followed where dumping and subsidies investigations are requested is 
twofold: First, the DoC determines whether goods are being sold at less than fair value (dumped) and 
whether a foreign government has provided countervailable subsidies to the industry manufacturing the 
goods under review. Second, the ITC determines whether the domestic industry is injured by reason of the 
subject imports. Each administrative agency must make an affirmative determination before the DoC 
issues a countervailing duty or antidumping order. 
38 This relevant provision of this Article reads as follows: 
"Article 1901. General Provisions 
[…] 3. Except for Article 2203 (Entry into Force), no provision of any other Chapter of this Agreement 
shall be construed as imposing obligations on a Party with respect to the Party's antidumping law or 
countervailing duty law." 




conclusion was however different for the Byrd Amendment, over which the tribunal 
retained jurisdiction.  
Interestingly, this Byrd Amendment (officially, the "Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act" or "CDSOA") had also been challenged before a WTO panel, in a dispute of 
the same name. In these WTO proceedings, the US argued that the act was merely a 
'payment program' and that it was therefore covered by either the WTO Anti Dumping 
or the Subsidies and Counter-Measures Agreements. Both the Panel, and the AB, 
rejected the argument, and found that the said act was a non-permissible specific action 
against dumping within the meaning of the WTO Anti Dumping (Article 18.1) and the 
Subsidies and Counter-Measures Agreements (Article 32.1).39 Addressing the NAFTA 
Arbitral Tribunal, the US attempted to develop the opposite argument, saying that the 
act had to be qualified as countervailing duty and antidumping law. The tribunal referred 
extensively to the WTO findings 40  and noted that before the WTO panel, the US 
asserted that the Byrd Amendment "had nothing to do with the administration of the 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws."41 Of course, as the US pointed out in the 
arbitral proceedings, the WTO Panel and AB disagreed with the US's characterization of 
the Byrd Amendment. However, the tribunal retorted that its charter was "to determine 
whether the Byrd Amendment is antidumping or countervailing duty law for purposes of 
Article 1901(3) and not for purposes of the separate WTO agreements in respect of 
which the WTO Panel and AB made their findings."42 The tribunal clarified its position 
in the following terms:  
"While the conduct of the United States before the WTO and the findings of 
WTO Panels and its Appellate Body have no binding effect upon this Tribunal, they 
constitute relevant factual evidence which the Tribunal can and should appropriately 
take into account, especially in the case of positions advocated by the United States 
before the WTO that amount to admissions against interest for purposes of this 
NAFTA case."43 
                                                 
39 For the AB decision on this particular issue, see United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
of 2000, WT/DS217-DS234/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (16 Jan. 2003) ¶¶254–56. As a result, the AB 
found the measure to be in breach of WTO law (it did not belong to the categories of measures mentioned 
in GATT Article VI.2) and ordered the US to bring their measures into compliance with their WTO 
obligations. Subsequent to the failure of the United States to repeal the Byrd Amendment within the 
required time, Canada, as well other WTO Members, were authorized to levy retaliatory duties reflecting 
the 'trade effect' of the CDSOA. Note that the AB decision has been criticized in scholarship, especially 
because it looked at the consequences of the measure (who gets the results of the AD duties in the US) 
rather than the rationale underlying the decision to dump. See, H. Horn & P.C. Mavroidis 'United States-
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000' (2005) 4 World Trade Rev. 525. 
40 An entire section of the arbitral decision relates to the WTO proceedings. See Canfor and all v. US (supra 
n.36) ¶¶85-94. 
41 Ibid. ¶325.  
42 Ibid. ¶326. 





This statement, which led the tribunal to conclude that the Byrd Amendment was not 
covered by NAFTA Chapter 19, is particularly instructive. The tribunal acknowledges 
the jurisdictional boundary that exists between NAFTA Chapter 11 and the WTO, but 
explains that WTO findings have no 'binding effect' upon the investment dispute because 
these determination were made in accordance with legal agreements that the tribunal 
does not have the jurisdiction to review to review. The tribunal does, nevertheless, 
accept that said findings have factual value. A factual value that happened to be decisive, 
as the tribunal's own determinations were closely connected to the ones in the WTO 
proceedings. During the hearings, the tribunal paid very special attention to these 
proceedings, asking the parties counsels, on several occasions, to clarify to what extent 
the WTO proceedings should be taken into consideration.44 Further, at the post-hearing 
stage, the tribunal sent a series of supplemental questions to the parties regarding the 
Byrd Amendment, three of which were related to the qualification of the Byrd 
Amendment in the trade dispute and the effect it could have on the investment 
proceedings. 45  The answers to these questions were an important element in the 
determination of the dispute outcome, as the tribunal cites directly from them in its 
decision.46 
This dispute, which is not isolated,47 illustrates how a WTO legal element (in that case, 
adjudicator findings) can influence investment proceedings, even if not considered as a 
legal 'norm' per se. The reference is only factual. Yet, the content remains particularly 
important for the investment tribunal. 
                                                 
44 See for instance, the discussion between Arbitrator Robinson and US counsel A. Menaker, and Arbitrator 
Robinson and claimant counsel, Canfor & al. v. US, Transcripts of Hearing - Day Two (12 Jan. 2006) 
pp.188-190 ; 196-198. 
45 Canfor & al. v. US, Response of Canfor Corporation and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. to Additional 
Questions by the Tribunal Regarding the Byrd Amendment (19 May 2006), Questions J(a), J(b) and K. 
46 Canfor & al. v. US (Decision on Preliminary Question, 6 Jun. 2006) ¶¶294-95. 
47 For other Scenario No.4 cases, see e.g. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican 
States, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of T. Wälde (1 Dec. 2005) (hereinafter 'Thunderbird v. Mexico') 
¶¶18-20, where the dissenting arbitrator made various references to WTO law to highlight differences 
and similarities between trade and investment law disciplines; as well as the three decisions on jurisdiction, 
issued on the same day (Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 Nov. 2009) in the case known 
as the 'Yukos' dispute, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. AA 228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 Nov. 2009) ; Hulley Enterprises Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (30 Nov. 2009), in which the tribunal referred to expert opinions in which comparisons 
between the drafting history of the ECT and the GATT were made. See also the pending dispute between a 
renewable energy company and Canada, where both parties have heavily relied on the WTO proceedings 
on the same subject. Mesa Power Group, LLC v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17(hereinafter 'Mesa v. Canada'). 




B. WTO AS AN ACCESSORY LEGAL ELEMENT 
1. Emphasis on Interpretation Methods  
Another sub-category of references that can be included in Scenario No.1, is the use of 
WTO panels or AB decisions that shed light on the application of legal principles not 
relating to substantial rules of trade, investment, or even economic, law. I call these 
references 'accessory' legal references. The main example of this sub-category is the use 
of WTO decisions to support investment tribunals in their understanding of rules, 
principles and methods of treaty interpretation.  
On numerous occasions, investment tribunals have referred to WTO panel and AB 
reports, as well as scholarly writing about interpretation of WTO agreements,48 when 
elaborating on basic principles of treaty interpretation. 
Arguably, the same basic rules of treaty interpretation are applicable in WTO dispute 
settlement, as are in investment dispute settlement. Investment tribunals may, therefore, 
rely on the findings of trade adjudicators, to underline interpretative considerations. For 
instance, the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal referred to the AB position on the necessity to 
adopt a 'prudential approach' when interpreting an international agreement.49 Another 
example, is how in two disputes, litigants and arbitrators have relied upon AB findings in 
the US–Shrimps and EC–Hormones cases, to explain that both the preamble and first 
chapter of the NAFTA, should be used to construe provisions of Chapter 11.50 
In the same vein, investment tribunals have largely referred to WTO considerations on 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. The section of the AB Report that focuses on treaty 
interpretation in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, one of the first disputes brought before the 
WTO dispute settlement body, has been quoted in at least three different investment 
disputes. In that case, the AB, while explaining that it had to refer to the principles of the 
VCLT when interpreting WTO covered agreements, elaborated on said principles. 
Referring to scholarly work, as well as to decisions of the ICJ, the AB notably affirmed 
that: 
                                                 
48 See e.g., Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (28 Sept. 
2007) ¶385, note 149, where the tribunal relies on the writing of M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum and P. 
Mavroidis to support its reasoning on the interpretation of so-called 'self-judging' provisions.  
49 See European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R; 
WT/DS48/AB/R; WT/DS320/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (16 Jan. 1998)  (hereinafter 'AB Report, 
EC–Hormones') ¶¶163-165. This statement was quoted both in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction (6 Aug. 2003)¶171. 
50 In the two WTO cases, the AB explained that it could rely on the preamble, or the 'objectives' provision 
of an agreement, for the purpose of establishing the meaning of an expression contained in a substantive 
provision of that agreement. See United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Report of the Appellate Body WT/DS58/AB/R (AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998) (hereinafter 'AB Report, US – 
Shrimp') ¶114 and AB Report, EC – Hormones ¶¶ 165; 181. These cases were cited in ADF Group Inc. v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (Award, 9 Jan. 2003) ¶147 and in Metalclad Corporation v. 






"Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form 
the foundation for the interpretive process: interpretation must be based above all 
upon the text of the treaty. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their 
ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to 
be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions. A fundamental 
tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set 
out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness […]. One of the corollaries of the 
'general rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation 
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not 
free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs 
of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."51  
The tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute, expressly 
referred to this statement to interpret NAFTA Article 1106 (performance requirements) 
and to stress the necessity to first look at the wording of an agreement before turning to 
supplementary means of interpretation.52 Similarly, in her dissenting opinion in Garanti 
Koza v. Turkmenistan, L. Boisson de Chazournes referred to the AB findings regarding 
the adjudicator's leeway when interpreting several provisions of an international 
treaty.53 
Still in Japan–Alcoholic Beverages, the AB held that subsequent practice, within the 
meaning of Article 31 VCLT, required a 'sequence' of acts or statements, sufficient 
enough to establish a 'discernible pattern'. In Telefónica S.A. v. Argentina, the tribunal 
quoted this passage when rebuffing Argentina's argument that both its position 
regarding the use of Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses for procedural purpose, and 
the one of the investor home State (in casu, Spain), had changed and that the tribunal 
should therefore proceed with a narrow interpretation of the MFN clause in Argentina-
Spain.54 
                                                 
51 Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8,10,11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (4 Oct. 1996) 
(hereinafter 'AB Report, Japan–Alcoholic Beverages'), pp.11-12 (references omitted).  
52 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award (26 Jun. 2000) (hereinafter 
'Pope & Talbot v. Canada') ¶¶68-9.  
53 Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Dissenting Opinion of L. Boisson de 
Chazournes (3 July 2013) ¶12, n.17.  
54 Telefónica S.A v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Objections to Jurisdiction (25 May 
2006). The question was about the use of a MFN clause to bypass procedural requirements contained in 
the dispute settlement clause. The argument, which is increasingly contested, is to say that MFN 
treatment applies to the procedural rights of the investor, and that the latter can invoke such a clause to 
refer to another BIT. Argentina argued that both the Spanish and its own government had shared, in their 
defensive briefs, filed in an international direct arbitration initiated against them by investors, the same 
positions about the inability to use an MFN to circumvent the procedural condition of a multi-tier 
arbitration clause. Argentina claimed that these shared positions amounted to subsequent practice, as this 
requirement is understood in public international law. The tribunal recalled what it considered to be the 
conditions for 'subsequent practice' pursuant to Article 31.3(b) and concluded as follows, quoting from the 
AB report in Japan–Alcoholic Beverages: "the Tribunal finds therefore that those positions, though 
concordant at least in appearance, do not entail a 'concordant, common and consistent sequence of acts or 
pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties 




WTO findings on interpretation have also been referred to when applying substantive 
rules that are specific to international economic law. As explained above however, these 
references belong to another scenario and will be examined later. 
It remains that the aforementioned numbers show that WTO jurisprudence has proved 
an interesting source of inspiration when investment tribunals must engage with treaty 
interpretation. The AB and WTO panel decisions have been prolific on these issues,55 
and it is therefore very likely that references to such decisions by investment tribunals 
will continue.  
2. Miscellaneous References 
Isolated references to WTO law have been made, in investment arbitration, for many 
other purposes. For instance, in one dispute, WTO law was referenced to support the 
general view that different provisions in a treaty should be treated as cumulative and 
complementary, except in the case of a clearly identified conflict.56 
Still, in Phoenix v. Czech Republic,57 the tribunal argued that like other international legal 
instruments, BITs and the ICSID Convention "had to be analyzed with due regard to the 
requirements of the general principles of law, such as the principle of non-retroactivity 
or the principle of good faith."58 Quoting from the WTO AB decision in US – Gasoline, 
the tribunal added that international investment should not "be read and interpreted in 
isolation from public international law, and its general principles."59 
                                                                                                                                                   
[to a treaty] regarding its interpretation' […] as would be required under Art.31.3(b) of the Vienna 
Convention." Ibid. ¶114.  
55 More than a hundred decisions refereeing to the interpretation principles codified in Section 5 of the 
VCLT could be identified. On the issue of interpretation of trade agreements See I. Van Damme 'Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body' (2010) 21 Eur. J. Int'l L. 605. 
56 S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 Nov. 2000) (hereinafter 'SD Myers v. 
Canada'). In that case, the tribunal, referring to the Panel report in Korea–Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Import of Certain Dairy Product, noted as follows:  
"In Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, the Panel summarized 
the line of WTO cases as follows, at paragraph 738 of its report "It is now well established that the WTO 
Agreement is a 'Single Undertaking' and therefore all WTO obligations are generally cumulative and 
Members must comply with all of them simultaneously unless there is a formal 'conflict' between them. 
The chapters of the NAFTA are part of a 'single undertaking'. There appears to be no reason in principle 
for not following the same preference as in the WTO system for viewing different provisions as 
'cumulative' and complementary. The WTO Panel in the Korean Dairy Products case adopted the 
definition of "conflict" in several earlier cases, including the report of the Appellate Body of the WTO in 
Guatemala Cement, at paragraph 65.51 The latter case suggests that provisions of agreements in the 
WTO system should be read as complementary unless there were a conflict in the sense that adherence to 
one provision would cause a violation of the other." Ibid. ¶¶291-93.  For the WTO case, see, Korea — 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/R Panel Report (21 June 
1999). 
57 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 Apr. 2009). 
58 Ibid. ¶77, citing J. Pauwelyn 'The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go?' 
(2001) 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 535, 539. 
59 Ibid. ¶78, citing United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 





More specifically, in Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, 60 the tribunal had to address an 
argument made by the claimant on the 'lack of transparency' it allegedly suffered. The 
tribunal referred to WTO AB jurisprudence in order to elaborate on that argument. 
According to the claimant in that case, pursuant to settlements concluded with the 
Egyptian government, its competitor received compensations for a failure in the 
regulation of the market it was involved in (cotton industry). The claimant did not 
receive this form of compensation and claimed that the conclusion of these settlements, 
which allegedly occurred behind closed doors, was contrary to international law. The 
claimant stated that Egypt's treatment of its investment "in terms of the secretive and 
non-transparent manner in which it intervened to compensate a limited group of select 
companies – fell below the minimum standard of treatment, constituting an abuse of 
right under customary international law and violated the international law principle of 
transparency."61 Quoting the AB decision in U.S.–Underwear, the tribunal explained how 
that principle found expression in the WTO regime: 
"The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be 
affected, by Governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other 
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about 
such measures and, accordingly, to protect and adjust their activities, or alternatively to 
seek modification of such measures."62 
The tribunal went on to examine other grounds on which this principle of transparency 
is based, and eventually ruled that whilst the principle also applied in investment 
arbitration, the claimant in that case had not "produced any evidence or even pertinent 
arguments that Egypt violated the principle of transparency under international law."63 
It therefore dismissed the claim. 
There have also been cases where arbitral tribunals have referred to WTO law in order 
to seek guidance on the interpretation of 'necessity' or 'emergency' clauses, and to 
support the conclusion that 'self-judging' emergency clauses must be expressly stated in 
the terms of the treaty. Self-judging clauses have been defined in the literature as 
"clauses that allow states to reserve to [sic] themselves a right of non-compliance with 
                                                 
60 Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (formerly Champion 
Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award (27 Oct. 2006), ¶161. 
61 Ibid. ¶35 (emphasis added). One should note that the principle of transparency in WTO law might have 
a scope that is slightly different from what the tribunal in Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt had in mind, 
especially since it is expressly referred to in WTO agreements and therefore cannot be qualified as 
customary. For a general overview on this principle in the jurisprudence of the WTO, See, A.I. Padideh 
'From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good 
Governance? ' (2008) 11 J. Int'l Eco. L. 779. 
62  Ibid. ¶161, citing United States — Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, 
WT/DS24/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (10 Feb. 1997) 21. 
63 Ibid. ¶164. 




international legal obligations in certain circumstances".64 They are called 'self-judging' 
because the discretion is with the state to determine that, in particular circumstances, it 
is not obliged to comply with certain obligations it has accepted under a particular 
international agreement. Examples of these particular circumstances include situations 
such as when a state considers that compliance with certain obligations will harm its 
sovereignty, security, public policy, or more generally, its essential interests.65 The use 
of clear language in the clause, is usually considered to be important in order to 
determine whether it is self-judging or not. For instance the inclusion of expression such 
as 'if the state considers', or 'if the state determines' are decisive.66 
In five investment disputes based on the US-Argentina BIT, tribunals have struggled to 
determine whether the (unclear) exception clause, found in the BIT, should be considered 
as "self-judging".67 Four out of the five tribunals referred to Article XXI of the GATT 
and discussions relating to it, in order to affirm that the language of a provision had to 
be very precise in order to lead to a conclusion about its self-judging nature.68 
Finally, investment tribunals have referred to the way WTO to clarify general 
procedural rules applicable to investment proceedings. They have for instance done so in 
order to frame the conditions applicable to the participation of non-dispute parties to the 
proceedings,69 or to clarify the rules relating to the burden of proof. As to this latter 
                                                 
64 R. Briese & S. Schill 'Djibouti v. France - Self-Judging Clauses before the International Court of Justice' 
(2009) 10 Melb. J. Int'l L. 308-328, 308. 
65 Ibid. 
66 For an exhaustive taxonomy of self-judging clauses in international agreements, see S. Schill & R. Briese 
'"If the State Considers": Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement' (2009) 13 Max Planck 
YB UN L. 61, 81-93.  
67 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 
2005) ¶¶349-52 (hereinafter 'CMS v. Argentina'); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E 
International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 Oct. 2006)  
¶208-09 (hereinafter 'LG&E v. Argentina'); Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Award (28 Sept. 2007) ¶¶364-91 (hereinafter 'Sempra v. Argentina'); Enron Corporation 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic (also known as Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. Ponderosa 
Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007) ¶¶324-26 
(hereinafter 'Enron v. Argentina'); Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶¶182-88. 
68 CMS v. Argentina (Award, 12 May 2005) ¶368; Enron v. Argentina, Award (22 May 2007) ¶336; Sempra 
v. Argentina, Award (28 Sept. 2007) ¶¶ 383-85; Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008), ¶184. 
69 Without entering into the details of an issue that has been broadly covered, the arbitral rules applicable 
in investment arbitration proceedings used to not refer expressly to the participation of non-parties to the 
said proceedings. Facing numerous criticisms on the opacity of their activity, investment tribunals started 
to accept non-party submissions. In the absence of clear rules to be used to justify acceptance of such 
submissions, investment tribunals relied on the way WTO adjudicators had dealt with the issue. In 
UNCITRAL proceedings, See, the interpretation of UNCITRAL Rules (1976) Article 15(1) in Methanex v. 
U.S., Decision of the Tribunals on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amicus Curiae" (15 Jan. 
2001), ¶33 and in United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of 
the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (17 Oct. 2001) ¶64. In ICSID 
Proceedings, see Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation 
as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005) ¶15. Interestingly, the conditions for participation developed by 





example, the statement of the AB in US–Wool Shirts and Blouses, on the basic rule 
according to which "the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or 
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a claim or defense",70 has been echoed by three 
investor-State tribunals.71 
Arguably, the list of legal notions that WTO adjudicators have elaborated upon and 
which are particularly important for investment arbitration is extensive.72 It is thus very 
likely that the number of cases that could be classified as belonging to Scenario No. 4 
will grow in the future. As explained in the following remarks, this should not be a 
problem. 
C. REMARKS 
In my opinion, Scenario No.1 references are not problematic. On the contrary, these 
references should be encouraged.  
By referring to trade norms, tribunals acknowledge the existence of another 
international legal system, which is interconnected to theirs. Using international trade 
law in their reasoning, investment arbitral tribunals show some openness towards other 
branches of international law, whilst arguably engaging in a form of dialogue that is 
necessary for the integration of international economic law and a reduction of 
transaction costs. 73  When doing so, arbitral tribunals gain positive credits from the 
commentators and even actors of the discipline. Awards referring to other international 
norms are more likely to be cited and 're-used'. In that sense, Scenario No. 1 references 
represent a gain for the arbitral tribunals.  
This gain is not very high. After all, the references are only incidental and –with one 
exception in the Canfor case–74 do not have a huge impact on the outcome of cases.  
                                                                                                                                                   
considered that, whilst anyone can send a submission to the panels, said panels are under no obligation to 
consider the submissions. Tribunals first referred to WTO case-law to justify their decisions to accept 
amicus, but then built up a different framework for such acceptance than the one existing in WTO law. 
Soon after these cases, the ICSID Arbitration rules were modified to warrant, upon the satisfaction of 
certain conditions, the participation of amicus curiae in ICSID proceedings. The UNICTRAL revised its 
arbitration rules in 2010. The new version of these rules includes, in  Article 17, an express provision on 
the participation of third parties to the arbitral proceedings. 
70 United States — Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, 
Appellate Body Report (25 Apr. 1997) p.14.  
71 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (16 Dec. 
2002)(heireinafter'Fieldman v. Mexico') ¶177 ; Canfor Corporation v. United States of America; Terminal Forest 
Products Ltd. v. United States of America (formerly Canfor Corporation v. United States of America; Tembec et al. 
v. United States of America; Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America), UNCITRAL, Order of 
the Consolidation Tribunal (7 Sept. 2005), ¶93; Thunderbird v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Arbitral Award (26 
Jan. 2006) ¶95. 
72 See Tereposky & Maguire (supra n.1). 
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Additionally, the costs of these accessory references are relatively low. First, these 
references do not represent an excessive commitment for the judges: they are basic (the 
presentation of one general principle or one GATT article, one citation from one case or 
set of case, etc.) and the arbitrators do not need to enter into lengthy demonstrations of 
the rules that are used. They do not apply these rules per se; they barely refer to them. 
Further, arbitrators risk little when sporadically referring to trade norms. In Scenario 
No.1, trade norms do not enter in the scope of the law applied by the tribunal.  
Therefore, the chance of being sanctioned, either formally by having the award annulled 
or informally by having the award criticized is relatively low.  
In the light of these two remarks (reasonably high gain / relatively low risk) it is easier 
to understand why Scenario 1 references are not to be considered as problematic. They 
are, I argue, a good example of successful (and/because 'cheap') cross-fertilization. 
Further, I argue that these references should even be encouraged. An interesting way of 
doing so could be to look at the techniques that can incentivize tribunals to make these 
references. This is done in Chapters 5 and 6. 
IV. TRADE NORMS AS AN INTERPRETATIVE ELEMENT 
Scenario No.2 situations (references to WTO law when discussing the interpretation of 
investment norms) have been slightly more frequent than Scenario No.1 situations. In 
about 20 disputes, investment arbitration actors have referred to WTO law, or 
jurisprudence, arguing that the latter may provide guidance on how a given investment 
rule should be interpreted. This should not come as a surprise. It has been argued that 
the international investment regime, being a developing and diffused regime, tends to be 
influenced by the dynamics of other international legal regimes.75 In that sense, the 
reason why WTO law is used in investment arbitration, may not necessarily be because 
WTO law is easily exportable, but rather because the investment legal regime is, 
presently, easily influenced by other disciplines of international law.  
The use of WTO law as an interpretative element in investment arbitration has been 
discussed in several scholarly contributions. While some authors consider cross-
fertilization between trade and investment as a positive, and a development that should 
be welcomed and enhanced,76 others seem more reluctant, shedding light on the dangers 
of 'boundary crossing'.77 However, a broad survey of the literature shows that no one has 
                                                 
75  The best work to understand the way other international disciplines have shaped the conceptual 
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Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System' (2013) 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45. 
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attempted to take into account all of the disputes in which such references are made. 
Commentaries and/or critiques are usually made about one case, or a group of cases that 
all refer to the same WTO rules or principles, potentially leading to misleading analyses. 
It would, for example, be incorrect to affirm that the ICTY has not been influenced by 
public international law, because it disregarded the approach of the ICJ regarding the 
notion of 'control' in one given case. 78  Likewise, it is wrong to assert that trade 
jurisprudence has no impact whatsoever on the way investment actors construe 
investment norms, because one tribunal once refused to look at the treatment of 'likeness' 
by the AB. It is, I argue, necessary to look at all investment arbitration decisions, in their 
entirety, if we are to fully apprehend the issue of the use, or misuse, of WTO law in 
investment law.79  
M. Wu has recently conducted a more comprehensive analysis on the influence of WTO 
Law on investment treaty interpretation.80 He notes that investment tribunals consider 
jurisprudential concepts developed in the case law of the trade regime "on only select 
occasions for a very limited set of substantive issues",81 and concludes "cross-regime 
borrowing […] often may turn out to be inappropriate."82 
The empirical research, conducted for this thesis, warrants challenging this affirmation. 
In fact, it appears that investment tribunals have had recourse to trade law on several 
occasions, in order to interpret various sets of investment norms. The following 
subsections will present these cases in an attempt to explain why references, such as 
these, are relatively frequent, and why their importance should not be understated.  
A. THE VARIOUS REFERENCES TO WTO LAW WHEN INTERPRETING 
INVESTMENT NORMS 
The two main examples of Scenario No.2 references are, the interpretation of the NT 
standard, and the notion of 'necessity', along with the question of the proportionality 
analysis that needs to be used when applying preclusion clauses. These two major 
examples are presented below, but should not be considered as isolated. The last 
development of this section addresses the other cases in which guidance has been found, 
or at least looked for, in WTO legal norms. 
                                                 
78 See, on the issue of case-law borrowing by international courts and tribunals, G. Guillaume 'The Use of 
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case law by investment tribunals to interpret the likeness comparator. Kurtz (supra n.1). 
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1. National Treatment 
Under the NT standard, which exists in both investment and trade disciplines, 
governments are obliged to treat foreign and national entities (e.g. goods, services 
suppliers and investors) in an indiscriminate manner. 
When asked to rule whether this obligation has been respected, and depending on the 
exact wording of the provision in which it is included, an adjudicator has to first compare 
the foreign goods, services suppliers, or investors with the national ones. In the words of 
DiMascio and Pauwelyn, "[n]ational treatment provisions take various forms, but their 
basic requirement is that nations treat foreign individuals, enterprises, products, or 
services no less favorably than they treat their domestic counterparts." 83  This 
comparison is made through the consideration of the treatment of the products, services, 
or investors being 'like' or operating in 'like circumstances'. Finally, one needs to 
establish whether the foreign products, services or investors have received treatment 
that is, in effect, less favorable. For instance, pursuant to GATT Article III.4, there exists 
a NT violation, if the (i) imported and domestic products at issue are 'like products' and 
(ii) the imported products are accorded 'less favorable' treatment than that accorded to 
like domestic products.84 
Over time, WTO panels and the AB have developed a particularly dense, and detailed, 
approach about how the comparison should be made, or in other words, how it is to be 
determined that two products, or services, are 'like'.85 Similarly, there is a considerable 
amount of international trade jurisprudence that touches upon the meaning of 'less 
favorable' treatment, including a long list of measures which have been examined in the 
context of such treatment.86 Of course, said jurisprudence has not developed in a linear 
manner and there still lie identifiable inconsistencies in today's WTO DSB approach on 
the term of 'likeness'.87 However, the numerous discussions from within international 
trade dispute settlement mechanisms on the issue, have made for particularly dense and 
interesting case law. It is not surprising then, to see parties to investment disputes 
frequently referring to these analyses when arguing about the application of NT, 
especially since there is very little indication in IIAs about how this standard should be 
enforced. 
                                                 
83 N. DiMascio & J. Pauwelyn 'Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: World Apart or Two 
Sides of the Same Coin?' (2008) 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 48, 58. 
84 The third criteria being: if the measure at issue is a 'law, regulation, or requirement affecting their 
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Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
(11 Dec. 2000) ¶133. 
85 P.C. Mavroidis & M. Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (2013) 232-40 
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87 See e.g., H. Horn & P.C. Mavroidis 'Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National 





Traditional Cases and Critiques of Textual Comparisons Between Trade and 
Investment Norms 
SD Myers v. Canada is the first investment dispute in which reference to the WTO, as 
regards NT, were made.88 In this NAFTA dispute, between a US corporation engaged in 
the treatment of hazardous chemical compounds and the government of Canada, arising 
from the enforcement by the latter of a measure prohibiting the investor to import 
chemical waste from Canada, the investor suggested that the tribunal to seek guidance 
from WTO law in interpreting the NAFTA Article 1102 expression "in like 
circumstances".89 The tribunal did refer to WTO decisions,90 but only to emphasize the 
importance of taking into consideration the context in which this rule is applied. 
According to the tribunal, such an approach was shared by the WTO itself. The tribunal 
then explained that said 'context' was different in an investment dispute on NT, from 
that of a trade dispute on the same standard. Consequently, the tribunal concluded that 
the application of the standard differed.91 In other words, and to simplify, pursuant to the 
decision in SD Myers, investment arbitrators may look to the jurisprudence of the WTO 
for guidance, but only to emphasize the differences between trade and investment 
disciplines, and to justify their course of action, in establishing their own analysis or tests 
when applying NT. The tribunal did not state that reference to WTO law must be 
avoided, but it certainly limited the possibility for such references being made in the 
future.  
Scholars usually refer to this case in order to highlight how tribunals should be cautious 
about importing principles 'en bloc' from trade jurisprudence. 92  The same scholars 
advance that, tribunals may refer to trade jurisprudence, and sometimes even quote from 
panel or AB decisions. However, they nevertheless refute that the analyses or the tests 
that investment tribunals have to make when applying NT standard in an investment 
dispute, is the same as those made in trade disputes.  
J. Kurtz goes on step further, stating that investment tribunals might err in their 
appreciation of trade concepts, and that these errors might have negative consequences 
on the development of investment law.93 According to him, in several instances where 
investment tribunals have not been as rigorous as they should have been with their 
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with National Treatment and the relevance WTO law analysis refer to it. Further, one of the arbitrators in 
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relations between NAFTA Chapter 11 and trade law. See SD Myers v. Canada (Separate Opinion by Dr. B. 
Schwartz, 12 Nov. 2000).  
89 SD Myers v. Canada, Memorial of the Investor (20 July 1999) pp. 35-40.  
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91 Ibid.  
92 See e.g. R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2012) 204-05. 
93 Kurtz (supra n.1) 763-69. 




references to the trade regime, "the misuse of WTO was the controlling factor for critical 
inconsistencies in the legal tests applied to effect [NT]." 94  
The cases criticized by Kurtz are Occidental v. Ecuador and Methanex v. US. In both 
disputes, the tribunals categorically refused to look at how trade adjudicators deal with 
NT, arguing that textual differences prevented them to do so, and so developed their 
own analytical methods to compare investors. These methods were later condemned for 
being too broad (Occidental) or too restrictive (Methanex). 95  Interestingly, instead of 
looking at the context of WTO jurisprudence, in order to see whether such context 
could be informative, as the SD Myers tribunal had done, the arbitrators in the Occidental 
and Methanex cases focused on the textual differences between investment and WTO 
legal regimes, and arrived to conclusions that can be use of WTO law was inappropriate. 
In Occidental v. Ecuador the dispute arose from the cancellation of VAT reimbursements 
that had been granted to the investor, an oil exploration and production company, 
pursuant to Ecuadorian tax legislation. Occidental instituted UNCITRAL proceedings 
against Ecuador under the Ecuador–US BIT, claiming multiple violations of BIT 
provisions, including one relating to non-discrimination, and requested to be reimbursed 
for all VAT amounts already paid on goods and services used for the production of oil for 
export, as well as for future VAT amounts. On the NT violation, the investor argued 
that Ecuador had breached its obligation, given that various companies involved in the 
export of other goods (e.g., flowers, mining and seafood products), were still entitled to 
receive VAT refunds.96 Naturally, Ecuador replied that the investor and the exporters 
mentioned in the claim were not 'in like situations', because operating in different 
markets. To interpret this expression, 'in like situation', the tribunal briefly referred to 
the WTO discipline, but did so in order to explain that, in said discipline, the purpose of 
national treatment was different, additionally emphasizing the differences between the 
text of GATT Article III and the BIT provision: 
"[T]he reference to "in like situations" used in the [BIT] seems to be different 
from that to "like products" in the GATT/WTO. The "situation" can relate to all 
exporters that share such condition, while the "product" necessarily relates to 
competitive and substitutable products."97 
For the tribunal, 'like situation' is broader than 'like product', and could not be narrowly 
interpreted: 'like situations' should not be limited to situations where the investor is 
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competing with a domestic enterprise. 98  Rather, one should focus on comparisons 
between broad categories of national and foreign exporters. 99  This method led the 
tribunal to agree with the claimant's demonstration, comparing the treatment it was 
offered with that offered to "all exporters", and to conclude on a breach of NT.100  
In Methanex v. US, the tribunal, accentuating the differences between the wording of 
NAFTA Article 1102 and GATT Article III, again interpreted the expression 'in like 
circumstances' in an overly narrow way. It dismissed the claimant's argument that 
because the products it imported competed directly with products manufactured by 
domestic companies, it thus stood 'in like circumstances' with said domestic producers 
and should not be treated differently. The tribunal refused such a competitive-based 
approach, and adopted a much more restrictive method, looking for identical 
comparators:  
"Given the object of Article 1102 and the flexibility which the provision provides in its 
adoption of "like circumstances", it would be as perverse to ignore identical comparators 
if they were available and to use comparators that were less "like", as it would be 
perverse to refuse to find and to apply less "like" comparators when no identical 
comparators existed."101 
The tribunal justified this position by highlighting the differences between NT in WTO 
law and in international investment law. The tribunal explained that, because the 
language of the NAFTA is not exactly the same as that used in GATT law, the tests 
used to apply the provisions ought to differ.102 The result is the application of a test, 
which stands at odds with previous determinations on NT by other investment tribunals, 
which seems difficult to put into practice. 
In his review of the two cases, Kurtz concludes that "the interpretative failures exhibited 
in Occidental and Methanex come down to an absence of knowledge on the part of the 
adjudicators of the specific features of the treaty text and jurisprudence of the WTO."103 
However, I argue that these critiques and words of caution, about references to WTO 
law when applying NT, should not be over-emphasized. The problem in these two cases 
was not the application of WTO law, but the non-application, or to use Kurtz's 
expression the 'misuse' of WTO law. More recent cases have shown that reference to 
WTO law might be useful. 
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More Recent Disputes and the Contextual Appreciation of WTO and Investment 
Norms Relating to National Treatment 
In several disputes – post Methanex and Occidental – investment tribunals have continued 
to refer, with caution, to WTO law, and have done so in a satisfying manner. In the three 
investment cases of the already mentioned Sugar saga, the tribunals took into 
considerations the findings of the WTO DSB in that dispute, as well as its reasoning. In 
Corn Products v. Mexico,104 the tribunal acknowledged the differences between the trade 
and investment regime, and explained that the investor, a producer of HFCS – the 
particular sweetener that had been banned in Mexico – could not succeed in its claim 
under Article 1102 by merely showing that HFCS and sugar were 'like products' for the 
purposes of GATT Article III. However, it did affirm that, the WTO Panel and AB's 
decision to consider HFCS and sugar as 'like products' for the purposes of GATT Article 
III, should not be viewed as "irrelevant".105 It reasoned as follows:  
"While the Tribunal would not suggest that the fact that a foreign investor and a 
domestic investor are producing like products will necessarily mean that they are 
to be considered as being in like circumstances for the purposes of Article 1102, or 
that differential treatment will necessarily entail a violation of that provision, 
where the measure said to constitute the violation of Article 1102 is directly 
concerned with the products and designed to discriminate in favour of one and 
against the other then that is a very strong indication that there has been a breach 
of Article 1102."106 
The tribunal proceeded in a reflective and interesting way: the context of WTO law was 
taken into consideration, and an interesting demonstration on the way WTO panels had 
applied this law could be given. From there, the tribunal explained why it was relevant 
to depart from the analysis undertaken in the trade discipline and how NT shall be 
applied in the investment discipline. 
In a more recent dispute, Merrill v. Canada, the investor dedicated an entire section of its 
pleadings on the relevance of WTO law,107 not limiting itself to GATT law, but also 
referring to GATS and other WTO agreements.108 The claimant sought to argue that 
the determinative element in the establishment of likeness is whether the investors are in 
direct competition in the marketplace, as is the case in trade jurisprudence. The investor 
also referred to trade law in order to demonstrate that Canada's interpretation of the NT 
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provision, when suggesting that there should also be a fourth step to the analysis, 
namely to determine whether any "less favorable treatment" accorded to Merrill was 
motivated by discriminatory intent was misguided.109 According to the investor, this 
obligation was not present in the NAFTA text, and furthermore, "it has been explicitly 
rejected in GATT and WTO jurisprudence on national treatment".110 The tribunal did 
not directly address the argument. Rather, it offered a general explanation of how in the 
trade context it makes sense to take in consideration a competition element, but that in 
the investment context, more elements should be considered.111 The tribunal did not 
categorically refuse to borrow from the trade discipline, but rather highlighted the 
differences between the tests that need to be operated while looking at the context of 
both disciplines. This approach, I argue, is appropriate. When looking at how NT works 
in trade law, one needs to be careful not to draw upon over-simplified analogies and rigid 
textual comparisons. Rather, the contextual elements of provisions in both disciplines 
should be taken in consideration. In that sense, trade law should not be disregarded. On 
the contrary, a careful analysis of how trade law applies might trigger a better 
appreciation and understanding of an investment norm.  
A. Antoni and M. Ewing-Chow share a similar view. They argue that if 'superficial 
convergence' should be avoided, one should attempt to understand "how these different 
regimes and DSMs fit together",112 especially when a measure, or a set of measures, 
results in multiple claims before different international trade and investment dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
Looking at the broader issue of non-discrimination in trade and investment treaties, 
DiMascio and Pauwelyn reach a similar conclusion. While they do not favor the outright 
borrowing of the WTO's tests regarding NT , they do argue that the investment regime 
would benefit from a better understanding of trade jurisprudence on the issue. According 
to them, such understanding would allow investment tribunals to examine the presence 
of nationality-based discrimination, a rationale that is present in both disciplines, and 
therefore depart from solely concentrating on the narrow comparison of identical 
investors.113 
These pertinent remarks seem to have been taken into consideration by investment 
arbitration actors. In at least two pending disputes, the parties have relied on trade 
norms to interpret NT in investment agreements in a more sophisticated and interesting 
way. 
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Pending Cases and More Sophisticated References  
In two recent cases against Canada, one in which the award was issued very recently and 
one still pending, the investors have urged the tribunal to seek guidance from WTO law. 
In both cases, investors refer to the GATT, as well as to the GATS.114 
In Bilcon & al v. Canada,115 the investor acknowledges that the language in the GATT, 
or GATS, is not identical to that of NAFTA Chapter 11, but maintains that this should 
not prevent the tribunal from drawing from trade jurisprudence. The investor refers to 
VCLT Article 31(3)(c) to bolster this argument:  
"That provision requires that a treaty be interpreted in light of "any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." If this 
provision were to be construed to permit consideration of other relevant rules of 
international law in the interpretation of treaties only where those other rules 
were expressed in identical language, it would be rendered largely inutile, since the 
only situations in which it would apply would be ones of actual direct 
incorporation. In such situations, however, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention would be inapplicable, since the intent of the parties to import one 
legal regime into another would be manifestly clear."116 
In a recently released award, the tribunal acknowledged the investor's reference to trade 
jurisprudence, but refused to elaborate on this reference, arguing that the language of 
NAFTA Article 1102 differed from that in "other trade-liberalizing agreements, such as 
those that refer to 'like products'",117 and that "Article 1102 refers to the way in which 
either the investor or investment is treated, rather than confining concerns over 
discrimination to comparisons between similar articles of trade."118 Quite interestingly, 
however, the tribunal's majority in the case sided with the investor's conception of 
'likeness', even though it refused to agree with the investor that this conception was 
influenced by trade jurisprudence.119  
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In Mesa v. Canada, an investment dispute relating to Canada's renewable energy feed-in-
tariff programs, the investor has attempted to rely on the connection between the two 
disciplines, and insists on the importance of taking trade law into consideration. 
However, rather than simply quoting from WTO/GATT law, the investor has 
developed a more complex demonstration, based on a comparison between GATT and 
GATS law, and the context in which the conclusion of these instruments may have 
influenced the wording of NAFTA.120 
Whether the tribunal will address this argument remain to be seen, but it is highly likely 
that the decision of that tribunal will be particularly interesting. 
The application of the NT standard in investment law, especially in NAFTA law, has 
been propitious for references to WTO law. The test operated in the trade discipline to 
determine whether products or services are alike is not identically replicated in 
investment arbitration, which is a good thing. Nonetheless, arbitrators may engage in 
compelling contextual and systematic comparisons. If they do so, I argue, they are more 
likely to apply the NT standard in a more satisfying way.121 
2. Proportionality Analysis and the Notion of Necessity 
In addition to the guidance investment tribunals may receive from WTO law when 
interpreting National Treatment and the 'notion' of likeness, it has been suggested that 
they could also turn to WTO jurisprudence when required to examine whether a 
measure alleged to be in breach of an investment treaty obligation, was in fact 'necessary' 
for the state in order to protect public interest.122 
This type of defense is usually based on non-precluded measures provisions that may be 
included in IIAs. These clauses set out the circumstances in which a state may 
promulgate a measure, or otherwise act in a manner inconsistent with its substantive 
obligations towards an investor, because it has to, for 'permissible' objectives such as 
human rights, public morals, intellectual property, the health of humans, animals, and 
plants and other environmental concerns, etc.123 The way these non-precluded clauses 
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operate is not always clear and tribunals have struggled to find the best way to apply 
such clause.124 
To perform this exercise, it may be argued that one could look at how similar provisions 
operate in other treaty-based regimes, and notably in the framework of GATT Article 
XX. The tribunal did so in the Continental v. Argentina dispute, 125 one of the many 
investment cases brought by US investors against Argentina for actions taken by the 
government during the 2001-2002 economic crisis.  
In all these cases, Argentina invoked Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT in its defense. 
This provisions reads in its entirety: 
"This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, 
or the protection of its own essential security interests."126 
In the four pre-Continental awards, tribunals looked into customary international law for 
interpretive guidance to the necessity defense.127 They relied notably on the text of 
Article 25 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 128  considering that the latter "adequately 
reflect[ed] the state of customary international law on the question of necessity."129 
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between the measure and its objective and, consequentially, the level of scrutiny that a tribunal would be 
expected to direct at the relationship between the policy objective and the measure selected to achieve 
it.continent" Mitchell & Henckels (supra n.122) 106-07. 
125 Continental v. Argentina,. Award (5 Sept. 2008). 
126  The text of the BIT can be accessed on the website of the US DoS at the following address 
<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
127 For a detailed analysis of these cases and an interesting critique of the approach used in these tribunals 
see A. Stone Sweet & G. Della Cananea 'Proportionality, General Principles of Law and Investor-State 
Arbitration' (2014) SSRN Paper, available online at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435307> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
128 Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility reads as follows:  
"Article 25 - Necessity 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or 
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity." 





Reference to this article, which one might considered to be more restrictive than Article 
XI Argentina-US BIT,130 was criticized and served as a basis to challenge the awards in 
three of these four cases.131 
The Continental tribunal followed a different approach. Rather than looking at customary 
international law, it relied on the WTO method to adjudicate the defense under Article 
XX of the GATT:  
"Since the text of the Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of the U.S. 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties and these treaties in turn reflect 
the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the Tribunal finds it more appropriate 
to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which has extensively dealt with the 
concept and requirements of necessity in the context of economic measures 
derogating to the obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the 
requirement of necessity under customary international law."132  
In other words, the tribunal in Continental considered that the rationale under GATT 
Article XX was rather similar to the one in Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT. This 
non-precluded-clause, in a similar manner to what the GATT Article XX does, provides 
a carve-out exemption from BIT obligations for state acts 'necessary' for achieving 
certain, specified, state purposes. The tribunal, which was aware that in the WTO 
regime the panels and the AB have developed an operational and – arguably – well-
engineered method to determine when the measure is indeed 'necessary',133 decided to 
refer to this method.  
The tribunal applied the so called proportionality analysis, the method employed by 
WTO panels and the AB when dealing with GATT Article XX arguments. First, it 
considered that the economic crisis fell within the scope of the non-preclusion clause of 
the BIT, under both the 'maintenance of public order' and 'essentially interests' headings. 
The tribunal then referred to the decisions in Korea–Beef and Brazil–Tyres, and affirmed 
that "a process of weighting and balancing factors"134 was required in order to establish 
the necessity of a measure and that this process should include "the relative importance 
of interests furthered by the challenged measures, the contribution of the measure to the 
realization of the ends pursued, and the restrictive impact of the measure on 
                                                 
130 Stone Sweet and Cananea explains for instance that, under Article 25, "necessity may be invoked to 
excuse an act that violates international law when it is the "only way" a state can "safeguard an essential 
interest" in the context of a "grave and imminent peril".  According to them, "Article XI [of the 
Argentina-US BIT] expressly permits State measures under headings that cover a broader range of 
contexts". Stone Sweet & Della Cananea (supra n.127) 12. See also, Mitchell & Henckels (supra n.122) 97.  
131 On the annulment procedures, see E. Martinez 'Understanding the Debate over Necessity: Unanswered 
Questions and Future Implications of Annulments in the Argentine Gas Cases' (2012) 23 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int'l L. 149. The challenges were successful in two cases (Enron and Sempra v. Argentina). In the last case 
(CMS v. Argentina) the tribunal did not annul the case, but criticized the deficiencies of the connection 
established between Article XI of the BIT and ILC Article 25. 
132 Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶192. 
133 Mitchell & Henckels (supra n.122) 145-59. 
134 Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶193 




international exchange". 135 The next step was to compare the state measures under 
review with a list of alternatives that, the claimant had argued, were just as effective and 
reasonably available, but which would have caused less harm to the investor. Guided by 
the principles on which the necessity analysis is based in WTO jurisprudence, the 
tribunal noted that it needed to determine:  
"whether Argentina had reasonably available alternatives, less in conflict or more 
compliant with its international obligations, 'while providing an equivalent 
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued,' to the Measures 
challenged by Continental as inconsistent with the BIT. If so, the Measures 
adopted would be deprived of a fundamental element underpinning their alleged 
necessity."136  
The Tribunal refused to consider the claimant's less restrictive argument and ruled that 
all of Argentina's measures, but one, were covered by Article XI of the BIT.137  
Continental is probably the case in which WTO law has had the biggest influence on 
investment treaty interpretation138, and the approach taken in the award has been largely 
debated. 
For instance, J. Alvarez and T. Brink have sharply criticized the result ensuing from the 
reference to WTO law, arguing that the consequence of this reference was a 
misapplication of the text of Article XI.139 One of their arguments lies on an emphasis of 
the role of the president of the tribunal G. Sacerdoti, former member of the AB. 
According to them, the Continental "tribunal simply reached for an off-the-shelf model of 
                                                 
135 Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶¶193-95, citing, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, Panel Report (12 June 2007) ¶7.104 (hereinafter 'Brazil–Tyres'), 
which sums up the AB case law on this issue and elaborated in Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (11 Dec. 2000) 
¶164; European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (12 Mar. 2001) ¶172; United States — Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (7 Apr. 
2005) ¶¶306-307; Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/AB/R (AB Report, 25 Apr. 2005) ¶70. 
136  Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶198, citing AB Report, Brazil–Tyres, 
WT/DS332/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (3 Dec. 2007) ¶156.  
137  Continental v. Argentina, Award (5 Sept. 2008) ¶304. As for the other Argentinean cases above 
mentioned, the case was later challenged before an Annulment Committee. This challenged was dismissed 
by the Committee who did not consider that the reference to WTO/GATT jurisprudence was a basis for 
annulment. On this issue, see Stone Sweet & Della Cananea (supra n.127). 
138 Wu (supra n.1) 207. Wu concludes his studies affirming that "only in one decision (Continental) do we 
see any influence directly exerted by the trade regime on the jurisprudence of the evolving investment 
regime".  
139  J.E. Alvarez & T. Brink, 'Revisiting the Necessity Defense' in K. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook of 
International Invesmtent Law & Policy 2010/2011 (2011) 315, 355. They identify the five following flaws 
in the reasoning of the tribunal, (i) the failure to explain reasons for the reference to WTO law, (ii) an 
erroneous reading of the history of the GATT and the conclusion of the BIT, (iii) the failure to consider 
the text of Article XX and relevant GATT jurisprudence, (iv) the failure to consider the differing purposes 
of BITs and the GATT, and (v) the failure to consider the structural differences between investor-State 
and WTO dispute settlement. They conclude that reference to customary international law was better 





balancing presumably because it was familiar—at least to the president of that 
tribunal."140 
A. Stone-Sweet and G. della Cananea have recently challenged Alvarez's and Brink's 
position.141 They claim that reference to WTO law and the introduction in investment 
arbitration of proportionality analysis, "a widely-recognized general principle of law that 
judges in the most powerful international courts use to adjudicate derogation clauses",142 
would allow investor-State tribunals to meet the present challenges of the international 
investment legal regime.143  
These writings show that the academic debate on the legitimacy of the use of 
proportionality analysis principle and the concept of necessity as applied in WTO 
dispute settlement, is still ongoing.144 Furthermore, contrary to the other decisions in 
which the notion of 'necessity' in the US-Argentina BIT Article XI was interpreted in 
the light of customary law, the Continental award has survived the ICSID Article 52 
annulment procedure it was subject to. The ad hoc annulment committee that examined 
the Continental award, did look into the issue of the tribunal having referenced WTO law 
and refused to consider that the tribunal "erred in its analysis of the law of GATT-
WTO."145 The committee made it clear that "the Tribunal was clearly not purporting to 
apply that body of law, but merely took it into account as relevant to determining the 
correct interpretation and application of Article XI of the BIT."146  
To date, no other references have been made to proportionality analysis as applied in the 
Continental award. In El Paso v. Argentina,147 the most recent case concluded on the basis 
of the Argentina-US BIT, the majority did not rely on the reasoning in the Continental 
case.148 One should note, however, that although the award in this case was issued after 
the Continental award was published (i.e. 5 September 2008), the merits exchange of briefs 
and pleadings in El Paso occurred before (the final hearing on the merits was held from 4 
to 13 June 2007). It was therefore impossible for the parties, and notably for Argentina, 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 356. 
141  Stone Sweet & Della Cananea (supra n.127); see also A. Stone Sweet 'Investor-State Arbitration: 
Proportionality’s New Frontier' (2010) 4 L. & Eth. of Human Rights 47.  
142 Stone Sweet & Della Cananea (supra n.127) 18. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Interestingly, none of these authors have looked at the preparatory work of the US-Argentina BIT and 
whether the framers were influenced by trade law when drafting Article XI. Because of this missing 
information, it is difficult to adopt a clear position on this debate. 
145 Continental v. Argentina (Annulment, 16 Sept. 2011) ¶133.  
146 Ibid.  
147El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Award, 31 
Oct. 2011)(hereinafter 'El Paso v. Argentina'). 
148 As emphasized by Stone Sweet and Della Cananea, the tribunal did not rely on the ILC Articles and 
customary international law either, hence rejecting the approach adopted in pre-Continental disputes: "The 
Tribunal, citing to Continental, focused on Article XI BIT, treating Article 25 ILC as "secondary law" (to 
be applied only" if Article XI is found not to apply)." Stone Sweet & Della Cananea (supra n.127). 




to advance arguments based on on the approach taken in the Continental case, as it was 
yet to transpire. Eventually, the El Paso majority rejected Argentina's defenses, finding 
that its measures had "contributed to the crisis of a substantial extent, so that Article XI 
cannot come to its rescues."149 Arbitrator B. Stern dissented on this issue, explaining 
that she was inclined to adopt the same conclusion as in Continental.150 On should note, 
finally, that the third dispute, and to date the last in which G. Sacerdoti sat as an 
arbitrator (Continental was the second one), Total v. Argentina, arose on the basis of the 
Argentina-France BIT, which does not include a non-precluded measure clause.151 In 
that case, the tribunal did not refer to the analysis made in Continental when examining 
Argentina's defense on necessity (which are based on customary international law).152 
3. Others References 
National treatment and necessity are not the only concepts contained in investment 
instruments for which tribunals have seen it fit to refer to WTO law, when in need of 
interpretative guidance. The following examples may also be mentioned. 
Measures 'Relating to'  an Investment  
In Methanex v. US, the tribunal referred to WTO case law to interpret the expression 
'relating to' contained in NAFTA Article 1101. This article limits the scope of the 
measures that can be challenged before investor-State tribunals pursuant to NAFTA 
Chapter 11. Only measures 'relating to' an investment, or an investor, are subject to 
review. The core idea behind this provision is that a measure that merely affects an 
investment cannot be subject to arbitration, whereas a measure that legally impedes that 
investment can. In Methanex, what was at issue was a Californian ban on the sale of 
gasoline containing a substance called MTBE. The investor, a Canadian firm with 
facilities in the US, and that was specialized in the production and importation of 
methanol – one component of MTBE –, challenged the ban, alleging that it was "a 
disguised trade and investment restriction intended to achieve the improper goal of 
protecting and advantaging the domestic ethanol industry through sham environmental 
regulations disadvantaging MTBE and methanol."153 Referring to Article 1101, the US 
argued that the measure did not 'relate to the investment' because it did not have a 
legally significant connection with it. In its reply to that defense, the investor pointed 
that in the WTO case US–Gasoline, the US themselves had interpreted the words 
                                                 
149 El Paso v. Argentina, Award (31 Oct. 2011) ¶665.  
150 Ibid. ¶670.  
151 EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award (11 June 2012)(hereinafter 'EDF v. Argentina'). 
152 One shall note, however, that the tribunal did refer, at least implicitly, to proportionality analysis, as it 
sought 'alternative measures' that would not have been in breach of the BIT. Ibid. ¶345. See also, ibid ¶484, 
where the tribunal notes that one of the measures found to be in breach of investment obligations, had not 
been proven to be 'the only way' to safeguard the essential interest at stake.  





'relating to' as merely suggesting "any connection or association existing between two 
things."154 
Assessing the arguments of both parties, the tribunal took the opportunity, bearing in 
mind the reference to WTO law, to recall that interpretation must be made in context.155 
Citing other sources and instruments that need to be taken in consideration in that 
regard, the tribunal refused to give particular importance to the Methanex reference. 
Eventually, the tribunal ruled that that the phrase 'relating to' in Article 1101(1) 
NAFTA, signified something more than the mere effect of a measure on an investor or 
investment, and that it required a legally significant connection between them.156 
Public Procurement 
In the pending Mesa Power Group v. Canada dispute, the investor relied on WTO law to 
define the notion of 'public procurement'. The dispute in that case arose from the 
application of various government measures relating to the regulation and production of 
renewable energy in Ontario. The claimant, a Delaware company, alleges that Ontario 
imposed sudden and discriminatory changes to the established scheme for renewable 
energy, namely the Feed-In-Tariff Program (FIT Program). This program, pursuant to 
which suppliers of renewable energy would be granted long-term contracts with an 
advantageous remuneration to be calculated over time, had already been challenged 
before the WTO, and the AB issued a decision in 2013 against Canada. 157  In that 
decision, the AB upheld the panel decision, though on different grounds, finding that 
some elements of the FIT program violated several of Canada's trade obligations 
(including NT obligations under GATT Article III.4 and performance requirements 
under TRIMS 2.1).158 The AB notably dismissed an objection from Canada according to 
which the elements of the program under review were covered by the exception for 
government procurement in GATT Article III.8. In brief, the AB ruled that the 
measures fell outside the GATT Article III.8 exception, because the object being 
'procured' (the electricity) was different from the object being discriminated against 
(equipment for the generation of electricity).159 
From the outset of the investment case, Canada had attempted to raise a similar 
objection, relying on NAFTA Article 1108.160 This provision carves out government 
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Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy - The Case for Redrafting the 
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO' (2014) 17 J. Int'l Eco. L. 11. 
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procurement from several NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations (including NT, MFN and 
restrictions on performance requirements). As a reply to this defense, the investor relied 
on GATT law and the WTO reports, in order to define the scope of public 
procurement.161 As mentioned earlier, the case is pending. The decision of the tribunal 
will be instructive as to whether these references are pertinent and to whether the recent 
WTO decisions will be taken into account in the interpretation of the notion. 
The Right to Regulate  
In Total v. Argentina,162 the tribunal referred to WTO law in order to stress an argument 
made regarding the need to take into consideration the host State’s right to regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest when examining an alleged breach to the 
legitimate expectations of investors under the standard of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment.163 The tribunal explained that the evaluation of the fairness of the conduct of 
the host country towards an investor could not be made 'in isolation', by only 
considering the bilateral relations of the investor and the host-State.  
"The context of the evolution of the host economy, the reasonableness of the 
normative changes challenged and their appropriateness in the light of a criterion 
of proportionality also have to be taken into account."164  
The tribunal turned to the WTO and brought forward the following idea:  
"[a]dditional criteria for the evaluation of the fairness of national measures of 
general application as to services are those found in the WTO General Agreement 
on Trade of Services (GATS). The Tribunal recalls that Article VI of the GATS of 
1994 on 'Domestic regulation' provides that 'In sectors where specific 
commitments are undertaken, each member shall ensure that all measures of 
general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, 
objective and impartial manner' […]. This reference concerning services (as 
undoubtedly Total’s operations in the gas transportation and electricity were) in a 
multilateral treaty to which both Argentina and France are parties offers useful 
guidance as to the requirements that a domestic regulation must contain in order 
to be considered fair and equitable."165 
The tribunal was quick to note that it referred to GATS law 'just as guidance', and 
clearly stated that "it has not been submitted that the GATS law was "directly 
                                                 
161 Mesa v. Canada, Memorial of the Investor (20 Nov. 2013) ¶¶474-79 ; Mesa v. Canada, Investor's Reply 
Memorial and Rejoinder on Jurisdiction (30 Apr. 2014)¶¶233-39 ; 258-66. 
162 Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability (27 Dec. 2010) 
(hereinafter 'Total v. Argentina'). 
163 It was not the first time investment arbitration actors referred to WTO law when interpreting the 
meaning of 'legitimate expectations' in the context of fair and equitable treatment. In his Separate Opinion 
in Thunderbird v. Mexico, Thomas Wälde extensively cited WTO law and jurisprudence, to demonstrate 
that legitimate expectation has been recognized as an important principle guiding the interpretation of 
other obligations in international economic law. See Thunderbird v. Mexico , Walde's Dissenting Opnion 
(supra n.47)¶29.  
164 Total v. Argentina, Decision on Liability (27 Dec. 2010) ¶123. 





applicable" in the dispute."166 The tribunal did look into the context and these additional 
criteria, and established that the changes made by Argentina, to the regulatory 
framework of gas pricing and distribution, constituted a breach of fair and equitable 
treatment. 
Good Faith, Abuse of Right and Procedural Fairness as Components of Fair and 
Equitable Treatment 
The vast majority of existing IIAs contain an obligation for their signatories to provide 
'fair and equitable treatment' (FET) to foreign investors. This standard, which has not 
been defined in IIAs until recently,167 is today one of the most prominent elements of the 
investment protection regime and is invoked quasi systemically as a cause of action 
before an arbitration tribunal. As recently noted by UNCTAD, "[t]he wide application 
of the FET obligation has revealed its protective value for foreign investors but has also 
exposed a number of uncertainties and risks." 168 And amongst those risks, lays the 
capacious wording of most FET provisions, which many tribunals have used to interpret 
the standard broadly, and which often include in their scope a variety of specific 
requirements, such as a State’s obligation to act consistently, transparently, reasonably, 
without ambiguity, arbitrariness or discrimination, in an even-handed manner, to ensure 
due process in decision-making and respect investors’ legitimate expectations.  
In order to interpret FET standards and decide whether they cover a specific obligation, 
tribunals may be tempted to look at other branches of international law which may 
include such standards, or at least obligations that are similar to it. 
In Mobil v. Venezuela, for instance, the tribunal referred to several other international 
legal regimes, including WTO law, to explain that the principle of good faith, a 
component of FET, was widely applied in international law. The tribunal first pointed at 
the ICJ case law and noted how the world court recognized that principle as "one of the 
basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations."169 The 
tribunal then turned to other regimes and noticed that the WTO AB used that principle 
as well.170 
                                                 
166 One may note, in this statement, an anticipation of potential critics about the reference to the WTO 
legal regime. As mentioned in previous developments, critics against the Continental award, and to the 
president of the tribunal in that case, G. Sacerdoti (also chairman in the Total v. Argentina tribunal) were 
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misapplication of the law governing the dispute.  
167 See CETA Draft Article X.9 which enumerates, exhaustively, all the situations in which the FET 
standard can be breached.  
168 UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment – A Sequel' (2012), UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, xiii.  
169 Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos 
Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
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Finally, in the recent Apotex v. US dispute, the claimant attempted to refer to WTO 
jurisprudence in order to bolster an argument on the existence of an international 
obligation for procedural fairness. The investor argued that principles of fair 
administration were embodied in supra-national legal orders, such as the laws of the 
European Union (EU) and the jurisprudence of the WTO, and should therefore be 
recognized in international investment law, as a part of the FET standard. 171  The 
tribunal did not refer to this specific part of the argument, and focused instead on the 
extensive investor-State case on that issue.172 The tribunal eventually accepted that such 
obligation existed and was, to some extent, protected pursuant the NAFTA Chapter 11 
provision on FET (Article 1105), but ruled that it had not been breached in the present 
case.173 
B. REMARKS 
1. Substantial Similarity 
As explained in the first Chapter of the present thesis, international investment and trade 
norms are based on principles that share the same roots.174 B. Schwartz's dissenting 
opinion in SD Myers is instructive on this point, stating,  
"International trade agreements tend to address the liberalized or free movement 
of one or more of four different economic factors: goods, services, people and 
investment. NAFTA addresses all four in various ways. Chapter 11 (Investment) 
of NAFTA focuses on the free and nondiscriminatory treatment of investors and 
investment. 
NAFTA does not stand in isolation from other developments in international trade 
law. Many of the ideas and legal phrases in NAFTA are drawn from the global 
trade law system that used to be called the GATT system. That system was 
expanded and consolidated in the Uruguay round of negotiations in 1994, leading 
to the creation of the WTO."175 
These statements reflect the basic idea expressed in Chapter 1, that investment and trade 
are both factors of production. 176  That these common ground principles have been 
transposed in rules that are not identically formulated, is not contested. Yet, the cases 
examined in the present section show that there exists a certain proximity in the 
formulation of trade and investment legal norms, and that this proximity should not be 
                                                 
171  Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, 
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174 See Chapter 1. 
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disregarded.177 On the contrary, it should be seen as an invitation for investor-State 
tribunals to look at the trade discipline, and assess whether guidance can be found in it, 
by comparing the rationale of each norm and the context in which they have been 
established, and by referring, when possible, to the interpretation of these trade norms 
by the judge competent to apply them. I argue that tribunals should not hesitate to use 
the norms from this other discipline, and that it will allow them to better apply the ones 
in theirs. In my opinion, it is in this sense that the following statement in Methanex 
should be read: 
"[The tribunal] may derive guidance from the way in which a similar phrase in the 
GATT has been interpreted in the past. Whilst such interpretations cannot be 
treated by this Tribunal as binding precedents, the Tribunal may remain open to 
persuasion based on legal reasoning developed in GATT and WTO jurisprudence, 
if relevant."178 
2. The Quality of WTO Jurisprudence 
A reason that has been put forward for referencing to trade law in investment 
arbitration, and more specifically WTO jurisprudence, is the alleged quality of the 
jurisprudence of international trade. This claim is debatable.  
On the one hand, one could argue that the WTO is supported by a permanent Secretariat 
comprised of knowledgeable, and experienced, legal and trade policy professionals, its 
role in the maintenance of an institution, going back as far as to the conclusion of the 
GATT in 1947, having been recognized by many. 179  For instance, Tereposky and 
Maguire explain that 
 "the Secretariat includes a legal staff that assists in the resolution of trade disputes 
involving the interpretation of WTO rules and jurisprudence and it supports ad 
hoc panelists and arbitrators in dispute settlement. The Appellate Body, which is 
not ad hoc, but rather is composed of seven members who are appointed by the 
DSB to serve four-year terms, has its own Secretariat that provides administrative 
and legal support and maintains its institutional memory. This institutional 
structure fosters uniformity and consistency in WTO jurisprudence."180  
According to the same people, the result of this structural organization of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism is that the reports, awards and decisions it issues, are 
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usually presented in a uniform manner that addresses the arguments of the parties at a 
relatively high level of detail.181  
On the other hand, it remains that WTO case law is subject to certain fluctuations and 
that the approach taken by trade adjudicators are not always crystal clear to the 
observer. As already mentioned, the jurisprudence on the interpretation of the main rules 
discussed in the present section (NT and necessity in the language of GATT Article XX) 
is far from consistent.182  
Without entering into this debate, which lies outside the scope of the present chapter, 
one has to reckon that the WTO offers a multilateral setting of comprehensive 
interconnected agreements and its dispute settlement mechanism represents a 
multilateral, inter-State, and permanent, judicial mechanism. 183  The WTO DSB is 
generally seen as a balanced mechanism, whose integrity and legitimacy is difficult to 
challenge.184 In contrast, investor-State tribunals are often criticized for their lack of 
legitimacy. Conversely, one may consider that, when appropriate, investment tribunals 
may benefit from referring to this authoritative jurisprudence of the WTO AB, for 
interpretative guidance, so as to promote legitimacy (if not consistency) in investment 
case law.185 
3. The (non-)use of VCLT Article 31(3)(c) and Systemic 
Integration Doctrine 
Interestingly, in Scenario No.2 cases, tribunals have rarely used VCLT Article 31(3)(c) to 
justify reference to the trade disciplines. This might come as a surprise, as an argument 
can be made that tribunals should be compelled to take WTO law into consideration 
when interpreting a norm contained in a BIT, pursuant to the application of VCLT 
Article 31(3)(c).  
This provision requires a tribunal, engaged in treaty interpretation, to take into account 
"any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." 
In the words of Sinclair, pursuant to this Article, "[e]very treaty provision must be read 
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not only in its own context, but in the wider context of general international law, whether 
conventional or customary."186  
Considering the number of States that are members to the WTO (161 since April 2015), 
the likeliness of the parties to a BIT, being interpreted by a given tribunal, also being 
parties to the WTO agreements, is relatively high. In that situation, the given tribunal 
would be well advised to use Article 31(3)(c) when taking into account the WTO 
obligations of the parties. This has happened only on a very limited number of occasions. 
The best example is Feldman v. Mexico, where the tribunals sought to identify the 
relevance of WTO jurisprudence through the application of the VCLT’s interpretation 
rules.187 
Another, more recent, example is Merrill v. Canada.188 In that case the tribunal reacted 
rather positively to the claimant's expert suggestion that the doctrine of systemic 
integration, which is embodied in Article 31(3)(c), could be applied to refer to trade 
norms.189 Recall that, in this case, the claimant invited the tribunal to turn to trade 
jurisprudence to interpret several rules included in NAFTA law, applicable to the 
dispute (including NT). In his reports, Howse, who acted as the claimant's legal expert, 
addressed the doctrine of systemic integration to support a reference to trade principles. 
He was then asked during the hearings to elaborate on the said doctrine.190 He explained 
that, given the diffused nature of the international legal system, a 'treaty interpreter' in 
one particular regime of international law, may –and Howse stresses 'where relevant'– 
bring principles and rules from outside that regime to bear on the interpretation of the 
provisions in question in that regime.191 In the award, the tribunal acknowledged the 
reference to that doctrine and noted that one should not exclude taking other 
international agreements into consideration when interpreting the rules applicable in the 
case. 
Such infrequent reference to Article 31(3)(c) may be seen as surprising, as it would 
certainly allow the tribunals to strengthen their reasoning when referring to trade 
norms. 
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V. TRADE NORMS IN THE CLAIM 
In a 2003 article, G. Verhoosel evaluated the possibility of using an investment 
agreement to seek relief for breaches of WTO obligations.192 At that time, the question 
had been asked to one tribunal only, and an answer was still pending. An answer has 
now been provided, and it is in the negative. The tribunal refused to consider that a 
breach of a trade obligation could pertain to a breach of an investment obligation. Yet, in 
three recent and pending investment claims, investors have tried, again, to rely to IIA 
standards to 'import' WTO obligations. These four cases are examined below.  
This study will allow us to show that the limits to directly importing trade obligations 
into investment claims are real, and that the possibility explored by Verhoosel more than 
ten years ago is still not likely to occur. Yet, such a possibility should not be entirely 
forgotten. A brief look at other attempts to import other international obligations 
(although not WTO obligations), show that tribunals might be inclined to import non-
investment obligations under certain circumstances. Should it be expanded to trade 
norms, important concerns regarding WTO enforcement mechanisms would need to be 
addressed. 
A. ATTEMPTS TO IMPORT WTO NORMS TO INVESTMENT CLAIMS 
1. Methanex v. US: WTO Obligations and Fair and Equitable 
Treatment 
The already mentioned dispute in Methanex v. US, staged a Canadian producer of 
chemical products operating in California against the US government. Methanex 
initiated arbitration in 1999 before a UNCITRAL tribunal arguing that measures taken 
by the State of California to ban MTBE, a chemical used in the composition of gasoline, 
were in breach of several NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations. 
The proceedings in that case developed slowly and rather chaotically. From the very 
outset, the US insistently challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal on various grounds. 
These challenges led the investor to, on several occasions, reformulate its statement of 
claim and the structure of its argumentation. Claims that WTO obligations entailed a 
breach of the BIT were made in the first versions of its claim only (before the Tribunal 
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issued a First Partial Award in which it directed Methanex to produce a 'fresh 
pleading').193  
These claims were articulated as follows: the investor argued that the ban against 
MTBE was illegal in light of the WTO SPS and TBT agreements. Essentially, the 
investor attempted to demonstrate that the measure was (i) discriminatory, (ii) did not 
achieve the legitimate objective it was based upon (i.e., the protection of the 
environment), (iii) was not the least trade-restrictive alternative which could achieve that 
legitimate objective and (iv) constituted a disguised restriction on trade.194 According to 
Methanex, this illegality was tantamount to a breach of the FET standard: "any violation 
of an international principle intended for the protection of trade or investment is also a 
violation of the NAFTA Article 1105 requirement that State measures be fair, equitable, 
and in accordance with international law."195 
Recall that NAFTA Article 1105 reads as follows:  
"Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment 
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment 
in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security. […]" 
Methanex relied on SD Myers, and notably on B. Schwartz's separate opinion, to 
interpret Article 1105 of the NAFTA. Bryan Schwartz had affirmed that the application 
of this provision must "also take into account the letter or spirit of widely, though not 
universally, accepted international agreements like those in the WTO system and those 
typical of BITs."196 Relying on this statement, the investor argued that "to the extent 
that state measures that violate other principles of international law also affect NAFTA 
investors or their investments adversely, they violate Article 1105 as well", concluding 
that the ban violated the TBT and the SPS agreements, and that the measures were 
"unfair and inequitable, and thus a violation of NAFTA Article 1105."197 
The US, replying to Methanex's arguments, stated that "Article 1105(1) did not 
incorporate WTO requirements". According to the US, WTO agreements were not part 
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of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment, and are therefore not 
incorporated into Article 1105(1). Rather, the US thought the suggestion that WTO 
agreements are incorporated into Article 1105(1), as treaty obligations, could not be 
supported in light of the NAFTA text. Specifically, the US argued that:  
"the limited consent to arbitration granted in Chapter 11 cannot reasonably be 
extended to the international law obligations embodied in those [WTO 
Agreements]. Otherwise, the NAFTA parties would potentially be subject to a 
vast number of claims for monetary damages based on obligations that were not 
assumed with the understanding that their breach could give rise to such 
claims."198 
In response, the investor argued that the incorporation of "legal principles relevant to 
investment protection will not create a private right of action for any breach of any 
GATT, WTO, or other multilateral obligation."199 Indeed, according to the investor 
because "regardless how fair and equitable is eventually defined, a Chapter 11 claimant 
must always meet the specified requirements, including that the measure complained of 
actually damaged a covered investment."200 
Methanex eventually dropped this part of the claim later in the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal did refer to the interconnection between trade and investment 
law in its final award. The tribunal made a distinction between its jurisdiction and the 
law applicable to the dispute. It thus explained that, although trade law could be seen as 
relevant to interpret substantive provisions of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, applying trade 
norms, as the claimant requested, would be seen as an expansion of its jurisdiction 
outside what the relevant provisions of the NAFTA provide for. 201  The tribunal 
therefore concluded that it disclaimed any power to decide the investor's allegation that 
the US had violated provisions of the GATT.202 
2. WTO Obligations and Specific Undertaking / Umbrella 
Clauses: The Philipp Morris cases 
The two cases opposing the tobacco company Philip Morris International against 
Uruguay and Australia, after the governments of these two states passed new regulation 
on tobacco control, have been widely covered by the media.203 For many detractors of 
international investment arbitration they are infamous examples of how the system may 
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be abused, where a multinational brings a State before an international adjudicator 
because of a regulation that aims to protect public health. 204  The dispute against 
Australia has been discussed even more extensively amongst the international legal 
community, as it provides a recent example of the existence of parallel and somehow 
competing jurisdictions, with the measures involved having also been challenged before 
domestic courts and the WTO.205 
In these two cases, which at the time of writing are still pending, the claimants have 
asked the investment tribunal to hold the States responsible for a breach of WTO law. In 
the case against Uruguay, the claimants are two Philipp Morris holding companies 
incorporated in Switzerland. In their request for arbitration, they claim, inter alia, that 
the Uruguayan ordinance prohibiting different packaging or presentation of cigarettes 
sold under a given brand is unfair and inequitable, and therefore in breach of the Swiss-
Uruguay BIT FET provision, because it is incompatible with Uruguay's obligations 
under the TRIPS agreement.206  
In the case against Australia, Philip Morris Asia, the Hong-Kong based branch of the 
multinational corporation, challenges Australia's plain-packaging regulation. Amongst 
the investor's claim, is a claim under the broad umbrella clause in the BIT, which 
provides that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party". 
According to the claimant's Notice of Arbitration:  
"This [umbrella clause] is broader than specific obligations … made by the host State to 
investors…. It also encompasses other international obligations binding on the host 
State that affect the way in which property is treated in Australia. [T]he relevant 
obligations are those enshrined in TRIPS […] and TBT. [The Claimant] as an owner 
of the investments is entitled to expect Australia to comply with its obligations pursuant 
to those treaties. By adopting and implementing plain packaging legislation, Australia 
has failed to observe and abide by those obligations."207 
In response, Australia argued that:  
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"The meaning and scope of such provisions is a matter of great controversy. 
However, it is clear in the instant case that … the "umbrella clause" … only covers 
commitments that a host State has entered into with respect to specific 
investments … [T]he obligations under these multilateral treaties … are not 
"obligations" which have been entered into with regard to investments of 
investors" of Hong Kong, but rather obligations that operate on the inter-State 
level, with their own particular inter-State dispute resolution procedures."208 
In the Australian case, it appears that the investor has dropped the claim based on the 
TRIPS argument. This was revealed in a Procedural Order decision on bifurcation 
issued by the tribunal in May 2014.209 However, that document has not been published 
and the parties have not released any other dispute materials since the notice of 
arbitration and the first statement of defense. Therefore, it is difficult to speculate about 
the investor's change in strategy. No information has been release on the possible trade 
claim in the Uruguay case. 
It is too early to affirm whether the tribunal in the Australian case will address, or not, 
the arguments made by the parties in their original submissions. It is further impossible 
to assess the likely success of this possible claim. Similarly, it is difficult to predict how 
the Uruguay case will unfold. It all depends on the interpretation, made by the tribunals, 
of the scope of the 'umbrella clause'. As mentioned earlier in this work, these clauses can 
be broadly interpreted. 210  Arbitral tribunals have, for instance, considered that they 
could encompass 'unilateral undertakings'. 211  Should the tribunals adopt this 
interpretation, chances are that PMI claims could be upheld.212 In an article devoted to 
the convergence of trade and investment law published before the May 2014 decision on 
bifurcation, Roger Alford reached this conclusion: according to him a claim such as the 
one made in Philipp Morris v. Australia, where the investor relies on the broad wording of 
the umbrella clause to import a trade obligation, would be "at least colorable."213 
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3. WTO Obligations and the Prohibition of Expropriation: Eli 
Lilly v. Canada  
In a pending NAFTA dispute that is gaining popularity, an investor is attempting to 
import TRIPS obligations through the FET standard, as well as the interdiction of 
expropriation. Eli Lilly, a US pharmaceutical company, is complaining about 
patentability requirements, as applied by the Canadian Courts since 2005, being too 
strict. Specifically, the investor alleges that Canadian courts have construed the utility 
standard for patent protection (one of three criteria an invention must meet to be 
patentable) and the requirement to disclose the invention (necessary to put the invention 
into practice) in a way that leads to the frequent invalidation of pharmaceutical or bio-
pharma patents.  
Its claim, on NAFTA Article 1110 (Expropriation), is based on the concept of judicial 
expropriation, pursuant to which measures or series of measures taken by domestic 
courts of the host-State can be tantamount to indirect expropriation under certain 
circumstances (for instance, if they are discriminatory or if they are not taken under due 
process of law).214 In its notice of intent, Eli Lilly attempts to affirm that the judicial 
decisions invalidating the patents for its pharmaceutical product constitute an 
expropriation because they are illegal from the perspective of international law, 
including international trade law.215 For that, it relies on several obligations contained in 
the Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, including inter alia, the obligation to make 
patents available when the conditions precedent to patentability by those agreements are 
met and the obligation to enforce valid patents, the obligation to make patents available 
and to enforce patent rights without discrimination as to field of technology, and the 
national treatment obligation. 216  Although in later pleadings the investor slightly 
changed the structure of its argument, references to TRIPS are still present.217 Similarly 
to what happened in Methanex or the Philipp Morris cases, the investor attempts to use 
investment arbitration to enforce trade obligations.  
Whether it is possible remains to be addressed, nevertheless these attempts raise several 
questions and comments. 
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In the light of the Methanex holding, it is difficult to affirm that attempts to hold a State 
liable under investment law because of alleged breaches of trade obligations in 
investment disputes are likely to succeed. Arguably however, it is allow difficult to claim 
that they would aways be dismissed. The importation of non-investment rules have been 
considered possible in other instances and one tribunal, using the broad language of 
investment agreements, may, in the future, accept an invitation to proceed with such an 
importation for trade obligations and, furthermore, enforce them.  
This would certainly raise numerous questions. As we have seen in the previous Chapter, 
investment tribunals serve different functions from that of trade dispute settlement 
bodies and they are not supposed to function as an alternative forum for right-holders to 
challenge trade obligations. Doing so would certainly alter the landscape of both trade 
and investment dispute settlement. 
1. Enforcement of Trade Obligations in Investment Arbitration: 
Not Likely, but not Impossible Either 
Importing trade obligations via FET standards may be viewed as prohibited, at least in 
the NAFTA context. In 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (the FTC), a body 
created by the NAFTA, and entitled to give binding interpretative statements upon the 
latter,218 issued a binding statement on Article 1105. The FTC used the expression 'in 
accordance with international law' to affirm that the NAFTA parties' original meaning of 
that Article was that it prescribed only 'customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens'. 219  Although it did not address all of the issues regarding 
diverging interpretations of Article 1105,220 the FTC's notes on interpretation have led 
tribunals to qualify the FET standard more narrowly. An overview of the NAFTA case 
law on this issue, shows that NAFTA tribunals have emphasized the high level of 
severity, and gravity, that is required, in order to rule on whether a FET breach has 
occurred, and that only a limited number of elements are part of the FET obligation 
under this provision.221 The violation of international obligations, alone, does not seem 
to be included as one of these elements. The Mondev v. US tribunal was explicit in this 
regard. Citing from the FTC notes on interpretation, it affirmed that: 
"Article 1105(1) refers to a standard existing under customary international law, 
and not to standards established by other treaties of the three NAFTA Parties. 
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There is no difficulty in accepting this as an interpretation of the phrase "in 
accordance with international law". Other treaties potentially concerned have their 
own systems of implementation. Chapter 11 Arbitration does not even extend to 
claims concerning all breaches of NAFTA itself […]. If there had been an 
intention to incorporate by reference extraneous treaty standards in Article 1105 
and to make Chapter 11 arbitration applicable to them, some clear indication of 
this would have been expected."222 
Nonetheless, it would be ill founded to assert that no arbitral tribunals will ever enforce 
trade obligations through the application of an investment norm. The language used in 
Article 1105 of the NAFTA and its reference to the minimum standard of treatment and 
international law are specific. 223  There might be different formulations of the FET 
standards, that are broader and give more leeway to arbitral tribunals.224 This leeway 
could be used to consider whether established breaches of other international obligations, 
would be tantamount to a breach of the FET standard.225  
More generally, investors willing to enforce trade norms can always try to rely on other 
investment standards. As we have seen with the Philipp Morris cases, investors can try to 
use umbrella clauses to apply trade obligations. No tribunal decision has yet been issued 
on this particular question, but looking at the general case law on umbrella clauses, it is 
possible that a tribunal may accept such an import. 
Another possibility, that has yet to be put into practice, is to use 'preservation of rights' 
clauses, which operate in a similar fashion to umbrella clauses, except that they not only 
apply to specific undertakings granted through a contract or through other instruments, 
but also to obligations existing pursuant to the host-State's domestic law, as well as 
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provisions of international law.226 In Roussalis v. Romania,227 the tribunal left open the 
possibility that this type of clause could be used to import human rights obligations into 
investment disputes.228 
In the light of the above, even if this has yet to occur, it is difficult to assert that a claim 
based on trade obligations could not succeed before an investment tribunal. 
2. The Direct Effect Question and other Concerns 
Finding the proper 'gateway' that can be used in order to import trade obligations, is not 
the only legal obstacle to the enforcement of trade obligations in investment arbitration.  
First, one might argue that giving investors the possibility to seek recourse for 
violations of trade obligations before an investment tribunal, would be equal to creating 
an avenue for private action. However, at it was highlighted in the previous chapter; 
individuals have been purposely excluded from the WTO dispute settlement system, for 
reasons to be found in the economic rationale of trade regulation principle.229 One could 
therefore understand why there may be a certain reluctance to the granting of such a 
such possibility before another a dispute settlement mechanism.230 
Second, under the framework of the WTO, the parties to the organization control 
decisions with respect to the adjudication and resolution of the dispute. With a 
possibility to invoke trade rules before a non-WTO adjudicator, investors could be 
accused of circumventing the WTO dispute settlement system. This could be 
problematic since, in principle, the WTO prohibits the recourse to non-WTO dispute 
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settlement mechanisms. Article 23 of the DSU provides that Member States "shall not 
make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred [...] except through 
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding." Of course, one could argue that both investors and non-WTO arbitral 
tribunals, are not technically bound by this rule. Similarly, one could also argue that 
investment arbitration cannot be considered as a unilateral remedy imposed in response 
to a WTO violation.231 However, it is difficult to imagine that a tribunal, willing to 
enforce a given WTO obligation, would totally disregard the rules and principles 
applicable to WTO dispute settlement. 
Finally, one may argue that this recourse to investment arbitration in order to litigate 
WTO matters, could be seen as problematic with regard to the consistent interpretation 
that the WTO AB is implicitly required to provide.232 An arbitral tribunal enforcing 
WTO law, would have to do so in a way that is coherent with that of a trade dispute 
settlement body. Failing that, the tribunal would certainly be criticized for breeding 
inconsistency in the application of WTO law. 
None of these three obstacles are insurmountable, but they might complicate the work of 
any tribunal willing to proceed with the importation of trade obligations. A more 
problematic obstacle may be represented by the hypothesis where an investor manages 
to convince an investment tribunal to apply trade law, and eventually wins the case on 
this basis, but where it is later discovered, or established (for instance, by a trade 
adjudicator ) that the investment tribunal's application of trade law was misguided. This 
hypothetical situation has not occurred in practice. Nonetheless, it represents a serious 
obstacle to the 'import' of trade norms in investment arbitration. 
In his paper, Alford does not refer to this obstacle. Instead, he argues that "investment 
arbitration may provide a vehicle for compensating or attenuating the harm caused to 
investors without offending the WTO restrictions on unilateral trade remedies."233 The 
way in which the pending disputes, that were mentioned in this section, will unfold, may 
reveal whether this statement is justified. What remains certain, however, is that 
investment tribunals should be extremely cautious when facing Scenario No.3 situations. 
As we will see in the next chapter, legal tools exist in order to make sure that risks are 
minimized. 
VI. TRADE NORMS AS A DEFENSE  
WTO law has finally been referred to by the respondent, or by the tribunal, in response 
to an argument made by the claimant (Scenario No.4). Two situations might be 
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distinguished at the outset:234 one where WTO is used to contest the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal (we will call it "Scenario No.4.A"), and one where WTO is used as proper 
argument on the merits of the case ("Scenario No.4.B"). These two situations are 
examined sequentially. The third part of the present section comments on these two 
situations. 
A. DEFENSE ON JURISDICTION 
In international dispute settlement, the jurisdiction of a given international adjudication 
body can be challenged, when it is demonstrated that another adjudicative body is vested 
with exclusive jurisdiction.235 To do so, one has to demonstrate that the treaty in which 
the cause of action is found confers such exclusive jurisdiction to another international 
tribunal. In our case, a defendant could thus attempt to show that the investor's claim 
relates to WTO law and then guide the tribunal towards WTO DSU Article 23.2 which 
– as explained elsewhere in this work – is supposed to confer exclusive jurisdiction to 
WTO Panels for any breach of the WTO panels and AB.236 This, however, has yet to 
occur.  
Of course, such a textbook hypothesis, where the claimant's claim would be blatantly and 
independently based only on a WTO norm, has not occurred, and is not likely to do so in 
the future. Whether a claim is based on WTO law or not, any investor-State tribunal 
would refuse jurisdiction if the cause of action is not connected to an investment 
agreement. Investor-State tribunals do enjoy relatively broad jurisdiction, but they are 
not courts of general jurisdiction. Although issued in a different setting, the award in 
Biloune v. Ghana is instructive in this regard.237 The claimant, who was a Syrian national, 
alleged that Ghana's action towards the company he invested in, as well as towards 
himself,238 constituted a violation of his human rights.239 The tribunal recognized that 
modern international law did contained provisions for the protection for human and that 
the parties had relied on international law in their submissions, yet it declined 
jurisdiction over Mr. Biloune's claim:  
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"[C]ontemporary international law recognizes that all individuals, regardless of 
nationality, are entitled to fundamental human rights […] which no government 
may violate. Nevertheless it does not follow that this Tribunal is competent to pass 
upon every type of departure from the minimum standard to which foreign 
nationals are entitled, or that this Tribunal is authorized to deal will allegations of 
violations of fundamental rights. The Tribunal's competence is limited to 
commercial disputes arising under a contract entered into in the context of 
Ghana's Investment Code. As noted, the Government agreed to arbitrate only 
disputes "in respect of" the foreign investment. Thus, other matters –however 
compelling the claim or wrongful the alleged act– are outside this Tribunal's 
jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case it must be concluded that, while the acts 
alleged to violate the international human rights of Mr Biloune may be relevant in 
considering the investment dispute under arbitration, this Tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of action, a claim of violation of 
human rights."240 
Further, and less generally, the establishment of jurisdiction over a given dispute implies 
a direct connection with the IIA. IIA arbitration clauses are usually worded so that the 
arbitral tribunal constituted, in the event of a dispute, has competence only when said 
dispute arises from the treaty, or relates to obligations that are included in the text of 
treaty. In other words, even if arbitral tribunals do enjoy some latitude in the 
qualification of the dispute (notably in determining the notion of investment, which 
conditions the qualification), and even if numerous non-investment laws might be used in 
this process, it is not possible to request an investment arbitration tribunal to rule on a 
non-investment law claim, that is not – at least indirectly – related to an obligation in an 
IIA. 
As we have seen in the previous section, it is, nonetheless, possible to incorporate a 
WTO element within an investment claim. An investor may seek to demonstrate that a 
WTO violation constitutes a predicate to an investment claim. Recall that this happened 
in Methanex v. US, where the investor argued that the host-State's actions were contrary 
to WTO law and, consequently, contrary to NAFTA Article 1105 on Fair and Equitable 
Treatment.241 In that case, however, the respondent did not have to rely on provisions of 
the WTO DSU, as the claimant did not develop its WTO incorporation argument 
extensively. The US defense was therefore limited to the narrow scope of the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Arbitration Clause. The US did refer to WTO agreements, but only to 
mention that these agreements did not "include an agreement analogous to NAFTA's 
Chapter Eleven or any investor-State dispute resolution process."242  
As new disputes, in which investors have developed 'incorporation' arguments similar to 
the one made in Methanex, are looming, it is likely that DSU Article 23.2 will be referred 
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to by investment arbitration tribunals. In the aforementioned Philipp Morris v. Australia 
arbitration, the Australian response to the notice of arbitration introduced a defense on 
jurisdictional issues that would tend to follow this path. Addressing the Philipp Morris 
claim, that Australia's plain cigarette packaging legislation was contrary to WTO 
obligations and thus gave rise to a violation of the umbrella clause contained in Article 
2(2) of the Hong-Kong–Australia BIT, the Australian government reasoned as follows:  
"Even if it were correct (which it is not) that Article 2(2) could somehow be 
understood as extending an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to obligations owed by 
Australia to other States under various multilateral treaties, the treaties that PM 
Asia seeks to invoke all contain their own dispute settlement mechanisms. It is not 
the function of a dispute settlement provision such as that contained at Article 10 
of the BIT to establish a roving jurisdiction that would enable a BIT tribunal to 
make a broad series of determinations that would potentially conflict with the 
determinations of the agreed dispute settlement bodies under the nominated 
multilateral treaties. This is all the more so in circumstances where such bodies 
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction."243 
The way this argument could be developed in the proceedings, as well as how the 
tribunal answers in this regard, will have to be examined. It is doubtful that the tribunal 
will rely on Article 23.2 WTO DSU. Indeed, as we will look into in further detail in the 
next Chapter, Article 23.2 WTO DSU binds, in principle, only WTO Members. It is not 
binding upon (i) private parties and –more controversially– (ii) other international 
tribunals.244 It would therefore be difficult for a defending State, party to an investment 
arbitration, to rely directly and only on Article 23.2 WTO DSU to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. However, it is still possible that the tribunal may make a 
general statement, as the Methanex tribunal did, on the general relations between the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals and trade adjudicative bodies. Such a statement 
would help clarify these relations and should therefore be encouraged. 
In addition to the 'exclusive jurisdiction' argument, one might argue that references to 
ongoing proceedings before WTO courts could be made in situations of jurisdictional 
overlap, or parallel and subsequent proceedings. In these hypotheses, however, the 
jurisdictional challenges are usually based on general principles of international law and 
dispute settlement. A State that is being sued by an investor before an arbitral tribunal 
on the basis of an IIA, and at the same time before the WTO DSB by the home-State of 
the investor, because the latter has convinced its government to espouse its claim, would 
rely on principles such as lis pendens or forum non conveniens which – arguably – apply to 
this type of situations.245 
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In these situations, there may be references to WTO proceedings, but they would be 
incidental. Recall how this occurred in the two known situations of parallel or 
subsequent proceedings between an international investment adjudicative body and a 
WTO adjudicative body: the already discussed Softwood Lumber dispute and the Soft 
Drink dispute. The references to WTO proceedings made during the arbitration 
proceedings were incidental. Neither the US in Tembec, nor the investor, in one of the 
investment dispute in the Softwood Lumber Saga, nor Mexico, in the three cases filled by 
US sugar producers in the Sugar War, developed jurisdictional arguments on the basis of 
WTO law.  
Against this background, it can be concluded that references to WTO law in a 
jurisdictional defense might only occur when a claim incorporate a WTO law element. In 
that situation, the defendant could try to use WTO DSU Article 23.1. However, as this 
has not yet occurred, it is difficult to predict how an investor-State would react. 
B. DEFENSE ON THE MERITS 
A straightforward 'it's not my fault, it's because of the WTO!' type argument has been made 
in only one case, and it did not work. In Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic,246 the claimant 
argued that three decrees taken by the Czech government in order to liberalize the sugar 
market were implemented in a way that harmed its investment in that industry. In 
response, the respondent claimed that it was required to open its market in order to 
comply with its WTO obligations.247 The Czech government however did not develop 
this argument any further and it was quite easy for the tribunal to dismiss such an 
assertion. The issue was about the implementation of the decree and not its origin. The 
Tribunal therefore affirmed that it was not clear whether WTO law did play a role in the 
implementation process and rejected this defense.248 
However, in several other disputes, respondent states have used trade norms in their 
defenses in a more indirect way, relying on WTO rules to undermine a claimant's 
position. The three following NAFTA cases, all involving Canada, are interesting 
examples of this type of reference to WTO law. 
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In the already mentioned Mobil & Murphy v. Canada,249 the respondent attempted to 
draw on TRIMS submissions (submission by WTO members to the TRIMS 
commission) to bolster arguments on the notion of performance requirements. The 
dispute in that case arose following the adoption, by a Canadian province, of guidelines 
requiring investors in offshore petroleum projects to spend a fixed percentage of project 
revenues, on an annual basis, on research and development (R&D), and on education and 
training (E&T). Until then, the Canadian province had encouraged oil companies to 
commit to 'a series of basic principles' instead of imposing specific requirements. Mobil 
and Murphy, who had been operating the province's oil fields for a number of years, 
challenged the provisions of the guidelines and the enforcement of these requirements 
under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. They claimed, inter alia, that the measures constituted 
breaches of NAFTA Article 1106 on performance requirements.250 The tribunal was thus 
request to rule on the scope of this article and on the definition of the notion of 
performance requirements. In its submission, Canada argued that the tribunal should 
look in the TRIMS agreement, as it provided the context regarding requirements 
imposed on investments that concern WTO members, and what is generally understood 
by local content requirements.251 Canada pointed out that the US (the home-State of the 
investors) had provided views on that notion in submissions that had been submitted to 
the TRIMS Negotiating Group. Canada thus explained that according to the US, local 
content requirements and R&D requirements were distinct.252 The tribunal refused to 
take into account these considerations. In its analysis of how Article 1106 should be 
construed, the tribunal explained that references to other treaties, agreements and 
sources as the ones used by the Canada did not assist in confirming either of the parties' 
views and were of no relevance for the purposes of confirming the NAFTA text.253 
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In SD Myers v. Canada, 254  the dispute involved a US corporation specialized in the 
process and treatment of PCB waste, (an environmentally hazardous chemical 
compound) alleging that Canada's ban on the export of PCB wastes, from Canada to the 
United States, in late 1995, breached Canada's obligations under several NAFTA 
Chapter 11 provisions. Canada argued that its investment obligations had to be 
conciliated with its other international obligations, including the ones contained in the 
international environmental agreements it had concluded. In this regard, Canada 
defended the position that NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations were to be read 'in context', 
and that the language of the Preamble of the NAFTA had to be taken into 
consideration.255 It developed its argument explaining that the language of the Preamble 
shows that the environment was a key consideration of the parties to the NAFTA. 
Hence, according to Canada "[t]he Parties intended to ensure a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and investment but only in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection". 256  To support this line of reasoning, Canada referred to 
WTO case law and recalled that:  
[i]n its report on the case of [US–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products] in interpreting the rights and obligations of the WTO members under 
the [GATT], the Appellate Body took the Preamble of GATT into account and 
noted : "the preamble attached to the GATT shows that the signatories to that 
Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of 
environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy."257 
Canada concluded that "[c]learly, this was the case in the context of the NAFTA."258  
In its award, the tribunal did not specifically address this argument. It did, however, look 
at the other environmental agreements that Canada referred to, but ruled that they all 
contained principles according to which if a state can achieve its chosen level of 
environmental protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it 
is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade. 259 
Interestingly, the tribunal noted that this principle was "consistent with the language 
and the case law arising out of the WTO family of agreements."260 
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In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, a NAFTA Chapter 11 case, concerning the allocation of 
quotas for softwood lumber exporters operating in Canada, as part of the already 
discussed Softwood Lumber Agreement, the investor claimed that the way the quotas 
were implemented was discriminatory, as Canadian exporters received more favorable 
treatment, and so constituted a breach of the non-discrimination standard included in 
NAFTA Article 1102. One of respondent's defenses was based on the necessity for the 
Tribunal to apply a 'disproportionate advantage' test, a test based on WTO law, 
regarding national treatment. Canada asserted that, to apply this test in the case at hand, 
the tribunal had to determine whether there were domestic investors that were accorded 
the same treatment as the foreign investor in question. Then, the size of that group of 
Canadian investors would have to be compared to the size of the group of Canadian 
investors receiving more favorable treatment than the one received by the claimant. 
According to Canada, such test would lead the tribunal to rule that the investor did not 
receive a less favorable treatment than the Canadian investors taken as a group, and that 
Canada did not discriminate against the claimant.261  
During the proceedings, Canada acknowledged that such a test did not appear in the 
NAFTA text itself, but that it was to be found in, and was likely imported from, 
applicable GATT and WTO precedents.262  
The Tribunal examined carefully the WTO cases brought forward by Canada,263 but 
eventually considered that they did not support Canada's argument on the 
disproportionate advantage test as applied to NAFTA. It is interesting to note that the 
tribunal did not refuse Canada's argument, en bloc, because it was essentially based on 
WTO case-law. On the contrary, the tribunal engaged in the analysis of the decisions 
referred to by Canada, which permitted the Tribunal to highlight the differences between 
the application of the national treatment standard in trade and investment.264 And it is 
the consideration of these differences that led the tribunal to conclude that Canada's 
defense was flawed. 
B. REMARKS 
The various cases presented in this section warrant the following two general remarks. 
First, when it comes to the use WTO law by the respondent in a defensive argument, 
tribunals appear to be more cautious than in the situation of Scenario No.1, presented 
earlier. If the tribunals do mention or use the rules in their reasoning, they do so without 
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extensively elaborating on them. Second, it interesting to see that in none of the disputes 
identified as belonging to the Scenario No.2 category, have tribunals considered that 
there could be a conflict between the content of an investment obligation and the content 
of a trade obligation and so, no tribunal has applied the international rules (which can be 
found in the VCLT for instance) that are supposed to apply in such cases of conflict.  
1. Cautious Referral 
When WTO norms are used in the pleadings of a defending State to a dispute, 
investment tribunals seem to have taken a cautious approach. In Scenario No.4 cases, 
arbitral tribunals address the arguments raised by the respondents and therefore address 
the concerns relating to WTO norms, but do not engage in extensive demonstrations on 
the application of these norms. In SD Myers, the tribunal did briefly refer to the 
arguments made by Canada, but only to refute them. Interestingly, whereas Canada was 
trying to use WTO norms to explain how the NAFTA should not be applied (i.e. without 
taking into consideration other international instruments) the tribunal took the 
opportunity of this reference to recall another test applied in international law when two 
norms interact. The tribunal indeed explained that the so called 'least restrictive 
alternative' test as applied by WTO courts,265 could be used in the case."266  
In Pope & Talbot, the tribunal also referred to the respondent's arguments based on 
WTO rules. As mentioned, the tribunal actually very carefully reviewed the three 
different WTO cases produced by Canada. The tribunal did not disregard trade norms, 
but explained that they applied in a different context.267 
In those two cases, tribunals did refer to WTO norms in the awards, especially to 
explain the content of the arguments made by the parties and to carefully discuss the 
potential use of these norms.  
2. No Apparent Conflict between Trade and Investment Law 
Another interesting remark that can be made about Scenario No.4 cases, is that States, 
and in turn tribunals, have not tried to argue on a potential conflict between 
international investment law on the one side and international trade law on the other, 
and thus have not relied upon rules that regulate such conflicts. It is broadly accepted 
that international treaties can interact in a conflicting manner. 268  International law 
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actually envisages situations of conflict and provides for different rules depending on the 
type of conflict.269  
Normative conflicts are not alien to the international investment law regime and 
international tribunals have had to apply these conflict rules in various situations.270 An 
argument could thus be made that one State would attempt to escape liability from an 
investment breach by referring to a trade norm. A. Van Aaken, for instance, puts forward 
the hypothesis where an investor would argue that State measures regarding compulsory 
licenses in the pharmaceutical industry would be tantamount to indirect expropriation. 
She explained that in such a situation, a State may try to rely on TRIPS law to justify the 
imposition of the compulsory licenses.271 As previously mentioned however, a defense 
that is based directly and solely on the existence of a WTO norm, has only partially been 
made in a dispute and the tribunal did not engage in the discussion. 
On the one hand, this absence of an argument on a possible 'conflict' between trade and 
investment norms might be seen as surprising. With investment tribunals being 
creatures of public international law, it naturally happens that parties to disputes ask 
tribunals to look either at, apply, or not misapply, obligations from other branches of 
international law. In various investment disputes, tribunals have been requested by the 
defending State to rule on a potential conflict between an investment norm and other 
international norms, and to give priority to the application of the latter.272 This type of 
defense has been used very frequently in situations were EU norms were involved. 
Without entering into any details regarding this on-going topic that has been widely 
covered,273 we may simply recall that in several disputes, defending States have relied on 
EU law to either escape liability from a alleged BIT violation or to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the investment tribunal relying on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to apply EU law.274 In these instances, tribunals have been 
requested to elaborate on the relation between investment law and EU law,275 or on the 
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(2011) 83 
271 A. Van Aaken 'Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International Investment Law' (2006) 
17 Finnish YB Int'l L. 91 
272 This issue is discussed at length in Chapter 5.  
273 For a recent review of the various issues and doctrinal discussion on this theme, see the 2013 special 
issue of Transnational Dispute Management on 'EU, Investment Treaties, and Investment Treaty 
Arbitration - Current Developments and Challenges', available at <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key=47> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
274 See e.g., S. Hindelang 'Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s Judicial Monopoly by 
Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties? The Case of Intra-EU 
Investment Arbitration' (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Eco. Integration 179. 
275  See e.g. AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 





supposed conflict between the two disciplines by applying for instance VCLT Articles 59 
(Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied by conclusion of a later 
treaty) and 30 (Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter),276 
or finally on the scope and limits of their jurisdiction in the light of the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU.277 The reasoning of the tribunals in these cases can be seen as a manifestation of 
openness towards the EU legal order and warrants better legal security in the use of EU 
law in investment disputes.278 Hence, one could only hope that more references to WTO 
law will be made by defending States in investment disputes, as it would push arbitral 
tribunals to engage more extensively on the relation between trade and investment law. 
On the other hand, the common roots that the two disciplines share, and which were 
highlighted in previous developments, could justify this absence of apparent conflict 
between international investment and trade norms.279 Another possibility could be the 
high degree of deference that investment tribunals have towards the WTO adjudicative 
bodies. 
The increase in cases which we have classified as belonging to our Scenario No.4, may 
support this assumption.  Such increase would certainly warrant a better understanding 
of the relations between the two disciplines. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
To sum up the results of the research on which this chapter is based, the following 
concluding remarks can be made. 
Trade norms are widely used in investment arbitration. The parties as well as the 
tribunals refer, sometimes extensively, to trade norms. They do so at all the stages of the 
dispute and for various reasons. References are not limited to WTO case law. In fact, 
investment arbitration actors rely on trade rules contained in many existing WTO legal 
instruments. The examples of national treatment and proportionality analysis, which 
have been subjected to widespread comment, are not isolated. Investment actors have 
used trade norms when elaborating on numerous other investment rules and principles.  
Trade norms are used in four different situations or scenarios: To illustrate a factual or 
incidental legal element of the investment dispute (Scenario No.1), to interpret a 
substantive investment norm (Scenario No.2), as a basis of a claim relating to a breach of 
an investment obligation (Scenario No.3), and finally, to counter a claim relating to such 
                                                 
276 See e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic (also know as 'Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic [I]'), UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (26 Oct. 2010).  
277 See e.g. Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable and Liability (30 Nov. 2012) ¶¶5.01-22. 
278 S.W. Schill 'Luxembourg Limits: Conditions For Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under Future EU 
Investment Agreements' (2013) 10 Transnational Dispute Management, available upon subscription at 
<www.transnational-dipsute-management.com> 17. 
279 See Chapter 1.  




a breach (Scenario No.4). Arguably these four situations carry four different 
consequences. The use of trade norms is not problematic for the first situation (trade 
norms as a factual or incidental legal element) and should even be encouraged, as (i) it 
does not raise legal concern and (ii) it is a manifestation of international judicial dialogue, 
something that, arguably, enhances the legitimacy of international investment 
arbitration. On the other hand, the use of investment arbitration to enforce a trade norm 
(Scenario No.3) is more challenging, since it raises several questions and legal obstacles. 
In between, we find scenarios No.4 (trade norms used as a defense) and 2 (trade norms 
used as an interpretative element). In these situations references might be of some 
interest, but must be 'handled with care'. 
Finally, I argue that, whatever the situation, if trade norms are used by investment 
tribunals, they should be used in the most appropriate way. In light of the four scenarios 
identified, and the conclusions we have reached for each of them, I argue that this would 
be facilitated with two types of legal techniques: techniques that allow for better 
coordination between the jurisdiction of investment tribunals and trade adjudicative 
bodies, and techniques that allow for better coordination between substantive investment 
norms and substantive trade norms. These two sets of techniques are examined in the 
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The main purpose of the present Chapter is to challenge the following contention: 
investor-State arbitral tribunals should decline jurisdiction over disputes that relate to 
international trade law.1 We have seen in the previous chapter that when the possibility 
to use trade law is raised before an investment tribunal, a symptomatic reaction is to look 
at the tribunal's scope of authority and object to the tribunal's competence to rule on the 
matter. Chapter 5 questions this reaction and advances the three following counter 
arguments.  
First, the possible use of trade law in a dispute (like, for example, in the scenarios 
identified in the previous Chapter) shall not affect the jurisdiction of an investment 
arbitral tribunal. Second, these tribunals may even have jurisdiction over claims, which 
refer directly to trade law (Scenario No.3). Third, the jurisdiction of the trade adjudicator 
over a dispute sharing the same subject matter as the one of an investment dispute 
brought before an arbitral tribunal does not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of that 
arbitral tribunal. The competence of the trade adjudicator and the investment 
adjudicator may overlap (rather than compete), but legal techniques exist that can help 
address the interaction between them. These techniques are not optimal but their use 
remains beneficial. In addition, promising suggestions and attempts for reform have been 
made both in scholarship and in practice. These suggestions shall be seen as an 
improvement compared to currently used techniques. 
Defending these three arguments implies a broad understanding of the rules relating to 
jurisdiction in international investment arbitration. Then, the following question arises 
as to if and how these rules are used to tackle problems relating to jurisdictional overlap 
and parallel proceedings. Chapter 5 undertakes this task and, in doing so, identifies the 
principles and techniques that arbitral tribunals need to employ when they use trade law. 
                                                 






This is where this Chapter fits within the general narrative of the present thesis, by 
explaining how the rules relating to jurisdiction of investor-State tribunals can be used 
to better integrate trade law in investment arbitration. 
The Chapter is organized as follows: Section II below defines the notion of jurisdiction 
and explains how it relates to the notion of applicable law. Section III examines the 
principal rules that govern jurisdiction and suggests that the simple connection of a 
dispute to trade law cannot be used as a basis for challenging the jurisdiction of an 
investment tribunal. Section IV addresses the relation between the jurisdiction of the 
investment and trade adjudicators. We will see that if there is no competition per se 
between the two dispute settlement mechanisms, interactions may occur, especially in 
situations of parallel proceedings. These interactions might have negative consequences, 
but principles exist to manage and limit these consequences. Section V concludes. 
II. THE (ABSENCE OF) CORRELATION BETWEEN 
JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 
Before entering into the presentation of the rules governing jurisdiction in investment 
arbitration and examining further how these rules shall be used to regulate the 
interactions with the trade legal regime, it is crucial to shed light on the often 
misunderstood distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law. Looking at both law 
and practice is necessary in order to illuminate this distinction and to address the 
following questions: to what extent may a decision on jurisdiction influence the choice of 
law applicable to the dispute? And what are the consequences of this influence on the 
interaction between the trade and investment disciplines? As we will see, the jurisdiction 
of an investment tribunal does not necessarily lead to the narrowing down of applicable 
law. The rules that are potentially applicable in an investment dispute are defined 
separately from the elements that need to be taken into consideration in order to 
establish the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. Sometimes, the applicable law will not be 
defined at all. In that case, the arbitral tribunal will have to identify this law. This 
identification process should not, necessarily, be influenced by the scope of the 
jurisdiction clause. 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 
1. A Well Established Distinction 
In International Dispute Settlement 
As further explained below, jurisdiction, in the context of international dispute 
settlement, refers to the power to state the law in relation to a dispute between opposing 




parties. Hence, the term connotes the authority of a court to hear and dispose of a 
disputed claim, or claims.2 
Generally speaking, in international dispute settlement, the establishment of jurisdiction 
for a given court requires prior demonstration of the existence of a dispute between, as 
least, two parties, as well as the establishment of the consent of said parties' to have their 
dispute settled by the court in question. 3 More specifically, this second requirement 
implies the need for the court to establish the validity of the agreement in which the 
consent is given, in order to enquire if, and how, this consent is delimited, as well as to 
confirm the existence of a connection between the dispute and the said agreement.4  
When this process is completed, and should the court decide to retain jurisdiction, it can 
then move on to the examination of the merits of the case. To simplify, the court can 
then decide in which party's favor the dispute is to be settled. To do so, the court will 
apply the body of rules applicable to the dispute, i.e. the applicable (or governing) law. 
This body of rules is normally identified pursuant to the applicable law provision 
contained in the agreement. To clarify, this body of rules is usually composed by the 
agreement itself, or 'principal norm',5 completed by various rules of international law 
(interpretation norms, unwritten procedural principles, mandatory rules, rules that do 
not belong to the agreement but which are referred to by the said agreement) as well as 
others sources (for instance domestic law) when the dispute so requires.6 
Going one step further, one shall note that in international dispute settlement, the 
jurisdiction of a given adjudicator is necessarily connected to the principal norm(s) said 
adjudicator is supposed to decide upon.7 That is, for instance, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR] for the European Court of 
Human Rights [ECtHR], The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), WTO Agreements for the 
WTO-DSB and a given investment treaty for an ICSID tribunal. The applicable law, on 
                                                 
2 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (2006) 152; C.F. Amerasinghe, 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals (2003) 51-52. 
3 C. Santulli, Droit du contentieux international (2005) 105-23. 
4 Ibid. 106-07. 
5 The expression is used by Bartels in a recent study on this matter. See, L. Bartels, 'Jurisdiction and 
Applicable Law Clauses: Where does a Tribunal find the Principal Norms Applicable to the Case before it?' 
in T. Broude & Y. Shany (eds.), Multi-sourced equivalent norms in international law (2011) 115. A caveat shall 
be offered about this expression. One may ask what is the principal norm for the ICJ? Of course, it could be 
argued that the ICJ has no principal norm. In that sense this expression would make sense for specialized 
courts only. Yet, Bartels would probably respond that the principal norm is necessarily subjective. In case 
of a given dispute before the ICJ, the principal norm would be the treaty that is used to refer the dispute to 
the Court. 
6 Hersch Lauterpacht in his magnus opus had a great discussion of this issue, so did Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. 
See H. Lauterpacht, International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht Systematically Arranged 
and Edited by Elihu Lauterpacht – Vol. 5 (2009) 212-13 ; G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice (1986) 428-432. 





the other hand, regards the norms that the dispute settlement body is going to apply in 
order to fulfill its function (that is, to settle the case). These norms are not limited to the 
principal norm upon which an international tribunal has been constituted. In actual fact, 
this applicable law can include various norms that are not necessarily connected to the 
general norm, nor compatible with it.8 
Several examples can be used to illustrate this point. The UNCLOS is particularly 
pertinent. Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 288(1), the ITLOS, or any other dispute 
settlement body established under UNCLOS Article 287, has "jurisdiction over any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is 
submitted to it in accordance with this Part."9 As such, pursuant to this provision, the 
ITLOS has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the application, interpretation or 
enforcement of the UNCLOS. This is crystal clear. The UNCLOS is the 'principal norm' 
of the ITLOS. Nevertheless, in order to settle UNCLOS disputes, the ITLOS is provided 
with legal tools that are not limited to the text of UNCLOS. UNCLOS Article 293(1) 
provides that, in determining an UNCLOS dispute the ITLOS (or any other adjudicator 
chosen by the parties) "shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law 
not incompatible with this Convention." Hence, when ruling on a UNCLOS dispute, the 
ITLOS will not be limited to the rules included in the UNCLOS. It also has the 
obligation to apply 'other rules of international law', provided that these rules are not 
conflicting with the text of the UNCLOS.  
The relationship between these two articles, and the distinction that shall be made 
between the obligations they create, has been discussed by the arbitral tribunal 
established pursuant to the UNCLOS in the famous MOX Plant case: 
"The Parties discussed at some length the question of the scope of Ireland’s claims, 
in particular its claims arising under other treaties (e.g. the OSPAR Convention) 
or instruments (e.g. the Sintra Ministerial Statement, adopted at a meeting of the 
OSPAR Commission on 23 July 1998), having regard to articles 288 and 293 of the 
Convention. The Tribunal agrees with the United Kingdom that there is a cardinal 
distinction between the scope of its jurisdiction under article 288, paragraph 1, of 
the Convention, on the one hand, and the law to be applied by the Tribunal under 
article 293 of the Convention, on the other hand. It also agrees that, to the extent 
that any aspects of Ireland’s claims arise directly under legal instruments other 
than the Convention, such claims may be inadmissible. However, the Tribunal does 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 119-20. 
9 UNCLOS Article 287 provides for different dispute-settlement options. The ITLOS is one of them. 
Pursuant to the said provision, parties to the Convention also have the possibility to go before the 
International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the 
UNCLOS, or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII of the UNCLOS, but 
only for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein. 




not agree that Ireland has failed to state and plead a case arising substantially 
under the Convention."10 
This example shows that an international body can have limited jurisdiction, in respect 
of the disputes to be resolved, and yet not be limited with regards to the law it is bound 
to apply in resolving these disputes. 
The World Court itself also highlighted the importance of the distinction between 
jurisdiction and applicable law. In Part IV of the 2007 judgment of the Genocide case, 
entitled "The Applicable Law: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide",11 the court affirmed that:  
"146. Article IX provides for certain disputes to be submitted to the Court: 
'Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the 
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of 
any of the parties to the dispute.' […] 
147. The jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based solely on Article IX of the 
Convention. All the other grounds of jurisdiction invoked by the Applicant were 
rejected in the 1996 Judgment on jurisdiction […]. It follows that the Court may 
rule only on the disputes between the Parties to which that provision refers. The 
Parties disagree on whether the Court finally decided the scope and meaning of 
that provision in its 1996 Judgment and, if it did not, on the matters over which 
the Court has jurisdiction under that provision. The Court rules on those two 
matters in following sections of this Judgment. It has no power to rule on alleged 
breaches of other obligations under international law, not amounting to genocide, 
particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflict. […] 
149. The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Convention, and 
the disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those 'relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment' of the Convention, but it does not follow that the 
Convention stands alone. In order to determine whether the Respondent breached 
its obligation under the Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a breach 
was committed, to determine its legal consequences, the Court will have recourse 
not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of general international law 
on treaty interpretation and on responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts."12 
                                                 
10 Ireland v. United Kingdom (The MOX Plant Case), PCA Administered Case (Procedural Order No.3, 24 
June 2003) ¶19 (emphasis added). 
11 One might say that this title is misleading. According to Forteau, the court should have either limited 
the title to 'Applicable law', as the convention was not the only applicable law, or substituted "Applicable 
Law" for  "Basis of Jurisdiction". See, M. Forteau, 'The Diversity of Applicable Law before International 
Tribunals as a Source of Forum Shopping and Fragmentation of International Law: An Assessment' in R. 
Wolfrum & I. Gätzschmann (eds.), International Dispute Settlement: Room for Innovations? (2013) 417, 153. 
12  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Preliminary 





Judge Koroma, in a separate opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, expressed a 
similar idea, in a much more synthesized way:  
"[T]he question whether the Court is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction must 
depend on the subject-matter and not on the applicable law, or the rules purported 
to have been violated."13 
The last example that can be mentioned here is the Eurotunnel case.14 This dispute was 
initiated by the two companies operating the Channel tunnel. These were The Channel 
Tunnel Group Ltd. and France Manche S.A. which, pursuant to Article 40 of a 
Concession Agreement, entered into in 1986 between the French and UK governments 
(the "Concession Agreement"). Eurotunnel claimed that France and the UK had 
breached their obligations under the Concession Agreement and the Treaty of 
Canterbury (a treaty signed February 12, 1986 by France and England to provide a legal 
framework for the construction of the Channel Tunnel). The Concession agreement 
included a dispute resolution clause stating that "[a]ny dispute between the [parties] 
relating to this Agreement shall be submitted to arbitration." 15  There was also an 
applicable law clause stating that:  
"[I]n order to resolve any disputes regarding the application of this Agreement, 
the relevant provisions of the Treaty and of this Agreement shall be applied. The 
rules of English law or the rules of the French law may, as appropriate, be applied 
when recourse to those rules is necessary for the implementation of particular 
obligations under English law or French law. In general, recourse may also be had 
to the relevant principles of international law and, if the parties in dispute agree, to 
the principles of equity."16 
The two claimants based their case on various provisions set out in this very broad 
applicable law clause, which did not form part of the instruments described in the 
jurisdiction clause. The tribunal rejected this approach, referring to the aforementioned 
sections of the decision in the MOX Plant case, and affirmed that the distinction between 
jurisdiction and applicable law was 'familiar' in international dispute settlement. Thus, 
the tribunal concluded that it only had jurisdiction to rule on claims relating to 
obligations to be found in the Concession Agreement. The tribunal further noted that: 
"The conclusion that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider claims for 
breaches of obligations extrinsic to the provisions of the Concession Agreement 
(and the Treaty as given effect by the Concession Agreement) does not mean that 
the rules of the applicable law identified in Clause 40.4 are without significance. 
They instruct the Tribunal on the law which it is to apply in determining issues 
                                                 
13 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma (4 Dec. 1998), ICJ Reports 
1998, 486 ¶4.  
14  The Channel Tunnel Group Limited and France-Manche S.A. v. France and the United Kingdom ("The 
Eurotunnel Case"), PCA Administered Case (Partial Award, 30 Jan. 2007).  
15 Ibid. ¶97.  
16 Ibid. ¶99.  




within its jurisdiction. They provide the legal background for the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty and the Concession Agreement, and they may well be 
relevant in other ways. But it is the relationship between the Principals and the 
Concessionaires as defined in Clause 41.1 on which the Tribunal is called to 
pronounce."17 
As such, the distinction between applicable law and jurisdiction seems to be well 
accepted in international dispute settlement. This distinction derives from the distinction 
made between jurisdiction and choice of law clauses in international treaties. 18 
International courts have a clear and valid understanding of the way they operate. 
In Investment Arbitration 
Like other international courts, investment tribunals have recognized the distinction. It 
is quite natural to do so for ICSID Tribunals, as the ICSID Convention itself lays down 
the basis for this recognition. Article 25(1) of the Convention governs the jurisdiction of 
arbitral tribunals, whereas Article 42(1) relates to the law the tribunals are bound to 
apply in deciding disputes. These two provisions have led tribunals to rule that, if in a 
given dispute the BIT is the legal instrument over which a given arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction (what was called above "the principal norm"), the law this tribunal may refer 
to, at the merit stage, extends to a variety of legal instruments in addition to the BIT.19 
This type of affirmation has also been made in non-ICSID disputes.20 Other arbitral 
rules, upon which an investment tribunal can be constituted, will also usually include a 
provision relating to jurisdiction, and a provision relating to applicable law. 
In investment arbitration, as in general international dispute settlement, jurisdiction and 
applicable law are, in principle, two separate concepts. An investment tribunal has the 
jurisdiction to verify whether a State has respected its obligations pursuant to an IIA. In 
order to do so, it might be necessary for the tribunal to apply, or to refer to, legal norms 
that are not contained in the IIA. However, when the tribunal uses other legal norms, it 
does not act beyond its jurisdiction. In principle, the tribunal's jurisdiction is not 
                                                 
17 Ibid. ¶151.  
18 Bartels explains, for instance, that in the case of ICJ disputes the different wording of Article 36 and 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute emphasizes this distinction. Article 36 enumerates the conditions under which 
the ICJ can assume jurisdiction over the dispute while Article 38 mentions the different sources that the 
court can use to settle a dispute. See Bartels (supra n.5) 121-22. His findings are based, inter alia, on the 
Serbian Loan case, where the Court admitted that its jurisdiction should be established in accordance with 
Article 36, no matter if the dispute brought before the court implied the application of a law that is not 
directly referred to in Article 38. See, The Payment of Various Serbian loans Issued in France (France v. Serbia), 
Judgment (12 Jul. 1929), PCIJ Series A, Nos. 20/21, at 18. 
19 See e.g. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award on 
Jurisdiction (17 July 2003)(hereinafter 'CMS v. Argentina') ¶¶88-89; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award on Jurisdiction (8 Dec. 2003) ; Abaclat and Others (Case formerly known 
as Giovanna a Beccara and Others) and The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (4 Aug. 2011) (hereinafter 'Abaclat v. Argentina') ¶430. 
20 C. Schreuer 'Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2014) 1 McGill J. 





contingent upon the legal norms that might be applied to decide the case.21 In other 
words, an arbitral tribunal does not exceed its jurisdiction when it uses non-investment 
law, in order to adjudicate an investment claim. By the same token, the conditions under 
which non-investment law can be used, are normally independent from the conditions 
upon which the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is established.22 
2. A Non-Absolute Distinction 
Of course, the distinction is not watertight. As Waibel notes "[e]ven though jurisdiction 
and applicable law are conceptually distinct, in practice compromissory clauses 
sometimes function as the gatekeepers of the law to be used by the court. The dispute 
passes through the gate of the jurisdictional clause, which in turn influences the 
tribunal's determination of the applicable law."23 In other words, the degree to which 
reference to other norms ('other rules of international law' in the ITLOS for example) is 
possible, depends on the text of the principal norm (the UNLCOS in my example). 
Indeed, it is within the principal norm that an international tribunal will find the 
governing law provision that can guide it in determining which law can be applied to the 
dispute at hand. Hence, some treaties will give broad leeway to the adjudicator as 
regards the law applicable to the dispute, others will be more restrictive. 24  In this 
respect, reference to other rules (domestic or international) will only be possible through 
interpretation, and might thus be relatively limited. 25  The same remark applies to 
investment arbitration. Schreuer notes in this regard that "[i]n some treaties the 
provisions concerning jurisdiction and applicable law seem to correspond: narrow 
jurisdictional clauses, which refer only to disputes over the treaty’s substantive 
standards, go hand in hand with narrow clauses on applicable law which refer only to the 
treaty and to general international law."26 
In practice, the distinction can be blurred. 27 Jurisdiction can have an influence over 
applicable law. The reverse is also true. Applicable law can influence the way a given 
tribunal will exercise its jurisdiction, especially when the jurisdictional clause is not 
                                                 
21  Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures (21 Mar. 2007) ¶68. 
22 The conditions upon which jurisdiction is established in investment arbitration are discussed in the 
present chapter. The conditions upon which non-investment law can be applied in non-investment 
arbitration are discussed in the next chapter. 
23 M. Waibel, 'Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility' in M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), 
International Investment Law - A Hanbook (2015) 1212, 1221, citing M. Papadaki 'Compromissory Clauses as 
the Gatekeepers of the Law to be ‘used’ in the ICJ and the PCIJ' (2014) 5 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 1-45. 
24 A large part of Chapter 5 is dedicated to this discussion in investment arbitration. 
25 See, in the context of WTO, L. Bartels 'Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings' (2001) 
35 J. of World Trade 419; P.C. Mavroidis 'No outsourcing of law? WTO law as practiced by WTO courts' 
(2008) 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 421; I. Van Damme, 'Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation' in D. 
Bethlehem et al. (eds.), Oxford Hanbook of International Trade Law (2009) 298. 
26 Schreuer (supra n.20) 24-25. 
27 Waibel (supra n.23) 1221-22 




drafted in broad terms. Waibel notes, in this respect, that "the content of the applicable 
law clause can have a feedback effect on the scope of jurisdiction, by way of 
interpretation." 28  For instance, a tribunal dealing with the interpretation of the 
nationality requirement mentioned in the arbitration clause of a BIT, that also includes 
an applicable law clause referring expressly to the domestic law of the host-State, might 
not reach the same result as a tribunal interpreting an identical arbitration clause in a 
BIT, which includes an applicable law clause that excludes the application of domestic 
law for the settlement of all disputes relating to the application of that BIT. Schreuer 
explains that this is often the case in investment arbitration when tribunals decide 
whether their jurisdiction extend to contractual disputes.29 
B. WHY ALL THE FUSS? THE 'CINDERELLA' PROBLEM 
One of the main contentions in this work is that an investor-State arbitral tribunal may, 
and sometimes should, refer to international trade law. A reaction to this affirmation is to 
say that investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction over trade law. However, the 
distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law informs us that this reaction is not 
always relevant.  
It might be justified in Scenario No.3 disputes.30 Recall that in such disputes, the investor 
refers directly to a trade obligation in its claim, arguing that the non-respect of the trade 
obligation causes the breach of an obligation contained in an IIA. For instance, an 
investor could argue that if a regulatory measure prohibiting the import of a given 
product appears to be illegal in the light of the WTO SPS agreement,31 then the said 
measure is to be considered unfair and inequitable and, therefore, in breach of the FET 
standard contained in a given BIT. This hypothesis, which is virtually the same as the 
claim the investor made in Methanex,32 is a typical manifestation of what can be called the 
first 'Cinderella problem', in reference to the eloquent statement from Judge Greenwood 
in a recent presentation given at Cambridge University:  
"Because there is no real system of compulsory jurisdiction in international law, 
jurisdictional disputes occupy a quite disproportionate part of the Courts' time 
[…] [This] also give rise to real difficulties in great many cases in trying to 
squeeze a case that is really about one subject into a jurisdictional clause that was 
designed to deal with something else. […] Suffice it to say that there is one legal 
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29 Schreuer (supra n.20) 22. For instance, according to him, reference to the domestic law of the host State 
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30 See Chapter 3. 
31 For instance, because it is discriminatory, it does not achieve a legitimate objective, it is not the least 
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dispute. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Claimant's Drafted Amended Claim 





authority which beautifully encapsulates the problem. That is the well known legal 
authority of Cinderella […]. Most of the time in international law you find that 
you have to try and squeeze a rather large, perhaps ungainly force, into the glass 
slipper of a jurisdictional clause that really is far too small for the case you want to 
bring."33 
In our hypothesis, the tribunal might certainly qualify the problem as a jurisdictional 
one. Addressing the investor's claim requires a final determination about the law 
contained in the SPS agreement, and therefore an assessment of whether the tribunal has 
the authority to do that or not. To do so, the tribunal will have to decide whether it has 
jurisdiction over the application of the law contained in the SPS agreement. In other 
words, this implies deciding whether the claim fits within the tribunal's jurisdictional 
'glass slipper'. In order to do so, the tribunal shall look at the arbitral clause and identify 
the conditions for establishing jurisdiction in the case. Certainly, it would be tempting 
for the investor to refer the tribunal to the applicable law clause as well. Assuming that 
this clause is broadly drafted,34 the investor could use this broad language to claim that 
the tribunal may apply SPS law. In principle, the tribunal should dismiss this type of 
reasoning since jurisdiction differs from applicable law. This was made clear in Methanex, 
where the tribunal affirmed that it would not construe the NAFTA Chapter 11 choice of 
law clause, Article 1131, "as creating any jurisdiction to decide on alleged violations of 
the GATT." 35  According to the tribunal, "interpreting Article 1131(1) to create a 
jurisdiction extending beyond Section A of Chapter 11 would indeed be to transform it 
[…] into an unqualified and comprehensive jurisdictional regime, in which there would 
be no limit ratione materiae to the jurisdiction of a tribunal established under Chapter 11 
NAFTA."36 
Another problem is that the same type of reasoning has been made when the parties 
request the application of trade law for reasons other than its mere enforcement (in non-
Scenario No.4 situations). Certain tribunals have also hidden behind a jurisdiction clause 
when requested to refer to rules extrinsic to the IIA use to initiate the dispute. They 
brandished the 'glass slipper' in a situation that does not require it. In Grand River v. US 
for instance, the tribunal referred to the limited jurisdiction of NAFTA Chapter 11 
tribunals when explaining its approach on applicable law, and in order to claim that non-
                                                 
33 Sir Christopher Greenwood CMG QC, 'Friday Lunchtime Lecture: Challenges of International Litigation' 
(7 Oct. 2011) at 30:31 available at <http://itunes.apple.com/itunes-u/lcii-international-
lawseminar/id472214191> (last accessed 1 Aug. 2015). This quotation is used in the introduction of a 
recent and interesting paper published by M. Papadaki on the World Court's case law, relating to the 
interplay between the limitation of jurisdiction and that of applicable law. See Papadaki (supra n.23) 1-2.  
34 For instance, it provides – as does the above-mentioned UNCLOS Article 293-1 – that the tribunal shall 
apply the IIA and other rules of international law not incompatible with the IIA. 
35 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (3 Aug. 2005) Part. II, Chap. 
B, ¶5. 
36 Ibid. citing Ireland v. United Kingdom (The MOX Plant Case), PCA Administered Case (Procedural Order 
No.3, 24 June 2003) ¶19. 




NAFTA case law on the notion of investment has little importance in construing the 
language of Chapter 11.37 I argue that the distinction between jurisdiction and applicable 
law makes the reference to jurisdiction in these situations inappropriate. As we saw 
earlier, jurisdiction informs applicable law discourse, but a jurisdictional clause in an IIA 
cannot be used to bar the possibility to apply extraneous norms, for instance trade 
norms.   
Of course, it is not always easy to know and determine when reference to trade law is 
made for interpretative purposes, or if it is actually in the claim and thus implies 
jurisdictional control. A good example for this is the Eli Lilly case. Here, the investor 
first relied expressly on the TRIPS agreement, arguing that the breach of that 
agreement by the Canadian courts was tantamount to expropriation, but then 'tuning 
down' its demonstration, choosing to focus rather on a breach of NAFTA Chapter 17 (on 
Intellectual Property), and to refer to WTO law in a more indirect manner, in order to 
illustrate how an obligation in NAFTA Chapter 17 should be interpreted.38 
So far this question of the determination when non-investment law is referred to for 
interpretative purposes of for something else has not been addressed in the case law. 
Looking at the definition of jurisdiction, the answer could be that when the tribunal is 
requested to give a final determination on the violation of a trade norm, it becomes a 
jurisdictional problem, and the use of the slipper is justified. But this is just a 
suggestion.39 What is clear, however, is that even if a tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
over trade law, it may nevertheless refer to trade law.40 Furthermore, the application of 
                                                 
37 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (12 June 
2011) ¶¶62-68. 
38 Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.UNCT/14/2 (Claimant's Memorial, 29 
Sept. 2014) ¶¶204-206 ; 216-226. For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Chapter 3. 
39 Of course, adopting this suggestion would lead to another question, which is the definition of 'final 
determination'.  Here again, existing case-law offers no answer. One may further suggests that a final 
determination implies a determination that is legally binding on the parties to the dispute. But again, this 
is just a suggestion and it would need to be confirmed in practice. 
40 In the context of the EU law – investment law relationship, this has been made clear by the tribunal in 
Eureko. v. Slovak Republic. In that case, the investor complained that various legislative measures 
introduced by Slovak Republic after a change in government in July 2006 constituted a systematic reversal 
of the 2004 liberalization of the Slovak health insurance market that had prompted its company to invest in 
the Slovak Republic’s health insurance sector.  According to the investor, these actions amounted to an 
unlawful indirect expropriation of its investment. The Slovak Republic raised several objections to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, arguing that the measures taken were the result of EU law application. The 
respondent hence argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be 
brought before the European Court of Justice, the only competent organ to apply EU law. Arguably, this 
objection was the result of the confusion between applicable law and jurisdiction. The tribunal reacted in 
an appropriate manner by distinguishing a conflict of law from the possible conflicts of jurisdiction and 
affirmed that (i) "its jurisdiction [was] confined to ruling upon alleged breaches of the BIT" and that it did 
not "have jurisdiction to rule on alleged breaches of EU law as such" and (ii) "[t]he fact that, at the merits 
stage, the Tribunal might have to consider and apply provisions of EU law [did] not deprive the Tribunal 
of jurisdiction." See, Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic (also know as 'Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic [I]'), 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (26 Oct. 2010) 





law extraneous from the 'principal norm' (the IIA) shall not be seen as an extension of a 
tribunal's jurisdiction.  
It seems also undisputable one requires a good understating of the concepts of 
jurisdiction and applicable law to answer that question.  This is undertaken in the 
present and following chapters. 
III. THE JURISDICTION OF INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS OVER 
TRADE-RELATED DISPUTES AND TRADE-RELATED CLAIMS 
The present section aims to address the general question of the jurisdiction of investor-
State tribunals over investment disputes relating to trade. The word 'relating' here is 
understood broadly. 'Trade-related' disputes may be investment dispute that are simply 
'connected' to the trade discipline. This connection may be purely factual, for instance the 
dispute relates to a discipline that is usually associated with the regulation of 
international trade (e.g. the regulation of import/exports of specific goods, tariffs, 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties, etc.), or may imply an element of trade law 
(trade law of jurisprudence is expressly referred to in the case). The cases labeled as 
'Scenario No.1' in the previous Chapter typically belong to this category. Further, trade-
related disputes also include disputes in which trade law is part of the claim (Scenario 
No.3 cases).  
Tackling this question requires us to understand how jurisdiction works in investment 
arbitration. To do that, I will briefly explain where to find the rules applicable to 
jurisdiction in investment arbitration (A.) and what the basic principles underlying these 
rules are (B.). I will then examine the specific issue of investor-State tribunals 
jurisdiction over trade-related disputes. The main argument that will be defended, is that 
the simple connection of a dispute to trade law cannot be used as a basis for challenging 
the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal (C.). Finally, we will see that the issue of trade-
related claims (or Scenario No.3) is slightly more complex. Relying on recent scholarship 
on the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, I argue that if, in principle, 
investment tribunals may accept jurisdiction over these claims, they may nevertheless 
decline to rule on their substance, based on the inadmissibility of the claims (D.). 
A. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
The question of the law applicable to jurisdiction is rather straightforward and does not 
require a long development. From what precedes, we know that the law applicable to 
jurisdiction is not necessarily the same as the law applicable to the merits. Hence, as 
Schreuer notes, the "questions of jurisdiction are governed by their own system which is 
defined by the instruments containing the parties' consent to jurisdiction."41 The CMS 
award, which was issued in the ICSID context is very clear in that regard. In that case, 
                                                 
41 Schreuer (supra n.20) 3. 




the tribunal distinguished the ICSID provision applicable to jurisdiction from the one 
applicable to applicable law and went on to explain that:  
"Article 42 is mainly designed for the resolution of disputes and, as such, it is in 
principle independent from the decision on jurisdiction, governed solely by Article 
25 of the Convention and those other provisions of the consent instrument which 
might be applicable, in the instant case the Treaty provisions."42 
It is well accepted in the case law that the rules applicable to questions relating to 
jurisdiction originate from three main sources: (i) the IIA upon which arbitration has 
been initiated, (ii) the tribunal's constitutive instrument or arbitral rules (e.g. the ICSID 
Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, etc.) and (iii) general principles of 
international law.43 In the ICSID context, the following affirmation of the tribunal in 
Daimler v. Argentina is particularly relevant.  
"For purposes of the Tribunal's jurisdiction […] the proper law to be applied is 
the German-Argentine BIT itself, in concert with the ICSID Convention, as 
interpreted in the light of general principles of international law."44 
Commenting on this decision, Schreuer concludes that "it is clear that, independent of 
any law chosen by the parties with respect to the merits of their claims, jurisdictional 
issues including the existence of an investment, the presence of an eligible investor and 
the parties' consent to arbitration, must be determined by reference to the legal 
instruments establishing jurisdiction and by general international law." 45  In some 
instances, the tribunal might have to look into to the domestic law of the host-State. This 
would be the case for example, when a question relating to the nationality of the claimant 
is raised. Yet, these references will only be the result of the application of rules contained 
in the instruments mentioned above.46 For instance, it is because the jurisdiction of an 
ICSID tribunal is limited to a "national of the party" pursuant to Article 25, and because 
international law provides that the nationality of a given individual is determined 
according to domestic law, that the tribunal will refer to the domestic law of the 
investor's home-State. This question will be addressed in further detail at a later stage. 
What needs to be remembered here, is that addressing a given jurisdictional objection 
usually implies subsequent verification of the rules contained in the BIT, in the 
constitutive instrument, and in general international law. As for the last element, we will 
                                                 
42 CMS v. Argentina, Award on Jurisdiction (17 July 2003) ¶88. 
43 See e.g., Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 (Award, 2 Aug. 
2006) ¶¶222-24; Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (8 
Dec. 2008) ¶135; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/22 (Award, 23 Sept. 2010) ¶¶7.6.1-7.6.4. 
44 Daimler Financial Services AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (22 Aug. 
2012) ¶172. 
45 Schreuer (supra n.20) 4. 
46  See e.g., Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 





see for instance that tribunals refer constantly to the case-law of the world court as well 
as other international adjudicators. 
B. JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
1. Generalities and Principles Relating to Jurisdiction in 
Investment Arbitration 
Definition of Jurisdiction 
As mentioned earlier in the context of international dispute settlement, and in its 
broader sense, jurisdiction means the 'legal power' of a court, or judge, "to 'state the law' 
[…] in an authoritative and final manner",47 or again, the "power of a court or judge to 
entertain an action, petition or other proceedings."48 C. Amerasinghe notes, in a rather 
sophisticated way, that the term 'jurisdiction' usually connotes "the authority of a 
tribunal to proceed judicially to decide an international dispute."49 He then explains that 
this authority covers three general matters:  
"first, the authority to proceed to exercise the power to apply rules of procedure 
and substance to decide the dispute referred to the tribunal, secondly, the power to 
grant what in the broadest terms may be called remedial measures once a decision 
has been taken on the merits and, thirdly, sometimes to select particular rules of 
substance or procedure in deciding the merits."50 
Investment tribunals have been more concise in their appreciation of the notion. If it is 
possible to identify, within arbitral decisions, implicit reference to all the elements 
Amerasinghe mentions on the scope of the concept of jurisdiction,51 the few decisions 
that have attempted to expressly define the term are more straightforward. In Achmea v. 
Slovak Republik [II] for instance, the tribunal incisively stated that jurisdiction refers to 
"the power to decide a specific dispute."52  
                                                 
47 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chambers (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995), ICTY: Judicial Reports 1994-1995, p. 367, ¶10. 
48 Waibel (supra n.23) 1213, citing J. Burke, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (1977), vol. 1, 1034, B.A. 
Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (1999) and Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009) 
¶293. 
49 Amerasinghe (supra n.2) 55 
50 Ibid. 
51 For a recent in-depth study of the scope of jurisdiction in investor-State arbitration, see P. Ghaffari, 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility in International Investment Arbitration, (August 2012, Thesis in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements of Anglia Ruskin University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy) 
available at 
<http://angliaruskin.openrepository.com/arro/bitstream/10540/297161/1/Ghaffari+PhD+Thesis.pdf>. 
52 Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic [II], PCA Case No. 2013-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (20 
May 2014)(heireinafter Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic) ¶114. 




Like in other international dispute settlement mechanisms, the concept of jurisdiction is 
intrinsically related to the disputing parties' consent to bring the case before an arbitral 
tribunal.53 In ST-AD v. Bulgaria, the tribunal insisted on this particular point:  
"[I]t is of the utmost importance not to forget that no participant in the 
international community, be it a State, an international organization, or a physical 
or legal person, has an inherent right of access to a jurisdictional recourse. Just as a 
State cannot sue another State unless there is a specific consent to that effect, […] 
in the same manner, within the framework of BITs, investors cannot intervene at 
the international level against States for the recognition of their rights unless the 
States have granted them such rights under conditions that they determined."54 
The importance of consent in investment arbitration, which plays a crucial role in 
determining the jurisdiction of the tribunal, has been recognized from the outset of the 
discipline, being included in provisions of the ICSID Convention, pursuant to which both 
parties to the dispute must give their consent to arbitration.55 Today, this role remains 
unchallenged 56  and is commonly accepted. The consent of the respondent State is, 
indeed, given in the offer to arbitrate, which is provided for in the IIA between the host-
State and the national State of the investor. For its part, the investor gives its consent 
when it accepts the offer by initiating the proceedings.57 The consent is 'dissociated' (i.e. 
                                                 
53 Schreuer and Dolzer explains for instance that "[c]onsent to arbitration by the host State and by the 
investor is an indispensable requirement for a tribunal's jurisdiction". R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law (2012) 254. 
54 ST-AD GmbH v. The Republic of Bulgaria, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction (18 July 
2013)¶361. 
55 First and foremost, the preamble of the Convention provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall by the 
mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed 
to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration". The consent 
requirement is then included in Article 25 of the Convention on the Jurisdiction of the tribunal. The first 
paragraph of this article reads as follows: 
"The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, 
between a Contracting State […] and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally." 
In their Report to the Bank's member governments in view to the ICSID Convention signature and 
ratification, the World Bank executive directors insisted on the importance of consent for jurisdictional 
matters, explaining that it was 'the cornerstone' of ICSID jurisdiction. The Report is available on the 
ICSID webpage at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx> (last consulted 1 
Aug. 2015). On the importance of consent, see also A. Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and Other 
Subjects of Public and Private International Law (1995) 199-200. 
56 Abaclat v. Argentina, Dissenting Opinion, Georges Abi-Saab (28 Oct. 2011) ¶¶8-10. Two French authors 
have recently attempted to challenge this idea assessing whether investment arbitration could be initiated 
without a BIT, on the sole basis of customary international law. They conclude that a customary 
international law rule providing for a general arbitration offer in foreign investment matters does not exist 
and that "still today it seems rather difficult to separate the consent to arbitration from BITs." M. Audit & 
M. Forteau 'Investment Arbitration without BIT: Toward a Foreign Investment Customary Based 
Arbitration?' (2012) 29 J. Int'l Arb. 581, 597. 
57  It is in this line of action that J. Paulsson has famously described investor-State arbitration as 
"arbitration without privity". The investor has not concluded a specific agreement to arbitrate with the 
State prior to the existence of the dispute. Hence, the investor is not in privity with the host-State. The 





the offer and the acceptance do not happen at the same time) but there is, eventually, an 
agreement to go before the international tribunal.58 In Hochtief v. Argentina, the tribunal 
recalled this principle explaining that there must be an agreement to arbitrate which 
provides the basis for its jurisdiction.59 
The Competence-Competence Principle and its Corollaries 
Pursuant to the competence-competence principle (traditionally Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle), it is widely accepted in international dispute settlement, since its first 
affirmation in the Betsey case at the end of the eighteenth century,60 that the adjudicator 
is vested with the authority to decide upon the existence and the extent of its 
jurisdictional authority. This principle, which has been inserted in Article 41(1) of the 
ICSID Convention, 61  as well as in other arbitration rules used in investment 
arbitration,62 is of particular importance to the investment arbitration discipline. Indeed, 
not recognizing the principle would result in having the domestic courts of the State 
party –i.e. the same courts whose authority is sought to be avoided through international 
arbitration– deciding on the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see that investor-State tribunals have firmly reiterated the principle and its critical 
function in investment arbitration cases.63 
                                                                                                                                                   
arisen, when initiating the arbitral proceedings. R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (2012) 254.  
58 The first such-known arbitration, Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, was initiated in 1987. The 
tribunal in this case ruled that the investment protection treaty, concluded by the State in which the 
investment was made and the home-State of the investor, could be considered as the expression of consent 
of the host-State to go before arbitration. In other words, in AAPL v. Sri Lanka, the tribunal ruled that 
private entities could use a bilateral investment treaty as a basis to initiate proceedings against a State 
before an international arbitral tribunal Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990). On the notion of 'dissociated consent' see J. Paulsson 
'Arbitration Without Privity' (1995) 10 ICSID Rev.–FILJ 232. 
59 Hochtief A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 Oct. 
2011)(hereinafter 'Hochtief A.G. v. Argentina')¶¶22-24. 
60 The case was decided in 1797 by a British-US Mixed Commission under Article 7 of the "Jay Treaty" 
(officially "Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, between His Britanic Majesty and the United 
States of America, 1794). Extracts can be found in A. Geouffre De Lapradelle & N. Politis, Recueil des 
arbitrages internationaux (1905) vol. I, 52, 63 et seq.; 99 et seq. Since then, the PICJ, the ICJ and other 
international adjudicators have reaffirmed the principle. See, B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied 
by International Courts and Tribunals (Reprinted, 2006) 275-78. 
61 ICSID Article 41(1) reads as follows: "The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence". 
62 To give only one example, Article 23 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that "[t]he arbitral 
tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the 
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement." 
63 In LESI v. Algeria the tribunal for instance noted that it could not be contested that it was well within a 
tribunal's jurisdiction to determine its own competence. See, L.E.S.I. S.p.A. and ASTALDI S.p.A. v. 
République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (12 
July 2006) ¶75. In SGS v. Pakistan, the tribunal stressed the importance of ICSID Article 41(1) when it 
explained that this provision established a rule of fundamental importance for the proper operation of the 
ICSID arbitral system. See, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
ARB/01/13, Procedural Order No. 2 (16 Oct. 2002) ¶22. In the non-ICSID case of Quasar de Valors v. 
Russia, the tribunal affirmed that the authority of international arbitral tribunals to rule on questions 




One of the corollaries of this competence-competence principle is that the tribunal may 
look at whether the conditions for jurisdiction are satisfied proprio motu. 64 In ICSID 
Arbitration, this possibility is expressly mentioned in Rule 41(2) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules65, and although the question has yet to be raised outside the ICSID 
context, this possibility should be considered to be open outside the ICSID context as 
well, as it is largely recognized in international dispute settlement.66 
Another consequence of the competence-competence principle is the affirmation that 
arbitral tribunals have a duty to exercise jurisdiction. Corn Products v. Mexico made it 
clear. 67 The tribunal in that NAFTA case noted that Mexico did not challenge the 
tribunal's competence and that there should be no doubt that the investor's claim did fall 
within the jurisdictional provision of NAFTA Chapter 11. Therefore, the tribunal 
affirmed that it should proceed to examine the claim on the basis that it had jurisdiction 
and that, in principle, it had to exercise that jurisdiction.68 In the decision on jurisdiction 
in Alemanni v. Argentina, the tribunal clearly described this principle and explained that it 
was connected to the duty to not exceed its powers:  
"As a matter of basic principle, if a claim raised before an ICSID tribunal is found 
to lie within its jurisdiction, the tribunal is under a duty to exercise the 
jurisdiction. This is the necessary (though often unspoken) corollary to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
pertaining to their own jurisdiction was a constant attribute that was "universally recognized norms and 
principles of international law". See, Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación 
Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., 
GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections 
(20 Mar. 2009), ¶80. 
64 Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, 
Award (15 Mar. 2002) ¶56. Some tribunals went one step further and affirmed that tribunals were under a 
duty to verify their jurisdiction, and that this duty had to be performed ex officio. See e.g., Metal-Tech Ltd. v. 
The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (4 Oct. 2013) ¶123 and Duke Energy 
Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award (18 Aug. 
2008) ¶163. 
65 This provision reads as follows: 
"The Tribunal may on its own initiative consider, at any stage of the proceeding, whether the dispute or 
any ancillary claim before it is within the jurisdiction of the Centre and within its own competence." For an 
application of this rule and a clear affirmation of the principle, see, Mihaly v. Sri Lanka (supra  n.64) ¶56. 
66 See e.g., Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 (Award, 8 Dec. 2008) ¶68 
(where the tribunal relies on PCIJ and ICJ decisions to affirm that an international court must always 
examine proprio motu the question of its own jurisdiction; even where one of the parties does not appear 
before it or fails to defend the case). For decisions of the World Court on this issue, Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment on Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the 
Application (20 Dec. 1988), ICJ Reports 1988, 69, at 76 and Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 
Judgment on Jurisdiction of the Court (4 Dec. 1998), ICJ Reports 1998, 432, at 450 where the court 
affirmed that "[T]here is no burden of proof to be discharged in the matter of jurisdiction." See also, in the 
WTO context, United States — Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R; WT/DS162/AB/R, 
Appellate Body Report (28 Aug. 2000) ¶ 54 and reference thereunder; and in international criminal 
proceedings Prosecutor v. Tadíc, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995) ¶¶ 15, 18. 
67 Corn Products International Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on 
Responsibility (redacted) (15 Jan. 2008)(hereinafter 'Corn Products v. Mexico'). 





principle reflected in the annulment provisions in Article 52 of the Convention that 
a tribunal may not exceed its powers."69 
In principle, this duty implies that a tribunal has little discretion to disregard a case once 
it has been found that the case falls within its jurisdiction. 
This is fundamental, especially in light of the problématique of the present Chapter. 
However, this 'duty to exercise jurisdiction' principle is not absolute. But, as we will see 
in later developments below, grounds for denying jurisdiction are limited and strictly 
framed. In this regard, the tribunal in Alemanni v. Argentina stated that any reason to 
refuse jurisdiction must be a 'strong' one.70 Similarly, the tribunal in Occidental Petroleum 
v. Ecuador found that any exception to the duty to exercise jurisdiction requires clear 
language to that effect.71 Potential interferences between the investment dispute and 
another international legal system (for instance, the international trade legal regime), or 
between the said investment dispute and the jurisdiction of another international 
adjudicator to deal with another facet of that dispute, are not likely to be considered as 
'strong' reasons for the investment tribunal to dismiss the case at the jurisdictional 
stage.72 As a result, the raising of an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal would 
not be the most efficient tool to deal with jurisdictional interactions between investment 
arbitration and other international dispute settlement mechanisms. This assumption will 
be further discussed over the present Chapter. At this stage, it is nonetheless important 
to bear in mind that this assumption is based, inter alia, on the competence-competence 
principle. 
Primary–Jurisdiction, Incidental Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers 
The last general point that needs to be made with respect to the jurisdiction of 
investment tribunals relates to the scope of investment tribunals' authority. 
Conventionally, investment tribunals, like any other existing international adjudicative 
bodies, do not have general jurisdiction, but rather 'attributed jurisdiction', or compétence 
                                                 
69  Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction & Admissibility (17 Nov. 2014) ¶320. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (9 Sept. 2008) ¶¶71-72. 
72 A similar conclusion was reached in the intra-EU BIT case Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic. There, the 
respondent attempted to use the connection between the case and the EU legal order to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The Czech Republic based this challenge on the ground that the 
dispute should be brought before the European Court of Justice, the only competent organ to apply EU 
law. The tribunal looked at the applicable law clause of the case and noted that EU law could be taken into 
consideration to examine the merits of the case, but this should not have an impact on its jurisdiction. To 
this extent, it stated very clearly that "[t]he fact that, at the merits stage, the Tribunal might have to 
consider and apply provisions of EU law does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction. See, Eureko B.V. (also 
known as Achmea B.V [I].) v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL - PCA Case No. 2008-13 (Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 26 Oct. 2010) ¶283. 




d'attribution.73 This means that the exercise of a given tribunal's adjudicative power is 
limited under (i) the IIA and (ii) the arbitration rules (ICSID, UNCITRAL, etc.) used to 
initiate the dispute. An investment treaty tribunal is not endowed with general 
jurisdiction to hear claims based on any source of law arising at any point in time.74 The 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals is limited to investment disputes (however qualified). 
As we will see later on, this 'limitation' can be more or less strict, depending on the 
wording of the IIA. Some agreements reserve the use of arbitration to claims that find 
their cause of action in specific legal instruments (the investment treaty, an investment 
agreement between the host-State and the investor, etc.). Some others are more broadly 
drafted, and permit all types of investment-related disputes to be submitted to 
arbitration.75  
Yet, even in the absence of a strict limitation in the investment agreement, it is 
impossible to conceive that a tribunal constituted in virtue of an IIA will accept to review 
any type of claim, regardless of their cause of action. The dispute needs to be about 
invoked measures of the host-State party to the IIA, and relating to the claimant’s 
investment as characterized in the investment agreement. The tribunal in Generation 
Ukraine v. Ukraine insisted on this particular point.76 In that case, the claimant argued 
that Ukrainian authorities obstructed and interfered with the realization of its 
investment in a manner that was tantamount to expropriation. Referring to the wording 
of the BIT used to initiate the proceedings (the Ukraine-U.S. BIT), the tribunal 
explained that its jurisdiction was limited to disputes relating to alleged breaches of any 
right conferred or created by the BIT with respect to an investment.77 The Ukraine-U.S. 
BIT does include a provision prohibiting expropriation, however, many of the alleged 
expropriatory acts occurred before the BIT entered into force. The tribunal explained 
that its jurisdiction was limited to the acts that occurred only after the date of entry into 
force of the BIT. Interestingly, the award added that even if several of the standards 
included in the BIT, including the prohibition against expropriation, were simply a 
conventional codification of standards that have long existed in customary international 
law, the tribunal did not have "general jurisdiction over causes of action based on the 
obligations of States in customary international law."78 
                                                 
73 See e.g., Abaclat v. Argentina, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab (28 Oct. 2011) ¶12 ; Impregilo 
S.p.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of 
Professor Brigitte Stern (21 June 2011) ¶53. See also, V. Heiskanen 'Ménage à trois? Jurisdiction, 
Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2014) 29 ICSID Rev. 231. 
74 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Final Award (16 Sept. 2003)¶8.10. 
75 Douglas (supra n.48) 234. 
76 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine  (supra n.74) ¶8.10. 
77 Ibid. ¶8.10. The arbitration clause also referred to disputes arising out of, or related to, investment 
agreements and investment authorizations. The claimant however did not refer to either of these two 
options. 





To refer to this limited 'class of cases' a given tribunal has the power to decide, authors 
have used the notions of 'primary jurisdiction', 'principal jurisdiction' or 'field 
jurisdiction'.79 In that sense, the primary jurisdiction of a given investment tribunal covers 
potential breaches of the investment agreement upon which it is constituted, and one 
might insist, only those breaches. 80  This limitation, however, shall not prevent the 
tribunal from deciding on questions that, whilst possibly falling outside the scope of its 
primary jurisdiction, are necessary to answer in order to guarantee the proper treatment 
of the dispute. This other 'sphere of jurisdiction' will usually be called the 'incidental' or 
'inherent' jurisdiction of international tribunals.81 It refers to matters that are decisive to 
some of the case's issues, but whose answers will not be necessarily final or decisive for 
the whole controversy. In the words of Pauwelyn and Salles, "incidental jurisdiction is 
asserted when an international tribunal faces a question that affects its ability to exercise 
the judicial function assigned to it. This sphere of jurisdiction guarantees that a tribunal 
maintains the integrity of its judicial function in exercising the limited jurisdiction 
granted to it."82 Of course, the key word in Salles and Pauwelyn definition is 'affects'. 
Alas, the two authors do not shed much light on this score. One could argue that, at one 
end of the spectrum, the term 'affects' refers only to the issues that, if not discussed, 
would frustrate the court or tribunal in deciding the case it is supposed to deal with. At 
the other end of the spectrum, 'affects' would mean anything that could, in principle at 
least, be worth discussing.  
How the court or tribunal envisages, or understands, its function, will determine 
whether it will adopt the former or the latter understanding of the word.  
Closely connected to the notion of incidental jurisdiction is the notion of 'inherent 
powers'.83 Some constituent instruments and procedural rules expressly foresee instances 
of incidental jurisdiction (i.e. how the ICJ Statute refers to the authority of the Court to 
issue jurisdictional measures, or how the WTO-DSU provides for the panels' authority 
to seek information and technical advice from any expert which they deems appropriate), 
whilst others are silent on the issue. Yet it does not mean that the courts or tribunals 
acting in virtue of these silent constituent instruments do not have jurisdiction over 
incidental matters. Under the doctrine of the inherent powers, this authority may derive 
from the very essence of international tribunals, as courts of law. B. Cheng explains that 
"[w]here a tribunal has jurisdiction in a particular matter, it is also competent with 
                                                 
79  J. Pauwelyn & L.E. Salles 'Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, 
(Im)possible Solutions' (2009) 42 Cornell Int'l L. J. 77, 98, citing G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of 
the International Court of Justice (1986) 434. 
80 To given another illustration, the primary jurisdiction of the ECtHR covers breaches of the ECHR and 
only those breaches. 
81 Pauwelyn & Salles (supra n.79) 100-01. See also, Rosenne (supra n.2) 578-579.  
82 Pauwelyn & Salles (supra n.79) 101. 
83 On this notion, see C. Brown 'The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals' (2005) 76 
Brit. YB Int'l L. 195. 




regard to all relevant incidental questions, subject to express provision to the 
contrary."84  
The doctrine of inherent powers has been recognized in investment arbitration. 85 
Tribunals have relied on it to grant binding provisional measures,86 to prevent an abuse 
of process,87 to accept submission from non-parties,88 and more generally, to deal with 
procedural matters and the submission of evidence.89 Like in general international law 
jurisprudence,90 investment tribunals have also used the doctrine to address substantive 
questions. In World Duty Free v. Kenya for instance, the tribunal noted that it had no 
jurisdiction to decide upon the legality of acts taken by the former president of Kenya. 
Yet, the tribunal explained that it was necessary to verify whether the president did 
corruptly favor the investor, when the latter concluded a contract with its country, in 
order to decide on the admissibility of the investor's claim.91 The recent cases against 
Russia in the Yukos controversy provide another interesting example. In these three 
parallel ECT cases, the claimants have referred to human rights law in their claims, 
arguing that Russia had carried out a campaign of harassment and intimidation against 
the employees of the investors' companies. 92  Russia, unsurprisingly, object to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal affirming that "the alleged violation of […] human rights 
[…] are outside the scope [of the tribunals' jurisdiction]."93 The tribunal recognized 
that it was not a human rights court, but explained that it was within the scope of its 
                                                 
84 Cheng (supra n.60) 266. 
85 M. Paparinskis, 'Inherent Powers of ICSID Tribunals: Broad and Rightly So', in I. Laird and T.J. 
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86 See e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on 
Request for Provisional Measures (28 Oct. 1999)(hereinafter Maffezini v. Spain)¶9. 
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jurisdictions "to consider the allegations of harassment and intimidation as they form 
part of the factual matrix of claimants' complaints that the Russian Federation violated 
its obligations under […] the ECT."94 Although the tribunal did not refer expressly to 
the notion of incidental jurisdiction, it seems clear that the concept was employed. The 
tribunal reviewed whether non-investment obligations have been violated or not, in 
order to better understand the factual matrix of the case. These cases can be presented as 
interesting examples of incidental jurisdiction or inherent powers extending to 
substance. A tribunal might use this doctrine when it finds it necessary to address a 
question that does not belong to its primary jurisdiction, in order to decide upon a claim 
that does belong to it. 
This is particularly important in light of the present Chapter's objectives. A claim based 
on the sole breach of international trade law, brought before an international investment 
tribunal, will not be considered. The investment tribunal does not have the power to 
entertain such claim. Nonetheless, should the claim be based on an investment treaty and 
refer, incidentally, to another international rule, the tribunal may use its incidental 
jurisdiction to assess this non-investment rule and decide on the merits of the case. Of 
course, the question then becomes, when does a claim qualify as a principal claim, and 
when does it qualify as an incidental claim? To my knowledge, this question has not been 
addressed in the case law. The discussions below on the nature of jurisdiction and the 
admissibility of claims might help to address this issue. 
2. Five Variables to Determine Jurisdiction under Investment 
Treaties 
Now that the general notions and concept relating to jurisdiction have been defined, we 
can turn to the specific elements that constitute jurisdiction under investment treaties. 
The jurisdiction of investment tribunals has been conceptualized in the four categories or 
'dimensions' that are traditionally found in international dispute settlement: jurisdiction 
ratione personae (personal jurisdiction), jurisdiction ratione materiae (subject-matter 
jurisdiction), jurisdiction ratione temporis (temporal jurisdiction), and jurisdiction ratione 
loci (spatial or territorial jurisdiction).95 In some international arbitral disputes, tribunals 
have added a fifth dimension by referring to the notion of jurisdiction rationae voluntatis 
(the extent of the parties' consent to arbitration), in order to emphasize the importance of 
consent.96 Indeed, it should be clear that if a tribunal does not have the latter, there is no 
point in inquiring into any of the prior four. 
These categories have proven to have an important practical role in investment 
arbitration. They seem to be useful analytical tools for practitioners, as they warrant a 
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¶54 ; ST-AD v. Republic of Bulgaria(supra  n.54) ¶¶334-75.  




more methodical examination of jurisdictional objections. A brief overview of each of 
these categories will show that the connection of an investment dispute to the trade 
discipline cannot be considered, per se, as a jurisdictional obstacle. 
Rationae Personae, Rationae Loci, and Rationae Temporis 
The jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione loci and jurisdiction ratione temporis elements, are 
only of a limited interest for the central question of the present Chapter and therefore 
will not be examined in detail. It is, however, important to recall that jurisdiction rationae 
personae relates to persons who can avail themselves of the arbitration mechanism. There, 
it is commonly admitted that disputes based on an IIA must include a State party to the 
agreement and a national of another party to the agreement. This generally requires the 
tribunal to enquire into the nationality of the claimant, which might necessitate looking 
into the domestic law of the alleged national State of the investor, especially when the 
investor is a natural person. When the investor is a company, the tribunal will need to 
look at where the company is incorporated, how it is structured, and if and how it is 
controlled by other entities. Jurisdiction rationae personae also covers the other party to 
the dispute, viz. the respondent State. The tribunal might thus have to address questions 
relating to the notion of 'attribution', for instance when the measure has not been taken 
by the State directly, but rather by one of its subdivisions or agencies, 97  or more 
generally as to whether the measure at stake is subject to the international responsibility 
of the respondent State.98 With respect to the notion of ratione loci, the tribunal has to 
examine whether the investment has been made within the territory of the host-State. 
This requirement is not always expressly mentioned in IIAs (NAFTA Article 1101 
refers to it, but it remains an exception99), nonetheless it is admitted that the need for a 
territorial link is implicit in the notion of investment.100 Finally, jurisdiction rationae 
temporis relates to the timing of the claim. In short, arbitral tribunals may decline 
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jurisdiction for temporal reasons when (i) the IIA under which the dispute is brought, or 
the tribunal's constitutive instrument (e.g. the ICSID Convention), has not come into 
force when the events complained of by the investor occurred, (ii) when this agreement 
or instrument has expired, or (iii) when the IIA includes a clause delimiting a tribunal's 
jurisdiction based on time (for instance, when it is stated in the IIA that the treaty covers 
all investments made by investors prior to or after its entry into force but is limited to 
disputes having arisen after its entry into force).101 
Rationae Materiae 
More important are the notions of ratione materiae and ratione voluntatis. The former 
relates to jurisdiction over the dispute's subject matter as identified in the IIA, used as 
the basis to initiate the arbitration.102 Investment treaties generally provide that only 
disputes 'arising from' an investment can be brought before an international arbitral 
tribunal. Other IIAs stipulate that arbitral tribunals may only hear disputes between an 
investor and a host-State. In that case, it is admitted that the investor shall be defined as 
a national of the other state, performing an investment. Either way, the focal question for 
the tribunal when addressing its subject matter jurisdiction is the existence of an 
investment.103 Defining the notion of investment is a hard task, and although tribunals 
may find guidance in investment treaties, which sometime include definitions and/or 
closed-lists of examples of operations that would qualify as investments, they usually 
have to rely on complex 'tests' developed in the case law and which can be only briefly 
summarized here.104 In short, for the purpose of international investment arbitration 
pursuant to IIAs, the notion of investment is perceived as relatively broad and 
articulated around the five following general components or basic characteristics: (i) a 
commitment of resources, (ii) an economic risk, (iii) an element of duration, (iv) the 
likelihood of return and profit and (v) a contribution to the economic development of the 
host-State.105 Interestingly, once the activity is qualified as an investment and once it is 
established that the dispute relates to the investment, the ratione materiae dimension of 
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the tribunal's jurisdiction is, in principle, satisfied. As we will see in the next 
development, this has an important consequence for the question at hand in the present 
chapter. In theory, the connection of the dispute with another branch of international 
law, such as trade law, should not be seen as a limit to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of 
the arbitral tribunal.106 
Rationae Voluntatis 
The last dimension relates to the consent of the parties to the dispute, and more 
precisely, the scope of the consent. As previously mentioned, consent is of critical 
importance in international arbitration: if there is no consent, by the parties, to 
arbitration, the tribunal has no authority to hear the dispute.107 One might, therefore, 
talk about jurisdiction ratione voluntatis. For instance, in her dissenting opinion in 
Impregilo v. Argentina, Stern noted that in addition to complying with the conditions 
ratione personae, ratione materiae, and ratione temporis, in order to benefit from the 
jurisdictional protection granted by an arbitration mechanism, there is a condition ratione 
voluntatis: "[T]he State must have given its consent to such a procedure which allows a 
foreign investor to sue the State directly on the international level."108 Any investor 
tribunal may thus have to determine that the defending State has consented to 
arbitration. Should the defending State challenge the existence of this consent, the 
tribunal will have to look at the IIA and determine on what conditions the State parties 
to the agreement have given their consent to arbitration. 
A State has the possibility of limiting the extent of its grant. Limited consent can take 
various forms: For instance, the parties to an IIA can limit their consent to arbitration 
for only particular provisions of the treaty, and explicitly exclude arbitration on certain 
classes of claims or include prerequisites to arbitration. NAFTA Art. 1116 limits the 
scope of the consent to arbitration to claims arising from alleged breaches of the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 itself. Similarly, pursuant to Art. 26.1 of the ECT, the scope of the consent is 
limited to claims arising from alleged breaches of the ECT. Including provisions such as 
NAFTA Article 1101 in an IIA, which provides that the chapter only applies to 
"measures relating to an investment", is also seen as a limitation to the scope of consent 
to arbitration and, by a consequence, to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 109  These 
provisions have the effect of creating a requirement for "a nexus between the particular 
measure attributable to the host state and the particular rights and interests that 
comprise the claimant’s investment."110  
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In last-generation IIAs, States have used this type of devices to prevent investors from 
relying on non-investment obligations when formulating their cause of action. However, 
in the absence of such limits, an attempt to connect the cause of action to non-investment 
obligations may not necessarily result in the tribunal declining jurisdiction. 
3. Objections to Jurisdiction in Practice 
Investment arbitral tribunals have applied the general principles, discussed above, 
broadly. A deeper examination of jurisdictional objections in practice warrants some 
additional remarks. 
Preliminary Nature of the Objections 
First of all, objections to jurisdiction are considered to be preliminary. This means that, 
in theory, the tribunal has to examine them before the merits, at the earliest stage of the 
dispute. The reason for that is simple: It is fundamental for the tribunal to make sure at 
the very outset of the dispute that it has the authority to deal with the dispute. Once this 
is established, in theory, that authority should not be questioned any further, so that the 
tribunal can deal with the merits and substance of the dispute without having its capacity 
to do so contested. Conversely, deciding these issues at an early stage removes, from the 
parties to the dispute,  the burden of dealing with the entire case (which can be long and 
costly) when it appears that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to do so. 
The ICSID and other arbitration rules used in investor-State arbitration contain 
provisions pursuant to which the objections shall be made in a timely manner. For 
instance, Article 21 of the UNCTIRAL Arbitration Rules states that "[a] plea that the 
arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than in the statement 
of defence or, with respect to a counter-claim, in the reply to the counter-claim." 
Similarly, ICSID Rule 41 provides that "[a]ny objection that the dispute or any ancillary 
claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre or, for other reasons, is not within the 
competence of the Tribunal shall be made as early as possible". 
Further, the ICSID and other arbitration rules also allow arbitral tribunals to 'bifurcate' 
arbitral proceedings, that is, to separate jurisdictional issues from the merits, having a 
separate jurisdictional phase to consider the jurisdictional and admissibility objections 
raised by the respondent.111 
The necessity to treat jurisdictional objections at the outset can be seen as problematic 
when the objection is based on the possible use of another legal discipline and therefore 
connected to the applicable law question, which, arguably, should only come into play 
once the tribunal has decided upon the issue of jurisdiction. Tribunals must be aware of 
that potential problem and they shall make sure that they differentiate questions relating 
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to jurisdiction and those relating to applicable law, even when the jurisdictional 
objection is linked to applicable law. 
The Role of ICSID Article 25 and the Specificities of ICSID Arbitration 
Second, it is important to note that a specific framework applies to jurisdictional issues 
when the arbitration is conducted under the ICSID Convention, (by comparison to 
arbitration under other arbitration rules, such as the UNCITRAL, the SCC, etc.). The 
ICSID Convention contains a provision relating to jurisdiction, namely Article 25. This 
provision provides for an additional 'layer' of control for the arbitral tribunal.112 The 
tribunal has to verify whether it has jurisdiction pursuant to the terms of the IIA used to 
initiate the dispute and, additionally, if the requirements of ICSID Convention Article 25 
are satisfied. This article states that:  
"The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State […] and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to 
the Centre." 
As explained in Vigotop v. Hungary, it is generally considered that Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention sets out four general requirements in order for ICSID tribunals to 
determine their jurisdiction: (i) the existence of a legal dispute; (ii) a dispute arising 
directly out of an 'investment'; (iii) a dispute between a contracting State and a national 
of another contracting State; and (iv) the existence of the written consent of both 
parties.113  
There is certainly some overlap between these requirements and the general variables 
and dimension that tribunals have to verify pursuant to investment treaties, as 
mentioned above, especially as concerns the second ('dispute arising out of an 
investment' corresponds with the rationae materiae dimension), third ('national of another 
contracting State' corresponds to the rationae personae dimension) and fourth criteria 
('consent of the State parties to the IIA' corresponds to the rationae volontatis dimension). 
Similarly, the first requirement –i.e. the existence of a legal dispute–, although expressly 
mentioned in the text of the ICSID, is not exclusive to ICSID arbitration. As mentioned 
previously, it is inherent to all mechanisms of international dispute settlement, with both 
ICSID and non-ICSID investment arbitral tribunals having had to define the notion. 
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The way the tribunals deal with these potential overlaps varies from case to case. In 
some cases, the tribunals have interpreted the IIA and the Convention together, seeking 
compatibility between the requirements.114 In  other cases, the tribunals have applied a 
so-called 'double-barreled test', whereby they verify whether a given requirement is 
satisfied under the wording of the IIA and whether the requirement is satisfied under the 
wording of the ICSID Convention. 115   This has been the case for instance for the 
condition relating to the existence of an investment. In a large number of cases, tribunals 
verified first whether the operation referred to by the claimant qualified as an investment 
under the definition provided in the BIT, and then, whether it qualified as such within 
the meaning of ICSID Convention Article 25.116 
At the end of the day, the discussion on the interplay between the jurisdictional 
requirements under the ICSID Convention and those under IIAs, is not of crucial 
importance for the present Chapter.  What needs to be kept in mind is that in ICSID 
arbitration, the jurisdictional hurdle might be considered to be higher than in non-ICSID 
arbitration. Yet, there seems to be nothing in the requirements contained in Article 25 
that can be used to deny jurisdiction because the dispute is connected to international 
trade law. 
C. THE JURISDICTION OF INVESTOR-STATE TRIBUNALS OVER TRADE-
RELATED CLAIMS 
In light of the previous developments, it can be affirmed that the mere connection of an 
investment dispute to trade law is not an element that, by itself, prescribes the 
parameters of an arbitral tribunal’s powers. In addition, it can be affirmed that even a 
direct reference to trade law in an investment claim does not, by itself, suffice to 
challenge the jurisdiction of an investment arbitral tribunal.  
Jurisdiction of Investment Tribunals and Disputes Connected to other 
International Legal Systems 
In Chapter 3, we saw that investor-State tribunals have used trade law in four different 
situations (or scenarios): To illustrate a factual or incidental legal element of the 
investment dispute (Scenario No.1), to interpret a substantive investment norm (Scenario 
No.2), as a basis of a claim relating to a breach on an investment obligation (Scenario 
No.3) and finally to counter a claim relating to a breach of an investment obligation 
(Scenario No.4).  
                                                 
114 See e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
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115 See e.g., Malicorp Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award (7 Feb. 
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All these situations imply a connection with the international trade legal discipline. In 
Scenario No.1, the connection is only minor; trade law is referred to as a fact, or as an 
incidental legal element. Yet, the investment dispute is, to some extent, connected to the 
trade discipline. In the three other scenarios, the connection is more obvious, and 
potentially more intricate. Trade law is part of the tribunal's reasoning (Scenario No.2), 
and directly referred to by the respondent State (Scenario No.3) or the investor (Scenario 
No.4).  
In the previous developments of this present chapter, we discussed the basic principles 
relating to jurisdiction in investment arbitration and, more precisely, the conditions that 
need to be satisfied to establish the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. As we have seen, 
while these conditions vary depending on the IIA and the arbitration rules used in the 
dispute, it is possible to identify general variables for the basis of jurisdiction. The 
connection of the dispute to another international legal discipline, and in particular to 
trade law, is not to be found in on these variables. Thus, it can be affirmed that, the mere 
use of trade law, absent any other considerations (Scenario No.1), cannot be considered 
as a basis to challenge the jurisdiction.  
For the reasons given above, the jurisdictional conditions relating to the investor, the 
timing of the claim, and to the host-State territory, are not likely to be used as channels 
to contest the authority of a tribunal because of a connection of the dispute to another 
international legal discipline. More realistically, one could try to use the conditions 
relating to the subject matter of the dispute, claiming for instance that investment 
arbitration should only deal with investment disputes, or the conditions relating to the 
State's consent to arbitration.  
As for the subject-matter element, we saw that once the operation at stake is qualified as 
an investment, the tribunal is considered to have jurisdiction ratione materiae. In 
principle, there are no other general limits to the authority of the tribunal with regards 
to the substantive aspect of the dispute. In theory then, and provided that the IIA 
includes a broad language on the scope of the tribunal's authority, the possible 
connection of the di spute with another branch of international law, for instance trade 
law, should not impact the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. 
The rationae voluntatis dimension is the other element that could be used to challenge or 
limit the jurisdiction of an international tribunal with regard to a dispute that shares a 
connection with the international trade legal discipline. The argument can be made that 
a State consents to arbitration in case of an investment dispute, but only according to the 
specific conditions in the IIA. In other words, the State establishes limits to its consent. 
As mentioned already, the vast majority of existing IIAs include arbitration clauses that 
are broadly drafted and that do not contain this type of limit.117 In such a case, any 
dispute relating to an investment (and provided that the other variables for jurisdiction 
                                                 





are satisfied) may be submitted to an arbitral tribunal, even when it is connected to trade 
law.  
Recent agreements are more detailed and tend to restrict the scope of consent to 
arbitration to disputes based exclusively on alleged violations of the substantive 
provisions of the treaty itself.118 The draft text of the EU investment agreement with 
Singapore is interesting in that respect. Pursuant to Article 9.14 of the Draft (October 
2014) version, the scope of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism is limited to 
disputes concerning "treatment alleged to breach the provisions of [the Agreement's 
Section on Investor Protection], which allegedly causes loss or damage to the claimant, 
or its locally established company." The consent to arbitration here is therefore limited 
to disputes based on a breach of substantive provisions of the agreement.119 The 2012 US 
Model BIT is even more elaborate in the delimitation of investment disputes. Pursuant 
to Article 24.1 of the Model, only claims that relate to an obligation under 'Articles 3 
through 10' of the agreement (i.e. substantive provisions for investment protections), or 
an investment authorization, or an investment agreement can be brought before an 
investor-State arbitral tribunal.120 Yet, even these types of detailed provisions, which 
limit the scope of consent to arbitration considerably, cannot be seen as jurisdictional 
obstacles for disputes that relate to trade law, due to the simple fact that disputes 
relating to trade law (Scenario No.1) do not bear any consequence on the jurisdiction of 
an arbitral tribunal. 
The Idea of 'Expandable Jurisdiction'  (vs. General Jurisdiction) and Tribunals'  
Authority to Deal with Investment Claim Based upon Trade Law 
Provided that a treaty does not provide otherwise, the simple fact that a dispute relates 
to trade law does not, by itself, suffice to challenge the jurisdiction of an investment 
arbitral tribunal. One could even take a step further and argue that absent clear 
limitations to the State's consent to arbitration in the IIA, it would be difficult for a 
tribunal to decline jurisdiction only because the cause of action of the investor's claim is 
founded upon a breach of trade law.  
This affirmation is based on the notion of 'expandable jurisdiction', which I already 
employed and explained in Chapter 2. This notion refers to the idea that IIAs contain 
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NAFTA Chapter 11 Articles 1116 and 1117, and in the ECT Article 26(1)) or indirect, through the 
definition of the type of dispute arbitrable under the IIA or via the identification of the exclusive legal 
sources for the investor's cause of action. See, Douglas (supra n.48) 234-35, citing the 2004 US Model BIT, 
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company of the other Party arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an investment 
agreement or an alleged breach of any right conferred, created or recognized by this Treaty with respect 
to a covered investment". 
119 The section referred to includes all the general substantive guarantees and treatment (although much 
more carefully defined and delimited) generally found in traditional IIA. 
120 The terms 'investment authorization' and 'investment agreement' are strictly defined and leave almost 
no room for interpretation.  




several features that can be used by investors to request tribunals to rule upon legal 
obligations that are not contained, per se, in the relevant investment treaty.  
To be clear, I do not argue that investor-State tribunals are tribunals of general 
jurisdiction. I already explained that this is unquestionable and has been affirmed on 
numerous occasions in the case-law.121 On the other hand, the broad wording of specific 
standards of protection included in IIAs (for instance, the FET standard) as well as legal 
instruments such as MFN clauses, Umbrella clauses and preservation of rights clauses, 
may be used to request the tribunal to evaluate claims founded on grounds other than 
those solely arising from obligations in  the relevant investment treaty .  
MFN clauses included in IIAs operate in a different manner than those contained in a 
WTO instrument (such as GATT Article I, GATS Article 2 or TRIPS Article 4). In 
investment law, it is usually accepted that MFN clauses can be used directly into the 
treaty used by the investor in the dispute the more favorable substantive treatment 
standards of another IIA treaty that the host-State is party to the benefit of the said 
investor.122 For instance, if a dispute is initiated on the basis of a BIT between State A 
and State B, and it appears that B, the defendant in the dispute, also concluded a BIT 
with State C, that includes a broader definition of the standard for full protection and 
security treatment (e.g. it contemplates legal security whereas the A-B BIT is limited to 
physical security), then the investor in the dispute, relying on the MFN clause in the A-B 
BIT, could invoke this B-C definition of the standard. More controversially, MFN 
clauses have been used to circumvent the limited subject matter jurisdiction granted to a 
tribunal under the arbitration clause of the treaty used to raise the dispute, by importing, 
via the clause, the broader subject matter jurisdiction granted under another treaty.123 In 
that sense, the MFN clause is used to open-up, or to expand, the scope of the arbitral 
tribunal's jurisdiction, to disputes that were not necessarily contemplated in the original 
BIT. 
Umbrella clauses are also frequently used to import, into the investment treaty, dispute 
rights that are not directly referred to in the IIA.124 Umbrella clauses refer to specific 
obligations relating directly to the legal relationship between the parties to the investor-
State arbitration, viz. the investor and the host-State. Broadly interpreted, they provide 
for an avenue through which investors can seek to import (the term 'elevate' has been 
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122 For a broad review of MFN treaty in investment treaty arbitration, see UNCTAD, 'Most-Favored 
Nation, a Sequel' (2010) UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, available 
at < http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20101_en.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
123  J.A. Maupin 'MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope for a 
Consistent Approach?' (2011) 14 J. Int'l Eco. L. 157.  
124 Investment tribunals have interpreted broad umbrella clauses to give investors treaty rights with 
respect to (i) contracts concluded between investors and the State or one of its entities and (ii) unilateral 
undertakings of the State embodied in municipal law. On this issue, see M.C. Gritón Salias, 'Do Umbrella 
Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?' in C. Binder et al. (eds.), International Investment Law for the 





also employed), into their treaty claims, contractual rights, or rights deriving from 
unilateral obligations the State could have consented to.125  
Finally, 'preservation of rights' clauses have also been used to import standards 
recognized in other international agreements (and contrary to MFN clauses, not 
necessarily IIAs) into disputes, such as human rights agreements, or even trade 
agreements. 126 For instance, in Roussalis v. Romania, 127  the tribunal accepted that, in 
principle, the preservation of rights clause included in the BIT used to initiate the 
dispute could include obligations deriving from multilateral instruments to which those 
states are parties. 128   The tribunal therefore left open the possibility to use the 
preservation clause to refer to the European Convention of Human Rights and its 
Additional Protocol No. 1.129  
The second feature that can be mentioned is the broad wording of specific standards of 
protection included in IIAs. As a consequence of this broad wording, investment 
tribunals are considered to have a wide margin of action to review state action, and 
although their jurisdiction is limited to the enforcement of the investment provisions in 
the BIT, the tribunals have the possibility to rule on various other grounds. For 
example, it is recognized that the investment standards of protection are broad enough 
to encompass State economic regulatory power, to the extent, of course, that it relates to 
investment and/or investment protection, and that tribunals may therefore review a 
measure taken in the application of other international rules, such as a WTO rule. 
                                                 
125 The literature is vast in this domain. See e.g., S.A. Alexandrov 'The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based 
Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines' 
(2004) 5 JWIT 555; J. Crawford 'Treaty and Contract in investment Arbitration' (2008) 24 Arb. Int'l 351, 
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Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty Tribunals over Investors' Human Rights Claims: The Case Against 
Roussalis v. Romania' (2013) 51 Columbia J. Transn'l L. 224.  
128 Roussalis v. Romania (supra n.127) ¶312.  The preservation clause was contained in Article 10 of the 
Greece-Romania BIT and read as follows: 
"If the provisions of law of either Contracting Party or obligations under international law existing at 
present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties in addition to this Agreement, contain a 
regulation, whether general or specific, entitling investments by investors of the other Contracting Party 
to a treatment more favourable than is provided for by this Agreement, such regulation shall, to the extent 
that it is more favourable, prevail over this Agreement." 
129 Ibid. The Claimant had argued that the preservation of rights clause could be used to import standards 
included in the ECHR, would lead the tribunal to hold these standards to be more protective and thus to 
declare that Romania's actions were contrary to European Human Right law. The tribunal accepted in 
abstracto the argument. It however refused to proceed as such, as it considered that the BIT level of 
protection was "higher and more specific" than the "more general protections offered to them" by the 
ECHR Protocol 1. Ibid. ¶312. See also Henin (supra n.127), 244-47.  




Another example is given by the recent discussion on the possibility to bring claims 
based on customary international law.130  
These hypotheses are not textbook cases. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
investors have already attempted to use these instruments to request a tribunal to apply 
trade norms. In Methanex, the investor tried to argue that a breach of WTO law could 
lead to a breach of the FET standard contained in NAFTA Chapter 11 Article 1105.131 
In the Philip Morris case, the investor formulated claims based on alleged violations of 
the TRIPS agreement, arguing they led to a violation of umbrella clauses.132 In the Eli 
Lilly case, the investor also alleged that the host-State breached TRIPS obligations, and 
that these breaches, along with other acts, were tantamount to expropriation.133  
In light of the previous developments on the establishment of jurisdiction in investment 
arbitration, tribunals should normally refuse to decline these types of trade-related 
claims on jurisdictional grounds. Indeed, none of the jurisdictional requirements permit 
tribunals to categorically set aside a claim on the sole basis that elements of its cause of 
action are to be found in another international agreement. It is largely conceivable that 
an investor, and a dispute, satisfy all the conditions discussed above (rationae materiae, 
personae, temporis, loci and voluntatis) and yet have a claim that is based on the violation of 
a trade agreement. In that case, and assuming that the arbitration clause does not 
provide otherwise, the tribunal should normally accept jurisdiction over the dispute and 
deal with the claim.  
The Eli Lilly case is an interesting example. Recall that in this case, the claimant argued 
that the way Canadian courts had implemented judge-made doctrine relating to patent 
law, in order to invalidate two of its patents, should be considered as a breach of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Articles 1105 (FET standard) and 1110 (prohibition of expropriation without 
compensation). Part of the claimant's argumentation related to international trade law. 
Indeed, according to the claimant, the doctrine the Canadian courts applied to its patent 
was inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under NAFTA Chapter 17 on Intellectual 
Property and the TRIPS agreement. 134  Interestingly, while Canada first raised the 
argument in its first pleadings, based on the tribunal's lack of jurisdiction to rule on 
alleged violations of TRIPS, it then nuanced its position, accepting that this issue would 
be more relevant to the merits stage of the dispute, and not the jurisdiction phase.135 
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Ultimately, Canada did not raise a formal jurisdictional objection,136 and the tribunal 
should therefore accept jurisdiction over the dispute. 137  The Eli Lilly case is still 
pending.138 The outcome of that dispute, along with the possible clarification from the 
tribunal on the merits of the investor's argument on TRIPS obligations (whether the 
tribunal will actually deal with the TRIPS claim) will be particularly interesting and 
instructive. 
Specifications in the Substantive Provisions of the IIA as a Potential Limit to 
Trade-related Claims 
From what precedes, it can be concluded that general jurisdictional requirements are not 
the proper tool to set aside a claim on the sole basis that elements of its cause of action 
are to be found in another international agreement, for instance a trade agreement. 
Consequently, should a tribunal refuse to apply trade law, because it considers that this 
would exceed its mandate, it would have to use another basis than that of jurisdiction to 
do so. 
For instance, one could argue that the specification in the substantive provisions of the 
IIA could be used to limit the reference to other international treaties. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the NAFTA FTC used this method for NAFTA Chapter 11 Article 
1105, when it made clear that a determination, that there had been a breach of another 
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish 
that there has been a breach of that agreement. The EU has followed this path as well. 
For instance, CETA Article X.9 "[f]or greater certainty, a breach of another provision 
of this Agreement, or of a separate international Agreement, does not establish that there 
has been a breach of this Article."139 Article 9.6.3 of the investment chapter in the Draft 
EU-Singapore FTA on expropriation is even more interesting. "This Article does not 
apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights, to the extent that such issuance is consistent with the [TRIPS Agreement]". 
This type of provision can clearly be seen as a reaction to disputes such as Philip Morris 
v. Australia or Eli Lilly v. Canada. 
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Claimant's Memorial (29 Sept. 2014) ¶¶209-210. 
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This type of specificity in a provision limits the possibility to refer to other agreements. 
This is not contested. Yet, they do not exclude these references. In any event, they 
cannot be seen as additional conditions to the jurisdiction of international tribunals. The 
NAFTA FTC did not rule that NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals have no jurisdiction over 
claims including a reference to other international agreements. It only said that a 
reference to another agreement and the demonstration that the other agreement has 
been violated by the host-State, are not enough to establish a breach under NAFTA 
Chapter 11. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that future EU agreements will limit the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over these type of claims. They inform the tribunals 
about a way to proceed when they evaluate the merits of these claims. 
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that the fact that an investment claim in 
connected with a trade norm does not constitute, in itself, a default that bars an 
investment arbitral tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction. 
D. THE CONCEPT OF ADMISSIBILITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO TRADE-
RELATED CLAIMS 
The last part of the present section relates to the notion of admissibility. As we will see, 
admissibility is a rather elusive concept in international dispute settlement. 
Understanding it, nonetheless, is important, as it can be used to better capture the 
opportunity and consequence of relying on trade law in a claim brought before an 
international arbitral tribunal. As Pauwelyn and Salles have explained in a 2009 article 
on forum shopping before international tribunals, the concept of admissibility might be 
seen as the 'key' to understanding questions relating to jurisdictional coordination.140 
This interesting argument, which was developed in the very specific context of 
interactions between the jurisdiction of the WTO and NAFTA adjudicators, is not 
uninteresting for the question the present chapter aims to tackle.  
1. The Distinction between Jurisdiction and Admissibility in 
Investment Arbitration 
The distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility has long been recognized in 
international legal scholarship.141 In his seminal study on the jurisprudence of the ICJ, 
Fitzmaurice explained that:  
[A]n objection to the substantive admissibility of the claim is plea that the 
tribunal should rule the claim inadmissible on some ground other than its ultimate 
merit; an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal is a plea that the tribunal 
itself is incompetent to give any ruling at all whether as to the merits or as to the 
admissibility of the claim.142 
                                                 
140 Pauwelyn & Salles (supra n.79) 78. 
141 Cheng (supra n.60) 275-78.  
142 Fitzmaurice (supra n.6) 438-39. See also, for a similar statement, J. Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of 





In practice however, the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility has not been 
easy to capture, both in general international dispute settlement and in investment 
arbitration in particular. 143  Contrary to the ICJ Rules of the Court, 144  the ICSID 
Convention and the other sets of procedural rules used in Investment Arbitration do not 
expressly refer to this distinction. Similarly, the great majority of IIAs do not provide for 
a distinction. Facing this silence, some tribunals in early cases nuanced the distinction 
and its practical implications. 145  Since then, many tribunals have used it, and while 
drawing a strict line between the two concepts is impossible,146 it is today admitted, in 
investment arbitration case law, that a distinction may be made between issues of 
jurisdiction and admissibility.147 Thus, it is possible for an investment tribunal with the 
jurisdiction to hear a case, to deny to rule on a claim because of its inadmissibility.148 
Whilst this distinction has been accepted, tribunals still struggle to identify the key 
element to decide the character of an objection. This is rather problematic, as the 
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144 Article 79.1 of the Rules of the Court reads as follows (emphasis added):  
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other objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits, shall be 
made in writing as soon as possible, and not later than three months after the delivery of the Memorial 
[…]. 
For examples of ICJ rulings on the admissibility of claims, see e.g. Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of 
America), Judgment on Preliminary Objections (21 Mar. 1959), ICJ Reports 1959, 6; Nottebohm 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment on Preliminary Objection (18 Nov. 1953), ICJ Reports 1953, 111, at 
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See, J. Paulsson, 'Jurisdiction and Admissibility' in G. Aksen & al. (eds.), Global Reflections on International 
Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum in honour of Robert Briner (ICC Publishing, 2005) 601, 
603 ("[I]t is vital to understand the fundamental distinction between the two concepts. They are indeed as 
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146 Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, Dissenting Opinion of 
Keith Highet (2 June 2000) ¶¶57-58. 
147 See e.g., Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine  (supra n.74) ¶15.7; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula S.C. European 
Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (24 September 2008)(hereinafter 'Micula v. Romania') ¶63; Bureau Veritas, 
Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/9, Decision on Jurisdiction (29 May 2009) ¶132. 
148 The main example is the SGS v. Philippines case, where the tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction to 
decide upon a contractual claim under the so-called 'umbrella clause' of the bilateral investment treaty at 
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distinction carries important consequences, such as the greater procedural flexibility 
tribunals enjoy in respect of cases over which they have jurisdiction but in which they 
decide that one of the claim is inadmissible,149 or the burden to raise an objection as a 
matter of jurisdiction or admissibility. 150  Indeed, it has been argued that whilst the 
tribunal must, if necessary, examine issues of jurisdiction of its own volition, questions of 
admissibility may only be examined if they are raised by the parties.151 
Relying on the Fitzmaurice's writings, the Hochtief tribunal affirmed that "jurisdiction is 
an attribute of a tribunal and not of a claim, whereas admissibility is an attribute of a 
claim but not of a tribunal."152 Recently, the tribunal in Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic 
attempted to summarize the case law and established that: 
"Jurisdiction of a tribunal goes to the power to decide a specific dispute, whereas 
admissibility relates to the ability to exercise that power and speaks to the 
characteristics of a particular claim and whether it is fit to be heard by a 
tribunal."153 
In other words, jurisdiction depends on whether requirements included in the treaty for 
establishing the existence of adjudicative power are satisfied, whereas admissibility 
depends on the nature of the claim and whether impediments to a properly constituted 
tribunal, hearing the claim, exist or not.  
On might argue, that, at the end of the day, the question of whether a particular legal 
issue falls in one and not the other category, is contingent on the meaning of the relevant 
provisions of the BIT. 154  Looking at the case law, authors have yet attempted to 
objectively delimitate these categories and identify matters that relate to one of the 
other.155 For instance, according to Waibel, objections based on procedural prerequisites, 
on the failure to exhaust local remedies or more generally on the grounds that the same 
(or similar) claim is allocated to, or pending in, another forum relate to admissibility. 156  
In theory, when it is established that a claim is inadmissible (for instance, because a 
procedural deadline for the presentation of the claim has not be respected) the tribunal 
should decline to rule on the claim. This is for instance what the tribunal did in SGS v. 
Philippines. The claim was related to the execution of a contract between the investor and 
an administrative agency of the government of the Philippines. That contract included a 
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dispute resolution clause, stating that any dispute related to the contract should be 
brought before domestic courts. The tribunal affirmed that although it had jurisdiction 
to deal with a contractual claim pursuant to the umbrella clause inserted in the treaty, 
the claim was inadmissible and that it could not exercise its jurisdiction until the 
domestic court had reached a decision on the performance of the contract.157  
Finally, one should always recall that investment arbitration usually features several 
claims. Investors rarely limit themselves to allegations based on one single treaty 
protection. For instance, it is very often the case that an investor will argue that a given 
measure is expropriatory and should result in compensation, and that in addition the 
State has breached the FET standard. Therefore, it is possible that one specific claim is 
declared inadmissible while the others are not.  
2. (Non-)Admissibility of Claims Based on Trade Law Norms? 
Can the argument be made that, in the absence of a detailed provision in the IIA 
delimitating the tribunal's scope of jurisdiction making it certain that the tribunal is 
incompetent to rule on a trade law-related claim, such claim should be analyzed through 
the prism of admissibility?  In other words, can the connection between an investment 
dispute with trade law be used to formulate an objection to the admissibility of an 
investor's claim, rather than an objection to the jurisdiction? 
Answering this question in the affirmative would result in two potential benefits. Firstly, 
determining that the inclusion of trade law within an investment claim pertains to the 
admissibility of that claim, rather than the jurisdiction of the tribunal, gives this arbitral 
tribunal more flexibility to examine and decide whether it may proceed with the claim. If 
the tribunal declines jurisdiction over a trade law related claim, it means that it rejects en 
bloc to deal with anything relating to this claim. The tribunal prevents itself from further 
enquiring about the details of the claim and the form it could take on the merits. 
Accepting jurisdiction over the claim and then deciding about its admissibility allows the 
tribunal to look into the attributes and details of the claim. The tribunal finds itself in a 
better position to determine whether the claim is only indirectly related to trade, and 
therefore no final determination of that law is required to rule on the investment breach 
(which is not problematic), or, instead, whether the claim is mainly about incorporating 
and applying non-investment norms directly into the investment dispute (which is 
problematic). 
Second, and more theoretically, as Pauwelyn and Salles explain, conceptualizing an 
objection based on the connection of the claim to trade law as relating to admissibility 
rather than to jurisdiction "shifts the discussion away from a 'clash of legal regimes' or 
'conflicts of law/conflicts of jurisdiction' perspective."158  As we will see in greater detail 
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in the next section of the present Chapter, conflicts of jurisdiction in international 
dispute settlement, and more particularly between trade and investment forum, have 
negative consequences and are difficult to tackle, due to the lack of efficient regulating 
techniques. When looking at the issue from the admissibility angle, the investment 
tribunal avoids the debate and the complicated tasks of determining whether another 
forum is, indeed, competent and, in the event of this being answered in the affirmative, 
on which grounds it shall decline jurisdiction to let the other forum deal with the case. 
These advantages, however, come with limits.  The first one relates to actual practice. 
To my knowledge, no tribunal has used the notion of admissibility to deal with a claim 
connected to non-investment law, let alone trade law.  While several investment 
tribunals did rely on the notion of admissibility to stop the proceedings without finding 
on the merits, they did so on much more specific, often procedural, grounds (i.e. the claim 
is temporally defective, a formal condition for the formulation of the claim has not been 
respected, etc.).159  
The second limit is based on the rationale that should be advanced to use the notion of 
admissibility. As already mentioned, admissibility relates to the intrinsic quality of the 
claim.  The problem in our hypothesis – the investment claim is based on an alleged 
violation of trade law – does not relate to the quality or nature of the claim, but to the 
fact that the cause of action identified in the claim is extrinsic to the investment 
agreement. The problem, here, is the law that is referred to in the claim rather than the 
claim itself. Admissibility may not be the most appropriate tool to address this question.  
Of course, one could argue that the rationale for declaring a trade-related claim 
inadmissible is the existence of a 'legal impediment' (for instance, an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in the trade agreement referred to, upon which only the trade 
adjudicator is competent to deal with disputes about that agreement) for the investor-
State tribunal to rule on the merits of that claim.160 As we have seen earlier, this is what 
the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines did when it declared an investment claim relating to 
contractual rights inadmissible, because of the existence of a forum selection clause in the 
contract.161 However, the issue in this case remains largely different from the one in our 
hypothesis.  In SGS, the tribunal considered that the contractual rights targeted in the 
claim were to be considered as an investment, and that, pursuant to the umbrella clause, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Koskenniemi & P. Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 15 Leiden J. 
Int'L L. 553. 
159 Waibel (supra n.23) 1278-79. 
160 Pauwelyn and Salles support this argument.  They look at the possibility for a party to refer to non-
WTO law in a WTO dispute, and the consequence of such reference on the jurisdiction of the WTO judge, 
and explain that said party can only be precluded from resorting to WTO dispute settlement "on the 
grounds that the claims is inadmissible" and not on the basis of a potential conflict with the jurisdiction of 
WTO judge. See, Pauwelyn & Salles (supra n.79) 98. For further discussion on the use and effect of a 
exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in provision extrinsic to the IIA, see infra pp.212 et seq. 





it could decide breaches of these contractual rights.  In our hypothesis, the investor does 
not argue that trade law created individual rights that can be qualified as an investment.  
Rather, in our hypothesis the investor argues that the State breached a trade agreement 
and that the consequence of that breach is a breach of a given obligation to be found in 
the investment agreement. The same reasoning as the one adopted in SGS v. Philipines 
seems therefore difficult to transpose in this situation.  
In conclusion, even if one can argue that using admissibility to deal with a trade-related 
claim presents some interests, it seems difficult to affirm, in a purely normative manner, 
that investor-State tribunals should always rely on this concept when required to rule on 
this type of claim. 
IV. REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL INTERACTIONS AND 
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS WITH THE TRADE LEGAL REGIME 
In the previous section, we have questioned whether the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals can be challenged on the sole basis that the dispute is connected to trade law or 
that the investment claim is based on a potential breach of trade law. The present section 
envisages the more complex situations of Scenario No.4 and more precisely the sub-
category labeled in the previous chapter as Scenario No.4.A, 162  that is when the 
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal is challenged on the basis of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the trade adjudicator to hear the dispute, or on the basis of parallel 
proceedings. 
A. JURISDICTIONAL INTERACTIONS AND PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
The notion 'jurisdictional interaction' is used here as a generic expression that includes 
the narrower concepts of jurisdictional overlap and conflict of jurisdiction. It refers 
broadly to situations where two or more cases brought before international adjudicators 
involve a certain similarity, and because of that similarity the jurisdiction of one 
adjudicator can be challenged on the basis of the jurisdiction of the other. After briefly 
examining the general dynamics of jurisdictional interactions and parallel proceedings in 
investment arbitration (1), and the problems associated with these two phenomena (2), I 
will focus on the specificities of interactions between investment and trade (3). 
1. Different Types of Multiple Proceedings and Jurisdictional 
Interactions 
Investment arbitration has been described as prone to parallel proceedings and 
jurisdictional interactions.163 The reasons for this 'vulnerability' are to be found in the 
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decentralized nature of the system, as well as the non-exclusivity of the investment 
tribunals' jurisdiction and the variety of legal sources applicable to an investment 
disputes.164 All these aspects have already been discussed elsewhere in this work and do 
not need to be analyzed again. More important is the distinction that needs to be made 
between the different types of jurisdictional interactions that can occur between 
investment tribunals and other courts.165 The first two types, vertical interactions and 
horizontal interactions, have been discussed at length, both in practice 166  and in 
scholarship.167 They present real problems, yet they are only of limited interest for this 
work. I will mention them briefly for the sole purpose of highlighting the specificities of 
the third category, the transversal interactions, to which  investment-trade interactions 
belong. 
Vertical Interactions 
'Vertical interactions' are the interactions that arise between an international tribunal, 
which claims jurisdiction over the dispute on the basis of an investment treaty, and a 
domestic court, which claims jurisdiction either on the basis of the normal procedure in 
force within the host-state in regard to foreign investments or, more likely, on the basis 
of a contract existing between the investor and the host-State or one of its subdivisions 
(a governmental authority, a regional or local entity, etc.). We have, on the one hand, an 
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international tribunal created by virtue of an international agreement concluded by two 
sovereign States, and on the other, a domestic court of one of the two states, to which the 
dispute can be referred following two procedural paths. We can call the first of these two 
procedural paths 'legislative'.  There the dispute has been initiated pursuant to the 
domestic law relating to investments, or on the basis of broader domestic legal 
provisions such those relating to the deprivation of property, establishment, and transfer 
of capital. The second procedural path is contractual. When investing in a foreign state, 
private persons often need to enter into contractual relationships with States or 
government authorities. These contracts, which might be, for instance, a concession or 
construction contract, usually include a dispute-resolution clause designating domestic 
jurisdictions. 168  In both situations, parties may be tempted to initiate domestic 
proceedings in addition to international ones. Even if domestic and/or contractual rights 
are different from those under BITs, and therefore the cause of action of a contractual 
claim is necessarily different from that of a treaty claim, it can be argued that both claims 
can lead to decisions that might be contradictory; thus they can be considered as 
interacting. 169 Neither situation is a textbook case. 170  Several cases have shown that 
procedures can be initiated simultaneously, before international tribunals and domestic 
courts, following one of the two-pronged schemes mentioned.171 
Horizontal Interactions 
'Horizontal interactions' occur when proceedings are subsequently brought before two 
investor-State arbitral tribunals. Like vertical interactions, horizontal interactions create 
a risk for inconsistent solutions, and, like vertical interactions, they can take different 
forms. First, there is horizontal interaction when the same or similar parties bring two 
or more claims under the same IIA. This can happen for instance when an investor 
initiates actions before two or more international tribunals.172 Second, and more likely, 
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there is a risk of horizontal interaction when two claims are initiated before international 
bodies on the basis of different legal instrument. These instrument could be, for instance, 
an international treaty – e.g. an IIA – and a domestic law or a contract with the host-
State.173 This situation happened in one of the first case decided by the ICSID.174 In SPP 
v. Republic of Egypt the investor brought a claim before the ICC on the basis of a contract 
concluded with the Egyptian governmental authorities and later started an action before 
the ICSID.175  
The norms could also be two international legal instruments – for instance, two IIAs. 
The same State measures can indeed be considered harmful by different investors or 
different entities participating in same investment, and this could lead to distinct but 
competing claims.176 The famous CME and Lauder cases illustrate this possibility.177 In 
these cases, the Czech Republic faced two different claims concerning governmental 
measures with regard to a local company that owned a TV license. The two claims were 
brought almost simultaneously: one by the final investor, Mr Lauder, under the US-
Czech Republic BIT, and the other by the Dutch company that Lauder controlled, and 
which was actually operating in the host State under the Netherlands-Czech Republic 
BIT. Both claims were held admissible under the respective treaties and resulted in two 
conflicting awards.178 Each claim was in relation to the same State measure and whilst 
one arbitration awarded damages to the investor, the other did not.179 
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Finally, 'transversal interactions' are interactions that occur between one investment 
tribunal and another international dispute resolution body that is not, strictly speaking, 
an investment tribunal. In other words, the interactions that arise between two 
international adjudicators that are not acting on the same plane, either because they are 
acting in a different mechanism of dispute settlement or because they have been created 
on the basis of international agreements that do not belong to the same branch of 
international law. These transversal interactions have been studied less than the two 
other types,180 and this is unfortunate, as they raise particularly interesting questions and 
are equally problematic. Like the previous two types, different manifestation can be 
identified.  
The first manifestation of transversal interaction occurs when one claim is launched by 
an investor against the host-State, while, at the same time, a dispute arises between the 
same host-State and the investor’s home-State. 181 IIAs are inter-State treaties. They 
necessarily include clauses regarding disputes that could take place between contracting-
parties, viz. inter-State dispute settlement. This is generally the case for BITs and 
multilateral agreements. 182  The NAFTA, for instance, created the Free Trade 
Commission, a consultation mechanism for contracting parties. According to NAFTA 
Chapter 20, the Commission can, among other things, supervise the implementation of 
the NAFTA Treaty and resolve disputes regarding its interpretation or application 
(Article 2001).183 If the Commission cannot solve the dispute, the contracting states are 
able to request for the establishment of an arbitral panel (Article 2008). This panel will 
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be competent to present a report with a suggested outcome that the commission will 
eventually implement. Such ‘two-tier’ mechanisms, one phase reserved for 
consultation/negotiation or even mediation, and another for arbitration, is the one 
usually settled for by BITs.184 In the event that states are unable to settle a dispute 
through negotiations or alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, nearly all the 
investment treaties give them the right to invoke arbitration to settle their conflict. 
These clauses follow the same, or at least a very similar, ad hoc interstate arbitration 
model which consists of, a three-arbitrator tribunal, each state appointing one arbitrator 
who then agree on the third; and if such an agreement cannot be reached, the said model 
refers to an appointing authority, such as the President of the ICJ or some other 
distinguished international figure, 185 the ECT nominating for instance the Secretary 
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.186  
Inter-State dispute-resolution mechanisms in IIAs have not been very popular. However, 
they are extremely important for the focus of this study. States might try to use such a 
mechanism to either delay or even block the proceedings relating to a claim raised by an 
investor. In 2003, Peru, in response to an ICSID claim brought against it by Chilean 
investors, instituted an interstate arbitration against Chile and requested the arbitral 
tribunal to suspend its proceedings until the interstate arbitration was resolved. This 
attempt was unsuccessful, with the ICSID arbitral tribunal declining the request, leading 
Peru to eventually withdraw its case against Chile.187 Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that nothing need have prevented Peru from continuing its case before the ad hoc 
tribunal against Chile, and nothing need have prevented the interstate tribunal from 
issuing an award that did not conflict with that of the ICSID tribunal. This situation, 
which is contemplated in the ICSID procedural rules, as well as any other arbitral forum 
rules, is problematic and reflects one of the 'weaknesses' of the investment law dispute-
resolution system towards transversal jurisdictional interactions.188  
The second type of transversal interactions concerns interactions between investment 
tribunals and other international adjudicative bodies belonging to another sub-system of 
international law. This type of interaction is based on the assumption that international 
investment law does not stand in isolation from other international legal regimes. 
Jurisdictional interactions between investment tribunals and other international courts 
can therefore occur. This last category of interaction is, of course, the one that interest us 
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the most, as it includes, inter alia the potential interactions between trade and investment 
adjudicators. Before turning to this particular instance of interactions between state-to-
state proceedings and investor-State proceedings, two other examples can be briefly 
discussed in order to illustrate and help us understand more fully the nature of the 
problem. 
The first one relates to the relation between investment law dispute settlement and 
human rights dispute settlement. Today, it seems well established that analogies can be 
drafted between investment and human rights law, and their mechanisms of 
enforcement.189 The most important of these analogies relates to the capacity given to a 
private person to start a legal action against a State before an international adjudicator 
and thus without the express consent of the State to this particular dispute. In both 
international investment law and human rights law, consent is given, en amont, in an 
international treaty, whether that be a BIT or a human rights convention. Thus, for 
instance, under the ECHR, and its Protocol 11, individuals are given the right to apply 
directly to the ECtHR. Further, parallels can be established between substantial 
provisions of investment and human rights laws. Both of these two disciplines aim to 
protect property rights, prohibit discrimination and condition expropriation. For these 
reasons, it is not surprising that investors try to use both mechanisms in order to protect 
their interests. Several cases have illustrated this possibility. For instance, in the Yukos 
and Amto/Eyum-10 disputes, investors have brought claims before the ECtHR in parallel 
with arbitral proceedings. 190  In both cases, the respondent States tried, in turn, to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals, arguing that because the disputes 
were litigated before another court they could not be heard again. In both cases, the 
arbitral tribunals rejected these arguments.191 Interestingly, the issue of conflicting and 
parallel proceedings has reappeared at the enforcement stage.192  
The second example relates to the relation between International Investment Law and 
European law. Concerns exist about the interaction between EU law and investment 
agreements,193 and, by extension, about 'conflicts' that could occur between international 
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investment tribunals and the European Court of Justice.194 In Eastern Sugar v. Czech 
Republic, the respondent State did raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
arguing that the dispute should be brought before the European Court of Justice.195 
The argument of the Czech Republic was essentially based on the possible interactions 
between its EU law obligations and those existing under the bilateral agreement 
concluded with the Czech Republic. This argument has been used again in Electrabel v. 
Hungary,196 but this time by the EU Commission, acting as amicus curiae in the case. Like 
the Czech Republic did in Eastern Sugar, the Commission challenged the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal on the basis of the potential conflicts between EU and Investment law, and 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to deal with questions relating to EU law.197 The 
two above-mentioned cases, among many other disputes, 198  have highlighted the 
potential jurisdictional interaction that can occur between IIA tribunals and the 
European Court. Like the other types of transversal jurisdictional interactions, they 
relate to the broader questions of competition between international courts and 
tribunals, a question that has been widely discussed in the past years, but that has not 
been properly addressed. As we will see in the next section, the same can be said for the 
interaction between investment tribunals and the WTO DSB. 
2. General Concerns Relating to Parallel Proceedings and 
Jurisdictional Interactions 
Parallel proceedings and jurisdictional interactions can lead to various problems.199 In 
the context of forum shopping, in general international dispute settlement, Pauwelyn 
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and Salles identify two main categories of negative issues: The first relates to the parties 
to the dispute, and contains five specific problems: (i) the cost of multiple proceedings, (ii) 
the finality of rulings/avoidance of oppressive litigation tactics, (iii) inconsistent rulings, 
(iv) avoidance of double jeopardy or double compensation and (v) party equality. In the 
second category, which relates to the system, they include (vi) waste of resources for the 
system's society as a whole, (vii) stability and security of the system and (viii) 
inconsistent rulings.200 Certainly, one could argue that all of these concerns belong to the 
same, unique broad category of transaction costs. Further, it is important to recall that 
forum shopping also exists in the domestic context. The phenomenon, as well as all the 
mentioned problems that may go with it, have been studied by a wide numbers of 
eminent jurists long before Pauwelyn and Salles.201 Nevertheless, the classification they 
offer remains interesting. As we will see, not all the sub-categories they identified exist 
or have the same intensity in the case of competing proceedings in investment 
arbitration. The following ones seem particularly pressing. 
Risk of Double Recovery 
In his study devoted to multiple proceedings in investment arbitration, Wehland notes 
the first concern, when stating that "where investors manage to secure decisions 
granting them the same type of relief in several proceedings there is always a danger of 
double recovery."202 He further explains that "[t]his risk is particularly acute where 
separate proceedings with regard to the same investment are initiated by formally 
separate entities situated at different levels of an investment structure."203 
Conflicting Outcomes 
Parallel proceedings and jurisdictional interactions might lead to inconsistent or even 
conflicting outcomes. 204  Inconsistent outcomes include but are not limited to the 
solutions given to the dispute. As Reinisch notes, inconsistencies can take the form of 
conflicting assessments of the same facts. Two courts or tribunals can, for instance, 
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interpret the evidence differently. They may be provided with different evidence, and 
thus reach different conclusions on the facts. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 
four cases relating to the Argentinian crisis, tribunals have reached different conclusions 
as to whether a state of necessity prevailed during the crisis.205  
Inconsistent outcomes can also take the form of divergent reasoning. Different 
adjudicators may assess the facts in the same way, but apply different rules to determine 
whether the facts can be characterized as a wrong and thus allow the granting of the 
requested remedy. The divergence in the interpretation and application of MFN 
standards can be cited as an example: Several tribunals have been divided as to the 
correct interpretation of MFN clauses included in IIAs. In 2000, an ICSID tribunal held 
that a BIT’s MFN clause was not limited to substantive standards of treatment, but 
extended to procedural issues and thus allowed an investor to rely on the more favorable 
waiting periods before instituting arbitration that were contained in another BIT of the 
host state.206 This particular reasoning has been used by some tribunals,207 and, at the 
same time, rejected by others.208 These divergences are not very problematic when the 
disputes are totally disconnected. 209  However, they do contribute to question the 
legitimacy of the investment litigation system when the divergences occur in an 
identical, if not the same, dispute.  
Finally, inconsistent outcomes can clearly occur if the solutions reached by two tribunals 
concerned with the same dispute are incompatible. This can happen, for example, when 
two solutions are simply conflicting, as when one adjudicator rules that the host-State 
shall compensate while the other rules it shall not. This can also be the case, however, 
when the remedies granted are conflicting, for example, if one tribunal orders that a 
host-State must pay 100 for damages while the other says it must pay only 50. These 
types of incompatible decisions are harmful because they damage the credibility, and thus 
the legitimacy, of the whole investment litigation system. The critiques that followed the 
conclusions of the Lauder and CME disputes are typical in this regard.210  
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Any of the above forms of inconsistencies can affect the legitimacy of the investment 
dispute system. They make the process of ensuring uniformity and predictability more 
complicated, 211 and have thus been used by several authors to criticize the legitimacy of 
the arbitration mechanism to settle investment disputes.212  
Waste of Time and Costs 
Even if they do not result in inconsistent outcomes, multiple proceedings can be seen as 
a waste of resources.213 As Cuniberti notes, this is true for the parties as well as for 
society as a whole.214 
"For the parties, parallel litigation entails an obvious increase of the litigation 
costs, since they have to bring or to defend claims before two adjudicators instead 
of one. For society, it is also a waste of resources, because the state funds several 
adjudicators instead of one. In addition, in investment disputes, the state is one of 
the litigants. The increase of the litigation costs that it bears as a party is also a 
cost for society as a whole, since it will be funded by tax payers."215 
 By the same token, one could also affirm that there is an opportunity cost that matters, 
since by doubling their efforts to litigate the case, litigants push administrative capacity 
to its limits, and probably contribute to worse judgments, since judicial resources are 
fixed in most democracies and not flexible. Although I am not aware of statistical 
research conducted on the length and costs of investment arbitrations when proceedings 
are involved, it can simply be noted that in nearly all known cases of parallel 
proceedings, procedural complications occurred. 216  These actions usually imply the 
service of additional lawyers, and will necessarily increase litigation costs and length of 
proceedings. 
Parties'  Satisfaction and Chances of Success 
A French author, B. Rémy, has recently developed the argument that, jurisdictional 
interactions change, to the detriment of the arbitration, the cost/benefits analysis which 
may be undertaken by states and investors when considering whether to use this method 
of dispute resolution.217 As explained above, jurisdictional interaction implies an increase 
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in the procedure costs and length. At the same time, this increase does not necessary 
imply a better quality of the dispute settlement mechanism. Such décallage can be 
considered as unsatisfying for the parties. Indeed, when initiating a dispute before an 
investment tribunal, the litigants have needs and expectations. Ultimately, the need is to 
have the dispute settled. Nevertheless, this need cannot be dissociated from the 
expectation of proper justifications. 218  This need, for proper justifications, has been 
included in procedural rules, such as the ICSID Convention or the UNCITRAL Model 
law, which both contained provisions obliging arbitrators to duly motivate their 
decisions. In Amco v. Indonesia, for instance, the tribunal explained that the "supporting 
reasons must constitute an appropriate foundation for the conclusions reached through 
such reasons". 219  Arguably, jurisdictional interactions may have a negative effect on 
these needs and expectations. As Rémy explains, different reasoning and/or conclusions 
may complicate the enforcement and render the execution process more complicated.220  
Further, the different appreciations given by different tribunals with jurisdiction over the 
same dispute can be perceived by the parties as destabilizing. Wehland notes, in this 
respect, that "the very possibility that the same matter might be re-adjudicated with a 
different outcome may effectively deprive a successful party of the benefits of a decision, 
by failing to provide it with the required legal security."221 
3. Parallel Proceedings Between Investment Arbitration and 
Trade Dispute Settlement 
The Hypothesis 
Jurisdictional interaction and parallel proceedings may occur between a dispute brought 
before an investment arbitration tribunal and an adjudicative body of an international 
trade agreement, starting with the WTO. In Chapter 4, we saw that investment 
tribunals have referred to trade law in disputes for which proceedings have also been 
initiated before the WTO dispute settlement body.  
As D. Price once noted, the same measure or series of measures taken by a government 
may give rise to violations of both IIA provisions and those of a WTO agreement.222 
Looking at the actual WTO DSB docket, and at the most recent disputes for which 
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requests for consultations have been submitted, it is possible to argue that some of the 
measures contested in those instances could trigger a dispute before an arbitral tribunal. 
To take only one example, on May 2015, Japan requested consultations with The 
Republic of Korea (hereinafter 'Korea') pursuant to WTO-DSU Article 4, on the basis 
that a set of food import bans on Japanese seafood products were inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement.223 Interestingly, Japan insists in its request on the 'fundamental lack of 
transparency' concerning the measures at issue, arguing that Korea failed to provide the 
information Japan is entitled to have, on the basis of the SPS agreement, about the bans' 
specifics.224 Hypothetically, the same set of facts could lead to an investment dispute. 
Korea and Japan are party to a BIT.225 This treaty is in force and provides for investor-
State arbitration in case of an 'investment dispute' (Article 15).226 Further, The Korea-
Japan BIT contains the traditional standards of protection generally found in IIAs, 
including FET (Article 10). A Japanese company operating in Korea (or a Japanese 
investor with shares in a local company) that is specialized in the import and distribution 
of food products, and affected by the bans, may well attempt to challenge the measures 
before a tribunal. Transparent and public exercise of government authority is, indeed, 
considered to be part of the FET standard and/or non-discrimination standards.227 In 
several cases, the lack of information on the implementation of a given governmental 
program has been used as a basis of a FET violation. 228 In Metalclad v. Mexico, for 
instance, the tribunal found that the respondent breached NAFTA Chapter 11 Article 
1105(1), because "it failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for 
Metalclad's business".229 More recently, in Micula v. Romania, the tribunal ruled that 
Romania breached the FET standard, because it acted in an un-transparent fashion, 
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when it delayed informing the investor that the investment incentives program it had 
benefited from had to be cancelled upon Romania's accession to the EU.230 Relying on 
this case law, the Japanese hypothetical investor could attempt to obtain damages from 
the Korean government, while at the same time, the measure would be under 
examination by a WTO panel. 
Of course, in this hypothesis, there would be no actual competition between the WTO 
panel and the arbitral tribunal. Allen and Soave, who have published a paper on this 
specific question, have expressed this idea in a very clear manner. According to them, 
"WTO dispute bodies and investor-State tribunals do not compete for jurisdiction,"231 
because (i) the "WTO and investor-State disputes appear to involve different parties"232 
and (ii) "the legal grounds and relief will also defer."233 Yet, there is a form of interaction 
between the jurisdiction of each adjudicative body, and as we will see in the next 
development, this interaction can "give rise to certain tensions and inefficiencies."234 
The Actual Cases 
In recent years, there have been at least four cases that involved parallel or subsequent 
proceedings: (i) the softwood lumber dispute, which involved the US, Canada and 
Canadian investors; (ii) the dispute over sugar quotas between Mexico and the US, which 
also triggered actions from US companies against Mexico; (iii) the ongoing disputes 
about Australia's legislation on the packaging of tobacco products; and finally (iv) the 
recent on-going disputes relating to Canada's Feed-In Tariff program. These disputes 
have been discussed at length in the literature,235 and have already been encountered in 
Chapter 4. I will not, therefore, delve too much into the details of each, but simply 
highlight the most important aspects of each of these cases. 
The first major instance of parallel proceedings arose with respect to a series of measures 
by the US, imposing tariff duties on Canadian softwood lumber, including the (in)famous 
"Byrd Amendment", a US legislative measure pursuant to which antidumping duties and 
countervailing tariff duties ('AD/CVD') collected from non-US lumber producers were to 
be reserved for, and distributed to, domestic competitors. All these measures, including 
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the Byrd Amendment, were challenged in various procedures before the WTO 
adjudicative body.236  
While WTO proceedings were ongoing, Several Canadian producers initiated 
arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11, arguing that the US measures were in breach of 
several investment protection standards (inter alia NT, MFN, FET and expropriation). 
The claims were consolidated and, with the exception of the Byrd Amendment, 
eventually dismissed. The tribunal found that NAFTA Article 1901(3) barred the 
submission of a claim with respect to antidumping and countervailing duty law to 
arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, and therefore concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to assess the legality of AC/CVD measures. As regards the Byrd 
Amendment, the tribunal found that it was not, per se, a dumping and subsidies measure 
and that, therefore, it was not covered by NAFTA Article 1901(3). The tribunal, 
however, reserved the question of determining whether the investors were entitled to 
damages. In the end, the tribunal did not address the question. The US and Canada later 
reached a political settlement and concluded an international agreement (the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement or 'SLA'), the entry in force of which was subject to the withdrawal 
of the claim. 
The second example of parallel proceedings arose in the context of a set of tax measures 
taken by Mexican authorities on various sweeteners contained in soft-drink beverages.237 
The US challenged these measures before the WTO, arguing that they were 
discriminatory. Both the Panel and the AB found that the soft drink taxes violated WTO 
provisions on discrimination and could not be justified under any applicable exception. 
Three US investors challenged the same tax measures in investment arbitration, under 
NAFTA Chapter 11. In the three cases, the tribunals found that the tax measures 
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violated NAFTA investment provisions on non-discrimination and awarded damages to 
the investors.  
The third instance of parallel proceedings involves the recent filing of WTO and BIT 
claims relating to Australia's legislation of tobacco plain packaging, which imposes 
trademark restrictions and other packaging requirements on tobacco products. This 
legislation has prompted legal actions both before trade and investment adjudicators. In 
2012 and 2013, Ukraine, as well as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Honduras, and 
Indonesia, initiated proceedings before the WTO-DSB against Australia, arguing that 
the Australian legislation was in breach of several provisions contained in the TRIPS 
agreement, as well as in the TBT agreement and in GATT Article III. Some of these 
proceedings are reportedly being funded by tobacco companies.238 Further, it appears 
that Philip Morris was directly at the origin of at least one of the cases. According to one 
source, it solicited the Dominican Republic to initiate the proceedings and is covering its 
legal costs.239  
The proceedings in the case brought by Ukraine were interrupted in 2015, upon a 
request of the complainants, in order to try and find a mutually agreeable solution. 
Today, the proceedings in that case are still suspended. The proceedings in the other 
four cases are still pending.  
In 2012, an investment tribunal was set up to hear a claim launched by the Asian branch 
of Philip Morris. As previously mentioned, in its request for arbitration, Philip Morris 
alleged that the Australian legislation constituted an unlawful expropriation of its 
intellectual property, and violated the FET and FPS standards, as well as the umbrella 
clause contained in the Hong-Kong Australia BIT. Since then, the claim has been 
reformulated, and the umbrella clause claim has been dropped. The proceedings have 
been bifurcated and the jurisdictional hearings were held in February 2015. Post-hearing 
submissions were submitted over the Spring of 2015 and a decision on jurisdiction is 
likely to be released in the next months. 
The last significant example of parallel proceedings, involves the recent filing of WTO 
and BIT claims relating to Canada's Feed-in Tariff Program, which subjected renewable 
energy producers to domestic content requirements. The implementation of the program 
in Ontario gave rise to a trade dispute between Japan and the EU on the one side, and 
Canada on the other, before the WTO DSB. The Panel and the AB found that the Feed-
in Program was inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement (local content 
requirement) and GATT Article III:4 (NT).  
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The same measures are being challenged in an investor-State arbitration between Mesa 
Power Group, a US investor, and the Government of Canada. Mesa claims that the wind 
farm projects in which it invested suffered economic loss due to the implementation of 
the program by the provincial government. The US companies allege that these 
measures are discriminatory and equal to a breach of the FET standard. The dispute is 
still pending. The hearings were held in October 2014, and in the last communication of 
the tribunal, a procedural order dated 10 November 2014, it was said that the cost 
submissions were due on February 2015. The award should be released soon. 
The Specifics Problems Associated with Uncoordinated Trade and Investment 
Proceedings 
Scenarios and situations like the four examples described above, are likely to recur.240 As 
Bjorklung notes, "[i]nvestors have every incentive to seek relief in multiple fora due to 
the differing nature of the remedies available." 241  One has to admit that investors 
operating abroad are, by definition, engaged in the international trade of goods and 
services. It is somehow natural for them to consider all relevant avenues of dispute 
resolution if, and when, they are adversely affected by a government measure.242 From 
the investor's point of view, initiating an investment treaty dispute before an arbitral 
tribunal and, at the same time, managing to convince its home government to 
diplomatically espouse a WTO claim, might even be seen as complementary. If 
successful, the investment arbitration will most likely result in retrospective relief in the 
form of monetary damages. A successful action before the WTO, on the other hand, 
would result in prospective relief in the form of the removal of the offending measure (on 
pain of trade sanctions).243 Triggering the two actions will, of course, have certain costs. 
However, determined, or 'deep-pocketed', investors might want to run the risk and take 
shots at different fora in order to maximize their chances of compensation or other 
favorable outcomes.244 Even if two actions are not pursued, investors may appreciate the 
possibility of parallel proceedings, because they could use the opportunity of bringing a 
claim, or to lobby a government, as (one might say oppressive 245) litigation tactics, 
possibly compelling the host-State to cooperate (for instance by accepting an 
advantageous settlement offer). 
From a State's perspective, however, this supposed 'complementarity' might be seen as 
double jeopardy. The state may have to defend itself for the same measure before 
different fora, with the risk of facing different sanctions for the same measures or set of 
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facts. The Feed-in dispute is a good example. Canada has lost the case under the WTO as 
it was asked to change its regulation. This change will have a specific cost. At the same 
time, it might be held liable for a breach of NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions, and ordered 
to pay compensation to the investor. This might be seen as problematic, in light of the 
potential result (double sentencing for the same measure), and also in light of the 
recourses spent in the multiple proceedings, as the costs involved in international 
litigation and international arbitration can be high.246  
The other typical issue mentioned when discussing concerns relating to overlapping 
jurisdiction in international dispute settlement, namely the risk of inconsistent ruling, 
exists also in the investment-trade scenario. In the Softwood Lumber dispute, the 
investment tribunal and WTO judge reached different results as to the nature of the 
Byrd Amendment. The investment tribunal concluded that it was not a dumping and 
subsidies measure within the meaning of NAFTA law, while the WTO panel concluded 
it was, within the meaning of WTO law. The possible negative consequences of these 
two inconsistent findings were avoided with the signature of the SLA Agreement. But 
without the conclusion of this agreement, two contradicting decisions would have had to 
be applied.  
Arguably, this type of 'dissonance' might alter both the credibility and legitimacy of the 
international dispute settlement system as a whole. As we have seen, commentators have 
not weighed the outcome of the investment facet of the Australian tobacco dispute, in 
order to ask questions about the way each dispute settlement mechanisms should 
coordinate, arguing that the mere possibility of having all these parallel disputes 
launched at the same time was a sign of a defect, and a problem with regard to a State's 
ability to regulate.247 Although investors might not be concerned about this problem, 
States certainly will be. If the system looks deficient, they have to spend both time and 
resources, either arguing that it is not, or accepting that it is and reforming it. 
B. INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING PRINCIPLES AND THE NECESSARY 
REASSESSMENT OF  A TRIBUNAL'S ROLE IN REGULATING INTERACTIONS 
There are several techniques that international tribunals can use to regulate overlapping 
jurisdiction and parallel proceedings.248 As we will see over the course of the present 
section, they do not operate the same way, and have different results. Further, their 
application and implementation to a given case depends on the type of interactions, as 
well as on the facts and details of the case.249 
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These techniques can be grouped into different categories.250 One might for instance 
focus on the specific type of interaction the tribunal is dealing with, and distinguish 
between the techniques that can be deployed to deal with two related on-going 
proceedings and techniques that can be used in situations of successive proceedings.251 
Pointing at the fact that coordination techniques usually originate from domestic legal 
systems, others will differentiate coordination techniques that have been developed in 
civil law systems, from those developed in common law systems. 252  For their part, 
Pauwelyn and Salles look at the effect of the techniques, as well as their rationale with 
regard to the courts' power, and distinguish between (i) preclusion doctrines, (ii) 
doctrines of consolidation and (iii) abstention doctrines.253 This distinction is useful for 
the purpose of this section and is adopted in the next developments. Indeed, as we will 
see below, the techniques belonging to the first two categories cannot be used to address 
the concerns of parallel proceedings and jurisdictional interactions between the 
investment tribunals and the trade adjudicator. The techniques belonging to the third 
category might be more pertinent, but imply a reassessment of the arbitral tribunals' role 
in regulating potential parallel proceedings and jurisdictional interactions. 
1. Inadequacies of Preclusion Doctrines (Res Judicata, Lis 
Pendens and Estoppel) 
As Pauwelyn and Salles explain,  
"preclusion doctrines bar either the jurisdiction of a court or the plaintiff's right to 
have her substantive claim examined. Under preclusions doctrines […] the second 
court does not have the any discretion and must decide that it does not have 
jurisdiction or that the action (or claim) is precluded."254  
Within these doctrines we usually find the three following techniques or principles: (i) lis 
pendens, (ii) res judicata and (iii) issue or collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue 
preclusion). Only a brief presentation of each of these three techniques suffices to 
demonstrate that they are not adequate to deal with this chapter's concerns. 
Lis Pendens and Res Judicata 
The lis pendens doctrine has been developed, in civil law system's, to deal with situations 
where the same dispute has been brought before two distinct courts or tribunals (because 
either party x initiates an action before tribunal A, and the other party, y, initiates an 
action before tribunal B ; or because x initiates two actions against y, one before tribunal 
A and one before tribunal B; or finally because a dispute is initiated in one court but an 
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aspect of the dispute has to be adjudicated by another specific court).255 In such cases, 
proceedings are on-going before two courts, both of which, in principle, have jurisdiction 
to hear the case.256 Pursuant to the lis pendens doctrine, and in principle, the second court 
seized should decline jurisdiction and let the first court that was seized decide on the 
dispute. Often, however, the solution will be less straightforward than one simply based 
on temporal priority. For instance, it can be that a decision by one court might be an 
input to take into consideration during proceedings by the latter. In any event, it is 
usually accepted that for the lis pendens doctrine to apply, three conditions are 
required.257  In theory, there must be (i) identical parties, (ii) an identical object or subject 
matter, and (iii) an identical (or at least closely connected) legal cause of action. 
The same conditions, or 'triple-identity test', also apply to the res judicata principle, which 
relates to subsequent, or sequential –and not parallel– proceedings. Pursuant to this 
principle, which is also from Roman law origin, a court shall not exercise jurisdiction 
when another court or tribunal has issued an earlier ruling on the same matter. This 
principles warrants the finality of proceedings as it ensures that a re-litigation of the 
same dispute before another court/tribunal is not possible.258 
As Reinisch explains, both lis pendens and res judicata principles serve the same policy 
rationale of judicial economy (by preventing costly parallel litigation), of legal security 
(by avoiding conflicting judgments), and of the protection of defendants (by protecting 
parties from oppressive litigation tactics).259 
Although investment tribunals have recognized that both principles may apply in 
investment arbitration in cases where the three conditions are fulfilled, 260 it is quite 
obvious that their application to parallel proceedings or jurisdictional interactions 
between trade and investment dispute settlement is impossible. 
While, there might be a connection between two disputes pending in each system, and 
the dispute might indeed involve the same measures or legal norms, this is not sufficient 
for res judicata or lis pendens to apply. Investment tribunals have interpreted rather 
strictly the three criteria in almost all the dispute in which one of the two doctrines have 
been raised. 
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It is simply impossible for WTO and investor-State arbitration proceedings to involve 
the same parties, the same cause of actions and the same relief. Let's imagine a hypothesis 
such as the one raised before to illustrate this affirmation. Imagine that in our 
hypothetical case, both the trade judge, and an investment arbitrator, would be asked to 
rule on the same measure (an import ban) and rule on the case on a similar ground (lack 
of transparency). The causes of action would still be different, as well as the parties. Even 
if we assume, for the sake of  argument, that the claimant before the investment tribunal 
asks for a form of restitution and thus the removal of the ban (rather than compensation), 
and that there is a similarity between the 'reliefs' asked for from the investment tribunal 
on the one hand and the trade dispute settlement body on the other, the parties, as well 
as the cause of action, would still be different. 
Issue or Collateral Estoppel 
The last preclusion technique that can be mentioned is issue or collateral estoppel. The 
traditional rule of collateral estoppel comes from common law systems and more 
particularly from US civil procedure.261 In short, the rule grants conclusive effect to 
material issues that have been already litigated and determined, and thus preclude an 
adjudicator from ruling on these issues again.262 This rule is similar to res judicata, but 
differentiates from the latter in the sense that it focuses (only) on issues in the dispute 
rather than on all the aspects of the claim (the parties to it, its cause and object).263 In 
this sense, the conditions for collateral estoppel to apply appear to be less stringent than 
the ones for res judicata. Unlike res judicata, issue estoppel applies even if the causes of 
action in the two proceedings are different.264 What matters here is whether the same 
issue has been litigated and decided in a previous case.265 Further, the strict identity of 
the parties is not required. Rather, the rule will apply if the parties are the same or in 
privy. In sum, to use Shell's words, "res judicata focuses on the general interest in finality 
and repose of judgments. Collateral estoppel, by contrast, emphasizes finality of specific 
instances of fact-finding."266  
                                                 
261 R.G. Shell 'Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration' (1987) 35 UCLA L. 
Rev. 623. 
262 H. Smit 'International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States' (1962) 9 UCLA L. Rev. 
44, 60.  
263 Shell (supra n.261) 625. See also, G.A. Bermann ''Domesticating' the New York Convention: the Impact 
of the Federal Arbitration Act' (2011) 2 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 317. 
264 The possibility to apply the principle in international dispute settlement has been discussed in the 
Nuclear Test case. See, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment (20 Dec. 1974), ICJ Reports 1974, 253, 
at 268. WTO Panels and the AB have also discussed the issue. See e.g., Argentina–Poultry Anti-dumping 
Measures, WT/DS241/R, Panel Report (19 May 2003) ¶¶5.37-38 and European Communities — Export 
Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, & WT/DS283/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
(28 Apr. 2005). See also, in the context of investment-trade jurisdictional interactions, Allen & Soave (supra 
n.231) 25. 
265 Shell (supra n.261) 647-48. 
266 Ibid. 648. 




This apparent flexibility seems interesting. In addition, numerous investment tribunals 
have generally applied the principle of estoppel, and an investment tribunal has once 
ruled that the specific collateral estoppel rule could be considered as a general principle 
of international law and therefore applied in investment arbitration. 267  One could, 
therefore, try to argue that once an issue (say for instance the nature of a measure, as was 
the case for the Byrd Amendment in the Softwood lumber dispute) has been decided by 
the WTO, the same party may be estopped to request another ruling from an investment 
tribunal. 
This particular question has not been addressed so far. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely 
that an arbitral tribunal will make use of this doctrine in this situation. The reaction of 
the tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico points toward this conclusion.268 Recall that in 
that case, Mexico had argued that the tax measures on non-alcoholic beverages 
containing a specific type of sugar, were to be considered as a countermeasure taken in 
response to prior violations of the NAFTA by the US.269 In response, the investor raised 
an argument based on very same logic of that underlying collateral estoppel, even 
though the rule was not expressly mentioned. Corn Products argued that Mexico had 
already lost the countermeasures argument in the WTO proceedings and could not, 
therefore, rely upon it in the present case.270 The tribunal refused that argument. It 
clearly affirmed that Mexico was not precluded from raising a defense of 
countermeasure, because of the rulings against it by the WTO Panel and the AB.271 
2. Inadequacies of Consolidation Doctrines 
There is no need to be exhaustive, either, with respect to the consolidation doctrine. 
Pursuant to this doctrine, when two identical claims are pending before two tribunals, 
one court can decide to consolidate the claims in one set of proceedings.272 In domestic 
legal systems where the doctrine is recognized, consolidation occurs based on explicit 
statutory provisions. 273  Similarly, in international dispute settlement, and more 
specifically in international investment arbitration, where the doctrine is recognized, 
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consolidation can only occur if provided for in the treaty upon which the disputes are 
based,274 or alternatively –but to a minimal extent– if the parties agree to it.275 
This doctrine is clearly not pertinent for parallel proceedings between investment and 
trade dispute settlement. The very first condition for the consolidation of two parallel 
proceedings rules this possibility out. Indeed, consolidation requires identical dispute 
settlement mechanisms. In other words, proceedings can be consolidated only if they 
involve similar tribunals, which both have jurisdiction to do decide upon all of the 
aspects, including the parties, to the dispute. 276  For instance, if two investors have 
initiated disputes against two NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, about the same set of 
measures taken by the same NAFTA party, then the latter can ask for consolidation, 
pursuant to NAFTA Article 1126. Further, it presumes that the tribunals have been 
constituted pursuant to the same rules and act within the same legal system, or on the 
basis of the same legal instrument.277 Clearly, this is no the case in the situation at hands. 
3. Abstention and Deference Doctrines and The Tribunal's Role 
in Regulating Interactions 
Pauwelyn and Salles define abstention doctrines as the doctrines that "lead the courts 
[…] not to exercise its power to pronounce on claims based on some factor extrinsic to 
the merits of the claims (for instance the jurisdiction of another court."278 In other words, 
contrary to the res judicata or lis pendens principles, which preclude the jurisdiction of the 
court because a decision has already been issued in the same dispute, or because the same 
dispute is actually pending before another court, here, the court has jurisdiction but 
refuses to exercise this jurisdiction over the dispute, or part(s) of the dispute. Within this 
category, we can mention the forum non conveniens and comity principles. These two 
principles are discussed below. As we will see, the application of these principles in 
international dispute settlement in general, and in investment arbitration more 
specifically, is limited. Yet, they should not be considered as totally irrelevant in cases of 
parallel proceedings or jurisdictional interactions between trade dispute settlement and 
investment arbitration. 
Forum Non Conveniens 
Pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine, which originates from common law 
countries, but for which equivalents can be found in civil law systems, 279 a court is 
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empowered to refuse exercising jurisdiction, or to stay an action, when it considers "that 
there is some other available forum which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties 
and the ends of justice."280 Unlike the lis pendens and res judicata rules examined above, 
forum non conveniens does not require the comparison of the disputes pending before two 
courts and to establish whether these disputes are identical. Similarly, the fact that the 
other court has already been seized of the dispute (lis pendens) or that it has already 
issued a ruling (res judicata) on said dispute are irrelevant factors. What matters here is 
that the other court, or the potential other court has, or would have, jurisdiction over the 
dispute and that its handling of the case could be considered as more appropriate. The 
criteria that need to be taken into consideration vary depending on the system where the 
doctrine is applicable. Generally, courts will take into consideration practical connecting 
factors relating to the parties' interests (their place of residence, or the place where they 
conduct their business, their resources, the availability of witnesses and experts) as well 
as more objective concerns such as the law applicable to the dispute and the general 
interests of justice.281  
Several authors have argued that the forum non conveniens doctrine cannot easily be 
applied in international dispute settlement. Pauwelyn and Salles for instance explain that 
applying the doctrine as it stands is problematic for the four following reasons. First, the 
doctrine originates from a common law system and international tribunals might refuse 
to recognize it as a general principle of international law.282 Second, in international 
dispute settlement, the condition according to which a court has to have jurisdiction to 
hear the whole dispute, or part of the dispute, for which the original court declines 
jurisdiction, is not likely to be met.283 Third, and finally, because international courts are 
not likely to show the judicial discretion the application of the principle implies. 284 
Similarly, Cuniberti argues that the principle is not likely to be applied in international 
investment arbitration, because courts generally refuse to decline jurisdiction if they 
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acquired such due to the existence of an arbitration clause.285 He further notes that, until 
today, no tribunal has expressly used the doctrine to decline jurisdiction.286  
These arguments are certainly not without merit. It is true that the traditional 
formulation of the doctrine does not seem to warrant tackling all the complexities of 
multiple proceedings in investment arbitration. Yet, as we will see, a slightly 
'reformulated version' of the doctrine, realigned with the problems of the present section 
could prove useful.287  
Comity 
Comity is another principle that can be described as an abstention doctrine. In the 
context of international dispute settlement, the principle of comity relates to the 
possibility for one court (court A) to take into consideration the fact that another court 
(court B) may have jurisdiction to deal with a dispute that is similar to the one pending 
before it, and to take the necessary measures to avoid negative interferences between the 
outcomes of the two disputes. In Shany's words, the principle of comity is based on the 
idea that "courts in one jurisdiction should respect and demonstrate a degree of deference 
to the law of other jurisdictions"288 as well as to "the courts themselves and to their 
procedures." 289 The idea is not that court A will apply the law of court B. This is 
certainly possible, and sometimes necessary, but is not related to comity. The idea is that 
court A, while dealing with dispute α, takes into consideration the fact that court B can 
more appropriately deal with α, and therefore abstains from ruling upon the case. Of 
course, with this principle, all depends on the will of the abstaining court.  
One might also argue that the principle further allows a court, that is facing a situation 
of parallel proceedings or jurisdictional internationals, to rely on a decision or findings 
reached by the other court. Or, if the other procedure is still ongoing, to stay its 
proceedings in order to let the other court decide on the issue, and thus place itself in a 
position to take that decision into account once it has been decided. In that situation, 
court A does not abruptly decline jurisdiction to the advantage of court B, it waits and 
sees.290 
Like forum non conveniens, it is unsure whether comity qualifies as a general principle of 
international law.291 Nonetheless, it seems that it is largely accepted that the exercise of 
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comity is part of the inherent powers of international courts, and that these courts 
should have the authority to take into account other international proceedings when the 
latter are related and relevant to the one they deal with, even if that authority is not 
expressly mentioned in their statutes, or procedural instruments. Similarly, it is usually 
accepted that international courts have the authority to manage their proceedings in 
order to act in deference towards another international court.292 In SPP v. Egypt for 
instance, the arbitral tribunal clearly affirmed that "every court has inherent powers to 
stay proceedings when justice so requires."293 In this case the tribunal actually accepted 
to stay the proceedings so that the French Cour de Cassation could rule on a matter that 
was directly related to the dispute. The tribunal expressly used the notion when it 
affirmed that,  
"[w]hen the jurisdiction of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the 
same dispute, there is no rule of international law which prevents either tribunal 
from exercising its jurisdiction. However, in the interest of international judicial 
order, either of the tribunals may, in its discretion and as a matter of comity, decide 
to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a decision by the other tribunal."294 
This case, which represents one of the main illustrations of the application of comity in 
international dispute settlement,295 is particularly instructive and should be seen as an 
interesting basis for techniques that are to be used in case of parallel proceedings or 
jurisdictional interactions between trade and investment dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Abstention and Deference Doctrine as a Flexible but Effective Tool to Coordinate 
Investment-Trade Jurisdictional Interactions? 
The principles presented above may not be pertinent for all types of jurisdictional 
interactions that arise in investment arbitration. Yet, they are certainly of interest and 
have an important role to play for those interactions studied in the present Chapter. I 
argue that it is towards these principles that investment tribunals should turn when they 
face interaction with trade adjudicative bodies or parallel proceedings. And for the 
following reasons.  
Firstly, as we have seen, the doctrines of forum non conveniens and comity apply in case of 
partial interaction.  That is when the disputes pending before the two competing forum 
are not exactly identical. This is likely to be the case in the hypothesis of parallel 
procedure before an investor-State tribunal and a trade adjudicative body. As we have 
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seen, while there might be similarities between two parallel disputes brought before 
investment and trade adjudicators, these proceedings will not be identical. 
Secondly, the two doctrines apply, notably, if it is highly likely that the other forum 
declares itself competent to hear the case.  As noted by Cuniberti, "the other forum 
should not only be more appropriate, but strongly so."296 When investment tribunals are 
faced with a challenge based on the existence of a dispute before a trade adjudicative 
body, it is very likely that the trade adjudicator has jurisdiction over the dispute.  
Further, in practice, this appropriateness requirement implies that the courts and 
processes compared be clearly different. If the processes are very similar, it is doubtful 
that any of them will appear as strongly more appropriate than the other, and thus 
trigger a stay of proceedings on convenience grounds. In our hypothesis, the two 
adjudicative bodies undertake different functions. It is therefore possible for the 
investment tribunal to refer to the trade adjudicative body for the aspects of the disputes 
which fall within its competence. 
In light of the above, the doctrines of forum non conveniens and comity seem appropriate 
to deny jurisdiction over a Scenario 3 claim in cases of parallel proceedings. Arguably, in 
some disputes already discussed in the present thesis, investor-State tribunals have 
applied these doctrines implicitly.  In Canfor & all v. US, for instance, the tribunal did not 
refer to the doctrine, but did express the idea that the treatment of a dispute relating to 
custom duties would be appropriate.297 
Finally, comity also allows a tribunal to proceed with the case, whilst 'taking into 
consideration' the proceedings before the other court. This possibility seems particularly 
interesting for the issues addressed in the present Chapter.  A situation of parallel 
proceedings before trade and investment adjudicative bodies does not necessarily imply a 
conflict between the jurisdiction of the two bodies, which can only be resolved with one 
of these bodies declining jurisdiction in favor of the other.  Often, the two proceedings 
will be parallel, but not all the issues to be addressed in the two forums will be 
competing.  It can be the case that only one specific factual element is identical in the two 
parallel proceedings, but that the dispute before forum A differs from the one addressed 
in forum B.  In this hypothesis, having one of the two forums declining jurisdiction over 
the whole dispute does not seem appropriate.  A more suitable situation would be having 
either or both forums exercising comity by taking into consideration what the other will 
do when addressing the specific element that is identical in both disputes.  In practical 
terms, comity may lead an investment tribunal to 'take into consideration' the 
jurisdiction of a trade tribunal in a parallel dispute and, for instance refer to the findings 
of the trade tribunal or to the way that tribunal will handle the facts of the disputes, or 
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request information to the parties about the trade proceedings. In a similar situation, 
comity might also justify a stay of the investment proceedings until the trade tribunal 
issues a decision, so that the decision can be addressed in the investment case.  Allen and 
Soave endorse this solution, explaining that this should not have a great impact on the 
unfolding of the investment case, as trade proceedings are usually relatively short.298 
Certainly, the use of these principles depends on the willingness of the arbitral tribunal 
to engage with its trade counterpart.  After all, the investment tribunal can always 
ignore the parallel proceedings and let the parties deal with the problem associated to it 
if and once they encounter them after the award is issued. Yet, one should note that 
investment tribunals have to administer the proceedings in accordance with the interests 
of the disputing parties. It can, therefore, be argued that a measure aiming at regulating 
a potential interaction with a parallel trade dispute (for instance requesting information 
about that dispute or staying the proceedings to wait for this outcome) is taken in 
accordance with the interests of the parties.  
In any event, there should be no doubt about the objective capacity of investment 
tribunals to rely on comity to pronounce this type of measure, as the use of comity fits 
within the scope of their inherent powers.  
At the end of the day, whether investment tribunals will accept to use these principles 
depends on the perception they have of their own function and their role in relation to 
other international dispute settlement bodies. In a recent study, Van Harten 
demonstrates that tribunals have usually declined to observe deference towards other 
international courts. 299 For him, refusing to show restraint and proceeding with the 
dispute despite the inconvenience it might create, and despite the potential for conflicting 
decisions and the possibility of having a legitimate forum, is problematic and may further 
affect the legitimacy of investment arbitration. 300  In his view, investment tribunals 
should re-evaluate their role towards a more system-oriented approach, even if this 
results in the stay of proceedings until the dispute is resolved in the parallel forum.301  
There is not enough data to affirm that his conclusion and recommendation also applies 
for situations of competition or interaction between the jurisdiction of trade adjudicative 
bodies and investor-State tribunals.  It seems, however, difficult to contest that a better 
integration between trade and investment law would be fostered should investment 
tribunals observe higher deference towards international trade courts in case of 
jurisdictional interactions or parallel proceedings.  This seems a laudable goal, in light of 
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the conclusions reached in the previous Chapter of the present study, and one may thus 
argue that reference to principles such as forum non conveniens or comity in cases of 
interactions between trade and investment proceedings should therefore be encouraged. 
C. THE WAY FORWARD: THE USE OF COORDINATION CLAUSES IN IIAS 
Parallel proceedings and jurisdictional interactions between international courts and 
tribunals may also be regulated directly in the treaties that are used as the basis of their 
jurisdiction. Pauwelyn and Salles argue that coordinating clauses in international treaties 
is actually the best method to regulate jurisdictional overlaps.302 Allen and Soave for 
their part note that treaty-based approaches to parallel proceedings ensure greater 
predictability and because they remain "grounded in the consent of the counteracting 
States – as opposed to the inherent authority of tribunals – […they] may have greater 
legitimacy."303  
Three types of device need to be examined: (i) Exclusivity clauses, (ii) Forum Selection 
Clauses, and (ii) Coordination Clauses. Each of these three devices has advantages, as 
well as limits, in dealing with investment-trade interactions, especially when it concerns 
addressing Scenario No.2 as well as Scenario No.4 situations. 
1. Exclusivity Clauses 
Shany defines an exclusivity clause as a jurisdiction clause which "bars litigation before 
any forum other than the one designated under the jurisdiction-granting instrument".304 
Article 344 of the TFEU, which provides that EU Member States cannot submit a 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of EU law to any other adjudicative 
body other than the CJEU, is a good example of this type of exclusivity clause.305 The 
other example that can be referred to is WTO-DSU Article 23, which we have already 
encountered. This article endows the WTO-DSB with exclusive jurisdiction over 
violation of WTO agreements.  
Exclusivity clauses appear to be interesting instruments for the managing of parallel 
proceedings and jurisdictional interactions. In theory, they should prevent a party from 
relying on two adjudicative bodies (the exclusive one and another) to deal with a dispute 
over given international norms.  
We have seen in Chapter 3 that investment dispute-settlement is non-exclusive, meaning 
that IIAs do not designate one, exclusive, dispute settlement body for investment 
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disputes. IIAs do not contain exclusivity clauses. Instead, the majority of IIA dispute 
settlement clauses refer to several alternatives, including investment arbitration.  
Yet, exclusivity clauses are still of interest for the investment-trade configuration 
considered in the present chapter. In an investment dispute where (one of) the investor's 
claim refers to a trade agreement, or where the subject matter is the same as the subject 
matter of a dispute about a trade agreement pending before a trade dispute settlement 
body, the tribunal could examine whether the trade agreement considered by the parties 
includes an exclusive jurisdiction clause. This textbook hypothesis is not unrealistic. 
Indeed, although we know, from Chapter 4, that Article 23 of the WTO-DSU has not 
been applied nor referred to by a tribunal (the reasons for that are explained below), in 
Canfor & all v. US the tribunal did refer to provisions of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms for anti-dumping and countervailing law under NAFTA (Chapter 19) to 
decline jurisdiction over several of an investor claim under NAFTA Chapter 11.306 The 
tribunal noted that Chapter 19 included its own dispute settlement mechanism, that the 
two proceedings (the one pursuant to Chapter 19 and the one pursuant to Chapter 11) 
were "concurrent or parallel (with the attendant problems that this creates), even though 
the applicable law and available remedies differ[ed]".307 Although Chapter 19 does not 
include an exclusive jurisdiction clause per se, that the tribunal could rely upon, it does 
include a provision providing that none of the other NAFTA chapters shall be construed 
as imposing obligations with regard to anti-dumping and countervailing law. Referring 
to this provision - Article 1901(3) - as well as the other provisions in Chapter 19, 
including Article 1904, which establishes the procedure for review of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures, the arbitral tribunal concluded that anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures could not be subject to adjudication under Chapter 11.308 The 
tribunal eventually ruled that all but one of the investor's claims related to anti-dumping 
and countervailing law, and that it therefore could not proceed, declining jurisdiction 
over these claims.309  Canfor & al. v. US thus provides a good example of a tribunal 
declining jurisdiction over a dispute because the said dispute relates to a subject matter 
that falls under the authority of an other international adjudicative body, and because 
that adjudicative body was itself seized, in parallel, by a dispute on that same subject 
matter. 
Exclusivity clauses in outside agreements present an interest, but their effect remains 
limited for two main reasons. First, they are binding only on the parties to the outside 
agreement. Hence, the party who invokes the clause might have difficulties convincing 
the tribunal that the clause shall be applied in the investment dispute. The best example 
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is Article 23 of the WTO DSU. As briefly mentioned in the previous Chapter, in a 
Scenario No.4A situation (WTO law used as a defense on jurisdiction) a defending State 
could refer to Article 23 of the WTO DSU to challenge the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal dealing with a dispute connected to WTO law. In theory, the defending State 
could attempt to argue that, because of Article 23, the WTO-DSB is the only competent 
body to apply WTO law. Yet, even if a dispute has been brought before the WTO by 
another member, this argument would be flawed, as the investor is not bound by this 
provision.310 In this hypothesis, it is in fact the defending State that would be bound by 
the provision and, in a way, somehow precluded to invoke said provision. Interestingly, 
in Philip Morris v. Australia, the respondent did refer, although implicitly, to the exclusive 
nature of the WTO dispute settlement body. In its response to the Notice of Arbitration, 
one of the very few pleading materials published in this case, Australia replied to the 
investor's attempt to rely on WTO law by explaining that the function of the arbitration 
clause in the Hong-Kong–Australia BIT was not "to establish a roving jurisdiction that 
would enable a BIT tribunal to make a broad series of determinations that would 
potentially conflict with the determinations of the agreed dispute settlement bodies 
under the nominated multilateral treaties."311 Australia then added "[t]his is all the 
more so in circumstances where such bodies enjoy exclusive jurisdiction."312  
There is no explicit mention of Article 23 of the WTO-DSU, but there is no doubt that 
the reference to this rule is implied.313 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the investor 
eventually withdrew the claim based on the WTO law. One might regret this 
withdrawal, as the tribunal will not have the opportunity to rule on the matter and we 
will not know if the tribunal would have considered that Article 23 could be referred to 
by the parties and applied in the case. 
The second limit to the application of exclusive jurisdiction clauses found in other 
treaties follows from the first one. At least one of the parties to the investment dispute is 
not bound by the exclusivity clause to be found in the other agreement. Similarly, one 
could argue that the tribunal is not bound either. Some authors have actually used this 
line of argument to highlight the limit of the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of the 
WTO DSB. Marceau and Kwak for instance claim that "[…] Article 23 cannot prohibit 
tribunals established by other treaties from exercising jurisdiction over the claims 
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arising from their treaty provisions that run parallel to, or overlap with, the WTO 
provisions."314  
Arguably, whether or not a tribunal will accept to apply a provision to be found in an 
outside treaty depends on the discretion of the tribunal and on its approach towards the 
applicability of non-investment rules in the dispute.315 Some tribunals may be willing to 
show deference to the other court and accept to look at the exclusive jurisdiction clause 
contained in the other agreement. Others may not.316  
What seems certain, however, is that the existence of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in 
the outside treaty alone might not suffice to convince the tribunal. Reference to the 
abstention doctrines mentioned in the previous development might be used to justify a 
decision pursuant to which jurisdiction over a claim that is based on an outside 
agreement is denied.  
Finally, it is important to recall that the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in 
an outside treaty can be seen as a 'legal impediment', that makes a given claim 
inadmissible. 317  As mentioned in the previous section, it is argued that the relation 
between the claim and trade law relates more to the admissibility of the claim rather than 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause might be 
an important element that will make an admissibility objection stronger.  
2. Forum Selection Clauses 
IIAs do not include exclusive jurisdiction clauses. They might however contain forum 
selection clauses, which may be used to regulate parallel proceedings. For instance, 'fork-
in-the-road clauses' give the investor the possibility to choose between different dispute 
settlement mechanisms (usually proceedings before local courts, proceedings before an 
international tribunal), but only if none of the other options available have already been 
chosen before.318 In other words, theses clauses require the investor to make a definitive 
election of a forum, prior to the initiation of the proceedings.  
Similarly, waiver (or 'no U-turn') clauses, provide that an investor may initiate arbitral 
proceedings only if it waives the right to initiate or continue any proceedings relating to 
                                                 
314 K. Kwak & G. Marceau, 'Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization 
and Regional Trade Agreements' in L. Bartels & F. Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
Legal System (2006) 465, 476. See also, T. Voon, A.D. Mitchell & J. Munro, 'Good Faith in Parallel Trade 
and Investment Disputes' in T. Voon, A. Mitchell & M. Sornarajah (eds.), Good Faith and International 
Economic Law (2015) 60, 75-76.  
315 As we will see in the next Chapter, States may reduce this margin of discretion by providing for 
detailed applicable law in their investment agreements.  
316 For instance, Eureko v. Slovakia the tribunal dismissed the respondent's objection pursuant to which the 
tribunal should decline jurisdiction because the dispute related to EU law, and that it should therefore be 
brought before the CJEU.   
317 See supra p.182.   
318 On this type of provision, see generally, Dolzer & Schreuer (supra n.53) 267-68; McLachlan et al. (eds.) 





the same measures in a court or tribunal of the host-State, or before any other dispute 
settlement body.319  
These two types of provisions are usually considered as efficient tools to prevent 
investors from initiating multiple proceedings for the same dispute. However, they are 
only of limited interest in respect to the problem addressed in the present chapter. 
Indeed, these clauses apply only when there is some form of close-similarity between the 
disputes presented before the two adjudicative bodies. Therefore, the same limits as those 
identified for res judicata and lis pendens apply; the investor is not a party before the trade 
adjudicator, and the cause of action is necessarily different. So even if it is proven, as is 
the case in the Australian Tobacco Package dispute, that there is a strong connection 
between the State party to the WTO proceedings and the investor before the arbitral 
tribunal, and that the subject matter of the dispute is relatively similar, the arbitrators 
could not rely on forum selection clauses to preclude the investor from arbitration. Allan 
and Soave summarize the issue as follows: "there is no 'fork-in-the-road' for [the] 
investor to take. An investor does not choose a WTO claim over an investment claim 
[…]."320 
3. Coordination Clauses 
I call 'coordination clauses' the provisions in IIAs that warrant and encourage arbitral 
tribunals to administrate their proceedings, and the way they handle the cases more 
generally in order to better manage interactions with other proceedings, or with the 
activity of other adjudicative bodies.  
Within this category we usually find what Allen and Soave call "bounded stay 
provisions",321 which are the clauses "that empower –but not compel– tribunals to stay 
their proceedings in situations of overlap",322 or clauses that enjoin tribunals to seek 
whether findings from the other proceedings might have an impact on the investment 
dispute, and in the affirmative, to take into consideration these findings.323  
The current consolidated draft of the CETA includes such a coordination clause. Article 
X.23 of the Investment Chapter, entitled "Proceedings under different international 
agreements", reads as follows:  
"Where claims are brought both pursuant to this Section and another international 
agreement and: 
• there is a potential for overlapping compensation; or 
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• the other international claim could have a significant impact on the resolution 
of the claim brought pursuant to this Section, 
a Tribunal constituted under this Section shall, as soon as possible after hearing 
the disputing parties, stay its proceedings or otherwise ensure that proceedings 
pursuant to another international agreement are taken into account in its decision, 
order or award."324 
It is interesting to note that the investment chapter includes other provisions dealing 
specifically with parallel proceedings before an investment arbitral tribunal and domestic 
courts, or before two investment arbitral tribunals. Further, the language in this 
provision is rather broad. The clause does not mention that the claims have to be the 
'same', which exclude a "triple-identity test" type of construction based on the lis pendens 
principle. The clause only mentions the 'potential for overlapping compensation' or, even 
more interestingly, 'a significant impact on the resolution of the claim' which implies 
connection, but not necessarily competition. Finally, this provision is entitled 'different 
international agreement' and not 'different investment agreement'. One could thus argue 
that the very goal of this provision is to address the question of parallel proceedings or 
jurisdictional interaction between investment arbitration on the one side and another 
international court or tribunal on the other, for instance the WTO-DSB.325 
Applying this type of provision in the hypothesis raised in the beginning of this chapter, 
it would be possible to claim that the parallel trade dispute might have an impact on the 
investment arbitration, and that the tribunal should either stay the proceedings to allow 
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the trade adjudicator to arrive at a decision, or make sure that it takes the decision of said 
adjudicator into consideration. 
To my knowledge, there are no other existing IIAs that include this type of provision. 
Most recent investment agreements concluded either by Canada or any EU Member, do 
not contain such a clause. It is thus difficult to assess how tribunals would interpret the 
conditions for the provision to apply and more specifically the notions of 'overlapping 
compensation' or 'significant impact'. One could say that the scope given to investment 
tribunals to stay the proceeding and/or consider the decision of the other courts or 
tribunals, is rather wide, and that it will not prevent arbitrators from deciding against 
engaging with trade adjudicators if they do not want to. On the other hand, one might 
also argue that "strict rules or mandated references may unduly constrain the decision-
making of tribunals."326 The formulation used in the CETA, therefore, seems interesting, 
in the sense that it aims to strike a balance between the necessity of settling the 
proceedings according to the interest of the parties, and the necessity of taking into 
account other international procedures that are connected, even only indirectly, to the 
arbitration. This innovation should certainly be seen as positive. 
The inclusion of this type of provision in IIAs is recent. It seems clear that the very 
reason for their inclusion is to tackle problems related with parallel proceedings and 
jurisdictional interactions between investment arbitration and other fields of 
international law, such as trade law. Whilst the efficiency of these types of provisions 
remains to be seen, they may already be qualified as 'promising'.327 In any event, they 
appear as clear evidence of the willingness of States to address the issue in their new 
instruments. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has demonstrated that, in principle, the connection to trade law of an 
investment dispute cannot be used to challenge the jurisdiction of the investment 
tribunal. Further, we have seen that, should the arbitration clause be broadly drafted, it 
is possible that a tribunal may even accept jurisdiction over a claim in which trade law is 
directly invoked. This does not mean, however, that the tribunal will have to accept to 
decide such a claim on the merits, as it can still qualify it as inadmissible. 
We have also seen that interactions might occur between the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals and the jurisdiction of the trade adjudicative bodies, most notably when 
proceedings relating to a similar subject matter are launched simultaneously in the 
investment and trade fora. This situation should not result in a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Nonetheless, when this happens, it is important for 
the investment tribunals to observe deference towards the trade dispute settlement 
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mechanisms. The general principles of forum non conveniens or comity, which belong to 
the toolbox of investment arbitral tribunals, might be seen as interesting techniques 
enabling them to do so. Even more interesting is the use of coordinating clauses, which 
compel arbitral tribunals to take into account the results of the trade proceedings, and 
more generally to look at how the trade dispute settlement body is dealing with its case. 
These clauses may be seen as the most efficient way of dealing with jurisdictional 
interactions between investment tribunals and the trade dispute settlement bodies. 






. CHAPTER 5. 
TRADE IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 





This last chapter addresses the issue of substantive interactions between investment and 
trade law. The goal is to demonstrate how an investment tribunal should deal with trade 
norms once these norms have 'entered', and are being discussed, at the merits stage of an 
investment dispute. 
The main argument I will be defending, is that when it is assumed that trade law has a 
direct bearing on a given investment dispute, the arbitral tribunal may, and should, 
engage in a better integration of the trade norms bearing upon the dispute at hand. As 
we will see, tribunals have the capacity, and the discretion, to use trade law, because they 
enjoy a relative amount of leeway concerning the selection of the laws and norms 
applicable to investment disputes. Furthermore, tribunals have the tools to address 
potential conflicts between trade and investment law. In this respect, I argue that several 
of these tools may be found in existing general principles of international law. However, 
we will see that tribunals would be better placed if provided with more precise guidelines 
for how or when to use these tools. These guidelines should take the form of specific 
clauses in investment agreements, that aim to regulate interactions with trade law.  
The present chapter is structured as follows: In Section II, I look at the principles used to 
identify and determine the applicable laws to an investment dispute, and investigate the 
discretion investment tribunals have when selecting the laws governing investment 
disputes. In Section III, I explain why one of the consequences of this discretion, is that 
investment disputes are then prone to normative interactions between investment norms 
and non-investment norms. I then identify what these 'non-investment' norms are, and 
explain how investment tribunals should engage with them. Section IV specifically 
addresses the interaction between investment and trade norms, and focuses on the 







II. THE DISCRETION INVESTMENT TRIBUNALS HAVE 
REGARDING APPLICABLE LAW 
This section deals with the applicable law in investment disputes. After two, brief, 
preliminary remarks (A), I will explain the extent to which investment arbitration can be 
qualified as specific (compared to other international dispute settlement mechanisms) 
when it comes to identifying (all) the law that may apply to a given dispute (B). I will 
then focus on the principles that guide adjudicators towards the identification of these 
applicable laws (C) and explain how these principles are applied in practice (D).  
A. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Terminology 
In this chapter, I will be referring to the notion of 'applicable law' (or 'governing laws', 
which is identical) and not that of 'sources of law'. These notions are very similar, and are 
both employed to refer to the bodies of rules in a given legal regime that the adjudicator, 
of that regime, uses to settle a dispute. For the present paper, however, 'applicable law' 
seems more pertinent, for at least three reasons. Firstly, and generally, the notion of 
'applicable law' is more precise, as it relates to a given situation in an actual dispute. The 
notion of 'sources of law' is an arguably more general notion, regarding the legal regime 
as a whole. Hence, one might say that, in a dispute, the adjudicator, in order to identify 
the law to be used to settle the dispute, may have to look at different sources of law, and 
when doing so, select the law applicable to the dispute. Ultimately, attention is to be 
given to these selected laws (applicable law) and not to the broad categories (sources) 
they come from.1 Secondly, and more precisely, 'sources of law' is a term that might be 
more relevant for centralized systems.2 Investment arbitration, if we are to consider it a 
system, is certainly not centralized.3 For example, the laws governing a dispute between 
a Belgian investor and the state of Hungary, will not necessarily be the same as the laws 
governing a dispute between a Canadian investor and the United States of America, even 
though the governing laws of these two distinct disputes may, in theory, derive from the 
same specific categories of what we may call 'sources of international investment law'. 
For these reasons, the term 'sources of law' is the more general notion, which 
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encompasses the notion of 'applicable law'. The latter is more specific than the first 
because it is linked to a given dispute, and thus, seems to be more suitable for investment 
arbitration. Finally, 'applicable law' is the expression employed in most of the case-law 
emanating from arbitral decisions regarding international investment disputes and 
relevant BITs.4 
Applicable Law and Jurisdiction 
The second remark regards the axiomatic distinction between jurisdiction and applicable 
law.5 Recall that these two concepts should, in theory, be distinguished. Jurisdiction, is 
about the power, or authority, of an adjudicator to hear a claim and solve a dispute. The 
notion of 'applicable law', as explained above, refers to the body of rules that the 
adjudicator uses to settle a dispute. This distinction is well recognized in international 
law, and has, to some extent, been recognized by investment tribunals. As we saw earlier, 
the distinction between the concept of jurisdiction and that of applicable law is not 
impermeable.6 However, it remains fundamental, as it serves as the basis for a better 
understanding of the rules and techniques available to regulate both interactions and 
conflicts of jurisdiction, as well as interactions and conflict of laws. The rationale and 
rules used to apprehend jurisdictional interactions are different from the rationale and 
rules used to apprehend substantive interactions. We have examined jurisdictional 
interactions, and how investment tribunals may, and indeed should, deal with them when 
they relate to investment-trade law, in the previous chapter. Here, we turn our attention 
to substantive interactions. 
B. THE PECULIARITIES OF APPLICABLE LAWS IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION 
Investment arbitration stands as a unique mechanism for international dispute 
settlement, presenting specificities that are hardly found in other international dispute 
settlement mechanisms. As demonstrated below, these particularities have an impact on 
the identification of the law applicable to disputes. 
First, let us consider the 'hybrid' nature of investment arbitration.7 Investment dispute 
settlement combines techniques from both public and private international law. The 
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basis of the mechanism is settled in an international treaty, and bears several 
characteristics of classic public international law dispute settlement,8 particularly those 
of international state liability. 9  At the same time, several principles applied to the 
proceedings, the formulation of the award, and to its enforcement, derive from private 
international litigation, and more specifically, from international commercial 
arbitration. 10  One of the consequences of this mixed nature, is the combination of 
different methods used in order to determine the law applicable to investment disputes. 
On the one hand, the tribunal shall follow indications provided by its constitutional 
instrument or arbitration rules (e.g. the ICSID Convention), as would any other 
international tribunal; on the other hand, due to private/ad hoc features of investment 
arbitration, and the application of principles attached to it, the arbitrators must carefully 
investigate both the consent of the parties, and their choice as regards all the rules they 
have chosen to govern a potential dispute between them. This dual approach, specific to 
investment arbitration, renders the determination of applicable law more complex. 
Second, an investment dispute requires arbitral tribunals to investigate "[a] diverse 
range of legal relationships".11 An investment can hardly be considered to be the result 
of one single operation, that would require the application of only one set of legal rules. 
Investments are complex economic operations, and are the result of diverse undertakings 
(the acquisition of property, the conclusion of a contract, the intervention in public 
regulatory frameworks, the delivery of concession licenses, the conclusion of financial 
transactions, etc.) regulated by separate legal provisions (property law, contract law, 
public law, etc.).12 In examining an investment claim, arbitrators must take numerous, 
and not necessarily connected, legal instruments into consideration. Furthermore, whilst 
not all of these instruments may be considered as 'laws governing the dispute', tribunals 
                                                 
8 See e.g., E. De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law: Procedural Aspects and 
Implications (2014). 
9 See, C. Leben 'La responsabilité internationale de l'État sur le fondement des traités de promotion et de 
protection des investissements' (2004) 50 AFDI 683, 694-97.  
10 The commercial nature of investment arbitration has been contested by several authors who argue that, 
given the principal objective of investor-State arbitration –the judicial examination of the validity of acts 
passed by government authorities– the proper paradigm to envisage this mechanism should be public law. 
See e.g., G. Van Harten & M. Loughling 'Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law' (2006) 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 121. For a general discussion about the different concepts 
that have been proposed to rationalize investment arbitration, see A. Roberts 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors 
and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System' (2013) 107 Am. J. Int'l L. 45. 
11 This expression is used by Douglas to introduce his chapter on 'Applicable Laws' in his work on "The 
International Law of Investment Claims". Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009) 40. 
Douglas' approach is further discussed at the end of the present section. 
12 This assertion has been validated by many tribunals, most notably when asserting whether the doctrine 
of the general unity of investment operation has to be applied. See e.g., Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. and Others 
(Case formerly known as Giordano Alpi and Others) v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 Feb. 2013)(heireinafter 'Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina') ¶428 
("The doctrine of the 'general unity of an investment operation' is well-established in international 
investment law […] Hence, when a tribunal is in presence of a complex operation, it is required to look at 
the economic substance of the operation in question in a holistic manner"). 




have to assess the extent of the role these instruments ought to play, if any, in the 
settlement of the dispute. The assessment operation distinguishes investor-State 
arbitration from other international dispute settlement mechanisms. 
In addition to these two specificities, it can be noted that the rules followed by a tribunal 
to determine the applicable law to an investment dispute are generally formulated in a 
rather vague and broad manner. Investment tribunals enjoy considerable latitude 
regarding the laws they may or may not apply, arguably broader than that enjoyed by 
other international dispute settlement bodies.  
It is, for instance, broader than the latitude enjoyed by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The laws governing 
the disputes brought before these two dispute settlement bodies are clearly delimited in 
their respective constitutional instruments, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea ('UNCLOS') for the ITLOS, and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.13 Rules applicable to these adjudicators are easily identifiable in advance, 
and limited to specific texts and normative instruments.14 
Similarly, in WTO dispute settlement, the pool of norms to be applied by the panels or 
the Appellate Body ('AB') seems to be strictly limited, even though the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding ('DSU') does not include an applicable law clause per se.15 
Pursuant to Article 1.1 of the WTO-DSU, the instruments (covered agreements) to be 
applied by a panel or the AB are the ones listed in Appendix 1.16 The list is to be read in 
light of Articles 3.2 and 23 of the DSU. These provisions do not prevent WTO judges 
from applying other sources of international law.17 Yet, they allow for the identification 
                                                 
13 The applicable law rules for disputes submitted before the ITLOS are included in Article 23 of the 
ITLOS Statute, and Articles 288 and 293 of the UNCLOS. The applicable law rules for disputes submitted 
before the International Criminal Court are included in Article 21 of the Rome Statute.  
14 See M. Forteau, 'The Diversity of Applicable Law before International Tribunals as a Source of Forum 
Shopping and Fragmentation of International Law: An Assessment' in R. Wolfrum & I. Gätzschmann 
(eds.), International Dispute Settlement: Room for Innovations? (2013) 417.  
15 L. Bartels, 'Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in the WTO' (2014), Cambridge Legal Studies Research 
Working Paper N.59/2014, 16. 
16 The text of this Article reads (emphasis added):  
"Article 1 - Coverage and Application 
1. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding 
(referred to in this Understanding as the "covered agreements")." 
The Appendix 1 mentions the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, and four Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Agreement on Trade in Civil 
Aircraft, Agreement on Government Procurement, International Dairy Agreement, and International 
Bovine Meat Agreement). 
17 See, Mavroidis (supra n.2). See also, L. Bartels 'Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings' 
(2001) 35 J. World Trade 419; I. Van Damme, 'Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation' in D. 





of the rules applicable to a dispute brought before a panel and the AB, and for the 
identification of the rules that, a priori, may not be applied by said organs. Pursuant to 
these rules, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (WTO-DSB) does not have the authority 
to assert whether the comportment of a State is valid under an international agreement 
which is not mentioned in Appendix 1, or under customary international law. Article 3.2 
simply requires the WTO judge to evaluate the conduct of a contracting party to the 
organization, based on the laws of the organization; laws that must be interpreted in 
accordance with customary international law. Thus, it might be argued that laws 
deriving from customary international law, or laws which are considered general 
principles of international law, are not, strictly speaking, laws applicable to a dispute 
brought before the WTO-DSB; they are simply interpretative elements. By the same 
token, domestic law is not mentioned in the above-mentioned provisions. WTO panels, 
when reviewing a given State measure, might find it necessary (or might be requested by 
a party) to look at the content of the municipal law of the State in question. It cannot, 
however, be argued that domestic law belongs to the norms 'governing' a WTO dispute. 
Domestic law will be referred to as a factual or interpretative element,18 but not a purely 
legal one. 
The study of the rules that must be used by tribunals to determine laws applicable to a 
dispute shows that it is slightly different in investment dispute settlement. Investment 
tribunals enjoy much latitude regarding the law applicable to the dispute they ought to 
settle. 
C. THE RULES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAWS  
1. The Principle: The Law(s) Chosen by the Parties  
In international arbitration, it is commonly accepted that the parties to a given dispute 
may choose the law applicable to the dispute.19 This affirmation derives from the cardinal 
principle of party autonomy in international arbitration.20 The principle that arbitrators 
have to apply the law chosen by the parties, a principle which plays a 'fundamental' role 
in international commercial arbitration, is also well recognized in investment arbitration, 
despite the difference in nature between these two mechanisms. 
ICSID Article 42(1), which reads, "[t]he Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance 
with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties", is a direct manifestation of this 
principle. The other arbitration instruments that may be used for investor-State 
arbitration also express this general principle. For example, pursuant to Article 35(1) of 
the UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of 
                                                 
18 Bartels (supra n.2) 511, referring to India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (19 Dec. 1997) ¶ 65. 
19 E. Gaillard & J. Savage (eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (1999), 
787-90.  
20 Ibid. 




law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute."21 The SCC 
2010 Arbitration Rules are slightly more exhaustive, with Article 22(1) providing that 
"[t]he arbitration tribunal shall decide the merits of the dispute on the basis of the law(s) 
or rules of law agreed upon by the parties." 
In light of these different provisions, the first step to be taken when determining what is 
the applicable law to an investment dispute, is to examine the agreement between the 
parties. In the event of an investment treaty claim, the fact that there is no direct and 
formal agreement between the investor and the host-State is of little importance. The 
consent of both the investor and the State, to the arbitration mechanism as a whole, 
including the law applicable to it, is deemed to be given when the procedure is initiated.22 
The host-State chooses the applicable law to a potential dispute when entering into the 
investment treaty, and the investor accepts this choice when starting the proceedings. 
This method has been recognized in Goetz v. Burundi,23 and is today well established.24 
The first step that needs to be taken is to look at the international investment agreement 
(IIA) upon which the claim is introduced. 
2. The Determination of Applicable Law Following 'Choice of 
Law' Clauses Contained in IIAs 
A first general observation can be drawn from a broad overview of different types of IIAs 
(including multilateral agreements, such as the ECT) and of several bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) models from major capital exporting countries. Not all IIAs designate the 
laws applicable to a potential investment dispute. In fact, it has been established that 
                                                 
21 The wording is the same as that of Article 33(1) of the former version. A virtually identical language is 
used in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 2012 Arbitration rules, and PCA Optional Rules for 
arbitrating disputes between two parties, of which only one is a State. 
22 Without entering into the details of a widely discussed issue, it is usually accepted that the State gives 
its consent to arbitration by formulating an offer to arbitrate when concluding the IIA (or when passing a 
law on foreign investment including an arbitration provision), and the investor accepts this offer (and 
therefore consents as well to arbitration) when issuing its notice of intent or request for arbitration. See 
e.g., E. Gaillard 'L’arbitrage sur le fondement des traités de protection des investissements' (2003) Rev. Arb. 
853, 858-59. 
23 Antoine Antoine Goetz et consorts v. République du Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3 (Award, 19 Feb. 
1999) ¶94, where the tribunal stated that: "Sans doute la détermination du droit applicable n’est-elle pas, à 
proprement parler, faite par les parties au présent arbitrage (Burundi et investisseurs requérants), mais par 
les parties à la Convention d’investissement (Burundi et Belgique). Comme cela a été le cas pour le 
consentement des parties, le Tribunal estime cependant que la République du Burundi s’est prononcée en 
faveur du droit applicable tel qu’il est déterminé dans la disposition précitée de la Convention belgo-
burundaise d’investissement en devenant partie à cette Convention et que les investisseurs requérants ont 
effectué un choix similaire en déposant leur requête d’arbitrage sur la base de ladite Convention." 
24  Y. Banifatemi, 'The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration' in K. Yannaca-Small (ed.), 
Abitration under International Investment Agreements, A Guide to the Key Issues (2010) 191, 195 citing Gaillard 





only a minority of IIAs include a choice of law clause.25 A recent study found that, out of 
1660 IIAs used as a sample, only 32% explicitly address the question of applicable law.26  
A closer look at these IIAs and BIT models allows for a second, and more important, 
observation. Even when treaties do address the issue of applicable law, the language used 
is relatively broad, and thus provides the arbitral tribunal with latitude in the 
determination of applicable law. Indeed, as the following developments demonstrate, 
choice-of-law provisions do not generally designate specific rules, but rather, refer to 
'body of rules' or 'principles'. Further, these designated 'bodies of law' often need to be 
combined with other 'bodies of law', as most of the clauses on applicable law are not 
restricted to only one body or sole type of rule. Because detailed guidelines relating to 
the interactions between these different sources are hardly ever given, arbitral tribunals 
have the responsibility to combine the different rules or set of rules. 
When IIAs do contain choice-of-law provisions, they usually refer to several sources, and 
tribunals might face the scenario where multiple rules will jointly apply. The most 
common situation is when the law from a host-State has to be combined with 
international law. 
This is, for instance, the case for the BIT between the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands (hereinafter CZ-NL BIT) used in the CME dispute,27 where the arbitrators 
extensively discussed the question of the interaction between the two bodies of law.28 
Article 8(6) of this treaty reads:  
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide on the basis of the law, taking into account in 
particular though not exclusively: 
(1) the law in force of the Contracting Party concerned; 
(2) the provisions of this Agreement, and other relevant Agreements between the 
Contracting Parties; 
(3) the provisions of special agreements relating to the investment; 
(4) the general principles of international law."29 
A similar combination lies in the France-Argentina BIT, which gave rise to six ICSID 
disputes.30 The text of article 8(4) of the that BIT provides as follows:  
                                                 
25 See e.g., C.F. Dugan et al., Investor-State Arbitration (2008) 202. 
26 J. Pohl, K. Mashigo, A. Nohen "Dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements: 
A large sample survey", OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/2, 29. 
27 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 September 2001). 
28 Sacerdoti, who was a party appointed expert in the dispute, uses this article as the basis of a study on 
applicable law in investment arbitration. See G. Sacerdoti 'Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and 
UNCITRAL Rules: Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review of Awards' (2004) 19 ICSID Rev. 1.  
29  The electronic version of this agreement is available on the UNCTAD International Investment 
Agreements Navigator database at <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> (last consulted 1 Aug. 
2015). 
30 Table on file with the author.  




"The ruling of the arbitral body shall be based on the provisions of this 
Agreement, the legislation of the Contracting Party which is a party to the dispute, 
including rules governing conflict of laws, the terms of any private agreements 
concluded on the subject of the investment, and the relevant principles of 
international law." 
The formulation in these examples show that the wording used to designate the law is 
not always the same, and may grant tribunals discretion regarding the use of the 
designated law(s). A tribunal acting upon the CZ-NL BIT will have to render its decision 
'on the basis of the law', and it will have to 'take into account' the different sources listed 
in Article 8.6 of that treaty; whereas a tribunal acting upon the France-Argentina BIT 
will have its ruling 'based on' the sources listed in Article 8.4 mentioned above. 
Arguably, the wording of these clauses, for instance 'the tribunal shall apply' or 'the 
dispute shall be governed by', gives the tribunal less flexibility regarding the use of the 
norms referred to.31 
These examples show that governing law clauses may refer to conflict of laws rules. This 
reference, which is not un-common, widens the scope of applicable laws to a dispute. 
Indeed, the application of conflict of law rules might result in referring to another system 
of law, which is not necessarily mentioned in the applicable law clause of the IIA. The 
example that is usually given is the law of the investor's home State,32 although, at least 
in theory, even the domestic legal system of a third state, non-party to the dispute, could 
be somehow elected though this mechanism.33  
Two last remarks can be made on the examples provided above. The CZ-NL treaty, and 
the France-Argentina treaties, refer to 'principles of international law'. The consequence 
is, again, a multiplication of the sources potentially applicable by investment tribunals 
acting upon these types of formulated treaties. Therefore, not only may we find specific 
international rules included within the toolbox at the disposal of the tribunal (binding for 
the two States parties to the IIA), but –again, at least in theory– 'principles of 
international law' regardless of their scope and subject. While the France-Argentina BIT 
shows that a tribunal can be 'limited' to 'relevant' (whatever that may mean) principles of 
international law, the CZ-NL BIT shows on the other hand that, 'general principles of 
international law' can be used by an arbitral tribunal, in addition to 'relevant Agreements 
between the Parties', the latter source being international treaties concluded between the 
two parties to the BIT. Second, none of the two clauses give any indication to the 
tribunal regarding the combination of all the designated and potentially applicable laws, 
and, as will be demonstrated below, this may be a source of further complication.  
                                                 
31 See, Sacerdoti (supra n.28) 18-19.  
32  M. Audit, 'Le Droit Applicable en Matière d'Arbitrage Fondé sur un Traité de Protection des 
Investissements' in J.-S. Bergé et al. (eds.), La fragmentation du droit applicable aux relations internationales : 
Regards croisés d'internationalistes privatistes et publicistes (2001) 65.  





Certainly, these two examples should not be seen as a representation of the majority of 
clauses. Some treaties can be more specific, with more precise indications regarding the 
interaction of different applicable laws, 34  or with mechanisms to limit or frame the 
interpretation of these laws. The US model is pertinent in this respect.35 The governing 
law clause in that model distinguishes situations between contract and treaty claims, 
provides for different mechanisms depending on said situations, and gives the parties to 
the treaty the possibility to submit declarations of interpretation.36 Nonetheless, today 
such detailed information remains an exception rather than the rule. 
In fact, the majority of IIAs do not include choice-of-law provisions. For instance, the 
BIT models of France (2006), UK (2005) and Germany (2005) are silent on the issue. 
Applicable law clauses are also absent from the text of the BITs which have been used 
the most for initiating disputes before an international investment tribunal, namely the 
US-Argentina BIT, 37 or the US-Ecuador BIT, which has been used as the basis for 
                                                 
34 M. Hirsch 'Sources of International Investment Law ' (2011) Paper given in the Conference held by The 
International Law Association Study Group - International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem on 'The Role of Soft Law Instruments in International Invesment Law' available on the author's 
SSRN page at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1892564>, at 5.  
35 The article reads:  
"1. Subject to paragraph 3, when a claim is submitted under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A) or Article 24(1)(b)(i)(A), 
the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of 
international law. 
2. Subject to paragraph 3 and the other terms of this Section, when a claim is submitted under Article 
24(1)(a)(i)(B) or (C), or Article 24(1)(b)(i)(B) or (C), the tribunal shall apply: 
(a) the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment authorization or investment agreement, or as the 
disputing parties may otherwise agree; or 
(b) if the rules of law have not been specified or otherwise agreed: 
(i) the law of the respondent, including its rules on the conflict of laws; and 
(ii) such rules of international law as may be applicable." 
The US BIT model is available online on the US DoS website at <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/> 
(last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
36 The governing law clauses in the US Model reads as follows: 
"Article 27 - Governing Law  
1. Subject to Paragraphs 2 and 3, when a claim is submitted under Article 20 (Claim by an Investor of a 
Party), the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement, any other 
applicable agreements between the Parties, any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the Parties, and, where applicable, any relevant domestic law of the disputing Party. 
2. Interpretation of any provision of this Agreement that is in issue in a dispute. The Parties shall submit 
in writing any joint decision declaring their interpretation to the tribunal within 60 days of the delivery of 
the request. Without prejudice to Paragraph 3, if the Parties fail to issue such a decision within 60 days, 
any interpretation submitted by a Party shall be forwarded to the disputing parties and the tribunal, which 
shall decide the issue on its own account. 
3. A joint decision of the Parties, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Agreement shall be 
binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint 
decision." 
37  See UNCTAD IIA Issue Note, March 2013, p.4, available at 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf> (last consulted 1 Aug. 2015). 
'The two IIAs that are most often used, are multilateral agreements: the NAFTA (more than 50 cases) and 
the ECT (more than 30 cases). The US-Argentina BIT comes next (about 20 cases).  




several of the most important recent cases. In these cases, the tribunals had to turn to 
their constitutional instruments or arbitration rules for guidance. As the next 
development demonstrates, these instruments provide tribunals with flexibility as well.  
3. The Applicable Law in Case of an Absence of Choice  
When the IIA does not contain a choice-of-law provision, and the parties have not 
expressly specified which law shall apply to their dispute, the Tribunal will either try to 
identify if the parties have implicitly agreed on governing laws,38 or –more likely– try to 
use the indications given by the instrument upon which the tribunal has been constituted 
(e.g. the ICSID Convention) or by its arbitration rules (e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, SCC Arbitration Rules).  
In this respect, Article 42.1 of the ICSID Convention establishes, in its second sentence, 
that: 
"In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) 
and such rules of international law as may be applicable." 
This formulation is very similar to the ones that may be directly included in IIAs, and 
leads to the same remarks regarding the relatively broad margin of appreciation left to 
the tribunal, as well as the necessity to combine the different sources of laws (i.e. 
domestic and international laws). One slight distinction can, however, be made. Indeed, 
one could argue that contrary to certain BIT provisions mentioned earlier, Article 42(1) 
actually provides for a limit relating to the application of international law. Nonetheless, 
recent scholarship tends to argue that the last part of the sentence ("such rules of 
international as may be applicable") is not to be interpreted as the conditional application 
of international law, but rather as clarification regarding the type of international law 
rules that the arbitrators may look at.39 Pursuant to Article 42(1), international law and 
domestic law are both applicable in investment disputes, and they both have to be 
coordinated by arbitrators.  
UNCITRAL and SCC Arbitration Rules give even more responsibility and flexibility to 
arbitral tribunals as regards the selection of applicable laws in the absence of choice. In 
both texts, the only given indication is that the law applied by the tribunal has to be 
'appropriate'.40 
                                                 
38 In several disputes, tribunals have indeed sought to identify the implicit choice of the parties by looking 
at the language of the treaty or at the possible agreements concluded between the parties. See Schreuer et 
al. (supra n.33) 557-58.  
39 Ibid. 617, citing LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 Oct. 2006) ¶88.  
40 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 35.1 states that the law applicable to the dispute is the law 
designated by the parties. Article 35.1 continues as follows "Failing such designation by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appropriate". (Emphasis added).  
SCC Article 22(1) explains that, in an absence of an agreement regarding the applicable law, "the Arbitral 





4. A Variety of Solutions 
If it can be argued that all international law dispute settlement mechanisms follow a 
contractual approach,41 it can also be argued that this approach is even more evident in 
investment dispute settlement. The choice made by the parties is primordial, as this 
choice will lead the arbitral tribunal to the identification of the norms to be applied in the 
settlement of the dispute. The more detail the choice-of-law clause contains, the less 
latitude the arbitrators will have in this determination task, and vice-versa. However, in 
practice, the few BITs that do include clauses, do not provide detailed information 
regarding the rules applicable in case of a dispute. Rather, they designate, in a broad 
manner, one or several bodies of laws.42 In the absence of choice, the tribunal will rely on 
provisions that are often not precise and give only limited indications. 
The direct consequence of this lack of thorough information is that it remains up to the 
arbitral tribunal to decide upon the laws applicable to disputes. This is a particularly 
important step in every investment dispute, and it is becoming more and more common 
for investment decisions and awards to include an entire section on applicable laws to the 
dispute. In these developments, the tribunals will explain the methodology used to 
identify all the rules that have to be used to address the questions raised by the parties.  
In case several rules apply to the dispute, the tribunals will also have to explain how 
these rules interact, especially when they derive from distinct sources and legal systems 
(e.g. international rules, domestic rules, etc.). As we will see in the next section, this has 
led to numerous solutions in practice. 
D. APPLICABLE LAW IN PRACTICE AND REMARKS 
From the presentation of applicable law mechanisms, we have seen that the clauses and 
provisions contained in IIAs, or Arbitration Rules, are limited in scope, and do not 
provide answers to all the questions regarding applicable laws in investment dispute 
settlements. Arbitrators are likely to investigate case-law to justify their reasoning in 
this regard and therefore, an analysis of the practice is necessary. The four following 
questions, which are of particular interest for our study, have been addressed in practice. 
1. The Investment Legal Regime's 'Clinical Non-Isolation' 
Firstly, it should be noted that the applicable law debate has been used by investment 
tribunals to affirm that, in general,43 investment treaties shall not be considered as 'self-
                                                 
41 Forteau (supra n.14). 
42 Douglas relies on this observation to argue that these clauses are not choice of law clauses per se. 
Douglas (supra n.11) 43. 
43 Parties to an IIA could, of course, decide otherwise and indicate in the agreement (and more specifically 
in the applicable law clause) that disputes arising from that agreement should be settled in accordance with 
its text only. To my knowledge, no IIA with such a formulation presently exists. Further, in my opinion, it 
is highly unlikely that this type of 'isolated' agreement will ever see the light of day, as States have a 
tendency to try and integrate their new IIAs more and more in the field of public international law, 
notably by using references to other international treaties (for instance, Human Rights treaties or 




contained regimes'. The famous passage of the award issued in the first treaty 
arbitration, AAPL v. Sri Lanka, is explicit in this regard:  
"[T]he Bilateral Investment Treaty is not a self contained closed legal system 
limited to provide for substantive materials rules of direct applicability, but it has 
to be envisaged within a wide juridical context in which rules from other sources 
are integrated through implied incorporations methods, or by direct reference to 
certain supplementary rules, whether of international law character or of domestic 
law nature."44 
This affirmation, which has been confirmed in several other cases, 45  highlights the 
complexity of investment litigation, and the importance of international law. Investment 
tribunals cannot rely solely on the principal norm upon which they are created, but 
rather have to look at other legal instruments as well, in order to fulfill their mission. In 
AAPL, the tribunal reckoned that the parties to the disputes reached an agreement to 
consider the provisions of the Sri Lanka /U.K. BIT as being the primary source of the 
applicable legal rules. Nonetheless, the tribunal accepted that it should not disregard 
other international rules of international law.46  
The AAPL discussion on applicable laws is also interesting for how it stresses the 
impossibility for the tribunal to totally exclude the application of domestic law. Although 
in that particular case, this was reinforced by the fact that the parties agreed, at least 
implicitly, to admit to admit supplementary recourse to Sri Lankan domestic law, it shall 
be clear that investment arbitral tribunals are hardly oblivious to the domestic law.47 
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, and as further demonstrated in the 
previous developments, investment law cannot be perceived as isolated from other legal 
regimes, whether international or domestic. In a typical investment dispute, the tribunal 
will have to refer to investment norms and other norms (international, domestic, etc.). 
Table No.1 below identifies all the different 'laws' which can be considered as 'applicable' 
by investor tribunals depending on the wording of the agreement used in the dispute. 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
environmental treaties, etc.). For a more exhaustive discussion on the filiation between international 
investment law and public international law, see generally De Brabandere (supra n.8). 
44 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 
June 1990)(hereinafter 'AAPL v. Sri Lanka')¶21. 
45 ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/2, Award (18 May 2010)¶121; Bosh International, Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise 
v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award (25 Oct. 2012) ¶113; El Paso Energy International Company 
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Award, 31 Oct. 2011)(hereinafter 'El Paso v. 
Argentina')¶131. 
46 This idea was later confirmed by an ICSID ad hoc Committee. See, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile 
S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment (21 Mar. 2007) ¶61 ("the 
Tribunal had to apply international law as a whole to the claim, and not the provisions of the BIT in 
isolation"). 
47 The tribunal noted that the "submission of the parties clearly demonstrate[d] that domestic law had a 
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2. Mandatory Rules, Limits to Consent, and the Decisive Role of 
Arbitral Tribunals in Identifying the Applicable Laws to a Dispute 
The third question tribunals have, in the absence of express legal provisions, relates to 
the limit of the parties' consent. It has been explained that when the parties have chosen 
a law, "the arbitrators have a duty to apply such law and nothing but such law."48 This 
statement is not entirely correct. Indeed, it is accepted that the parties' consent can be 
limited at least on one occasion, that is, when the law chosen by the parties is contrary to 
international public policy.49 As Schreuer et al. explained,  
"The matter is different with regard to certain basic international tenets that may 
be described as international public policy. These principles would include but not 
be restricted to peremptory rules of international law. Examples are the 
prohibition of slavery, piracy, drug trade, terrorism and genocide, the protection of 
basic principles of human rights, the prohibition to prepare and wage an aggressive 
war or the use of force contrary to Art. 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 
Provisions that would otherwise be applicable, whether contained in an investment 
agreement or adopted by reference, which violate these basic principles, would 
have to be disregarded by an ICSID tribunal."50 
In order to identify these norms, the arbitrators would have to rely on values that are 
widely recognized by the international community. In this regard, scholars have 
                                                 
48 Banifatemi (supra n.24) 193. 
49 See, generally, A.K. Bjorklund 'Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration' (2008) 18 Am. Rev. 
of Int'l Arb. 175. 
50 Schreuer et al. (supra n.33) 566. 




explained that arbitrators should not rely on their conception of 'public policy', nor the 
one accepted as so in a given legal order. 51 Nevertheless, it would be impossible to 
identify public principles that have been recognized in all systems of law.52 Therefore, 
arbitrators have to find a challenging equilibrium. Still, international public policy is not 
fantasy. Investment tribunals and practitioners have, from time to time, referred to it. 
For instance, in Inceysa v. El Salvador, the tribunal, while referring to a condition of 
legality contained in the BIT,53 reasoned as follows:  
"International public policy consists of a series of fundamental principles that 
constitute the very essence of the State, and its essential function is to preserve the 
values of the international legal system against actions contrary to it […]. 
This Tribunal considers that assuming competence to resolve the dispute brought 
before it would mean recognizing for the investor rights established in the BIT for 
investments made in accordance with the law of the host country. It is not possible 
to recognize the existence of rights arising from illegal acts, because it would 
violate the respect for the law which, as already indicated, is a principle of 
international public policy."54 
The tribunal therefore refused to grant the investor's claim. Although the tribunal did 
not exclude or limit the effect of a rule chosen by the parties and applied international 
public policy instead, this case remains interesting, as it shows that investment treaty 
tribunals may rely on this conception to modulate the direction given by the parties 
regarding the applicable law. Cremades, one of the most selected arbitrators in 
investment disputes, in a dissenting opinion issued in Fraport v. Philippines, noted that:  
"In cases of gross illegality there may also be other reasons for the inadmissibility 
of a claim. In some cases, for example, the principles of good faith and public policy 
may bar a claim. Both good faith and international public policy were important in 
Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador."55 
Hence, even if it is true that in practice arbitrators are generally reluctant to refer to 
international public policy, especially because it is difficult to define the notion and 
identify with precision its content, it may nevertheless have a 'decisive influence' on the 
tribunal's reasoning regarding the determination of applicable law in a given investment 
claim.56  
                                                 
51 Gaillard & Savage (eds.) (supra n.19) 863. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Under this condition, only an investment has to be made "in accordance" with the law host-State can 
receive the protection of the BIT. For a general discussion on such conditions, see S.W. Schill 'Illegal 
Investments in Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2012) 11 L. & Practice Int'l Courts and Trib. 281.  
54  Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 (Award, 2 Aug. 
2006)(hereinafter 'Inceysa v. Savador)¶¶245-48.  
55  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Dissenting Opinion of Bernardo M. Cremades (16 Aug. 2007)¶40.  





The limit of parties' consent highlights the decisive role of investment tribunals in 
identifying the laws applicable to a dispute. As we will see below, this role is particularly 
important. 
III. INVESTMENTS TRIBUNALS AND NON-INVESTMENT 
OBLIGATIONS  
Mechanisms for the determination of applicable laws in investment arbitration allow 
tribunals to refer to rules that do not belong to the international investment legal 
regime. The objective of this section is to shed light on this aspect. The following 
developments therefore aim to elucidate why, and how, investment tribunals use, apply, 
or refer to norms that do not belong to the investment legal regime. I aim to remain 
upwind of the discussion relating to the potential conflicts between investment law and 
other branches of law, which is discussed in the next section. Here, the objective is to 
explain which rules are applied. After a brief explanation of what shall be called 'non-
investment-law', I will draw up an inventory of non-investment norms that investment 
tribunals can use and apply following the choice of laws rules identified in the previous 
section, and analyze how these norms are used in investment arbitration. 
A. INVESTMENT LAW AND NON-INVESTMENT LAW 
It is interesting to note that, whilst many have discussed conflicts between investment 
norms and non-investment norms, the concept of 'non-investment norms' has not been 
properly defined.57 In the next two developments, we will attempt to identify what is 
investment law, and what is non-investment law.  
1. Investment Law: the IIAs 
The easiest way to define what 'non-investment law' means, is to proceed a contrario and 
to firstly define investment law. Identifying the sources of international obligations, 
regarding the protection of investments that are binding for the State, might be of some 
help in this regard. 
Hirsch, has undertaken extensive work on this topic.58 In his piece entitled "sources of 
law in international investment law",59 he uses as a point of departure Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute, and identifies six categories of normative and quasi-normative instruments: 
(i) investment treaties, (ii) customary international law, (iii) general principles of law, (iv) 
                                                 
57 See e.g., A. Reinisch, '"Investment and…" - The Broader Picture of Investment Law' in A. Reinisch & C. 
Knahr (eds.), International Investment Law in Context (2008) 201.  
58  Hirsch (supra n.34). See also, M. Hirsch, 'Interactions Between Investment and Non-Investment 
Obligations' in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino & C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Hanbook of International Investment 
Law (2008) 1008; M. Hirsch, 'Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment 
Tribunals' Perspective' in T. Broude & Y. Shany (eds.), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International 
Law (2008) 323. 
59 Hirsch (supra n.34).  




judicial decisions, (v) scholarly writings, and finally (vi) soft-law. Although it is admitted 
that all of these 'sources' may "play an important role in numerous important cases",60 
one must recognize that this is not sufficient to be qualified as investment law. 
Even Hirsch agrees that the investment treaty, which is to say, the norm that grounds 
the cause of action of an investment dispute, is 'the centerpiece' of the investment legal 
regime.61 
Accordingly, the principal 'source' of international investment law is to be found in the 
framework of approximately 3000 IIAs. Let alone the situations where a law of the host-
State or a specific agreement between the host-State and the investor is used as the basis 
for arbitration, which are outside the scope of the present study, investment tribunals are 
created on the basis of the investment treaty. As mentioned earlier, investment 
arbitration is a specialized dispute-settlement mechanism, focusing on the enforcement of 
obligations on a State towards the investor of another State. These obligations are found 
in treaties entered into between the former and the latter. 
Investment treaties represent the principal source of investment law. But investment 
treaties are not self-explanatory, and have to be interpreted. The result of the 
interpretation of these obligations by investment tribunals, may therefore be associated 
to this principal source. Although the binding-nature of arbitral precedent is still debated 
in practice, 62  and in the literature, 63  it seems reasonable to consider investment 
arbitration case-law as a secondary source of investment law, as it will very often –if not 
systematically– be used by investment tribunals to determine the applicability of the 
obligations contained in IIAs, which is to say, investment law obligations.64 
Investment tribunals have significantly used customary international law. It is difficult 
to assert that it should not be considered as a direct source of international investment 
law. Custom is a source of international law in general, and some customary rules relate 
to the protection of foreign property, which is, in essence, a core principle of investment 
                                                 
60 Ibid, 8.  
61 Ibid, 3.  
62 See e.g., AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(26 Apr. 2005) ¶23 (references omitted, emphasis added), where the tribunal affirmed, in a very clear way 
that:  
"The provisions of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention together with fundamental principles of public 
international law dictate, among others, that the Tribunal respects: 
[…] the rule according to which each decision or award delivered by an ICSID Tribunal is only binding 
on the parties to the dispute settled by this decision or award. There is so far no rule of precedent in general 
international law; nor is there any within the specific ICSID system for the settlement of disputes between one State 
party to the Convention and the National of another State Party. This was in particular illustrated by diverging 
positions respectively taken by two ICSID tribunals on issues dealing with the interpretation of arguably 
similar language in two different BITs."  
63 See e.g., G. Kaufmann-Kohler 'Arbitral Precedent Dream, Necessity or Excuse?' (2007) 23 Arb. Int'l 357. 
64 Hirsch (supra n.34); see also J.P. Commission 'Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation 





law. 65  Those specific customary rules may be considered as a secondary source of 
investment obligations.  
These three types of norms –(i) IIAs, (ii) investment jurisprudence and (iii) customary 
international rules relating to investment protection– represent, in my opinion, what 
should be called international investment law. These are the three principal sources of 
investment law.  
2. Non-investment Law: The Rest 
All of the other legal instruments that may be used in investment arbitration are to be 
categorized as non-investment norms. But, and this is fundamental, this does not mean 
that obligations based on rules belonging to this second category cannot be applied by 
investment tribunals. On the contrary, as explained above, mechanisms of applicable law 
in investment dispute settlement allow the application of non-investment law in 
investment disputes. Hence, these mechanisms can be considered as 'gateways' for the 
use of non-investment law in investment disputes.66  
B. IDENTIFICATION OF NON-INVESTMENT OBLIGATIONS APPLICABLE IN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES  
Non-investment laws applied to investment disputes derive from different sources of law. 
These sources can be divided into two broad categories: municipal law and international 
law.  
1. Municipal Law 
A complete explanation of the relevance of municipal law in investment treaty 
arbitration is beyond the scope of this chapter. 67  Nevertheless, it is worth briefly 
explaining which municipal laws may be used by an investment tribunal and why this 
matters. In that respect, the following observations can be made. 
Firstly, one may ask which State's domestic law the arbitrators may apply? As already 
noted, investment tribunals are likely to apply the domestic law of the host-State,68 and 
                                                 
65 C. McLachlan, L. Shore & M. Weiniger (eds.), International Investment Arbitration : Substantive Principles 
(2007) 16-17. 
66 V. Prislan, 'Non-Investment Obligations in Investment Treaty Arbitration - Towards a Greater Role for 
States' in F. Baetens (ed.), Investment Law Within International Law: An Integrationist Perspective (2013) 450.  
67 This question has been deeply analyzed by M. Sasson; see, M. Sasson, Substantive Law in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship Between International and Municipal Law (2010).  
68 For instance, when addressing questions regarding the existence of property rights that are considered 
as constituting the investment. By a way of example, in EnCana v. Ecuador, the arbitral tribunal considered 
that "[f]or there to have been an expropriation of an investment or return (in a situation involving legal 
rights or claims as distinct from the seizure of physical assets) the rights affected must exist under the law 
which creates them, in this case, the law of Ecuador." EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case 
No. UN 3481, Award, 3 February 2006, para. 184.  




to some extent the law of the State which the investor is a national of.69 In rare instances, 
investment tribunals can also apply the municipal law of a third-state.70 
Secondly, even if investment tribunals can apply both international and domestic law, 
little indication is given regarding the relationship between these two bodies of rules. 
Certainly, this interaction can be organized in the IIA, but as previously explained, 
applicable law clauses in IIAs are, usually, broadly drafted, and do not provide for 
guidelines on how different applicable laws should interact. The ICSID Convention, or 
the Arbitration Rules that the tribunals could use in absence of an applicable law clause, 
are not informative in this regard either. Facing this lack of indication, tribunals have 
developed different approaches to address the problem. In Goetz v. Burundi, a 1999 
dispute, arbitrators already attempted to summarize what these approaches were. 
"In the previous case-law the problem of the links between the various applicable 
sources of international law is posed in the context of the second sentence of 
Article 42, first paragraph, of the ICSID Convention, and it has received divergent 
responses, abundantly commented on in academic writings: hierarchical 
relationships according to some, domestic law applying first of all but being 
overborne where it contradicts international law; according to others, relationships 
based on subsidiarity, with international law being called upon only to fill lacunae 
or to settle uncertainties in national law; according to others again, complementary 
relationships, with domestic law and international each having its own sphere of 
application."71 
Today, commentators seem to agree that different laws, rules, or bodies of rules 
(domestic or international), can be autonomously, and simultaneously, applied by 
tribunals, depending on the issues in the dispute. 72  Tribunals have the authority to 
determine, or 'characterize', what the issues at stake in a dispute are, and then apply, on a 
distributive basis, the specific rule applicable to the issue.73 For instance, when analyzing 
an issue regarding the existence of an investment, the tribunal should refer to domestic 
law; an issue regarding liability of the host-State should be governed by treaty 'as 
supplemented by general international law', etc. This approach, based on a method 
inspired by private international law, has been endorsed by several tribunals and it seems 
to be the predominant approach in contemporary practice. 
                                                 
69 For instance, when there is a need to address a question regarding the nationality of the investment. See 
e.g., The Flegenheimer Case, Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, Decision No. 182 of 20 September 
1958, XIV R.I.A.A. 327, ¶24; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and 
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(24 September 2008)(hereinafter 'Micula v. Romania')¶86. 
70 As noted by Schreuer, such reference would be possible in cases involving loan contracts, which might 
refer to the law of the country that grants the loan or the law of a third country which has an important 
financial centre. Schreuer et al. (supra n.33) 559. 
71 Goetz v. Burundi (supra n.23) ¶97.  






Thirdly, one might ask, to what extent may municipal law be applied in investment 
arbitration? Today, it seems accepted that municipal law might be applied to resolve 
questions relating both to jurisdiction (existence and legality of the investment), and to 
the merits of a case (attribution and liability). More specifically, municipal law has been 
found to be relevant when addressing questions regarding (i) the nationality of the 
investor, (ii) the existence and the legality of the investment, (iii) the extent to which 
shareholders may have standing to bring an investment claim, (iv) the interpretation of 
contractual rights encompassed in the investment claims and (v) the appreciation of a 
denial of justice allegation. 74  Looking at these cases, it seems nearly impossible to 
identify a branch of domestic law that has not been referred to by arbitrators. The law of 
nationality, investment and establishment law, property law, public law, contract law, 
competition law, intellectual property law, and procedural law, all belong to the non-
exhaustive list of domestic rules that may be applied by investment tribunals.  
2. Public International Law  
Investment tribunals may be requested to refer to international law in order to solve an 
investment claim, pursuant to the directions given in the IIA or in their constitutional 
instrument or arbitration rules. These mechanisms do not, however, specify which 
'international law' rules the tribunal may refer to. Practice has shown that a wide range 
of instruments have been used.  
In fact, tribunals have used norms belonging to all of the five traditional categories of 
international sources of law: (i) treaties, (ii) custom, (iii) general principles, (iv) case-law, 
and (v) soft-law.  
International Treaties 
The first category includes international treaties. Of course, investment tribunals rely on 
investment treaties. But they also rely on non-investment treaties. The list of 
international treaties and conventions referred to by investment tribunals is extremely 
long. A broad research on all existing decisions awards issued since the landmark 
decision in AAPL, shows that tribunals have used just over 100 non-IIA international 
instruments.75 At the top of this list we find the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), which is used in the majority of investment disputes.76 The list also 
includes many other multilateral agreements, such as the United Nations Charter,77other 
                                                 
74 H.E. Kjos, Applicable law in Investor-State Arbitration - The Interplay Between National and International 
Law (2013) 258-68. 
75 Table on file with the author. The dates correspond to the same one used for the research presented in 
Chapter 4. 
76 J.R. Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (2012) 4-8; M. Waibel, 'International 
Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation'' in R. Hofmann & C.J. Tams (eds.), International Investment Law 
and General International Law: From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? (2011) 29, 29-30.  
77 See e.g., Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 Dec. 
2014) ¶¶559-60, where the tribunal relied on Article 2 of the UN Charter to support its finding that the 




trade multilateral agreements,78 regional agreements, such as the European Convention 
of Human Rights or the North American Agreement on Environmental Protection, and 
bilateral agreements (Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Double 
Taxation Agreement, etc.). 79  As these brief examples show, reference to 'other' 
international norms, that investor-State tribunals may use, is not a term limited to refer 
to one branch of international law, but rather encompasses various domains. 
The reason why arbitral tribunals may refer to these non-investment-related agreements 
is discussed below. What can be said at this stage, however, is that the examples 
mentioned above and the list of international agreements referred to by investment 
tribunals as well as the high number of references to this body of rules show the 
'appetite' of the tribunals for international law rules deriving from conventional law.  
Customary International Law 
The second category is customary international law. As already mentioned, it is possible 
to identify rules, or principles, of customary international law that actually belong to 
what one might call international investment law. In addition to these principles, 
investment tribunals have relied on other general rules of customary international law to 
fill lacunas in IIAs.80  For instance, the principles of the State responsibility have been 
used in a very large number of disputes.81 In Enron v. Argentina, where the tribunal 
encountered arguments regarding 'necessity', the arbitrators examined the relevant 
treaty provisions, and stated: 
"[A] treaty regime specifically dealing with a given matter will prevail over more 
general rules of customary law. Had this been the case here the Tribunal would 
have started out its considerations on the basis of the Treaty provision and would 
have resorted to the Articles on State Responsibility only as a supplementary 
means. But the problem is that the Treaty itself did not deal with these elements. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Respondent State had to observe the international human rights obligations it had consented to when 
concluding international agreements 'in good faith'. 
78 See Chapter 3 for more detailed information on these references. 
79 See e.g., El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Award, 31 Oct. 
2011) ¶594, where the tribunal relied on the 1956 Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (and the ICJ case related to the agreement) to illustrate how other international 
agreements, similar to BITs, may also contain compromissory clauses.  
80 Hirsch (supra n.34) 8. See also, more generally, T. Gazzini 'The Role of Customary International Law in 
the Field of Foreign Investment' (2007) 8 JWIT 691. 
81 Hirsch (supra n.34) 8. See also, J. Crawford 'Investment Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility' (2010) 25 ICSID Rev. 127 ; J. Kurtz 'The Paradoxical Treatment of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility in Investor-State Arbitration' (2010) 25 ICSID Rev. 200. Z. Douglas, 'Other Specific 
Remiges of Responsibilty: Investment Treaty Arbitration and ICSID' in J. Crawford, A. Pellet & S. Olleson 





The Treaty thus becomes inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as 
the conditions for the operation of state of necessity are concerned."82 
But these principles relating to State responsibility are not the only customary 
international rules which have driven the reasoning of investment tribunals. The drafters 
of the ICSID convention anticipated the importance of customary international law and, 
at the time the text was designed, attempted to identify the rules that could be applied by 
investment tribunals. Schreuer et al, relying on the history of the drafting of the ICSID 
convention, and on case-law, have established a list of general rules that have been 
referred to by ICSID tribunals.83 This list is reproduced below:  
" – the principle of respect for acquired rights 
 – consequence of a state of necessity  
 – denial of justice  
 – the standard of protection in case of an insurrection  
 – nationalization in breach of stabilization clause 
 – expropriation requires compensation  
– the Chorzow Factory standard providing the appropriate measure of compensation 
for wrongful expropriation;  
– a lawful nationalization requires a legislative enactment, taken for a bona fides public 
purpose, non-discrimination and appropriate compensation;  
– not only tangible property rights but also contractual rights may be indirectly 
expropriated;  
– jurisdiction is determined by reference to the date on which proceedings are 
instituted;  
 – is there a requirement to exhaust local remedies? 
 – is it permissible to pierce the corporate veil to determine jurisdiction? 
 – are shareholders protected under general international law?"84 
Many of these principles have been applied outside the ICSID convention. It is indeed 
difficult (not to say impossible) to argue that because of the non-application of Article 
42(1), a treaty tribunal acting on the basis of the UNCITRAL, or other arbitration rules, 
would refuse to rely on one of these customary rules, should this was necessary to rule to 
decide the case. 
General Principles of International Law 
The third category is that of the general principles of international law. These principles, 
which have been defined "as general rules on which there is international consensus to 
consider them as universal standards and rules of conduct that must always be applied 
                                                 
82 Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic (also known as Enron Creditors Recovery 
Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007) 
¶334.  
83 Schreuer et al. (supra n.33) 606-07 (references omitted). 
84 Ibid. 




and which, in the opinion of important commentators, are rules of law on which the legal 
systems of the States are based,"85 have been applied in numerous instances. The list of 
these principles is also long.86 It includes (i) rules regarding the proceedings, such as res 
judicata or burden of proof, as well as (ii) rules related to the merits and attribution of 
damages (prohibition of abuse of right,87 mitigation of damages88). As Schreuer notes, 
these principles "[a]lthough formally equivalent to treaty and custom, […] are 
frequently used to fill gaps left by these two sources."89 
International Case-Law 
The fourth category is international case-law. We have seen in Chapter 4 that tribunals 
have relied quite often on the case law of WTO panels and AB. In addition, arbitral 
tribunal have referred to the decisions of other courts and tribunals, including the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the ICJ, the ECtHR, the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, and the CJEU.90 
Soft-law 
The last category includes soft law and scholarly instruments. In several cases, 
investment tribunals have relied on guidelines, or non-legally binding instruments. They 
can provide guidance to investment tribunals, especially in procedural matters (IBA 
Guidelines, model laws, etc.). Their importance is nevertheless limited, as it can be 
argued that, contrary to the other sources, they are not directly referred to by clauses 
directing the tribunal to apply 'international law' or 'principles of international law'. 
Hence, Kaufmann-Kholer, who has examined the question in depth, 91  stresses the 
importance of the codification and applicability of this type of instrument only if they are 
incorporated in, or associated to, a norm that is mentioned in choice of law clauses.92  
3. Remarks 
Wide Range of Instruments and Irrelevance of Substantive Discussions 
The range of 'non-investment' legal sources that investment tribunals apply is relatively 
wide. This confirmed an assumption made in the introduction of this dissertation. 
Investment tribunals refer to trade law. It is a fact. But they refer to other international 
                                                 
85 Inceysa v. Salvador (supra n.54) ¶227.  
86 Schreuer et al. (supra n.33) 606-07 (references omitted). 
87 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award (30 Jun. 2009) 
¶¶154-58.  
88 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 
Award (12 Apr. 2002) ¶167.  
89 Schreuer et al. (supra n.33) 608.  
90 See Chapter 3 for data regarding these references. 
91 G. Kaufmann-Kohler 'Soft Law in International Arbitration: Codification and Normativity' (2010) 1 J. 
Int'l Dispute Settlement 283.  





norms too. Although it is claimed in the present thesis that trade law is closer to 
investment law than any other international legal regime, 93 it is not repudiated that the 
tools that need to be used to better clarify the relation between investment and trade law 
can be used to better clarify the relation between investment and human rights, or 
investment and international environmental law. 
The Use of a Norm whose Application and Interpretation is Reserved for the 
Exclusive Jurisdiction of another Body 
The study of the use of non-investment law confirms another idea which was made in 
previous developments: Investment tribunals have relied on instruments whose 
application is –in principle– reserved for the exclusive competence of another body. The 
various cases where EU law was referred to by tribunals, and in which EU institutions 
intervened to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the basis of TFUE Article 344 
(exclusive competence of the ECJ), are pertinent examples.94 In Chapter 4 we confronted 
the issue of how the possible jurisdictional interactions that might be created because of 
this use should be handled for the investment-trade relation. Further research on the 
regulation of other interactions with regimes, including a dispute settlement mechanism 
that is exclusively competent for the application of the regime's substantive norms, 
might be required.  
C. OTHER REFERENCES AND USE OF NON-INVESTMENT OBLIGATIONS 
In the previous sections of this study, I have explained how investment tribunals may 
have to apply non-investment laws pursuant to applicable law clauses. In this last 
development, I focus on the other 'gateways', or 'entry points', that can be used by parties 
to a dispute, as well as by tribunals, to refer to non-investment laws and other 
international norms, and how investment tribunals actually use this non-investment law, 
once it has 'entered' into the dispute. 
1. The Entry-Points  
Investment tribunals use non-investment law because they can, or sometimes, because 
they must. When the law says they shall apply domestic or international law, they have 
an obligation to do it. 95 As extensively demonstrated in the first part of the present 
Chapter, the basic entry-point for the application of non-investment obligations is the 
means for the determination of applicable law (either the choice-of-law clause, or the 
provision of the arbitration rules regarding governing law). However, this is not the only 
one. Investment treaties include other provisions that may direct the tribunal to consider 
non-investment source of law. 
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94 For a discussion on the interaction between EU and Investment Law, see infra pp.263. 
95 It is generally admitted in international arbitration, and in investment arbitration in particular, that a 
failure to apply the law chosen by the parties may lead to the annulment or the vacatur of the award.  




First, IIAs may include what may be called 'legality clauses'. Pursuant to this type of 
provision, the investor, in order to benefit from the protection of the treaty, must have 
conducted its operations 'in accordance with the laws of the host-State'.96 Examining 
these clauses, the arbitrators would therefore have to refer to municipal law. Further, a 
State, as a respondent in arbitration, could also try to use these clauses to request the 
tribunal to 'apply' international law, by arguing that an international standard, let us say 
a human right standard, is actually incorporated in its domestic law. In this situation, the 
investment tribunal, accepting the argument, would have to refer, indirectly, to the 
international norm. 
Second, reference to non-investment law can be made in the definition of a standard 
protected by the IIA. Thus, for instance, Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA (regarding 
minimum standard of treatment) provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments 
of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security". As mentioned in Chapter 
3, pursuant to NAFTA Articles 2001 and 1131(2), 97  the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission (the FTC) stated in 2001 that "Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party." 98  Here, the 
'process' that leads a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal to apply customary international law 
is complex (the reference is made in NAFTA Chapter 11 and highlighted by the 
interpretation of that provision by the State parties to the treaty but particularly 
interesting. In addition, a body created by the treaty, the FTC, and which is 
institutionally independent from the tribunal, but entitled to give binding interpretative 
statements upon the latter, affirmed that the Article 1105(1) standard should be 
interpreted in accordance with customary international law. Therefore, a NAFTA 
tribunal willing to assess whether the NAFTA minimum standard of treatment has been 
respected, would have to apply customary international law. This process was followed 
in several NAFTA disputes, and notably in Mondev v. United States. The award in this 
dispute discusses the consequences of the FTC's interpretation of Article 1105(1) and 
concludes that:  
"In holding that Article 1105(1) refers to customary international law, the FTC 
interpretations incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by 
the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many 
treaties of friendship and commerce. Those treaties largely and concordantly 
                                                 
96 See, for a general discussion of such clauses, Schill (supra n.53). 
97 For a detailed analysis of the FTC's activity in this regard, see G. Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Interpretive 
Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of Law' in F. Bachand & E. Gaillard (eds.), Fifteen 
Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration (2011) 175.  
98 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter Eleven Provisions, 31 July 






provide for "fair and equitable" treatment of, and for "full protection and security" 
for, the foreign investor and his investments. Correspondingly the investments of 
investors under NAFTA are entitled, under the customary international law which 
NAFTA Parties interpret Article 1105(1) to comprehend, to fair and equitable 
treatment and to full protection and security."99 
The tribunal, therefore, held that there was no breach of Article 1105(1).100  
Ultimately, one might argue that this process is of limited value, since the NAFTA 
choice-of-law provision includes international law, and that therefore the result would 
have been similar, even if no reference was expressly made to the substantive provision 
of Article 1105. However, other examples show that reference to international law can be 
made in the absence of a choice-of-law provision. The France-Qatar BIT is a pertinent 
example. 101  This treaty does not contain any provision regarding applicable law. 102 
Nevertheless, Article 3 of the BIT explains that fair and equitable treatment will be 
assured "in accordance with the principles of International Law". A tribunal requested to 
apply this standard could use a similar reasoning as the one used by the FTC and the 
Mondev tribunal, and decide to look at customary international law to better interpret the 
wording of this article. 
The result of these different clauses is that investment tribunals would have no option 
but to refer to non-investment law, even if this law is not mentioned in the choice-of-law 
clause. This remark highlights the decisive role of the treaty drafters. The lawmakers, 
which is to say the States, are indeed in the driver's seat regarding the opening of 
avenues for investment tribunals to refer to non-investment law.103 
2. The Different Use and Application of Non-Investment Law 
Recall that in the previous chapter we established that investor-State tribunals have used 
trade law for various reasons, and more precisely, in four different scenarios.104 The goal 
                                                 
99 Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 Oct. 
2002) ¶125.  
100 Ibid. ¶56. 
101 US 2004 BIT Model Article 5.1, which is related to the minimum standard of treatment, contains 
similar language:  
"Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." (Emphasis added).  
102 The arbitration clause, Article 8 of the BIT, offers, in general terms, the possibility to go either before 
an ICSID tribunal or, in case one of the two States is not member to the ICISD Convention, before an ad 
hoc tribunal, with UNCITRAL arbitration rules being applicable. 
103 This is consistent with general international law practice. ICJ case law shows that States can always 
adopt another system of applicable law than the system contemplated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. See 
e.g., Forteau (supra n.14) 421-23.  
104 See Chapter 3. The four scenarios were described as follows: 
- Scenario No.1: WTO as a factual or incidental legal element, (used to construe rules or principles 
that are not substantive investment standards, e.g. general principles of procedures). 
- Scenario No.2: WTO as an interpretative element (for substantive investment standards). 
- Scenario No.3: WTO norms in the claim. 




of the present development is not to proceed with the same exhaustive exercise for all 
other 'non-investment law' applied by investment tribunals, but to briefly demonstrate 
that these other 'non-investment' laws have been used for various purposes as well. 
Firstly, arbitrators may refer to non-investment law at different stage of the arbitral 
procedure. Tribunals have indeed referred to non-investment law at the jurisdictional 
stage, when defining the investment, or the investor, for jurisdictional rationae materiae 
or rationale personae purposes.105 Tribunals have obviously referred to non-investment 
law at the determination of liability and, for instance, to interpret a treaty standard and 
assess whether it has been respected. Finally, investment tribunals have applied non-
investment law when calculating the amount of damages an investor is entitled to, once 
the breach has been recognized. The quasi-systematic reference to customary 
international law, and to the Chorzow Factory case, is a good example in this regard.106 
If we now turn to the ways in which investment tribunals actually use non-investment 
law, we can see that three different ways in which investment tribunal can refer to non-
investment law may be distinguished.107 Firstly, non-investment laws can be treated as 
'facts'. This is often the case for domestic law.108 But other legal sources have been used 
as 'facts' by international tribunals. For instance, in AES v. Hungary,109 an ECT dispute 
in which the parties disagreed on whether the host State's behaviour towards the 
investor was driven by its EU law obligations, the tribunal affirmed that EU law should 
be considered as fact.110 In that dispute, the tribunal explained that the objective of the 
arbitration was not to determine whether there is a conflict between EU law and the 
ECT. Rather, the dispute was about the conformity, or non-conformity, of Hungary's 
acts and measures with the ECT. Therefore, in the tribunal's words:  
                                                                                                                                                   
- Scenario No.4: WTO norms as a defense.  
105 See Chapter 4, pp.168 et. seq. 
106 See Chapter 2, pp.63 et. seq. for discussion on damages in international investment arbitration. See also 
the interesting work of L. Liberti on the possibility of referring to non-investment treaty obligations when 
assessing damages. L. Liberti, 'The Relevance of Non-Investment Treaty Obligations in Assessing 
Compensation' in P.-M. Dupuy, E.-U. Petersmann & F. Francioni (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (2009) 557. 
107 Bartels, in his study on the applicable law before the WTO judges, identifies similar categories for the 
ways in which the Panels and the AB use non-WTO law when deciding a dispute. Bartels (supra n.2), 510. 
108 Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003, Award (29 Mar. 2005) ¶VII.1.B.7 
(where the tribunal affirmed that, according to a fundamental principle of international law, "for the 
purposes of an international law claim, domestic law and governmental measures are essentially matters of 
fact or evidence"). See also, Rupert Binder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award [Redacted] (15 
July 2011) ¶¶390-91 (where the tribunal explained that it derived its competence exclusively from the 
BIT and was not competent to decide how Czech law is to be interpreted, this being a matter for the Czech 
courts, but that "in this arbitration Czech law [was] one of the factual elements which the Tribunal must 
take into account when establishing whether the Czech Republic [had] observed its undertakings in the 
Czech-German BIT"). 
109 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
Award (23 Sept. 2010). 





"[I]t is the behaviour of the state (the introduction by Hungary of the Price 
Decrees) which must be analyzed in light of the ECT, to determine whether the 
measures, or the manner in which they were introduced, violated the Treaty. The 
question of whether Hungary was, may have been, or may have felt obliged under 
EC law to act as it did, is only an element to be considered by this Tribunal when 
determining the "rationality", "reasonableness" and "transparency" of the re-
introduction of administrative pricing and the Price Decrees."111 
Second, non-investment law can be used as an interpretative element. We saw in Chapter 
3 that this has been the case in numerous disputes for international trade law. In this 
situation, non-investment laws will be integrated in the reasoning of an investment 
tribunal when construing a provision that needs to be enforced. For instance, investment 
tribunals have relied on human rights jurisprudence to interpret and determine the 
contents of various substantive investment obligations. 112  Examples include, the 
definition of expropriation, non-discrimination standards, the rules related to the need to 
exhaust local remedies, the principle of denial of justice, and the assessment of allocation 
costs.113 
Finally, non-investment law can be used as a legal element to determine compliance with 
a provision that is being enforced by the tribunal. In this last scenario, the tribunal will 
actually 'apply' the non-investment law, verify if it is being respected or not, the 
conclusion of this verification, in turn, will then be used to verify the application of the 
IIA provisions. In Maffezini v. Spain for instance,114 the tribunal referred and, to some 
extent, applied Spanish constitutional law, as well as specific Spanish legislation on 
environmental protection, to rule that Spain could not be held responsible for some of 
the measures taken towards the investor,115 because these measures were nothing more 
that the mere consequence of the application of Spanish law applicable to the industry in 
question.116 In Chevron v. Ecuador I,117 one of the claimant's claims was based on a breach 
of the customary rule prohibiting a denial of justice. The claimant substantiated this 
claim by referring, inter alia, to the jurisprudence from various international and regional 
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112 On the relation between international investment law and human rights in general, see, P.-M. Dupuy, 
F. Francioni & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 
(2009).  
113 J.D. Fry 'International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law's 
Unity' (2007) 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 77, 83-96. See also, P.-M. Dupuy, 'Unification Rather than 
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law' 
in P.-M. Dupuy, E.-U. Petersmann & F. Francioni (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (2009) 45. 
114 Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (13 Nov. 2000).  
115 Ibid. ¶¶68-69. 
116 Ibid. ¶71. 
117  Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Partial Award (1 Dec. 2008)(hereinafter 'Chevron v. Ecuador'). 




human rights bodies.118 In defence, Ecuador argued that, pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in the treaty, the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide upon claims of a 
breach of customary international law. 119  The tribunal rejected this argument and 
affirmed that the arbitration clause in the treaty did "confer jurisdiction over customary 
international law claims, as it was in contrast to […] the wording of large number of 
other BITs, […] not limited to causes of action based on the treaty".120 Eventually, the 
tribunal found that the respondent breached a BIT obligation and that it did not need to 
decide upon the claim based on customary international law.121 Yet, it seems that for this 
case the tribunal was ready to apply customary international law, on denial of justice, to 
the merits of the case. 
3. Remarks 
This section has shown that the range of legal instruments, not belonging to investment 
law, that can be used by investment tribunals is relatively broad. Arguably, it allows a 
better understanding of the numbers given in Chapter 3. In that chapter, I demonstrated 
that investment tribunals refer frequently to trade norms. Looking more broadly at all 
the laws that can be used in investor-State arbitration, it is possible to argue that those 
investment tribunals refer frequently to all type of international norms, including trade 
norms. 
In that sense, we can affirm once more that IIAs cannot be conceived as self-contained 
regimes, and, more importantly, that they cannot be operated by investment tribunals as 
if they stood in isolation from other norms that are binding on the States parties to these 
IIAs. The various above-mentioned 'entry points' to non-investment law incorporated in 
investment agreements, and the necessity for tribunals to refer to non-investment law 
when interpreting and applying investment norms, highlight the potential for 
substantive interactions between investment law and other international norms. 
Arguably, these interactions need to be regulated. The techniques that can be used to 
perform this necessary coordination are discussed in the following section. 
IV. REGULATING SUBSTANTIVE INTERACTIONS WITH THE 
TRADE LEGAL REGIME 
In the previous section, I demonstrated how investor-State tribunals may have to make 
use of non-investment law, either because an applicable law clause allows and requests 
them to do so, or by the operation of other IIA clauses. We have also seen that investor-
State tribunals, in fact, do use, and refer frequently to, non-investment law, especially 
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trade law. What if this use or reference to non-investment law leads to a conflict between 
the non-investment norm entering into the dispute and the investment obligations the 
tribunals have to enforce? In Chapter 3, we have seen for instance that a trade obligation 
can be referred to by the respondent State to justify (or mitigate) a breach of an 
investment obligation. Less categorically, we have also seen that investor-State tribunals 
may be requested to refer to trade norms in order to interpret investment obligations, 
even if the trade norms are not exactly identical to the investment obligations in 
question.  
This section aims to deal with this question, and in so doing, will address interactions 
between investment law and the trade legal regime. We will first look at principles to be 
found in general international law for substantial interaction, and the way investment 
tribunals apply these principles (A). We will then turn to the way investor-State 
tribunals have applied these principles when dealing with non-investment law in general. 
This will allow me to explain how investment tribunals should deal with trade norms in 
particular (B), and why conflict clauses included in IIAs are important (C). 
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
The ILC has undertaken important work on the issue of conflicts between international 
legal rules, which resulted in the publication of a report in 2006, that is considered by 
many as an important piece of work in the field.122 According to this report, there are 
two major techniques that can be used to deal with an interaction between applicable 
laws in international dispute settlement: resolving a conflict through the application of 
one norm over the other norm, and resolving a conflict through the interpretation of one 
norm in light of the other norm. This affirmation squares with J. Pauwelyn's 
authoritative work on the issue of conflict of norms in international law.123 In his chapter 
on conflict in the applicable law, he notes that the conflict avoidance techniques are to be 
used in case of 'genuine conflicts', which exist where interpretation does not lead to a 
harmonious reading of the interacting norms.124 These two techniques are presented 
below. 
                                                 
122 ILC, 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission' (2006), UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr. 2006), as corrected UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (11 Aug. 2006) available at < 
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which provide a summary of the study, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.702> (hereinafter "ILC 2006 
Conclusions").  
123 J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (2003). 
124 Ibid. 330-31. 




1. Application of One Norm Over Another 
General international law, contains several provisions that allow an adjudicator facing a 
conflict of norms (i.e. a "situation where a party bound by two international obligations 
cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties"125) to determine 
which of the two conflicting obligations shall have priority over the other. A very simple 
presentation of these principles is provided in the following developments. 
Lex Superior 
It is generally accepted that establishing hierarchies amongst international treaties is a 
difficult endeavor.126 Yet, it is also broadly admitted that certain, very limited, categories 
of international norms prevail over other norms in cases of inconsistency, because these 
prevailing norms convey values that are considered so fundamental by the international 
community that they cannot be derogated from. 
The concept that most fully encapsulates this higher importance is that of jus cogens, 
codified in VCLT Article 53. Article 53 thus establishes that any inconsistent norm in 
conflict with a norm of jus cogens should be void.  
Similar –although not identical– to jus cogens, is the concept of 'international public 
policy' or 'ordre public international' already discussed in the previous section. This 
concept conveys the idea that some norms protect particularly important values, and 
should therefore be applied by arbitral tribunals, irrespective of the will of the parties to 
the dispute.127  
Lex Posterior & Lex Specialis 
Where rules of jus cogens or public policy are not involved, other rules of international law 
regulate interactions between inconsistent international norms. 128  For instance, the 
principle of lex posterior derogate priori, pursuant to which a later rule prevails over a prior 
one, which finds application in Articles 30.3 and 59 of the VCLT, provides further 
guidance for conflicts between two successive treaties on the same subject matter.129 
VCLT Article 59 provides that when two treaties are in conflict and the parties intended 
to terminate the earlier treaty (or if this appears from either two treaties), the first treaty 
(i.e. the earlier in time) can be considered as terminated. Article 30, which relates to 
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Shelton 'Normative Hierarchy in International Law' (2006) 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 291. 
127 Gaillard & Savage (eds.) (supra n.19) 1322. See also, G. Bermann & L. Mistelis (eds.), Mandatory Rules in 
International Arbitration (2011); C. Kessedjian, "Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration: 
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International Arbitration" (1986) 2 Arbitration International 274.  
128 Hirsch, 'Conflicting Obligations…' (supra n.58) 327. 
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situations in which the intention of the parties are not obvious.  Pursuant to this 
provision, both treaties continue to exist but one can be considered as temporally 
suspended.130 
The other relevant principle in the context of treaty conflicts is lex specialis derogat 
generali. In the words of the ILC, the principle "suggests that whenever two or more 
norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is 
more specific."131 For various reasons, and notably because of its difficult application 
depending on the context in which it is invoked, 132  the lex specialis derogat generali 
principle has not been codified in the Vienna Convention, and its function in 
international law might be considered as limited. The main obstacle for the use of that 
principle is that it is often the case that it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish which 
norm is specialis and which norm is generali.133 Yet, the principle has been recognized and 
applied in a number of cases by the ICJ and seems to be largely recognized in the 
scholarship.134 
Importantly, there is a two-tier trigger for the application of the two mentioned 
principles. First, the adjudicator dealing with the conflict must determine that the rules 
deriving from the allegedly conflicting treaties are indeed inconsistent. Such 
determination depends to a significant extent on the interpretation given to the 
international rules involved. Second, the adjudicator needs to also determine that the 
rules are dealing with the same subject matter. This involves, again, interpretation. 
Because of that, as we shall see next, one might suggest that it is preferable to handle 
normative conflicts through the use of interpretation techniques. 
2. Resolving Conflicts Through Harmonious Interpretation 
Establishing a hierarchical order between different, potentially applicable, rules to a 
given problem is problematic. The principles mentioned above have limits, and cannot be 
used in all norm conflict, or interaction, situations. One might therefore look for a more 
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Pauwelyn (supra n.123) 399-404.  
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between two distinct international instruments, see, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ Series A, No.2 
(1924) at p. 31. See also, for a broad exposé of the case law on the principle, ILC 2006 Report, ¶¶68-84. As 
to scholarship see e.g., Pauwelyn (supra n.78) 385-91 and J. Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public 
International Law (2012) 708. 




moderate approach, which would consist in interpreting the norms in such a way that 
they can be applied together. This approach, often called harmonious interpretation, is 
consistent with VCLT Article 31(3)(c). 
As the ILC affirmed, 135  international treaty provisions cannot be interpreted in a 
vacuum, as they all belong to the same legal order, namely, the international legal 
order.136 This idea constitutes the foundation of Article 31(3)(c), according to which 
"there shall be taken into account, together with the context […] any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relation between the parties."137  
The ICJ and other international courts have provided guidance for the application of this 
article.138 In the Oil Platform case of 2003, the ICJ had to interpret Article I of the 1955 
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between US and Iran, pursuant to which "there 
shall be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of 
America and Iran."139 Referring to its prior case law, the court pointed out that:  
"[U]nder the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into account 'any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' 
(Art. 31, para. 3 (c)). The Court cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of 
the 1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant 
rules of international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being 
successfully invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the 
Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of force. The application of the relevant rules 
of international law relating to this question thus forms an integral part of the task 
of interpretation entrusted to the Court by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 
Treaty."140 
From this affirmation, one might consider that international adjudicators, when facing 
possible incompatibility between the norm they have to apply in a given dispute, and 
other legal obligations that are binding on the parties to that dispute, should always 
attempt to take cognizance of the content of that other legal obligation, as well as the 
context in which it has been materialized.141  
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Iran, signed at Tehran, on 15 August 1955, 284 UNTS 93. 
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On the other hand, VCLT Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention does not suggest 
that international courts and tribunals, interpreting a treaty provision, have to look at all 
types of international rules. It is usually accepted that the external rule qualifies for 
consideration under Article 31(3)(c) if the three following requirements are fulfilled: (i) 
the rule must be a "rule of international law", (ii) it must be applicable in the relation 
between the parties, and (iii) it must be relevant.  
As to the first one, it is usually widely accepted that 'any rules of international law' 
means all the sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of the Statue of the 
ICJ. 142  Both multilateral 143  and bilateral treaties 144  might be referred to, as well as 
customary international law145 and general principles of international law.146  
The second requirement, which relates to the question of whether a rule is applicable in 
the relations between State parties to a particular treaty, can be separated into three sub-
requirements: (i) temporality, (ii) applicability and (iii) relations between the parties. The 
first one concerns the temporal connection between the rule that is being interpreted and 
the rule that is being referred to. Because the language of Article 31(3)(c) does not 
include any temporal limitations, it is considered that all rules applicable between the 
parties at the date on which the treaty is being interpreted can be referred to, and not 
just the rules applicable at the date when the treaty was drafted.147 The second sub-
requirement relates to the term 'applicable'. While different views have been discussed in 
the scholarship,148 it seems to be accepted that only the rules that are legally 'binding' 
can be relied upon.149 Finally the third sub-requirement relating to the phrase 'applicable 
in the relations between the parties' concerns the relation between the 'parties' to the 
treaty that is being interpreted. The WTO panel decision in EC-Biotech Products casted 
some doubts as to whether a rule binding upon only a limited number of the parties to 
                                                 
142 ILC 2006 Report, ¶¶462-70. 
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the multilateral treaty that is being interpreted, could be referred to pursuant to Article 
31(3)(c) or not.150 Nonetheless, it seems to be accepted that it is sufficient for the States 
parties to the dispute to be also parties to the treaty relied upon, and thus even if the 
treaty being interpreted is a multilateral agreement.151 As B. Simma and T. Kill have 
noted, in the context of investor-State arbitration, the situation is even more 
complicated, because the parties to the dispute (an investor and a State) will never be 
parties to another international treaty.152 As explained below, this has not prevented 
tribunals from referring to Article 31(3)(c). Indeed, it is accepted that for the purpose of 
investment arbitration, it seems sufficient that the two parties to the BIT that is being 
interpreted (the host State party to the dispute and the investor home State) are also 
parties to the treaty that the arbitrators are referring to in the interpretation process.153  
Pursuant to the third condition for Article 31(3)(c) to apply, the rule of international law 
applicable between the parties must be 'relevant'. Like for the other conditions, the 
meaning and extent of this third requirement has been subject to debate. M. Villiger 
claims on his side that relevant rules "concern the subject-matter of the treaty term at 
issue. In the case of customary rules, these may even be identical with, and run parallel 
to, the treaty rule."154 Simma and Kill contest this position, arguing that the expression 
'same subject matter' is used elsewhere in the VCLT and that the use of another term, i.e. 
'relevant' suggest a broader scope:  
"[i]f the drafters had intended the term 'relevant' to mean 'relating to the same 
subject-matter' they could have simply repeated the Article 30 formulation in 
Article 31(3)(c). Instead, the drafters chose to use the term 'relevant', a term whose 
ordinary meaning is broader than 'addressing the same subject matter'."155  
The debate remains open. Even if one could argue that the ICJ judgment in the Certain 
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case seems closer to Simma and Kill's 
reading of relevance, which found that rules from a Friendship and Co-operation Treaty 
were 'relevant' to interpret rules on mutual criminal assistance in another treaty, it is 
difficult to affirm that 'relevant' always has to be interpreted. 156 As we will see, the 
different readings of relevance can have a significant impact on the interpretation of 
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investment treaties and, more specifically, on the interpretation of investment treaties by 
reference to trade law. 
B. APPLICATION OF REGULATING TECHNIQUES IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION 
1. In General 
Investment tribunals are far from unfamiliar with issues relating to conflicts of law, and 
the regulation of normative interactions within disputes.157 In fact, they have had to deal 
with all of the above-mentioned principles in various cases.158 Nonetheless, they have 
used said principles in a relatively cautious manner, favoring a somewhat (case-by-case) 
conciliatory approach, denying the existence of normative conflicts and resulting in, 
most of the time, the predominance of investment obligations over non-investment 
concerns.  
Investment Tribunals and Lex Superior 
As for lex superior and incidences of jus cogens, some investment tribunals have, on a few 
occasions, referred to the concepts, and have made general statements about them and 
the 'methodology' they implied. In the recurring Methanex case, 159  the tribunal, for 
instance, stated that "as a matter of international constitutional law a tribunal has an 
independent duty to apply imperative principles of law or jus cogens and not to give 
effect to parties’ choices of law that are inconsistent with such principles."160 Quoting 
Pauwelyn, the tribunal in Phoenix v. Czech Republic reached a similar statement and 
affirmed "States in their treaty relations, can contract out of one, more or in theory, all 
rules of general international law other than those of jus cogens."161  
In other disputes, tribunals have investigated the content of these concepts even further, 
by linking them to 'fundamental rights' or basic human rights.162 For instance, in EDF v. 
Argentina, the arbitrators recognized that it was 'common ground' that investment 
tribunals had "to be sensitive to international jus cogens norms, including basic principles 
of human rights."163 Yet, tribunals have usually avoided stating that a given norm of 
international law has priority over another one.164 The only exception seems to be in 
regard with the concept of public policy. As we have seen in the previous section, 
arbitrators may call upon the concept of public policy to decide not to apply the law 
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chosen by the parties and subsequently, to rule on a specific question of a given case.165 
Similarly to the cases examined in the previous section, in World Duty Free v. Kenya, the 
tribunal dismissed a contractual claim tainted by bribery. The tribunal ruled that states, 
in investment treaty arbitration, could escape liability by proving that the aggrieved 
investor engaged in corrupt activities in connection with the investment under dispute:  
"[I]n light of domestic laws and international conventions relating to corruption, 
and in light of the decisions taken in the matter by courts and international 
tribunals, this Tribunal is convinced that bribery is contrary to the international 
public policy of most, if not all States, or to use another formula, to transnational 
public policy. Thus, claims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts 
obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral Tribunal."166 
Beside these examples, observers have noted that tribunals are reluctant to establish a 
hierarchy amongst different international obligations when ruling on a case.167 They seem 
to be even more reluctant to favor the application of non-investment laws over 
investment obligations on the basis of a possible higher 'rank' or importance of the 
former.168 The main argument that investment tribunals usually put forward is related to 
the allegedly limited scope of their jurisdiction, and the impossibility to 'import' non-
investment norms within the dispute. 169 In Siemens v. Argentina for instance, tribunals 
considered an argument raised by the Argentine government, according to which its 
obligations under human rights law required the adoption of the measure challenged by 
the investor. The tribunal avoided addressing the issue in the following manner: 
"The reference made by Argentina to international human rights ranking at the 
level of the Constitution after the 1994 constitutional reform and implying that 
property rights claimed in this arbitration, if upheld, would constitute a breach of 
international human rights law […] has not been developed by Argentina. The 
tribunal considers that, without the benefit of further elaboration and 
substantiation by the parties, it is not an argument that, prima facie, bears any 
relationship to the merits of this case."170 
This type of reasoning has been criticized. Several commentators regret that investment 
tribunals have been overly cautious, when requested to balance the protection of investor 
rights with State obligations related to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
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liberties.171 They especially stress the limits of the argument on the distinction between 
jurisdiction and applicable law, whose pertinence fades away when it comes to norms of a 
particular nature, such as human rights obligations.172 
Investment Tribunals and other Conflict Regulation Techniques 
Investment tribunals have also been cautious in the application of conflict regulation 
techniques such as lex specialis and lex posterior, when disputes relate to inconsistencies 
between IIA obligations and non-investment laws.173 In his recently published thesis on 
the issue of conflicting treaties in investment arbitration, Ghouri notes, for instance, that 
investor-State tribunals, like other international courts, have had "a tendency to avoid 
and not resolve treaty conflicts, for which they have developed various techniques, such 
as reconciling conflicting norms, declaring treaties as parallel instead of conflicting, 
limited their jurisdiction to only one of the treaty concerned, or simply denying the 
existence of a treaty conflict."174  
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica is a good example of this reluctance towards traditional conflict 
regulation techniques.175 In that case, the respondent requested the tribunal to balance 
the investor's right to compensation in case of expropriation, with its obligations related 
to environmental protection, as enclosed in a series of regional and international 
conventions.176 The tribunal refused to engage in the discussion on the potential conflict 
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between the host-State environmental obligations and the ones owed to the foreign 
investor. Rather, it disregarded the references made by Costa Rica, explaining that 
expropriatory environmental measures, no matter how beneficial and laudable to society, 
had to be compensated, and that "the international source of the obligation to protect 
environment"177 made no difference. For the tribunal, the fact that the parties had agreed 
that, under international law, an expropriation could be made only "against the prompt 
payment of adequate and effective compensation", meant that it was thus not necessary 
to take into account the normative sources which led the government to expropriate 
when (i) deciding about the compensation and (ii) determining the amount of this 
compensation.178 This reasoning, which seems logically sound on the surface, has been 
criticized in doctrine.179 For instance, Ghouri regrets that the tribunal did not even 
attempt to envisage whether there was a potential conflict between the host-State's 
international obligations, and therefore did not look at how this conflict had to be 
resolved.180 
Beside Santa Elena, several other cases have been used to illustrate the (absence of solid) 
methodology of investment tribunals when facing investment and non-investment norm 
interactions. In SPP v. Egypt, 181  Egypt faced an investment claim following its 
cancellation of agreements with a Hong-Kong's investors, for the development of 
destination tourism complexes in Egypt near the pyramids. The investor argued that the 
cancellation of the project amounted to an expropriation of its investment and that they 
should therefore be compensated. Egypt defended itself arguing, inter alia, that the 
cancellation was required by international law, in accordance with the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 182  The 
tribunal, which agreed that international law, and more specifically the UNESCO 
Convention, was 'relevant' to the dispute, 183  had to therefore decide whether said 
Convention, and the registration of the Pyramids Plateau with the World Heritage 
Committee, forced Egypt to cancel the project. The tribunal carefully examined the 
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scope of application of the Convention, and noted that the contract was cancelled prior to 
the date that the relevant international obligations, emanating from the Convention, 
became binding on Egypt.184 Hence, the tribunal rejected Egypt's arguments regarding 
the incompatibility between the investment laws and the international Convention. The 
tribunal investigated the obligations created by the Convention and concluded that the 
cancellation of the investment project was not externally imposed on Egypt, but rather 
resulted from Egypt's voluntary actions. Nonetheless, the tribunal accepted that, after 
the date on which the obligations to protect the site became internationally binding upon 
its government, Egypt could have been justified in taking such measures. Thus, in the 
tribunal's words, "a hypothetical continuation of the Claimants' activities interfering with 
antiquities in the area could be considered as unlawful from the international point of 
view." 185  Because of this finding, the tribunal declined to award future lost profits. 
Compensation was ordered only for lost profit until the date when the obligations 
resulting from the UNESCO Convention became binding on Egypt.186 According to the 
tribunal, "from that date forward, the Claimants' activities on the Pyramids Plateau 
would have been in conflict with the Convention and therefore in violation of 
international law, and any profits that might have resulted from such activities are 
consequently non-compensable."187 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the tribunal's reasoning in SPP. It indicates 
that where a non-investment obligation is externally imposed on a party to an 
investment agreement, this factor is likely to be taken into account by an arbitral 
tribunal. However, the reasoning shows that tribunals will not necessarily refer to the 
traditional normative interactions techniques referred to earlier. Instead, tribunals might 
adopt their own methodology, based on the factual circumstances of the case, in order to 
balance obligations related to investment protection and non-investment obligations.  
The approach adopted by the tribunal in Parkerings v. Lithuania, 188 provides another 
interesting example of such an absence of general methodology when it comes to 
substantive interactions. In that case, the investor brought a claim following the 
termination of a project for the development of a large-scale parking system in the Old 
Town area of Vilnius, a site included in the UNESCO World Heritage List. One of the 
reasons given by the Lithuanian authority, for the cancellation, was that the construction 
of the project would be detrimental to the cultural character of the Old Town, and could 
destroy a large part of the archaeological heritage of the city. The investor initiated 
arbitral proceedings on the basis of the Norway-Lithuania BIT, claiming, inter alia, that 
the cancellation led to a breach of the FET and MFN standards of protection. As for the 
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justification given by the Lithuanian authorities with regard to the possible harm that 
may come to Vilnius' cultural heritage, Parkering claimed that such justifications were 
ill-founded, due the project having been subsequently handed over to another foreign 
investor, a Dutch company, which was de facto treated more favorably.189 In response, 
Lithuania contented that the project agreement with the Dutch company was entirely 
different, especially because it had been subject to the approval of the authorities in 
charge of the conservation of the cultural heritage of Lithuania. The tribunal addressed 
this issue by comparing the two projects, and by establishing whether Parkering and the 
Dutch company were in 'like circumstances'. The tribunal noted that, in contrast to the 
project presented by the Dutch company, Parkering's project extended significantly into 
the UNESCO site of Vilnius Old Town. Notably, the tribunal took into consideration the 
concerns expressed by the local authorities in charge over cultural heritage, 
environmental protection, and urban development, and ruled that:  
"Despite similarities in objective and venue […] the differences of size of Pinus 
Proprius [the Dutch Company] and [Parkering]'s projects, as well as the 
significant extension of the latter into the Old Town near the Cathedral area, are 
important enough to determine that the two investors were not in like 
circumstances. Furthermore, the Municipality of Vilnius was faced with numerous 
and solid oppositions from various bodies that relied on archaeological and 
environmental concerns. In the record, nothing convincing would show that such 
concerns were not determinant or were built up to reject [Parkering]’s project. 
Thus the City of Vilnius did have legitimate grounds to distinguish between the 
two projects."190  
The tribunal further noted that the refusal of authorization to proceed with the project 
"was justified by various concerns, especially in terms of historical and archaeological 
preservation and environmental protection"191 and concluded that the investor was not 
treated in a less favorable manner than the Dutch investor.192 Parkering v. Lithuania 
represents another interesting case in which the tribunal took into consideration non-
investment obligations, yet did not draw upon the traditional principles of international 
law relating to normative interactions.193  
Finally, in SD Myers v. Canada,194 Canada argued that it should not be held liable for a 
breach of its NAFTA investment obligations because the measures at stake were taken 
pursuant to international environmental obligations, inter alia those included in the Basel 
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Convention (a UN international agreement dealing with international traffic in chemical 
compounds and hazardous wastes).195 The tribunal examined the relationship between 
the NAFTA and the other international agreement, and noted that both the NAFTA and 
the Basel Convention included provisions regulating the relations between the two 
treaties, and that no fundamental contradictions existed between them.196 Looking in 
greater depth into the content of the Basel Convention, the tribunal decided that Canada 
could not refer to it in order to excuse an alleged NAFTA violation. Especially if 
amongst the variety of equally effective means that Canada could adopt to comply with 
environmental obligations, one is available that is not inconsistent with its international 
investment obligations: 
"[…] where a State can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection 
through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt 
the alternative that is most consistent with open trade. This corollary also is 
consistent with the language and the case law arising out of the WTO family of 
agreements."197  
The tribunal did not attempt to create a hierarchy between NAFTA obligations and non-
investment obligations, but rather looked for a solution that ensured that the investment 
obligations and non-investment obligations could be considered as mutually 
consistent.198  
Interestingly, in a commentary published several years after the award, M. Hunter –who 
served as president of the SD Myers tribunal– and G. Gonde e Silva, explained that the 
tribunal could have, in fact, unconsciously applied the transnational public policy 
principles when it referred to Canada's other international treaty obligations, and could 
have engaged in balancing them against its NAFTA obligations.199 While they admitted 
the difficulties in defining the exact nature, content, and scope of the transnational public 
policy, Hunter and Gonde e Silva went on to suggest that the notion was a 'flexible and 
dynamic concept' which could act as a 'corrective mechanism' in the interpretation and 
application of IIAs. 200  Nevertheless, SD Myers shows once again that investment 
tribunals usually avoid direct conflict between investment and non-investment 
obligations, and regulate the interactions between these obligations using techniques and 
principles which are not the traditional ones international law offers when in comes to 
addressing interactions between treaties. 
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Investment Tribunals and the Particularities of the EU-Investment Interaction 
The frictions between EU Law and Investment Law which have given, in practice, 
fruitful discussions on the applicability of conflict regulating techniques.201 In several 
intra-EU BIT cases (i.e. where the two parties to the BIT are both EU member states) 
respondent states have argued that intra-EU BITs should be considered invalid because 
of their accession to the EU.202 These defenses were based on VCLT Article 30 and 59 
and thus gave investment tribunals the opportunity to reason on the principles of lex 
posterior and lex specialis.203 
Tribunals have engaged in the application of these principles, but have rejected the 
arguments by demonstrating that (i) EU law and provisions in the applicable IIAs were 
not incompatible, and that (ii) EU Treaties and IIAs do not have the same subject matter, 
despite partial overlap between the guarantees contained in EU law and investment 
protection standards.204 
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Several EU law and international law scholars have criticized the approach of the 
tribunals in these cases. 205 Recently, C. Teijte and C. Wackernagel have argued, for 
instance, that traditional regulating techniques are difficult to apply because they 
necessarily result in a 'forceful demonstration of superiority' from one legal order over 
the other.206 Relying on the jurisprudence related to the interrelationship between the 
EU legal order and the ECHR, they plead for a 'collaborative attitude' that would consist 
in a coordination of these competing legal orders.207 For them, "each legal order can 
prevail to the extent that it is factually and legally possible" 208  and only a 'gross 
violation' of the rules contained in the legal system created by one treaty (for instance 
the EU Treaties), when applying the other (for instance the IIA), would justify giving 
priority to the former (EU Treaties) over the later (the IIA).209 
Perhaps more interestingly, G. Bermann refers to the notion of 'accommodation 
strategies' in order to address the attitude investor-State tribunals should show when 
facing interactions between EU law and international investment law.210 According to 
Bermann, these accommodation strategies are techniques that lead an adjudicator "to 
interpret one or both of two potentially conflicting norms in such a way as to dispel an 
apparent contradiction between them."211 This will usually require the adjudicator to 
compromise the values and interests of the legal system she or he belongs to, and 
therefore to "weigh the costs and benefits of compromise in the long as well as the short 
term."212 As Bermann explains, "an important component of that exercise is the decision-
maker's assessment of both its vulnerabilities and those of the legal order to which it 
primarily belongs." Bermann suggests that the vulnerabilities which the international 
arbitration legal order and the EU legal orders have towards each-other might "operate 
as an incentive to pursuing accommodation strategies of various sorts."213 
Finally, Ghouri suggests that a better way of addressing potential conflicts between 
investment treaties and EU law would be through systematic interpretation. Relying on 
the recent case in Electrabel v. Hungary where the tribunal expressly referred to Article 
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31(3)(c) VCLT,214 he notes that "proactive systemic integration where non-investment 




Investment Tribunals and the Systemic Integration Principle 
The last technique mentioned to address interactions between two international norms 
lies with the principle of systemic integration. As we have seen in the previous 
development, this principle has been codified in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Investment 
tribunals have relied quite frequently on this Article. In fact, to date, it is possible to 
identify more than a dozen decisions and awards in which tribunals have expressly 
referred to this Article, and therefore taken into account other relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties of a dispute, when 
required to interpret provisions contained in IIAs.216 The cause, and impact, of the use of 
this principle varies from case to case. Reference to Article 31(3)(c) can be accessory, like 
in the Azurix v. Argentina annulment proceedings, where the ad hoc Committee briefly 
mentioned the article but explained that the parties to the dispute had not referred to 
"any agreement or rules of international law of the kind referred to in [Article 31(3)(c)], 
other than the BIT and the ICSID Convention, and general principles of customary 
international law."217 For the Committee the use of the principle was therefore moot.218 
In other cases, reference to Article 31(3)(c) is of considerable importance. In Al-Warraq v. 
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Indonesia for instance, the tribunal used Article 31(3)(c) to interpret a relatively vague 
arbitration clause contained in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Investment 
Agreement by reference to BIT practice, and accepted jurisdiction over the case.219 To 
this date, Al-Warraq v. Indonesia remains the first, and only, investment arbitration case 
brought before a tribunal through this instrument.  
The use of the principle is certainly not without limits. In at least two cases, Grand River 
v. US and Emmis v. Hungary, the tribunals noted that the need to take into account other 
rules of international law does not 'provide a license to import' legal elements found in 
other treaties, or customary international law, into the arbitration.220 In other words, 
Article 31(3)(c) cannot be used to expand the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.  
Looking at the case-law on this provision, and at the nature of investment arbitration 
more generally, one may argue that the systemic integration principle is particularly 
suitable for addressing normative interactions as envisaged by investment tribunals.221 
The technique does not compel tribunals to blindly apply other norms that have no 
relation whatsoever with the treaty being interpreted. The use of Article 31(3)(c) implies 
that tribunals enquire as to whether the treaty they are interpreting, and the external 
norms they may refer to, may be harmonized, and how this can be done. As mentioned 
previously, the external rule must have a substantial legal relationship with the provision 
interpreted. Further, the bearing and scope of the external obligation has to be carefully 
assessed in order to determine the extent to which it should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of the investment treaty. This exercise necessitates a pragmatic, case-by-
case, approach. It also requires a contextual approach. That means looking at the context 
in which the investment treaty that is being interpreted has been concluded, as well as 
the context in which the other rule, that is being referred to, has been concluded. These 
exercises seem in line with both the flexibility required in investment arbitration, and 
with actual practice.222 
2. With Trade Norms 
Direct Conflict between Trade and Investment Law: Inadequacy of Lex Posterior 
and Lex Specialis Principles and the VCLT Rules on Conflicts between Treaties?  
Turning to the specific interactions between trade and investment treaties, one needs to 
recall from the previous chapter that direct confrontations between a norm contained in 
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an IIA, and one contained in a trade agreement, have been rare in practice.223 To use 
Pauwelyn's language,224 investor-State tribunals have seldom faced arguments based on 
a 'conflict situation' where compliance or invocation of trade law has led, or would lead, 
to a breach of an IIA.225 
It is therefore difficult to affirm with certitude what an investment tribunal should do, 
when faced with an argument, pursuant to which WTO law should trump investment 
law, or vice-versa. 
Should this hypothesis occur, and in light of the previous developments, it seems difficult 
to imagine that investor-State tribunals would rely on the traditional conflicting 
regulation techniques above-mentioned, such as lex posterior and lex specialis. Similarly, 
the VCLT rules on conflicts between treaties (Articles 30, and to some extent Article 
59), do not seem to be adequate tools for addressing the issue at hand in the present 
section. Looking at (i) the conditions for these principles and rules to apply, and 
especially the 'same subject matter' requirement, and (ii) the existing case-law on these 
issues, it is unlikely that tribunals will accept to engage in the application of these 
principles in order to address a possible conflict between investment and trade law.  
WTO Law as International Public Policy?  
One option to address an argument pursuant to which a given WTO rule trumps 
investment law, would be to demonstrate that the former belongs to public policy. This 
should be seen as an innovative proposition, as such a demonstration has never been 
attempted in practice.  
However, one could argue that grounds exist to develop this demonstration. As 
explained earlier, public policy is concept that is well known by international arbitral 
tribunals and, more specifically, the international arbitration community.226 If the exact 
content of public policy is uncertain, it usually accepted that international public policy is 
supposed to reflect the fundamental values, basic ethical and economic standards, and the 
enduring moral consensus of the international business community.227 One could use the 
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malleability of the scope of the notion to argue that WTO law may, in certain 
circumstances, pertain to international public policy. For instance, the proximity 
between the rationale of some rules of WTO law and competition law, which to some 
extent may qualify as public policy, could be used in this respect. 
Yet, this demonstration suffers from a number of shortcomings. First and foremost, it 
based on the assumption that a form of hierarchy can be observed in international law 
between different international rules. As we have already seen, this is difficult, if not 
impossible to establish.228 For instance, it is not the case that, because WTO agreements 
are multilateral, they should prevail over IIAs, which, most of the time, are bilateral. 
Further, as we have also seen in previous developments, in practice, investment tribunals 
have shown some reluctance towards establishing a hierarchy amongst different 
international obligations. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that an argument, pursuant to which WTO law pertains to 
public policy, and should therefore prevail over a conflicting investment obligation, 
would succeed before an investor-State arbitral tribunal. 
Harmonious Interpretation between Trade and Investment Obligations 
The 'systemic integration' principle seems more suitable for dealing with substantive 
interactions between international trade and investment law. It is particularly pertinent 
to address questions related to the previously mentioned Scenarios No.1 and Scenarios 
No.2. As we have seen in Chapter 4's conclusions, in these situations, investor-State 
tribunals have an interest in ensuring harmonious interpretation between interacting 
investment and trade norms. VCLT Article 31(3)(c) is an interesting tool in that regard, 
for the two following reasons. 
Firstly, the conditions for the application of that Article in case of an interaction between 
a trade and an investment norm, should not be difficult to satisfy. Recall that these 
conditions are (i) the normative nature of the rule referred to (it has to be a 'rule of 
international law'), (ii) the binding character of the rule referred to, for the parties to the 
IIA that is to be interpreted (the rule has to be 'applicable' in the relation between the 
parties) and finally (iii) the relevance of the rule referred to. 
The first and second conditions are not difficult to satisfy. WTO agreements certainly 
qualify as rules of international law for the purpose of Article 31(3)(c). Further, as 
mentioned elsewhere in this work, the WTO presently consists of 160 members. The 
odds that it will be binding upon the parties to a given investment agreement are, 
therefore, relatively high. 
As for the relevance condition, as we have seen, it depends on the interpretation given to 
the term. One could argue that if one party refers to a trade agreement, it arguably 
becomes relevant. In addition, as we have seen in the introduction of this work, there are 
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some similarities between the investment and trade disciplines. This similarity 
necessarily emphasizes the relevance of the reference. If it is difficult to argue that any of 
the WTO agreements could be considered as having the "same subject matter" as a 
given IIA, it is, however, possible for a tribunal to be convinced that a WTO agreement 
is relevant for the interpretation of a notion that is used both in that agreement and in 
the IIA it has to apply. 
Secondly, one should recall that Article 31(3)(c) does not enjoin the investor-State 
tribunal to apply or enforce the given trade norm that is at play in the investment 
dispute. For research that have already been explored, enforcement would be 
problematic. Rather, Article 31(3)(c) enjoins the tribunal to 'take into account' the trade 
norm, that is, to take cognizance of the norm, and to look at the context in which it has 
been concluded, and whether this context might inform the context in which the 
investment norm has been concluded. As mentioned several times in this work, this 
exercise is supported by the seminal obiter from AAPL v. Sri Lanka, where the tribunal 
affirmed that investment law could not be considered a self-contained regime.229 
Finally, as we have seen, this solution seems to be supported in case law, as well as in the 
scholarship. For instance, Sacerdoti has claimed that Article 31(3)(c) could be used as a 
tool to connect the investment and trade disciplines back together. 230  On several 
occasions, E.U. Petersmann has emphasized the role of Article 31(3)(c) in what he calls 
the "harmonization of substantive international economic law standards"231. Although 
not addressing the trade-investment relationship specifically, Ghouri has also called for 
the wider use of Article 31(3)(c), in order to address conflicts between investment 
obligations and non-investment law.232  
C. REFERENCE CLAUSES: THE WAY FORWARD? 
In Electrabel v. Hungary, the Tribunal affirmed in a quite straightforward manner that 
there was no general principle under international law compelling the harmonious 
interpretation of all existing legal rules.233 This affirmation is not without merits. Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT gives a possibility international courts to refer to other 
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international rules, it does enjoin them to do so. For this reason, State sometime choose 
to include specific provisions in their international instruments to give proper guidelines 
and instructions on how conflict and interactions between different international treaty 
shall be deal with by international judges. Often labeled as 'conflict clauses' or 'reference 
clauses', these provisions either create rules of priory between international instruments 
in case of conflict or invite judges to refer to a given other international treaty when 
interpreting the one containing the clause.234  
Trade and investment agreements may include this type of clauses, and in some 
instances specifically to address trade-investment interactions.235 NAFTA Article 103 is 
often mentioned as an example of such clause. This provision, which is included in the 
first Chapter of the NAFTA, provides that, in case of inconsistency between the rights 
and obligations created in virtue of the NAFTA and those existing pursuant to GATT, 
the NAFTA is supposed to prevail.236  
The draft of the CETA agreement includes more interesting examples. For instance, in 
the First Chapter on Initial Provisions and General Definitions, current Article X.04 
entitled 'Relation to other agreements' reads as follows: 
 "The Parties affirm their rights and obligations with respect to each other under 
the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which the Parties are party." 
In the Investment Chapter (currently, Chapter 1), Article Article X.5 entitled 
'Performance Requirements' includes, it its last paragraph, the following provision:  
 "This article is without prejudice to the WTO commitment of a Party".  
Still in Chapter 11, Article X.14  on 'Reservation and Exceptions' reads, in its relevant 
parts:  
In respect of intellectual property rights, a Party may derogate from Article X.6 
(National Treatment), Article X.7 (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) and 
subparagraph 1(f) of Article X.8 (Performance Requirements) where permitted by 
the TRIPS Agreement, including any amendments to the TRIPS Agreement in 
force for both Parties, and waivers to the TRIPS Agreement adopted pursuant to 
Article IX of the WTO Agreement. 
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These provisions expressly enjoin tribunals to take into consideration WTO law. To 
some extent, they even establish a form of hierarchy between WTO law and investment 
norms.  
There is no case-law on these provisions. 237  It is impossible elaborate on their 
application. Yet, these clauses may be seen as interesting instruments to address 
substantive interactions between trade and investment law. Their inclusion should 
therefore be encouraged. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has allowed for the demonstration of the following general argument: 
investment arbitral tribunals have the legal capacity to apply trade law.  
Investment arbitral tribunals enjoy latitude when it comes to identifying and selecting 
the rules that need to be applied to deal with a case. Of course, States have the possibility 
to narrow down this latitude by including choice-of-law clauses in their IIAs, and by 
drafting these clauses so that the options for the rules to be selected remain limited. 
However, this does not seem to be a trend. The clauses included in 'new generation' IIAs 
are still relatively broad and usually provide for the application of the IIA itself, and 
'other international legal instruments' in force between the parties. As explain in this 
chapter, reference to these 'other' legal instruments can be seen as a 'gateway' through 
which international trade law enters an investment dispute. 
This gateway, and more generally the rules related to applicable law identified in the 
present chapter, should be used to address situations identified in Scenarios No.1 and 
No.2. Investment tribunals have used, and should use, the possibility to refer to, and 
when necessary apply, trade law when dealing with disputes. 
We have further seen that, in cases of interference between the substance of an 
investment norm and a trade norm that has to be applied, arbitral tribunals have the 
necessary tools, to avoid direct conflict between the two norms, in their arsenal. 
Amongst these tools, the use of rules of treaty interpretation, and more specifically 
Article 31(3)(c) are the ones that should be favored by investment tribunals. In addition, 
conflict and coordination clauses, whose inclusion in IIAs seems to be becoming standard 
practice, are interesting instruments to address trade-investment substantive 
interactions, and notably Scenario No.4 situations. 
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"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler." 
A. Einstein 
 
International dispute settlement is certainly as exciting and complex as astrophysics, one 
of Einstein's numerous fields of expertise. The international judicial universe is still 
expanding, a myriad of objects dot this universe and the behavior of these objects is often 
as mysterious as dark matter.1 In this conclusion,  I will summarize the main findings of 
the present thesis 'as simply as possible', in an attempt to apply the maxim of the great 
German-born theoretical physicist, by focusing on the framework I attempted to draw in 
the previous chapters, to which investor-State tribunals should refer when they engage 
with international trade law. I will then identify the lines of research this work has 
opened up, the potential study of which will hopefully allow for a better understanding of 
the international investment legal regime. 
I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis aimed to address the following research question: How should investor-State 
tribunals refer to international trade law, and why? This question was answered through 
the demonstration of the following points.  
International Trade Law and International Investment Law Are Interconnected, 
and Arguably, Converging Towards Each Other 
We saw in the introduction that the international investment and trade legal disciplines 
are closely interconnected. Investment and trade law share the same 'history', the rules 
for the regulation of foreign investment and trade once having been blended in single 
instruments. Although today these rules belong to different institutional structures, 
several connecting factors between the two disciplines continue to exist. Trade and 
investment share the same conceptual narrative: While the same pro-market, anti-
protectionist bias influenced the development of both trade and investment law after 
World War II, the two regimes have, since then, been subject to a 'rebalancing', in order 
to better safeguard the public interest of States through a process of 'maturation'.  In 
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addition, trade and investment law are based on the same general economic rationale, as 
both regimes ultimately aim to offer and protect the competitive opportunities of 
international economic actors. More pragmatically, foreign trade and foreign investment 
are interdependent and sometimes complementary economic activities. Investment 
activities may trigger trade flows and vice-versa. This interdependence may give occasion 
for one singular government measure to spawn parallel trade and investment 
proceedings. Finally, the interdependence between international trade and investment 
activities has lead governments to conclude agreements that combine regulation of trade 
and regulation of investment. The number of preferential trade agreements that include 
a whole set of investment protection provisions is growing and this demonstrates how 
the regulation of one international economic activity (for instance trade) necessarily 
implies the taking into account of the regulation of another international economic 
activity (for instance investment). 
In the introduction, we also noted how several authors have looked at these 
interconnections between international trade and investment law, and have argued that 
their growing importance indicates convergence between the two disciplines. As we have 
explained, this argument is not totally misguided, as the line between trade and 
investment law continues to fade. It is, however, difficult to talk about proper 
consolidation, as the two regimes remain institutionally different.   
Investor-State Tribunals and Trade Adjudicative Bodies Serve Different Functions 
and the Consolidation of the Two Regimes is Unwarranted 
In Chapter 2, we looked at the way investment arbitration operates, especially in 
comparison to international trade dispute settlement. We have seen that these two 
adjudicative mechanisms are fundamentally different; especially because they serve 
different functions, despite the substantive principles applied in both fora being relatively 
similar.  Investment arbitration is geared towards individuals and the reparation of the 
harm their investments might have suffered due to State actions. Trade dispute 
settlement, on the other hand, focuses on maintaining a state of equilibrium between the 
trade concessions negotiated by sovereign States. Whereas in investment arbitration the 
principal form of remedy is presented in the form of monetary damages to be paid to the 
investor, in trade dispute settlement the remedy usually takes the form of an order to the 
losing State to withdraw the unlawful measure. From this observation, we concluded, in 
Chapter 2, that coherence and convergence between trade and investment law could only 
be achieved through the development of soft integration techniques (rules that allow an 
adjudicator from one discipline to take into account what an adjudicator from another 
discipline is saying).  
International Trade is Frequently Used by Investor-State Tribunals 
In an attempt to better understand how these techniques should be used in investment 
arbitration, we looked, in Chapter 3, at all the different situations in which investor-State 






references to trade norms in investment arbitration are made more often than one might 
think. More importantly, we have also seen that these references can be categorized into 
four different situations: Trade norms are used to illustrate a factual or incidental legal 
element of the investment dispute (Scenario No.1), to interpret a substantive investment 
norm (Scenario No.2), as a basis of a claim relating to a breach of an investment 
obligation (Scenario No.3), and finally, to counter a claim relating to such a breach 
(Scenario No.4). The examination of these four scenarios led us to conclude that if trade 
norms are to be used by investment tribunals, they should be used in the most 
appropriate way, and that this would be facilitated by two types of legal techniques: 
Techniques that allow for better coordination between the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals and trade adjudicative bodies, and techniques that allow for better coordination 
between substantive investment norms and substantive trade norms. These two sets of 
techniques were examined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Techniques Exist to Avoid (Jurisdictional and Substantive) Conflicts When 
Arbitral Tribunals Apply Trade Law 
In Chapter 4, we focused on the concept of jurisdiction and explained why (i) the use of 
trade norms in a given investment dispute does not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of 
the investment tribunal dealing with that dispute, and that (ii) investment tribunals may 
even have jurisdiction over claims that refer directly to trade law. We have also seen that 
techniques exist to address potential conflicts of jurisdiction between trade and 
investment adjudicators in cases of parallel or subsequent proceedings. In Chapter 5, we 
addressed the issue of substantive interactions between investment and trade law and 
studied how an investment tribunal should deal with trade norms once these norms have 
'entered', and are being discussed at, the merits stage of an investment dispute. The main 
result of this last examination was that when it is assumed that trade law has a direct 
bearing on a given investment dispute, the arbitral tribunal may, and should, engage in a 
better integration of the trade norms bearing upon the dispute at hand. 
The two sets of techniques identified in Chapters 4 and 5 constitute the analytical 
framework which investor-State arbitral tribunals can refer to in cases where 




II. THE FRAMEWORK 
Scenario Description Jurisdiction / Applicable Law 
Integration Technique(s) and Principle(s) to be 
used by Arbitral Tribunals 
Scenario 
No.1 
WTO law is mentioned as part of the factual matrix of 
the case. Also included in this first scenario are what I 
call accessory legal references to WTO law, which are 
isolated references to WTO law, used to underpin a 
legal argument that is not directly linked to 
investment standards. 
• No concerns regarding the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal 
  
• No concerns regarding applicable 
law principles 
• Distinction between Jurisdiction and Applicable 
Law 
• General Rules Governing the Jurisdiction of 
Investment Tribunals 
• Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT 
Scenario 
No.2 
WTO law is taken into account in the interpretation of 
a given, substantive, investment standard.  
• No concerns regarding the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal 
 
• No concerns regarding applicable 
law principles 
• Distinction between Jurisdiction and Applicable 
Law 




• Choice of Law Clauses 
• Reference Clauses 
Scenario 
No.3 
WTO law is being 'imported' into the investment 
arbitration by the investor, who argues that the breach 
of a WTO obligation results in the breach of an 
investment obligation. 
• Potential concerns relating to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal 




WTO law is used as a defense. It is raised by the 
respondent State either to challenge the jurisdiction of 
the arbitral tribunal,…   
• Potential concerns relating to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal 
• General Principles 
• Conflict Clauses 
… or as a counter argument on the merits of the case, 
to say that the measure being challenged before the 
investment tribunal had to be taken in order to comply 
with a WTO obligation. 
• Potential normative conflict 
between trade and investment 
obligations 
• Limited use of General Principles 
• Conflict Clauses and Reference Clauses 







The Table presented on the previous page aims to summarize the main findings of 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It represents the legal framework to which investor-State arbitral 
tribunals can refer in cases where international trade law is invoked.  
In the first two columns, I list the four scenarios identified in Chapter 4 and recall what 
each scenario is about. The third column (entitled 'Jurisdiction / Applicable Law') 
identifies whether the situation referred to in the relevant scenario raises concerns about 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and/or about the law to be applied by the arbitral 
tribunal. The last column (entitled 'Integration Technique(s) and Principle(s)') identifies 
the legal techniques and principles which should be referred to and applied by investor-
State tribunals to ensure the appropriate use of trade law. 
Scenario No.1 situations do not raise jurisdictional concerns. As we have seen in Chapter 
4, pursuant to the distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law, as well as to the 
general rules governing jurisdiction in investment arbitration, the simple connection of 
an investment dispute to trade law cannot be used to challenge the jurisdiction of an 
investment tribunal. The jurisdiction of a tribunal cannot be challenged simply because 
the tribunal is requested to apply trade law as a fact, or to refer to it as an 'incidental 
legal element'. We have also seen that Scenario No.1 references might be encouraged, as 
they are typical examples of cross-references between international courts. VCLT Article 
31.3.(c), the function of which has been described in Chapter 5, can be seen as a pertinent 
vector to foster these types of references. 
Scenario No.2 situations do not raise jurisdictional concerns either. Again, in light of  the 
same reasons given in the explanation for Scenario No.1, an investor-State arbitral 
tribunal that refers to trade law in order to interpret a given investment obligation 
cannot be considered to be acting beyond its jurisdiction. Like in Scenario No.1 
situations, tribunals will benefit from the use of Article 31.3(c) in Scenario No.2 
situations. In addition, they can also refer to specific provisions in IIAs, such as broad 
'choice of law clauses' and 'reference clauses', both examined in Chapter 5.  
In contrast, Scenario No.3 situations do raise jurisdictional concerns. Depending on the 
language of the arbitral agreement and the limits it may include, it can easily be argued 
that tribunals do not have jurisdiction over claims that are based, indirectly, on a breach 
of a trade obligation. However, when the clauses are broadly drafted (for instance, when 
they provide for jurisdiction over 'all disputes relating to an investment' as defined in the 
IIA), it seems possible to argue that tribunals may entertain jurisdiction over trade-
related claims. As explained in Chapter 4, the concept of admissibility might also be used 
by an investor-State tribunal to decide whether a trade-related claim can proceed to the 
merits. 
Finally, Scenario No.4 situations can be divided into two subcategories. The first 
subcategory relates to situations where trade law is used to challenge the jurisdiction of 
an investor-State tribunal. These situations usually occur when parallel proceedings are 





jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. As we have seen in the last section of Chapter 4, 
these concerns might be addressed by either applying general principles of international 
law (such as comity), or any conflict clauses that might be included in the IIAs, which 
aim to regulate jurisdictional interactions between international trade and investment 
proceedings.  
The second subcategory relates to the use of trade law as a counter argument on the 
merits of the case. In such an instance, the State argues that trade law should trump 
investment law. In this situation, the tribunal might, therefore, face a conflict between 
the content of the investment obligation and the content of the trade obligation. As we 
have seen in Chapter 5, the existing general principles of international law relating to 
conflicts of international treaties (lex specialis and lex posterior), are only of limited 
interest, as the conditions for the application of these principles seem difficult to satisfy 
in cases of a conflict between trade and investment legal instruments. Tribunals shall 
therefore rely on the conflict clauses or reference clauses that might be included in IIAs 
or use interpretative or accommodation techniques to address the conflict. 
This analytical framework is, certainly, perfectible and its use in practice will depend on 
the specific considerations of each case where trade law is invoked. Yet, I argue that 
references to this framework might serve increase the quality of decisions and awards 
and allow for interpretative consistency in the work of investor-State tribunals whenever 
they engage with international trade law. 
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ITS OTHERS 
 
In the introduction of this work, I noted that international investment law was evolving 
and moving in new directions. In the thesis, I focused on one of these directions, that is 
international trade law. 
 
Nevertheless, one has to admit that international investment law is, to some extent, also 
connected to other branches of public international law. To mention only a few 
examples, the relations between international investment law and human rights, 
environmental law or cultural heritage, have been the object of various studies and 
commentaries. 
 
It is certain that these other connections have different causes and consequences than the 
ones studied in the present work. However, looking at the surface of the studies devoted 
to these other connections, and bearing in mind the results of the present thesis, it is 
possible to make the following general remark: International investment law cannot be 
viewed as an isolated regime within the international legal system. Its content and the 






Drafting similar analytical frameworks for each of these other connections might lead to 
a better understanding of how principles and rules developed in the context of other sub-
fields of international law should inform the content of investment law. This 
understanding will, in turn, allow for a better understanding and more accurate 
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